



Navies and Maritime Policies in the South Atlantic

Edited by

Érico Duarte · Manuel Correia de Barros

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ISBN 978-3-030-10599-0 ISBN 978-3-030-10600-3 (eBook)
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10600-3>

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018968423

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This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG

The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We thank the two grants that funded the elaboration of this book from the Ministries of Education (CAPES) and Defence of Brazil's 'Pró-Defesa' fellowship and the Brazilian Council for Science Technology (CNPq).

We also thank Danilo Marcondes, from Brazilian National War College, who reviewed and commented on most of the manuscript making significant progress in its coherence and quality. We thank also Ms. Bruna Toso de Alcantara for reviewing some of the chapters, and Igor Castellano, from Federal University of Santa Maria – Brazil, who played a special role in the designing of the book.

Finally, we appreciate Alina Yurova, from Palgrave Macmillan, for her trust and support of this project.

The Editors

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Érico Duarte

This book offers assessments of the maritime policies of the principal South Atlantic navies, and their implications for the regional maritime order. It is part of a project to set a new agenda for scholarship on South Atlantic maritime security issues. While *Maritime Security Challenges in the South Atlantic* deals with regional security issues with maritime implications, *Navies and Maritime Policies in the South Atlantic* discusses the maritime interests, naval capabilities, and policy agendas of Nigeria, South Africa, Argentina, United Kingdom, and Brazil.

The overall project aims to provide the first comprehensive and multi-level analysis of South Atlantic contemporary maritime security issues. First, it is a multinational effort that reflects the compromise in providing South American and African perspectives of naval and maritime issues, without neglecting Northern hemispheric counterpoint views. Second, these collaborations involve individuals with eclectic backgrounds, united by the emerging field of maritime security studies.¹ Third, the project aims to launch further research agendas rather than conclude any of its several topics. This book presents different conceptual backgrounds and views over the possibilities of African navies' engagement in naval cooperative arrangements; the character of British maritime policies for the Falkland Islands, Argentina, and South America; the national strategies to deal with

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É. Duarte, M. Correia de Barros (eds.), *Navies and Maritime Policies in the South Atlantic*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10600-3_1

the opposed claims of economic exclusive zones; and the reach and feasibility of Brazilian aspirations in the South Atlantic.

An introduction to those issues must consider the two nexuses between seapower and the South Atlantic small navies.² First, to talk about seapower is to talk about United States seapower, and the actual or potential changes in US maritime strategy which also impact the South Atlantic. That region was one of the first to be shaped by US seapower primacy in the early twentieth century, and it has been affected by the US pivot to the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia during George W. Bush and Barack Obama's administrations, while the ongoing retrenchment or isolationism of Trump's (lack of) grand strategy raises doubts about the void of seapower in the region.³ A second issue is assessing the implications in the South Atlantic of the changing character of seapower in the twenty-first century, among other emergent issues, when small navies and coastguards start to perform strategic relevant roles.⁴

THE SOUTH ATLANTIC: AN OCEAN WITHOUT SEAPOWER?

Since the beginning of twentieth century, the hegemonic concentration of real capabilities by the United States Navy blocked any other gain or expression of seapower in the South Atlantic by regional and extra-regional states. For almost a hundred years, any naval expression of power in that ocean was a very risky business. In the last decade, there is evidence that regional and extra-regional powers are investing in sponsorship and hedge strategies to evade US seapower in the South Atlantic.

The US hegemony in the Western hemisphere has been favoured by three patterns of US foreign policy.⁵ First, the United States has been reactive against any insertion in the Atlantic Ocean by an extra-continental seapower. This became an American political condition after expelling Spain from the continent in 1898 and after the United Kingdom's consent to the Moore Doctrine in 1900, led to the United States becoming the sole Atlantic seapower. Since then, the United States has reacted against German special relationships with Latin American countries and its opposition to a Soviet nuclear permanent stronghold in Cuba almost carried the world to Armageddon in 1962.

Second, the United States has interposed against the raise of any other seapower in the region. The United States' containment policy has been proportional to the growing reach of its own seapower. On one hand, the United States' seapower projection served regularly for interventions in

Central America and Caribbean that took place early in the achievement of its maritime primacy in the continent. And this meant that armed forces and navies on constabulary guards were subordinated, mainly, to US Navy operations and bases. On the other hand, the United States' presence and involvement in South America developed later and more slowly, only after the Second World War, though it was already expressed on several occasions during the nineteenth century, when the British Navy was still the main offshore balancer at the time.⁶

During the first half of the twentieth century, Argentina and Brazil were considered to have the potential for great power: large armies by universal and compulsory conscription, the acquisition of big battleships and aircraft carriers, air fighters, and even the development of nuclear projects. Nonetheless, their pursuit of real power and regional influence was downgraded slowly with US ascendancy as the global seapower during and after the Second World War. One cannot ignore the dual purpose of the United States' military presence in Brazilian northeast region as intermediary basing for operations in North Africa and a negative incentive to South American alignment to the Axis powers. Hence, the South Atlantic was never a primary area of US seapower action and lost importance after the construction of the Suez and Panama canals. During the Cold War, the Southern Atlantic routes had secondary relevance as alternative routes for Soviet submarines, and dealing with that challenge became the main role and responsibility of the Argentinian, Brazilian, and South African navies at that time. The end of the Cold War and wider global compromises have weakened the United States' presence in the South Atlantic since the 1990s. The constraints of the United States' global distribution of power plus the South Atlantic countries' uninterrupted, but heterogeneous, development are offering room for regional and extra-regional limited expressions and gains of seapower.

Third, the United States never had a traditional strategic interest in Africa, and during the Cold War it was clear that in the South Atlantic division of influence, Africa was the focus of mainly European interest. That changed with the creation of the US Africa Command in 2007, with responsibility for all African countries, except Egypt, and headquarters in Stuttgart. It was created and especially motivated to counter terrorism and to provide humanitarian assistance, but it also engaged in supporting a more secure environment in the Gulf of Guinea. Although US forces have an advanced HQ in Djibouti, the demands of force employment

everywhere else and the regional sensibilities have led the United States to adopt palliative and spin control measures in West Africa.⁷

Hence, the South Atlantic is not relevant to United States and global geo-economics and geopolitics with one big exception: it holds the greatest potential of seabed mineral and energy reserves in the world. The ‘deep-water offshore boom’ was started by Brazil, expanded to Angola and Nigeria, and may embrace Uruguay, Argentina, Guyana, Namibia, and the Falkland Islands among other South Atlantic countries. As evidence, the region ranked globally at first position with 109 oil and gas floating platforms (the North Atlantic had 90, the Pacific 76, and the Indian Ocean only 2) in 2010, and it became the first area of investment in offshore hydrocarbons after 2011.⁸ Consequently, this new Atlantic energy ‘Eldorado’ already presses traditional and emerging powers—especially from Europe and China—to implement new maritime security policies to guarantee safe passage of oil and gas and protect the related increasing market that they involve. The United Kingdom’s 2014 Maritime Security Strategy affirms: ‘many coastal States do not have the capacity to govern their maritime zones effectively’, but mentions only the oil producing countries of West Africa as main concern areas. The G-7 Declaration of 15 April 2015 is comprehensive and states the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Operations Ocean Shield and Active Endeavour and the European Union Naval Force Operation Atalanta as operational models for the provision of security in the Gulf of Guinea.

In the case of China, Africa provides 33% of its oil imports, and Angola and Nigeria alone represent more than half of that. Accordingly, the ‘Angola model’—the Chinese trade of vast investment in African infrastructure for oil export credits—has created new sorts of interdependencies and their evolution to military cooperation is already on the table.⁹

If the South Atlantic lacks the core components of seapower—sustainable fleet projection and regional bases—alternative forms of extra-regional presence and power projection proliferate. Europe and China have replicated in West and South Africa the US strategy of sponsorship and naval cooperation ties have started to spread across the South Atlantic.

Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski define sponsorship strategy as ‘the provision of material and moral resources in support of policies largely advocated and initiated by other actors, whether states, global or regional institutions, or nonstate actors’.¹⁰ In its formal modality, it involves multi-lateral cooperative security and humanitarian campaigns sanctioned by international law and/or regional organizations. It also may operate

through formal defence cooperation agreements aiming at security sector reform and capacity building. In its informal modality, it involves a sort of buck-passing or delegation strategies to local proxy groups, allies, and partners with some level of support and transference of means to deal with limited and regionalized rivalries and threats. Recently, the United States has conducted a sponsorship strategy in Libya and Syria, though that practice dates from the Cold War, and in the maritime domain the United States is concentrated in the Indian Ocean and Caribbean Sea. In the first case, it sponsors the East Africa and Southwest Indian Ocean Initiative through the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTf-HOA), which relies on multinational contribution such as the International Contact Group on Somalia (ICG) and the EU's NAVFOR Atalanta Operation.¹¹ In the second case, in fact, it is not a proper strategy, as the US Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF) South has no dedicated means and the above-mentioned systemic conditions of power favour the United States taking more unilateralist and reactive measures. For instance, the Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act (DTVIA) criminalized the mere act of operating a vessel on the high seas without a national registration while attempting to evade detection. Furthermore, none of those lines of action seem to be replicable or effective in the South Atlantic due to different factors in West Africa and South America.

The United States seems to not yet have a clear vision as to whether and how to replicate in West Africa its sponsoring strategy to strengthen African capabilities to produce regional solutions to regional insecurity problems.¹² First, the United States has no dedicated assets or operations in the Gulf of Guinea and its sponsorship initiatives there have limited reach. The leading US maritime initiative is the African Coastal and Border Security Program (ACBSP), through which the United States supplies specialized military equipment for the patrol and defence of coastal waters to African countries. However, it offers training in intelligence operations and airborne surveillance only in some cases. The provision of training follows two other programmes. Under the African Partnership Station (APS) initiative, a navy ship serves as a continuing sea base of operations and a floating schoolhouse providing aid and training to the Gulf nations. Moreover, the annual joint exercises Obangame Express since 2010 involve the participation of European and Brazilian navies,¹³ as well as the maritime surveillance centres in Cameroon. Nonetheless, several observers already pointed out that boarding and patrolling training and exercises are not enough to defeat the threat of transnational organized crime. The

African armed service officers require education on strategic planning and command and control to be able to deal with the coastal and land dimensions of the regional criminal organizations.

Third, the United States is ambiguous about how far European Union or other naval powers can play the sponsor role. Despite the statement of AFRICOM Deputy Commander for Civil Affairs, Ambassador Christopher Dell, that the United States does not support ‘expanding regional naval forces or deploying Western naval forces to fill a perceived security void’,¹⁴ this is, in fact, taking place. The European Union supports the Gulf of Guinea Council and ECOWAS’s multinational maritime architectures with initiatives and footprints in Cameroon and Ghana, among other West African countries. China provides substantial investments and second-hand hardware to Angola and Namibia, aiming to explore further opportunities of defence cooperation and naval basing. Brazil tries to maintain its influence on the other side of the Atlantic through a wide net of defence cooperation agreements, naval officer exchanges, and joint exercises.

In case of South America, US opportunity to conduct a maritime sponsorship strategy is limited due to the estimates of Fourth Fleet and Coast Guard budget cuts, the region’s low status of importance in the 2015 Maritime Security Strategy, and the ongoing US isolationist trend of pushing border controls further from its own borders. The ultimate effect is that US maritime interests have a low impact on the agenda of the states in the region.¹⁵ Consequently, there are indications of Russian and Chinese informal sponsorship in Venezuela and, very recently, Argentina and Russia have concluded defence cooperation agreements.

The potential seapower rebalance in the South Atlantic is still hypothetical, but it has already unfolded instances of hedging strategy, understood as a method of balancing strategic relationships against each other and keeping one’s long-term options to expand naval and military means open as insurance. The most relevant strategy is the Brazilian project to develop expeditionary sustainable forces, aiming to grasp opportunities in Africa and tackle extra-regional naval threats.¹⁶ In the short run, Brazil is gradually expanding its naval category of limited participation of maritime power projection to leadership in multinational projection operations. Brazil has just concluded an agreement to ten years’ leading participation in the UN peace enforcement operation in Haiti, has joined the UN multinational naval force in Lebanon,¹⁷ and is considering leading a peace-keeping operation in the Central African Republic. Accordingly, it has just acquired new platforms: the former UK helicopter carrier HMS *Ocean*

(now *Atlantico*) and the French Foudre-class landing platform dock *Siroco* (now *Bahia*). In the long run, the Brazilian Navy aspires to double its fleet and construct a multi-layered maritime perimeter, including deploying a fleet of attack nuclear-propelled submarines.¹⁸ As will be explored in the following chapters, Nigeria, South Africa, and Argentina seem to prefer hedging strategies of lower costs and risks, keeping balanced strategic relationships with the United States, Russia, China, and the European Union until more clear developments regarding US rivalry with China and Russia and further extra-regional maritime presence in the South Atlantic.

THE SOUTH ATLANTIC SMALL NAVIES

The features of South Atlantic geopolitics and navies demand adjustments on previous frameworks to categorize and compare small navies.

First, the reality of new technology, systems, and naval operational concepts that would favour coastal defence and small navies are not novelties for the South American and African countries. A few of them—such as Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and South Africa—have developed them with different levels of achievements. However, the lack of previous experience and a clear scenario of threat and employment leave those efforts sometimes without direction. The Falklands War had a deep impact on South American navies' missions and postures; however, the unresolved contentions between Argentina and the United Kingdom do not have much appeal to justify significant and regular investment in naval power. Moreover, the effectiveness of small navies in the use of force at sea—normally named as sea control and sea deny strategies—requires some geographical features that are nearly absent in the region. The most relevant one is the absence of chokepoints and entrenched seas that can impact upon maritime shipping.¹⁹

Second, the creation and expansion of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) sanctioned by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS—1982) favoured 'a new maritime consciousness for policy makers charged with the protection and preservation of their coastal environment' in the South Atlantic basin.²⁰ The coastguards have been used for protection of territorial sovereignty, with a blurry demarcation as to whether that includes EEZs or not. For instance, illegal fishing vessels—mainly Chinese—constitute a maritime priority issue for several African countries along with piracy, and there are recurrent crisis situations between Chinese vessels and the Argentinian coastguard.²¹ Furthermore,

to a lesser degree than South Asia,²² coastguards and other resources than a naval fleet have started to play a maritime diplomacy role on disputed or foreign maritime territories, where states carve out real estate in strategic locations.²³ Beyond the several levels of dodging and feinting between Argentina and the United Kingdom regarding their EEZ claims in the South Atlantic, notice the overlapping of South Africa's Operation Ocean Economy Phakisa over maritime areas under dispute with Namibia.²⁴

Third, the South Atlantic differs from European and Asian regions in two main aspects. On one hand, former big and medium size and token navies are converging to coastguards' posture and missions. As most of the South Atlantic is free of maritime territory contentions, the navies there expand the patrol of their respective EEZs without expanding surface and under-surface capacities, as observed in East Indian and West Pacific small navies. On the other hand, despite impressive levels of maritime security cooperation in West Africa and Southern America, it is unclear whether any further naval developments and specialization, as observed in the European area, are likely. While EEZ expansions and new transnational maritime threats produce incentives for cooperation in maritime policing and patrolling, South Atlantic states, whose navies perform more than constabulary roles, tend to resist evolving them to post-modern collaborative navies, in Geoffrey Till's terms.²⁵

Having all that in mind, a useful exercise is to use Eric Grove's *The Ranking of Smaller Navies Revisited* for the case studies in this book, and to consider his categorization of naval power in the Cold War in relation to current naval terminology, technology, missions, and postures. Bearing in mind Grove's nine ranks of naval capabilities, one can propose the following regarding the South Atlantic:

- Rank 4: Regional force projection navies: Brazil.
- Rank 5: Adjacent force projection navies: Argentina and South Africa.
- Rank 6: Offshore territorial defence: Venezuela, Nigeria, and Uruguay.
- Rank 7: Inshore territorial defence navies: Namibia and Equatorial Guinea.
- Rank 8: Police and contributory: Cameroon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Guyana, and Gabon.
- Rank 9: Token navies: Angola, Togo, Benin, Suriname, and Ivory Coast.

Surely, one mission of the following chapters is to qualify the attributes of each of these top four navies. And, as naval power is a relative, the book's conclusion will confront that ranking again, but adding and considering

other South Atlantic navies. Finally, this book has a chapter on the British maritime role. We argue for its pertinence, beyond the fact that the Falklands is still the most sensitive past and current naval issue in the region, because the Royal Navy is the only other extra-regional force with the actual means to exercise seapower in the South Atlantic.

WHAT DOES THIS BOOK OFFER?

This book has the ambition to foster a debate rather than conclude it. For this reason, its content dialogues with the above-mentioned edited book *Maritime Security Challenges in the South Atlantic*. Likewise, it was designed to favour contrary visions among its chapters.

The book begins with specific studies of the two main Africa countries with coasts on the South Atlantic in Chaps. 2 and 3. Paul G. Adogamhe stresses Nigeria's continued commitment and interest in fostering an overarching framework of regional stakeholders in a 'South-South cooperation' perspective to reduce the potential maritime threats and challenges posed to West Africa. Theodore Neethling gives a less optimistic account of South Africa as an active player, given South Africa's understated view of regional maritime security as of national interest, and the political-economic constraints imposed upon its Navy.

Chapters 4 and 5 advance perspectives of the opposed sides of the Falklands/Malvinas issue. Rodrigo Gonzales and Sérgio Caplan detail the Argentinian commitment to and strategic assessment of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, to include the Antarctic continent, and how Britain's continued presence and overlapping EEZ claims in the area endanger its national political projects. Martin Robson proposes an economic interference approach to offer an alternative formulation. The British relationships with Argentina were imperial businesses until the beginning of the twentieth century, and the Falklands/Malvinas conflict was a severe break in the already ongoing review of that British status in the South Atlantic. Robson states that resurgence of the Falklands issue comes at a complicated time, when the Brexit development is forcing the United Kingdom to recalibrate its overall foreign and trade policies to South America.

The last contrasting pair of chapters address Brazil's role in the South Atlantic. Ambassador Rodrigo Baena Soares and Cláudio Leopoldino's Chap. 6 discusses the historical background of the Brazilian perspective on the South Atlantic. It summarizes the official documentation and the several initiatives of Brazil's maritime security agenda, without neglecting the

classic and new kinds of threats to that. Juliano Cortinhas' Chap. 7 advances the view—based on Susan Strange's concepts of structural and relational powers—that Brazil does not commit enough resources to uphold its leadership and provision of maritime public goods in the region. To verify that, the chapter compares Brazil's defence and naval resources and capabilities with those of France and the United Kingdom.

Finally, Brigadier Manuel Correia de Barros closes the book assessing the overall South Atlantic contemporary naval panorama, small navies' challenges, and proposing what and how to look ahead.

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CHAPTER 2

Maritime Security and Governance of the South Atlantic: The Nigerian Perspective

Paul G. Adogamhe

INTRODUCTION

This chapter deals with maritime security and governance of the South Atlantic, principally from the Nigerian perspective. The South Atlantic refers not just to the oceanic expanse, but also to the entire basin area (sea as well as coastal lands) south of the Tropic of Cancer. That is the Atlantic Ocean outside of the area of jurisdiction of NATO.¹ The South Atlantic Ocean is a sea route for international trade and commerce which links Europe and North America with the Far East countries. The high volume of traffic in trade and travel through the South Atlantic Ocean demands maximum maritime security coordination on a global scale. The South Atlantic also contains vast mineral deposits that make it the crown jewel of the Atlantic Ocean. Notwithstanding this immense mineral wealth, the South Atlantic has become a breeding ground and a safe haven for a network of local and transnational criminal activities that endanger the security and the supply of critical resources to the global market; the most

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É. Duarte, M. Correia de Barros (eds.), *Navies and Maritime Policies
in the South Atlantic*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10600-3_2

notable of these dangers are piracy, sea robbery, human and drug trafficking, and pollution.² As the number of these transnational criminal activities as reported by International Maritime Organization (IMO) increases, it has placed a high freight premium on the region-bound cargoes, which attracts more freight payments and higher marine insurance premiums.³

As a major stakeholder and one of the rising powers in the region, Nigeria could play a crucial role in crafting a more effective and integrated maritime security strategy for the region as well as serve as one of the energizers for the rest of the member states of the South Atlantic. Nigeria's policy-makers are of the view that these maritime security threats and challenges in the region tend to exceed the capacity of individual states to address them, and therefore require a multilateral response. Therefore, this chapter also delineates Nigeria's continued interest and commitment in promoting bilateral and multilateral initiatives in maritime security and governance, with the goal of enhancing the safety and security of navigation, the protection of the marine environment, as well as ensuring cooperative maritime operations in the South Atlantic. A secured South Atlantic provides a better prospect for an inter-regional framework for the maintenance of peace and security as well as a boost to commerce and travel. The Zone for Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic (ZPCSA), established by UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/41/11 on 27 October 1986, serves as a diplomatic and multilateral forum for addressing regional issues affecting the South Atlantic nations.⁴ However, the ZPCSA, unlike NATO, has not yet evolved into a full-fledged military alliance which provides military security.

Since the Cold War era, there is increasing interest among policy-makers and analysts alike on both sides of the South Atlantic on how to evolve an effective maritime security community regime. Maritime security and governance in the South Atlantic are not only subjects of growing geostrategic importance and geopolitical interest, but also a field of expanding 'South-South cooperation'. The South-South cooperation model stands as an alternative approach to the traditional North-South cooperation. This model is ideally based on principles of mutual respect, solidarity, sovereignty, and cooperation, in contrast to the traditional model of North-South relations in which the Southern nations received aid linked to economic and political conditions from the nations of the North Atlantic. The traditional North-South relations are built on an assumption that is basically asymmetric and vertical rather than symmetric and horizontal in character; the structures of these former relationships tend to reinforce and perpetuate the

patterns of global inequalities.⁵ The systematic dissemination of lessons learned from the study of the littoral states of the South Atlantic could contribute much to the international debate on ‘South–South cooperation’.

MARITIME SECURITY: CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

The concept of maritime security is a holistic term for discussing security regarding the sea, as opposed to air or land security. For the context of this chapter, maritime security is restricted to the South Atlantic Ocean. The Brent Hurst Foundation further defines this concept as ‘anything that creates, sustains or improves the use of Africa’s waterways and the infrastructure that supports these waterways’.⁶ Stockbruegger and Bueger suggest two ways of thinking of maritime security:

First [...] a *securitization process* in which different issues are rendered as challenges and require coordinated responses. Second [...] the relations it has to other challenges, including national security and sea power, the marine environment and marine safety, economic development and blue economy, and human security and the resilience of coastal populations.⁷

The notion of security in international politics has remained an essentially contested and value-laden concept, thus open to various meanings and interpretations. Global terrorism has not only dramatically enhanced the importance of security in the world. David Mutimer and his colleagues claim that the notion of security has become a much more expansive, fluid, and uncertain concept in the post 9/11 world. This expansiveness and uncertainty of security, according to them, have multiplied the sites at which security can be found to include traditional militaries and conflicts, as well as border fences, detention centers, airport check-in counters, container ports, places of worship, universities, torture chambers, and cyber-attacks.⁸

We must, therefore, broaden our understanding of security to encompass the concept of maritime security. At a time of new mounting non-traditional security threats such as maritime piracy, terrorism, cyber terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug trafficking, and illegal fishing, it behooves maritime nations to rethink their national security policy. At present, these security threats constitute a large part of the security agendas of the international community as a whole, and regional organizations. South American and African continental and regional institutions must develop new protocols to enable member states to deal effectively with

terrorists, pirates, and drug traffickers, among others. Therefore, 'security is no longer defined primarily as a zero-sum game [...], but is instead increasingly seen as a trans- and supra-national project for solving societal problems and achieving shared aims'.⁹ It becomes necessary then to deconstruct the traditionally accepted notion of national security which was viewed mainly in military terms as the defense of the territory, people, and government of one nation-state. The notion of human security goes beyond conventional conceptions because 'the threats to peace and security in the 21st century include not just international wars [...] but organized crime and civil violence. They also include poverty, deadly infectious disease and environmental degradation.'¹⁰ In both South America and post-colonial Africa, however, poor state-building and failure of governance have led to the inability of governments to develop properly accountable public security systems that represent and protect the entire population. As a result, there has been a proliferation of non-state armed actors, including rebel movements, insurgents, warlords, guerrilla and mercenary forces that have undertaken security for and on behalf some groups of the population as opposed to and to the exclusion of others. Therefore, some private firms and individuals too have become reliant on the services of private security firms for their protection in the absence of state provision of security.

The challenge for the twenty-first century is to fashion a broader understanding of what collective security means.¹¹ The ultimate goal of human security is to provide a holistic framework for addressing security. The concept of human security arises from the recognition that human security needs are different from state security needs and therefore should be addressed directly. International security must include the well-being of individuals within states, as well as within the regional and global communities of states. As Bueger argues, 'human security has [...] several maritime dimensions, which stretch from the security of seafarers to the vulnerability of coastal populations to maritime threats more broadly'.¹² More specifically, Gilpin argues that the maritime threats in the Gulf of Guinea 'undermine economic activity, hinder the movement of goods and services, and make it difficult for these countries to attain their development goals'.¹³ In other words, maritime security problems and the insecurity born of underdevelopment on land exist in a symbiotic relationship. This paradigm shift provides an understanding of contemporary security challenges through a more inclusive approach that 'equates security with people rather than territories, with development rather than arms'.¹⁴

The paradigm of non-traditional security consists of a dynamic process of interaction among individuals, communities, societies, and states and creating institutions to provide mechanisms for diplomacy and cooperation. States must learn to consider acts of terrorism against one state as acts of terrorism against all states, because we live in a global village. Today, transnational maritime security faces a range of new threats from terrorists, unregulated fishing, natural and environmental disasters, mass migration, drug smuggling, human trafficking, and piracy. The doctrine of collective security tends to emphasize the growth of interdependence among nation-states and of cooperation in international organizations. Maritime security is a key component of collective security. It is the foundation for any economic development through the improvement of global competitiveness for goods and services. There is competition between individual states as realists have correctly observed, but there is also a natural pull of gravitation toward collective survival and security. This cooperative and communal spirit is a significant factor to our understanding of South Atlantic maritime states' perspective of security.

The 2008 UN Secretary-General Report on oceans and the law of the sea emphasized the importance of international cooperation and coordinated responses, and stresses that maritime security is a shared responsibility and requires a new vision of collective security.¹⁵ The areas promoted for cooperation and integration in such a comprehensive approach to a regional maritime security include accession to and cooperation under the Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS); conflict prevention at sea; protection and maintenance of Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs); sharing of maritime surveillance information; naval cooperation (for confidence-building purposes); search-and-rescue operations; maritime safety; management of natural marine disasters (including humanitarian assistance); law and order at sea; protection and preservation of the marine environment; marine resources; marine scientific research; technical cooperation and capacity building; and training and education.¹⁶

NIGERIA'S PERCEPTION OF ITS STRATEGIC SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC

The prevailing perception of Nigeria as a predominant leader in Africa plays an important role in determining Nigerian foreign and security policies. Nigeria plays a critical leading role in regional security governance at

two levels: at the regional level in West Africa and at the continental level in Africa. We can argue that Nigeria's dual roles in both regional and continental leadership bestow hegemonic status on Nigeria among Gulf of Guinea states.¹⁷ With this status come certain maritime security responsibilities, which occasionally require the use of force to instill security in the region. Apart from Nigeria, Cameroon, Senegal, Angola, and Ghana, no other country among the Gulf of Guinea states has a navy, much less coastguards, to deal with the growing maritime crimes, especially piracy, and hijacking of transport and oil tanker ships. It is therefore imperative on all states of the Gulf of Guinea to lift the prohibition of coastguards from monitoring the entire Gulf of Guinea, particularly when such states have no navy and coastguards of their own. As Ukeje notes:

[...] most of the other Gulf of Guinea countries cannot boast of a national strategy, or even a well-resourced action plan to tackle maritime security challenges beyond paying lip service to the desire to scale-up the capability of their navy and coastguard services. Even the largest of the navy in the region, the Nigerian navy, faces the problem of acute resource deficits; especially in terms of dwindling statutory allocation that affects training, equipment, facilities and operational costs.¹⁸

While the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has remained central to Nigeria's responses to transnational security threats and challenges in the Gulf of Guinea,¹⁹ the overarching strategic objective is to make the Gulf of Guinea safe and secure and investment friendly. ECOWAS's security goal is the strengthening of maritime governance, maritime safety, maritime environmental management, and research.²⁰ Hence, ECOWAS adopted the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS), the Yaoundé Declaration of the Heads of States and Governments of Central and West African states, and the Yaoundé Memorandum of Understanding to create an inter-regional integrated coastguard network for West and Central Africa. The Joint Agreement gives the legal authority to member states to pursue and arrest criminals outside their territorial waters, and the protocol for extradition of criminals involved in piracy.²¹ In a recent address at the Joint Committee on Political Affairs, Peace and Security of the ECOWAS, the Director General of the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA), Dakuku Peterside, said the following:

The adoption of the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS) [...] is clear demonstration of the critical role of the ECOWAS parliament in ensuring safety and security of the sub-region's shipping and maritime transportation. [...] the ocean is the medium for which most of our trade and transactions are conducted [...] to optimize the benefits of the blue economy and a special opportunity for us to tap into the benefits of nature.²²

Nigeria is one of the strong pivotal countries to drive the process of maritime security and governance in the Gulf of Guinea. The weaker nations of ECOWAS do not want to lose their sovereignty to ECOWAS and this awareness sometimes dampens the enthusiasm to embrace wholeheartedly the implementation of EIMS. Nigeria, however, has sought to advance its perceived security and developmental interests within the regional organization and is committed to preserving the freedom of the seas in order to facilitate the movement of desirable goods, services, and people across borders within the framework of UNCLOS and the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

The overall strategy of Nigeria's defense policy objectives is to secure the nation by air, sea, and land. For this reason, the Nigerian government has an army, an air force, and a navy. The role of the Nigerian Navy is defending the country from direct attack; ensuring freedom of the seas and access to ports, and freedom of navigation in international waters; strengthening partnerships and alliances; and establishing favorable maritime security conditions in the South Atlantic. Nigeria's strategic objectives in the South Atlantic hinge on the country's geographical and strategic location on the Gulf of Guinea as a littoral nation. This advantageous coastline location makes it act as a trade-transit state, which is of significant importance to some West African landlocked states' economies, particularly those states that require exporting of their commodities and importing of goods. This requires cooperation with Nigeria and other littoral states by landlocked states. With its long coastal boundaries straddling Western and Equatorial Africa and its onshore and offshore oil and gas deposits, Nigeria definitely has maritime security interests in the South Atlantic—particularly given the myriad domestic and transnational maritime crimes along the Gulf of Guinea, as such oil theft, piracy, sea robbery, and poaching, among others. Therefore, there is need 'to step up surveillance activities along our waterways so as to allow the unperturbed movement of goods, services and passengers in the entire Gulf of Guinea (GoG) region'.²³

Nigeria has invested heavily in the Gulf of Guinea maritime security, which is a safeguard for Nigeria's economic crown jewel, the oil and gas industry. The exploitation of its oil and gas deposits account for over 80 percent of government revenue and contributes 85 percent to the country's GDP, making it the mainstay of Nigeria's national economy. Hence, Nigeria is building a robust naval force and coastguard to secure the Gulf of Guinea and to protect its natural resources and to support its foreign policy. The Nigerian Navy plays an active role in projects such as officer training, joint training exercises, and equipment provisions especially with other nations from the Gulf of Guinea. Illegal fishing costs often have an immediate impact on the lives of local populations; at least one study suggests that fishery depletion from illegal fishing is a contributing cause of maritime piracy. Therefore, Nigeria and other African states have valid reasons to upgrade their naval forces to protect them from natural and human security threats within their territorial waters. Maritime strategy should serve the interests of the state and, in terms of security, the type of strategy a maritime force adopts must reflect the national objectives of the state. Maritime forces of the state are important for the protection of a country's natural resources and rights in war and in peace.

The 1964 Navy Act assigned to the Nigerian Navy the tasks of defending territorial waters, training in naval duties, conducting hydrographic surveys, assisting in the enforcement of customs laws, and undertaking other missions assigned by the government. The Nigerian maritime security objectives include the protection and exploitation of resources in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs); the prevention of illegal fishing; the protection of the maritime environment from pollution and other environmental damages; combating smuggling and trafficking at sea, illegal oil bunkering, and maritime terrorism; ensuring security of ports and other facilities; and safeguarding the communities living in the coastal regions.²⁴ Since the 1980s, the specific tasks of the Nigerian Navy include defense against seaborne attack, protection of international shipping and maritime commerce, offshore oil and sea resources, and prevention or prosecution of illegal bunkering and lifting of petroleum. In his address at an International Maritime Conference in Lagos organized to mark the 60th Anniversary of the Nigerian Navy, President Buhari of Nigeria called for greater collaboration between the Nigeria Navy and other stakeholders in tackling maritime security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea:

The challenges of maritime threats in the Gulf of Guinea have gone beyond what Nigeria alone could deal with. The Nigerian Navy [...] have remained constant in ensuring sea control and arrest of illegal bunkers, smugglers, pipeline vandals [...] But the situation has gone beyond our capability to handle. It, therefore, calls for greater international collaboration between the Nigerian Navy and other international maritime stakeholders.²⁵

In an environment of rising insecurity from non-state armed actors and inadequate public protection, some people have raised the prospect of using private security firms to protect their crews and cargoes as well as safeguard their assets and investments in the shipping industry. They also recommended the use of private semi-navies to patrol the extensive oil sector in the Gulf of Guinea where insurgency, piracy, and illegal oil siphoning cost Nigeria and oil companies billions of dollars. Such private security forces will be paid and controlled by the oil companies. A leaked report revealed that Shell Oil Multinational Companies between 2007 and 2008 spent \$383 million in securing just Nigerian operations alone—one-third of the oil company's total worldwide expenditure on security. The payments were split between those to the government for use of military forces and those to private security firms and individuals. While Shell Oil Company defends its spending on the grounds that it is working in a very dangerous region, critics have argued it is unethical to siphon so many millions of dollars into private security forces for their alleged corruption and human rights abuses. However, what is really striking about the amount is that, despite it all, high levels of criminality continue in the Nigerian oil industry. These vigilante groups and other militias such as the Bakassi Boys that have had the ability to provide the private security services that the Nigerian state is not able to deliver, have themselves evolved over time into criminal organizations and extortion rings.

The national navies continue to patrol shipping operations in the Gulf of Guinea but with such a vast area to cover, their effectiveness against tiny speed boats use by pirates has been limited. Some shipping companies have now begun to hire Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) to protect their crews and cargoes. Although this has led to a reduction in the number of successful and attempted hijacking over previous years, it has raised the cost of shipping and maritime traffic in general with serious consequences to the economies of the region. There is also ample evidence that these hired contractors employ maritime security firms who openly fire on suspected pirates, which highlights the lack of

rules of engagement at sea. The UN's International Maritime Organization has issued guidelines but they are non-binding. If one of the important responsibilities of the state is to provide security and to control the use of violence, the very existence of private security forces that individuals and companies can access for a fee diminishes people's already low expectations of the government. It further reduces the legitimacy and accountability of already weak government in the eyes of their citizens. The legacy of past African conflicts has demonstrated that these private security and military companies, their partner arms brokers as well as the local warlords are the major source of the ongoing asymmetric warfare in most fragile African states in their ambition for illegitimate resource appropriation. Therefore, there is urgent need to encourage and empower the countries of the South Atlantic with the goal of promoting bilateral and multilateral initiatives in maritime security cooperation and governance.

REGIONAL COOPERATION AND PARTNERSHIP IN THE GULF OF GUINEA

The West African nations have made tremendous progress toward cooperating to combat piracy in the South Atlantic in order to improve maritime security. Nigeria has been at the forefront of this effort to combat both piracy and other transnational crimes, especially in the Gulf of Guinea. It has helped to craft the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) treaty that was ratified in 2001. The treaty harmonizes the policies of member states on peace and security, the transport of oil and natural resources, and the free circulation of goods and services in the Gulf of Guinea. The Nigerian government has also taken steps to enhance maritime security in Africa by being signatory to the African Union Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS) in 2015 which was to 'ensure security and safety of maritime transportation systems' and to 'prevent hostile and criminal acts at sea and to coordinate/harmonize the prosecution of the offenders'.²⁶ Nigeria is also a signatory to other international legal instruments to combat threats posed by piracy, such as the UNCLOS that prescribes exclusive zones over which individual states have the rights for exploration, to cultivate energy production from water and wind, and to use marine resources. Member states are expected to incorporate it into their national laws. Most West African countries have signed and ratified the Law of the Sea Convention.

Nigeria plays a leading role in shaping the surrounding regional maritime security and governance through its membership of the Maritime Organization for West and Central Africa (MOWCA), which was established in May 1975. MOWCA's objective is to serve the regional and international community by handling all maritime matters that are regional in character. Since 2001, it has been working with the IMO to establish an 'integrated coastguard function network' to facilitate regional coordination and cooperation. MOWCA unifies 25 countries from West and Central Africa in an organization larger than the ZPCSA.²⁷ What is of special interest about MOWCA is that in 1998 MOWCA member states generated an estimated 4.8 percent of world cargo, 95 percent of which was seaborne.²⁸ This helped to stimulate commerce and to boost development among members through the South-South partnerships. Other functions performed by MOWCA include maintenance of maritime safety and environmental protection, and pollution prevention. Nigeria has also actively promoted such regional initiatives through MOWCA.

The Nigerian government participates regularly in the Gulf of Guinea, multinational maritime training exercises christened 'Obangame Express'. The exercises are done to enhance the collective and response capabilities of the Gulf of Guinea nations to deter piracy, illicit trafficking, and other maritime crimes. The idea is to promote effective maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. The Obangame Express 2017 was attended by 29 foreign navies. Nigeria has also helped to improve and enhance the naval system and coastal surveillance capabilities in order to tackle the maritime security threats in African waters, especially in the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria, the Republic of Benin, Togo, and Ghana have collaborative sea policing, by installing surveillance systems to help cope with detecting pirates. In January 2012, Nigeria's government transformed its joint task force, Operation Restore Hope, which was initially established to combat militancy in the Niger Delta into an expanded maritime security framework, known as Operation Pulo Shield to collaborate with neighboring West African countries.²⁹

The Gulf of Guinea's international donor partners, especially the United States, France, United Kingdom, and the European Union, consider the Gulf of Guinea as strategically important. The US military has played an important role in capacity building in the region through AFRICOM's African Partnership Station (APS) initiative.³⁰ The US military has been involved in joint training exercises with navies in the region to develop proficiencies in areas such as maritime interdiction, search-and-

rescue, and counter-terrorism operations. To this end, the United States spent about \$35 million in the training of naval personnel of the Gulf of Guinea to combat piracy and other maritime crimes that have plagued the region in recent years.³¹ Nigeria has worked with the US Command in its efforts to help train the Nigerian Navy through its African Partnership Program. Since 2007, the United States has been improving the country's Regional Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC) by helping to set up radar, radio equipment, and Automated Identification Systems (AIS) at several sites along the Gulf of Guinea coast to boost the technical equipment in the region. The United States has also donated at least five boats to Nigeria in support of maritime security exercises in the Gulf of Guinea.³²

The United Kingdom is backing the Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF), which ships hydrocarbons through the Gulf of Guinea. The US and French warships stationed in the Gulf of Guinea to train local navies of the Gulf of Guinea, also help to deter piracy and when pirates attack ships on the high sea, they offer assistance.³³ The European Union has adopted a Gulf of Guinea Action Plan for 2015–2020 to support countries in the region to improve maritime security and counter organized crime. The European Union, in addition to commissioning many studies on Gulf of Guinea piracy, also leads a Port Cooperation Programme (SEA-COP) in several West African countries, which aims at curbing drug trafficking from Latin America to Europe by strengthening national and regional maritime control.³⁴ The UN has provided technical support to Gulf of Guinea coastal states and shipping companies through the IMO and UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). It has planned and organized a summit to encourage leaders of the Gulf of Guinea states to agree on a comprehensive strategy to counter maritime insecurity.

TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION: BRIDGING THE SOUTH ATLANTIC DIVIDE

The focus on transatlantic strategic partnership and cooperation hinges on the Nigeria/Brazil transatlantic relationship because of the volume of trade and investment, and military equipment supply, and because of the hegemonic role of the two nations in their respective continents. Brazil has also a strong relationship with countries on the west coast of Africa, primarily based on the joint stewardship of the South Atlantic Ocean as well as cultural ties. The historical links between Brazil and Africa go

beyond linguistic connections with Portuguese-speaking countries to include the legacy of slavery and other important historical, demographic, cultural, and political bonds that bridge the two sides of the South Atlantic. The key countries on the western perimeter of the South Atlantic include Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay while Nigeria, South Africa, Angola, and Namibia are key partners on the eastern perimeter of the South Atlantic. The shifting strategic and economic concerns have not only contributed to the growing importance that Nigeria attaches to the South Atlantic but also its growing new interest in the changing ecology of the region. It seems Nigeria's maritime security agenda has evolved gradually and that it is genuinely ready to cooperate with other countries in fighting the most prominent security threats in order to make the ocean safer for navigation especially in the Gulf of Guinea.

Nigeria's growing maritime security interests in the South Atlantic is bolstered by the discovery of large offshore oil and gas reserves along the Gulf of Guinea, especially those mineral deposits that lie untapped within its EEZ. Similarly, Brazil's Blue Amazon policy is aimed at gaining popular support for the notion that it has a responsibility to enforce peace and security in the South Atlantic in order to protect and safeguard the newly discovered natural resources. The Blue Amazon in the maritime area off the coast of Brazil is now recognized by UNCLOS as the exclusive property of the coastal state. The Brazilian main security interest in the South Atlantic includes this area that is extremely rich in petroleum and has great potential for exploration for a variety of metallic nodules found on the seabed. Brazil is now looking eastward, asserting its influence across the South Atlantic. It has increased its engagement not only with its traditional African Lusophone partners, but also with countries such as Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Tanzania. Today, Brazil has the second-largest population of people of African descent in the world, in absolute number, behind only Nigeria.³⁵ There are not only convergences of interests between Brazil and Africa but also a strong cultural and historic affinity.

Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, with a 2010 World Bank population estimate of about 175 million. Like Brazil, the huge population presents an enormous market. However, Nigeria's economy is largely dependent on foreign trade which generates more than 90 percent of the GDP through exports of oil and gas. Like other littoral states in the zone, Nigeria relies heavily on the South Atlantic Ocean for both imports and exports. The high volume of Nigeria's foreign trade is a testimony to the incalculable importance of maritime security in South Atlantic. To the

Nigerian government, the region requires an adequate and proper protection in order to ensure a safe and smooth flow of goods, services, people, and commerce. This security becomes more vital when we consider the South Atlantic as the economic life line of the nation's east and west shores of the South Atlantic Ocean. As the regional hegemon of the Gulf of Guinea, Nigeria is also aggressively building alliances and partnerships with states along the western perimeter of the South Atlantic such as Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, and Argentina. Nigeria and Venezuela have an interest in more solid energy relations, being key players themselves in OPEC.

The new patterns of cocaine trade across the South Atlantic have raised serious and legitimate security concerns about connections and collusion between Latin American and West African drug trafficking networks.³⁶ Nigeria joined the South–South nations to disrupt this illicit drug traffic and other transnational crimes. The prominence that Nigeria's foreign policy attaches to South–South relations was underscored in the annual address to the nation in 1986 by the former President of Nigeria, Ibrahim Babangida. President Babangida underscored the vital role which the South must play concertedly to draw the attention of the North to the inequitable world order between the North and South. He reiterated that Africa and Latin America form part of the emergent South–South dialogue.³⁷

Over the last two decades, an unprecedented growth in political, diplomatic, and economic relations between South American and African nations has been witnessed. Trade between Africa and South America has risen 75 percent since 2006 reaching \$39 billion in 2011.³⁸ Brazil owns 70 percent of the South American trade with Africa. The former Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and his administration (2003–2011) were responsible for the commercial and diplomatic success with Africa. President Lula da Silva's foreign policy in Africa has been continued under President Dilma Rousseff's administration. Africa–Brazil trade reached \$26 billion in 2012, an 85 percent increase over six years. It is reported that the government-run Brazilian Cooperation Agency, charged with the South–South technical cooperation, spent up to \$70.5 million of its budget in 42 African countries from 2012 to 2014.³⁹ This renewal of transatlantic relations between African nations and Brazil is significant, not only when seen against the backdrop of their shared history, but also within the broader framework of South–South cooperation. Together, Brazil and African countries are forging a new model of South–South relations with innovative approaches to trade, investments, security cooperation, and cultural exchanges.

In 2010, at the end of a special summit between regional leaders of ECOWAS and their Brazilian counterpart in Sal, Cape Verde, the two parties agreed to focus on new initiatives that will boost their economic, security, and political cooperation, by addressing the issues of poverty, food security, environment and renewable energy, capacity building, and political dialogue. By focusing on these priorities the summit's final document declared that both regions would be expanding, upgrading, and strengthening their strategic partnership for their mutual benefit.⁴⁰ However, the connection between Brazil's economic interest and its development cooperation in Africa has become the focus of attention in recent years. As Yonemura notes:

Brazil seems to be shifting its ambition from regional political influence to commercial and technological interests. [...] As far as motivation goes, there are mixed views—on the one hand, it is observed that Brazil's foreign policy has been emphasizing cooperation and solidarity with developing countries, while on the other hand, it is suggested that the Brazilian policies are also consistent with its economic self-interest.⁴¹

From the Brazilian perspective, the political motives behind the recent Brazilian government's ambitious foreign policy agenda in Africa can be classified as follows: First, as a rising global power, Brazil is motivated to globalize its diplomatic network in order to signal its arrival as a global player on the world stage and to encourage the developing world to do the same. Second, there is a strong cultural and historic affinity between Brazil and Africa since approximately half of Brazil's population is of African descent. They trace their ancestry and religious practices to Africa, especially to Nigeria. Brazil shares similar food, music, religion, and sports in common with Africa. Finally, Brazil's interest in Africa lies in opportunities for trade and investments in a growing African market. Brazil as one of the emerging economies (as a member of the BRICS) that can play a significant role in Africa's growth, contributing to development and prosperity on the continent, with an extensive development program that is aimed at agriculture, health, energy, and poverty alleviation.⁴² Brazil has sought to transfer to Africa technology used in its own industries for cotton and biofuel, for example, in order to take advantage of the economic opportunities in the continent.

Both Nigeria and Brazil have shown strong support and commitment to the regional integration and development as demonstrated by their

membership of and leadership roles they have played in their respective regional groupings. Brazil has sought to strengthen the South American regional integration process (MERCOSUR), while Nigeria has pursued a similar policy of integration with ECOWAS, a regional economic union of 15 countries located in West Africa. The union was formally established on 28 May 1975 with the signing of the Treaty of Lagos. ECOWAS's stated goal is to promote economic integration across the region. The MERCOSUR agreement, which was created in 1991 by the Treaty of Asuncion, links Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. It is Latin America's largest trade bloc and it hopes to incorporate the Andean Group (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela) in its free-trade union. The goals include the harmonization of the economic policies of its members and the promotion of economic development. The promotion and deepening of trade relations between these two regional groupings could provide the potential opportunity to expand the channels for greater cultural, diplomatic, and economic collaboration and engagement in the South Atlantic.

Brazil has coupled economic power initiatives with a dramatic boost in military cooperation with Africa over the past decade, conducting joint naval exercises, providing training and arms, and establishing outposts in ports across the continent's coast. Both Brazil and Nigeria are manifestations of rising great powers in the South Atlantic and both countries are interested in fostering security and safety in the South Atlantic. Brazil's security partnership with African states is also motivated to a large extent by a desire to expand business opportunities for Brazilian defense firms. It has given military equipment to a number of West African nations, including maritime patrol aircraft to Cape Verde and Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) to the Namibian Navy in order to enhance the maritime security of these important partners.⁴³ Brazil has slowly moved eastward, asserting its influence across the South Atlantic Ocean by signing defense cooperation accords with a number of African nations including Nigeria in 2010, Cape Verde in 1994, South Africa in 2003, Guinea-Bissau in 2006, Mozambique in 2009, Namibia in 2009, Senegal in 2010, Angola in 2010, and Equatorial Guinea in 2010.⁴⁴ It has also provided them with technical assistance in science, technology, and professional development.

Brazil is also strengthening bilateral cooperation with countries such as Guinea itself, Nigeria, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, and Ghana. Also included are some of its African partners of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries such as Cape Verde, Angola, and São Tome & Príncipe.⁴⁵ Through

its capacity building in West Africa, the Brazilian government has also demonstrated their interest and willingness to help the local powers to counter the threat posed by maritime criminals in the Gulf of Guinea.⁴⁶ Brazil has participated actively in the Obangame Express, a series of annual naval training exercises led by AFRICOM. These training exercises have been carried out since 2011 in the Gulf of Guinea with the aim of enhancing multinational capabilities to foster security and safety in that area. Brazil is the only new maritime power with credible future prospects for projecting military might across the South Atlantic. As Lete notes:

The Brazilian strategy for security in the South Atlantic is certainly innovative because it has a clear trans-regional focus, involving not only South America, where Brazil has a long history of political, economic and military ties, but also West Africa, where its involvement was, until recently, far more episodic [...] the cooperation that forms part of this strategy suggests Brazil's growing relevance to security in Africa. Nevertheless, Brazil's strategy is also based on very clear South-South lines, and suggests no opportunities for pan-Atlantic approaches involving the countries of the Northern Atlantic.⁴⁷

However, some critics have argued that these Brazilian military initiatives, trade, and investments in Africa have done too little to address governance issues in Africa, rather dooming them to the same failures of past projects. Brazil's argument is that it purportedly brings something different to the table—a commitment to South-South cooperation and development forged through a shared experience, culture, and history. According to the Council of the Americas' Vice President, Eric Farnsworth, 'The idea of South-South cooperation for so long little more than an aspiration, is finally here and it is remaking the world.'⁴⁸ The practice of South-South cooperation by Brazil involves the transfer of knowledge and takes into account the interests and priorities of the recipient countries, different from the 'imposing cooperation' of North-South relations where donor countries often indicate which projects they want to fund, in accordance with their own interests.⁴⁹ Brazil has opened 37 embassies on the African continent while African countries have 33 embassies in Brazil, giving Brazil the greatest number of African embassies in any Latin American country.⁵⁰ Brazilian-Nigerian bilateral relations have brought not only attention to Afro-Brazilian connections but also a renewed focus on the emerging intra-South trade relations.

THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AS A REGION FOR SOUTH–SOUTH COOPERATION: AN ASSESSMENT

There has been a recent resurgence of ‘South–South cooperation’ as an alternative complementary relationship between developing countries as opposed to North–South relations. The current debate on South–South cooperation tends to involve what should be the pattern of engagement especially for those who are optimistic in transforming the world economic order. The key questions are: Can the horizontal regional arrangements enable South–South states to take advantage of a growing interdependence to achieve both their developmental and security goals that deliberately exclude the North Atlantic nations? How do you assess the role of international donor partners such as the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the European Union vis-à-vis the need for local ownership of the process? To what extent is their support agenda accepted and internalized by the very institutions and political communities in which they take place? In the Gulf of Guinea for instance, the United States and the European Union have been helping to combat piracy and maintain maritime security in the region, but they were also called upon to support a greater operational autonomy of regional actors and a greater leadership of emerging actors.

With regards to development assistance to developing countries from the international donor partners, Edmunds recommends local ownership and local leadership because for the donor’s projects to be sustainable, they need the support and empowerment of local actors over the long term.⁵¹ Local ownership is also necessary to maximize the chance that these projects will be sustained and continued once the specific donor initiatives have come to an end as well as to empower local actors to grapple with the problems themselves. For instance, some critics have expressed reservation about the United States leading anti-piracy efforts at the tactical or security level. They argue that rather, the United States should partner with regional organizations specifically like ECCAS and ECOWAS, using US-AFRICOM to empower these groups to combat piracy through a multifaceted approach as recommended and sanctioned by UN Resolutions 2018 and 2039. In fact, the effectiveness of anti-piracy efforts will also depend on the ability of regional governments to prosecute perpetrators and provide the foundations for increased economic opportunities.

The main premise of a South–South argument is that the current characteristics of the international economic system do not suit the interests of

developing countries, and that they in fact work against them, and are unlikely to be structurally changed by the generous concessions of the industrial states in the North.⁵² The idea of South–South cooperation is to encourage collaboration among developing countries in political, economic, cultural, environmental, and technical domains. It is also meant to strengthen and enhance the bargaining power of developing and least-developed countries in multilateral negotiations, such as those related to international trade, investment, or climate change. Development assistance is based on the notion of solidarity and is guided by the principles of respect for national sovereignty, national ownership and independence, equality, non-conditionality, non-interference in domestic affairs, and mutual benefits (the so-called win–win situations). Global South nations share knowledge, skill, expertise, and resources to address their developmental and security challenges such as high population pressure, poverty, hunger, disease, environmental deterioration, conflict, and natural disasters and to deal with cross-border issues such as environmental protection. However, in 1983, the former President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere warned:

South–South cooperation cannot be developed along the pattern of the past North–South interactions [...] And if we try to establish systems of Third World cooperation which would produce reasonably balanced results only on condition that all started equal, then we shall intensify the inequalities which now exist between us.⁵³

Some analysts have pointed out that the very same patterns of asymmetries might be reproduced among Southern countries,⁵⁴ while other analysts have not arrived at any satisfactory answer to the question.⁵⁵ Therefore, there is need for further investigation on the question whether the patterns of asymmetries in the relations between South–South countries develop differently from those of North–South countries. However, the North Atlantic nations are beginning to address some of the counter-productive aspects of the traditional technical cooperation such as disregard for local ownership, foreign aid, disconnection with reality, and unconcern with sustainability. The United States and the European Union have also begun to pursue a ‘partnering approach within and well beyond the Atlantic Basin, seeking to shift the paradigm of the North–South relationship to a new “joint approach” to common challenges’.⁵⁶ This approach refers to a triangular cooperation whereby traditional donor countries and multilateral organizations facilitate South–South initiatives

through the provision of funding, training, and management and technological systems, as well as other forms of support.⁵⁷ However, the South–South nations are still fearful of the good will of North Atlantic nations because of historic precedents of imperialist and colonial occupation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

While the ZPCSA is built strictly on South–South cooperation principles, there are also wide disparities, and uneven capabilities and commitment of participating states in terms of maritime security forces, coastguard capabilities, and resource/budget constraints. The differences in perception of capabilities and goals among ZPCSA member states are serious enough to complicate the efforts aimed at organizing regional security cooperation in the South Atlantic. On the one hand, the countries in the Gulf of Guinea seem to be more concerned by the immediate insecurity due to maritime piracy, which threatens the security and economies of their sub-region and other local issues of governance such as human security, poverty, and internal security rather than the broader strategic issues that concern the wider South Atlantic. These common and major non-state security challenges confronting the region include transnational crimes, piracy that threatens commercial traffic and oil supplies in the Gulf of Guinea, narcotics smuggling from Latin America to West Africa, and other related illicit traffics.⁵⁸ On the other hand, Brazil has more multifaceted goals within the broader framework focusing on strategic, political, and economic engagement especially with the goals of developing a consensus regional hegemony and the development of Blue Amazon—the vast mineral deposits that lie untapped within its EEZ. The foreign policies of Brazil’s neighbors (Argentina and Uruguay) appear to be more modest and focused on sub-regional issues and do not share Brazil’s enthusiasm for enhanced transatlantic relations with West Africa. Argentina is still concerned over the ongoing disputed status of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands with Great Britain.⁵⁹

One of the maritime security challenges facing most of the countries dealing with piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is inadequate surveillance systems for establishing Maritime Domain Awareness, for the purpose of interdiction and response in civil–military capacities.⁶⁰ Lack of knowledge about illegal activity at sea (or sea blindness) is a threat to security because it makes the area an ungoverned space and a haven for armed non-state actors’ illegal activities.⁶¹ The South–South initiatives alone will not be able to address the South Atlantic’s emerging maritime security challenges if the South–South nations keep excluding all the necessary operational

and financial capabilities of the North Atlantic nations from their equation. Pirates, terrorists, and criminals take advantage of sea blindness to operate. Because of this, improving maritime vision is a necessary first step in dealing with them. Hence, some critics have alleged that although ECOWAS has remained central to Nigeria's responses to these transnational security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea, not much has been achieved in terms of concrete results such as counter-piracy operations. While there is great pride and interest on the part of the states in the region to assert a South-South identity and solidarity, the prospects for evolving a successful and effective maritime security architecture in the South Atlantic also appear uncertain due to lack of advanced technology and the under-resourced capacity of these states to deal with the immediate problems of piracy and other transnational maritime crimes.

The outbreak of piracy off the coast of the Gulf of Guinea has provided a catalyst for extra-regional involvement in the region because of a legitimately stated interest in the regional maritime safety and security of navigation. The involvement of these extra-regional countries makes the governance arrangements a vexed issue as all the current major powers are involved including the United States, France, Great Britain, and China. The warships of these global dominant powers routinely crisscross the South Atlantic Ocean. The United Kingdom is still laying claim to some territories in the region, thereby continuing its territorial disputes with Argentina. Apart from the disputed Falkland/Malvinas Islands, the United Kingdom also controls South Georgia, Sandwich and Ascension Islands. Moreover, the British-controlled Ascension Island is strategically important to the United Kingdom and it was a stopover for British warships and transport vessels during the Falklands War. China, through its clever use of soft power, has been gaining influence in both Africa and South America and this has brought economic competition with the Western nations. While there is certainly a momentum for a new maritime security governance in the South Atlantic, the challenges arising from multiple and perhaps cross-cutting bilateral relations in the region, contending institutions and initiatives, competing priorities and interests among the participating regional and international actors make it more difficult to implement an effective maritime security governance regime at the moment. However, there is also ample room for continuous dialogue and agenda among the major actors involved on how to evolve an effective security architecture for the region.

CONCLUSION

The South Atlantic is dotted by 24 littoral nation-states and stretches from South America to South Africa and the Gulf of Guinea in Africa. The South Atlantic body of water contains the richest mineral deposits in the world, most of which still lie under the Atlantic seabed unexplored mostly because the South Atlantic nation-states are industrially and technologically underdeveloped. Since the twentieth century, oil and gas industries in the Gulf of Guinea have escalated the commercial traffic in the South Atlantic. As a result of the lack of effective surveillance capabilities, insufficient cooperation and information sharing among governments, as well as weak coastguard capabilities, the national maritime security and governance have proven to be inadequate to deal with piracy, drug trafficking, and transnational crimes across the South Atlantic. Piracy not only poses a real threat to the safety and security of vessels and their crews but also increasingly portends grave danger to the stability and prosperity of countries in the South Atlantic. For this reason, the nation-states of the South Atlantic, in the spirit of the needs of human security, decided to endorse and implement the United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/41/11 of 27 October 1986. This resolution has triggered a flurry of other regional organizations by some members of the South Atlantic maritime security and governance community in order to improve their capacity to deal with the challenges and security risks involved in trading in the South Atlantic.

Notwithstanding these giant strides in building international organizations of collaboration to deal with piracy, drug smuggling, and other transnational crimes in the South Atlantic, a lot more remains to be done. The South Atlantic needs a new maritime security and governance architecture to develop the coastal surveillance and satellite technology to survey the vast South Atlantic Ocean. It also needs the communication networks to monitor and detect illegal activities as well as the capacity to effectively deal with them. Consequently, the South Atlantic nations need the cooperation not only among themselves but also with the North Atlantic nations who have the superior technology, expertise, and resources at hand to make a difference. Despite its anti-imperialist ideology and rhetoric, Nigeria appears to be the front-runner in soliciting these types of collaborations because it is fully committed to a collective security strategy on the high seas. It also believes that the attainment of maritime security in the region will be through cooperation and partnerships with its neigh-

bors and the international community. The United States and the European Union might play a crucial role here since they, too, are engaged in ‘capacity-building’ efforts in the region and they also have direct energy security interests in ensuring minimal disruption of oil supply chains in the Gulf of Guinea. Most of the export products are ultimately destined for either Europe or the United States with the former receiving approximately 4 percent of its oil from the Gulf of Guinea.

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CHAPTER 3

The South African Navy and Regional Maritime Security: The Dilemma of Political-Strategic Objectives and Financial Constraints

Theo Neethling

INTRODUCTION

*Whether or not South Africa should have a defence force is no longer an issue. It has been accepted by Parliament that the country should have a balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced military force that includes the need for a navy [...] South Africa, with its island economy, cannot run the risk of an inadequate investment in its Navy. The concept of defending the coast is out of question.*¹

These were the words of Vice-Admiral Robert Simpson-Anderson, former Chief of the South African Navy (SAN) back in 17 October 1996 at a conference on ‘The Utility of Naval Power’ in Cape Town. Yet, going back twenty years into the contemporary history of the SAN, it is clear that the SAN did not get the required financial support from the relevant political role-players. Cilliers,² for instance, pointed out that despite having presented

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É. Duarte, M. Correia de Barros (eds.), *Navies and Maritime Policies in the South Atlantic*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10600-3_3

and argued its case both in private and public to secure the required funding for meeting its defence obligations, the SAN had been 'held hostage' for some time, first by the Joint Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence and later by Cabinet. In short, inaction or a delayed response on the part of political role-players hampered the procurement of new equipment for the post-1994 South African military in general and the SAN in particular. The problem, according to Cilliers,³ was that 'the defence budget continues to be tapped to fund budget increases by other departments', and as far as the SAN was concerned, 'the Navy is becoming hollow and is in serious danger of being figuratively sunk'.

The above-mentioned problem was not only confined to lack of support at the political level. In post-1994 South Africa the reaction of the general public has constantly been to question procurements for the modernization of the SAN in view of dire socio-economic challenges, specifically health, housing, education, and employment in the country. In this regard, the SAN's usefulness as a foreign policy instrument has been curtailed,⁴ and the issue of socio-economic challenges remains of the utmost importance in any understanding and evaluation of the current and future status of the SAN as a policy tool.

In view of the above, this chapter concentrates on the following: first, the way South Africa views its national interests and the way in which the national interests translate into specific, contemporary maritime-oriented objectives; second, the challenges relating to the role of South Africa (and that of the SAN) with regard to regional (in)security; and lastly the current political-economic challenges in South Africa that are effectively constraining the SAN in the execution of its current tasks and strategic responsibilities. Before these matters are explored, a background section introduces the reader to South Africa's post-apartheid maritime context and the role and functions of the SAN in this regard.

This chapter is situated in the scholarly field of *peace and conflict studies in the maritime context as it attends to peacekeeping institutions* and processes that can facilitate or lead to a more desirable human condition. In this regard, the notion of maritime security cooperation is of special interest. The chapter is also situated in the field of military strategy which relates to the quest for a balance between the political level (*ends*) and the military level (*means* and *ways*) in Darfur. After all, military strategy implies a harmonious balance between the political objectives (*ends*), assessment of the economy of force (*means*), and the considerations on the application of force (*ways*). Put differently, strategy is fundamentally about the

ways in which military power is applied or used to achieve political objectives.⁵ That being said, this chapter intends to argue that political demands on the one hand and implementation constraints on the other have always been at the centre of challenges relating to a better balancing of ends and means in post-Cold War African maritime cooperation in general and the South African naval context in particular.

Maritime strategies in general terms typically include elements that focus on awareness of the maritime domain, intelligence operations, threat response, coordination of activities, infrastructure and transportation, and commerce and port security. In the military strategic context (as explained above), it should be understood that for any maritime strategy to succeed, political commitment and will must be demonstrated, adequate operational capabilities must be provided, and proper public awareness is necessary.⁶ Obviously, this also applies to the South African maritime context as the topic under review in this chapter.

It should finally be noted that although states are the primary agents of good order at sea through governance measures and professional naval forces, private security agents or non-state actors have also started to present themselves as significant actors in African waters. To this end, private companies have shown competence to cover new domains of lower-order maritime threats that require a rapid response, especially in the Gulf of Guinea and the Gulf of Aden. In fact, privatization can complement naval forces in coping with the lower end of the maritime threat perspective and already provide lower-end security services at sea as part of low-key naval-private partnerships.⁷ Developments in this regard will, however, not be covered in the discussion below.

BACKGROUND: THE POST-1994 SOUTH AFRICAN MARITIME CONTEXT

South Africa's network of ports is considered the largest, best equipped, and most efficient in the African maritime context. South Africa's ports handle about 80–90 per cent of South Africa's trade, which makes the security of shipping, sea lanes of communication, maritime resources and harbours of major importance. This matter is also recognized by other states in the region, even those land-locked states with no direct access to the sea.⁸

South Africa's geographical profile can be described as a medium-sized coastal state. The country has a coastline of about 1865 miles (3000 km) and the SAN has to deal with the roughest seas in the world,⁹ as well as a

number of other challenges. First, the South African coastline is located on a strategic international maritime trade route. Second, the country has international obligations with regard to the safety of navigation and ships, ensuring freedom of the seas and security of shipping and the marine environment. Third, economically, South Africa is in essence an 'island economy' that is highly dependent on maritime transport. Fourth, the bulk of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) is dependent on and generated through trade, with up to 90 per cent of imports and exports being transported by sea. As such, South Africa and the SAN have an obligation to cooperate with other maritime nations and actors with a view to maintaining good order at sea as well as protecting the country's national interests.¹⁰

It should be clear that South Africa is a maritime nation.¹¹ The country is endowed with a double geopolitical identity relating to the land and the sea. Its maritime border extends from the Orange River in the west to Punta do Ouro in the east. Geopolitically, South Africa is strategically situated along vital sea routes of the world, namely the South Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, and the Southern Oceans. The strategic importance of its geopolitical position also relates to its maritime zones, marine resources, marine ecology and conservation, as well as its maritime trade. All of these factors carry with them immediate national, regional, and international obligations—and are of obvious importance to the SAN. South Africa's maritime zones span the territorial waters, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the continental shelf, as well as the Marion and Prince Edward Islands.¹²

South Africa's *Defence Review 1998*—a landmark document in the post-apartheid context—states that South Africa's dominant position on a vital global trade sea-route, its dependence on sea trade, and its vast maritime area makes maritime defence a matter of great importance. From a policy position, it is stated in *Defence Review 1998* that effective maritime defence in the South African context requires balanced surface and sub-surface capabilities, and that the neglect of any one of these elements will have a negative effect on overall maritime defence capabilities. For the SAN to have a minimum force level that can be maintained as a growth core, it must have strike craft, submarines, mine countermeasure vessels, corvette-size vessels, and combat surface vessels.¹³

As far as political commitment is concerned, South Africa's post-apartheid government clearly indicated its seriousness pertaining to the matter of maritime security. In 1997, former President Nelson Mandela pronounced that:

The sea is a vital national interest, and that is why we maintain a navy. Just as we believe all people should be free, so too, as a nation, we believe in the freedom of the seas. This is a matter of national strategic interest. We are a maritime nation trading all over the world. We accept our obligations to combine with other nations to uphold the freedom of the seas and to protect our national interest through naval power.¹⁴

Post-apartheid SAN considers itself a ‘contiguous’ navy. The primary role of the SAN is pronounced as providing maritime military services to South Africa. These fall into three major categories:¹⁵

- maritime operations—naval and ‘para-naval’ missions;
- assistance operations—support to other government departments, such as search and rescue, disaster relief, fisheries protection, pollution and anti-smuggling patrols, as well as support for scientific programmes; and
- hydrographic services.

Politically, it has always been difficult to design a defence force in South Africa to cater for all possible contingencies in view of substantial budgetary constraints. In the mid-1990s, post-apartheid SAN was confronted with the reality that it did not have a modernized force to speak of. The SAN had three Daphne-class submarines (after one had been permanently decommissioned) that were more than 25 years old and which had come to the end of their economical service lives. Moreover, the country had no patrol corvettes and nine ageing Minister-class missile-armed strike craft, which were almost 20 years old.¹⁶ For its operational activities the SAN had to rely on two combat support ships (replenishment ships) as well as a mine countermeasures flotilla, with four minehunters, four minesweepers, and a diving tender.¹⁷

Against this background, it needs to be noted that the SAN’s share of the defence budget had been steadily shrinking from a peak of 17 per cent in 1977 to about 7 per cent in the mid-1990s. Still, the SAN maintained effectiveness and efficiency and an ability not normally associated with small navies.¹⁸ Yet, militarily, this became a matter of great concern, as there was a growing diplomatic requirement for the SAN to become more integrated in continental affairs and to participate in multinational maritime operations of a non-offensive nature.¹⁹ It thus became a challenge of mandate versus means, or political ambition versus affordability.

It should also be understood that the final years of apartheid saw increasing civil disobedience and low-level guerrilla activity in South Africa's townships. Therefore, budgets were shifted to favour the army, police, and counter-revolutionary social spending. Consequently, the main equipment of the SAN and the South African Air Force (SAAF) was allowed to run down, and both the SAN and the SAAF desperately needed rejuvenation by way of new equipment, as articulated by Engelbrecht:

The navy, whose task it is to patrol our long coastline, is barely functional. But the non-availability of spare parts internationally for South Africa's three ageing submarines makes keeping them serviceable so expensive that, at any one time, only one submarine is seaworthy. Moreover, two of six strike craft and at least five mine hunters and minesweepers have either been decommissioned, placed in reserve or cannibalized for spares in recent years.²⁰

Perhaps most important is that the SAN had no ships in the patrol corvette/frigate class, having lost its destroyers and frigates in the 1970s and 1980s.²¹ Against this background, Cabinet decided in 1998 that South Africa would procure the following military equipment for the SAN:

- 4 patrol corvettes from the German Frigate Consortium to replace the ageing strike craft of the SAN (which had been in service since 1979); and
- 3 submarines from the German Submarine Consortium, to replace the ageing Daphne submarines (which had been in service since 1971).²²

Many littoral states in the African context lack the capacity to monitor their maritime areas²³ and this makes the SAN of particular importance in the sub-Saharan African maritime context in general and the Southern African context in particular. These matters will be further discussed in the sections below.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT AND VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS

Following the *Defence Review 1998* as a comprehensive policy position relating to the South African military (and its structures, strategic environment, tasks, doctrine, policy, human resources and acquisition management), the *Defence Review 2015* is arguably the most important and

comprehensive defence policy framework produced in South Africa in recent years. This document is a huge improvement on previous policy documents and was approved by Cabinet in March 2014 after three years of extensive consultations by a team comprising, among others, several defence experts. Cilliers²⁴ describes this document as ‘as much a manual to fix the department [of defence] as it is a path towards the future’. The document was produced against the backdrop of widespread criticism by informed critics and defence analysts and other observers that:

[t]he Department of Defence is neither equipped, nor trained, nor oriented for its future missions. It is mired in indecision, endless transformation and an unsustainable use of its existing budget. Time has to come for a radical intervention if the country is to avoid future embarrassment.²⁵

The above obviously extends to the current role and status of the SAN, which will be further discussed below. As far as the strategic environment is concerned, the *Defence Review 2015* clarifies the risks to both international and domestic security. It states that internationally, the security environment is faced by a range of traditional and non-traditional threats. These pertain to violent political, ethnic, and religious extremism, acts of terror, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the involvement of non-state actors in conflict, high levels of international crime, and cyber threats. Moving to African security, it is stated that contemporary conflicts and insecurity in Africa derive from factors relating to a lack of political rights, weak and dysfunctional states, inadequate political and economic governance, the politicization of ethnicity, the marginalization of groups, inappropriate military involvement, and unconstitutional changes of government. Other drivers of African insecurity relate to competition over scarce resources, poverty, underdevelopment and poor human insecurity, endemic diseases, as well as maritime insecurity.²⁶

In order to address its constitutional mandate, South Africa requires a relevant, balanced and sustainable defence force. According to the *Defence Review 2015*, this constitutional mandate pertains to four strategic goals: defend and protect South Africa; safeguard South Africa; promote regional peace and stability; and contribute to developmental and other ordered tasks. To this end, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) generally and the SAN in particular should be in a position to conduct maritime operations. This requires a naval capability that is capable of providing an enduring presence in South Africa’s areas of maritime interest.

This presence should be pursued through maritime defence or deterrence and powerful intervention through surface, sub-surface, and air capabilities with a focus on South Africa's ports, territorial waters, trade routes, and marine resources. In addition to a naval capability that is able to conduct riverine and inland water operations, it must be capable of strategic reach and joint rapid response across the spectrum of conflict, supporting the sustainment of protracted joint operations over long distances. The motivation or rationale underlying the above-mentioned strategic goals and required naval capability is South Africa's maritime-dependent economy and significant maritime interests. The country is obliged to defend and protect these through the configuration and maintenance of a versatile littoral maritime capability, as well as a credible deep ocean capability and effective maritime domain awareness.²⁷

The importance of maritime security—and a functional and competent SAN—is evident from most if not all the defence responsibilities listed in the *Defence Review 2015*. These responsibilities have a direct bearing on matters relating to South Africa's sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interests, and extend to the following²⁸:

- defending South Africa against armed aggression and threats to the constitutional order;
- the execution of national tasks, such as border safeguarding, maritime security, cyber security and airspace defence;
- the protection of vital maritime, air and land trade routes, good order at sea and in the airspace, and the safety and security of trade and transport hubs;
- fulfilling South Africa's international treaty obligations;
- the safeguarding of South Africa's key infrastructure;
- assisting civil authorities with the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of public order and security;
- assistance in disaster relief and in the event of a large-scale humanitarian crisis; and
- contributing to the social upliftment of the South African people within the context of a developmental state.

According to the *Defence Review 2015*, there are several maritime threats. Threats include maritime piracy and terrorism, armed crimes, and illegal activity at sea, such as unregulated and unreported fishing. It further extends to loss of marine biodiversity. A most significant threat in the

maritime domain pertains to the illegal movement of people and goods. The *Defence Review 2015* also makes it clear that the continued and increased illegal exploitation of South Africa's natural maritime resources will lead to increased crime and instability, which pose a risk to stability in certain coastal regions of South Africa.²⁹

In order to fulfil its obligations, the SAN currently operates the following equipment:³⁰

- auxiliaries: 1 replenishment ship (auxiliary oiler replenishment) and 1 hydrographic ship (Heccla class);
- submarines: 3 (Heroine class);
- frigates: 4 (Valour class);
- mine-countermeasures vessels: 4 (River class);
- offshore patrol vessels: 3 fast attack craft (Warrior [ex-Minister] class); 26 harbour patrol boats (Namacurra class); 3 inshore patrol vessels (T craft class);
- tugs: 5 coastal and harbour tugs;
- maritime aircraft: 4 (Westland Super Lynx).

Politically and economically, South Africa is arguably a power of major importance in Africa, and its maritime responsibilities therefore extend well beyond the South African borders. The country's economy accounts for 24 per cent of Africa's GDP and 33 per cent of that of sub-Saharan Africa, and the country is therefore obliged to play a leadership role in continental affairs. It also has to cooperate with African partners, ranging from matters such as conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and post-conflict reconstruction to security-sector reform. Practically, this pertains to military contributions in a multinational context as well as partnerships with other African states in the political, economic, social, and security realms.³¹ The following section expands on these matters.

THE SAN IN THE REGIONAL (AFRICAN) CONTEXT

Potgieter³² rightly points out that maritime security is a broad, amorphous focus area and that there is more than one way of considering it. The International Maritime Organization views maritime security in terms of a comprehensive security regime with an overall responsibility for international shipping, various mandatory and non-mandatory measures and security-related requirements pertaining to states, ports, and shipping

companies, as well as a range of guidelines on how to achieve these. While many definitions and interpretations abound, Potgieter³³ offers the following exposition: 'Simply put, maritime security is concerned with preventing illicit activities in the maritime domain. It could be directly linked to a specific country and national security efforts, but it can also include regional or international efforts to enforce maritime security.' In the maritime security landscape the interests of nations are typically focused on the following two broad objectives: facilitating the vibrant maritime commerce and economic activities at sea that underpin economic security; and protecting the maritime domain against ocean-related threats such as piracy, criminal activities, terrorism, pollution, and the like. Cooperation between nations in these matters—often in a regional context—is essential, since virtually all nations benefit from maritime activity and security.

Regional security refers to a level of security above that of the state and regional organizations become involved in promoting maritime security. According to Vreÿ,³⁴ the newer patterns of regional security cooperation emerge from an approach that flows from the platforms that regional organizations offer for political functionaries and relevant officials to meet and address matters of mutual concern in the field of security.

Since 1994 (the post-apartheid era), the SAN was increasingly integrated into the maritime affairs of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), a region consisting of 14 countries, six of which have sea borders (the Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC], Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Tanzania and South Africa) and two island states in the Indian Ocean (Madagascar and Mauritius). On the one hand, the Southern African region represents perhaps one of the most stable maritime domains in the African context.³⁵ On the other hand, the SAN cannot escape the fact that a substantial increase in acts of maritime crime has been recorded along Africa's coastline, a phenomenon that (still) threatens the security and stability of the continent. Against this background, both the SADC Maritime Security Strategy (MSS) and the African Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050 (AIMS-2050) recognize the threat to human security associated with acts of maritime piracy and criminality. Practically, the Southern African region faces serious challenges relating to combating piracy and the smuggling of weapons, contraband, people, and goods. Another challenge is the protection of maritime trade and resources, including fisheries, seabed minerals and energy resources.

Obviously, the above-mentioned maritime threats are primarily transnational and trans-oceanic and require relatively advanced capabilities for surveillance over the sea and for effecting search and seizure at sea.

From a sentimental point of view, South Africa's relations with the rest of Africa seemed to arise from a genuine concern with the future of the continent and its people. According to a 1997 foreign policy discussion document of the ANC (as South Africa's governing party), South Africa's approach to the rest of the continent relates to the following considerations:³⁶

- the fact that South Africa is part of the African continent, and that its economic development is linked to what happens on the continent as a whole;
- the fact that South Africa has an important role to play in the economic and political revival of the continent; and
- the fact that the economic development of the African continent as a whole will be a significant step in overcoming the North–South divide.

Against this background, it is hardly surprising that South Africa's post-1994 security interests gradually became strongly attached to those of the rest of the continent and that the country's armed forces had been committed to participation in multinational peace missions on African soil since Thabo Mbeki became South Africa's head of state in 1999. The above-mentioned are obviously of relevance to maritime affairs. During the 1995 National Maritime Strategic Conference which was conducted under the title 'Navies in Peace and War', the former Deputy Minister of Defence, Ronnie Kasrils, stated that the demands for South Africa to become involved in regional security have been growing. The reason is that South Africa is one of a few regional states on the continent with a naval capability and that the SAN has been called upon to curb the pillaging and compromising of Africa's maritime resources. Similarly, the former Minister of Defence, Joe Modise, also stated that South Africa's neighbouring states need assistance in protecting their coastal areas against the plundering of the marine life in their waters. Mozambique and Namibia especially need South Africa's support.³⁷

On the basis of South Africa being the 'major economic power of Sub-Saharan Africa', Heitman³⁸ maintains that the country—and the SAN in particular—has a responsibility to assist and support other African states in the field of regional security. At the same time, this is also a matter of self-interest, as South Africa needs a stable environment in which to develop its own economy.

Heitman³⁹ further maintains that the SAN should be regarded as a sub-Saharan asset in the field of peace support, stabilization, intervention, constabulary and humanitarian operations. This coincides with the view

expressed by a former chief of the Kenyan Navy when he referred to South Africa's submarines in the following way: 'They are not your submarines [...] they are our submarines.' This does not mean that the SAN should be expected to do everything for everyone as this would not be acceptable to the South African taxpayer, and there are limitations to the role and function of the SAN. At the same time, the SAN needs to be visible in the regional context and its role should not fall short of regional maritime security. To this end, Heitman⁴⁰ suggests that, as a regional asset, the SAN could complement navies from other African states by providing capabilities they cannot supply. Practically this means the following:

- Submarines could conduct surveillance and reconnaissance operations before and during an operation. They could further provide a screen to warn of potential interference by other naval elements.
- Frigates could conduct extended duration or long-range patrols. They could also serve as flagships for small squadrons or serve as command and support ships for small craft during operations.
- The combat support ship could serve as underway replenishment ship or as a depot ship for smaller vessels conducting operations, or render logistical support and even serve as a flagship.
- Mine-countermeasure vessels and off-board systems could be deployed to conduct routine bottom surveys and respond to mine threats.

The above implies an ambitious role for the SAN. It also implies a point of departure that South Africa is a regional power and that the country should exercise the security responsibilities that come with that status. It requires that the SAN should regard itself as a regional navy, and that it should develop the force design and doctrine required by that role accordingly, as well as securing the funding that it needs for its role.

THE SAN AND CRIMINALITY IN AFRICA'S WATERS: PIRACY AND ILLEGAL FISHING

In recent years, the maritime security debate in South Africa has provoked considerable public and media attention. This could be ascribed to events and a lack of maritime security around the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Guinea. In short, acts of piracy have put the focus on the possibility of

South African naval participation in multinational efforts to limit piracy. The general message has further been that more should be done from the side of South Africa, and that greater cooperation among African role-players is needed.⁴¹ Against this background, Campbell⁴² states that SAN has moved from a largely peacetime routine to a predominantly operational profile. Two developments have been responsible for this development; one domestic, one foreign. The domestic matter has been the adoption of a so-called back to the borders policy by Cabinet in 2009 in terms of which the South African military had to reassume the responsibility for protecting and patrolling the country's borders from the South African Police Service. This impacted heavily on the army but also on the SAN. The foreign development relates to the increasing prevalence of piracy in the northern Mozambique Channel, leading to requests for naval and air support from South Africa to secure the regional waters. To this end, much is expected of South Africa and the SAN, but the current fleet is 'extremely modest' and the SAN is in need of more funding and equipment if it is to fulfil a meaningful role and help shape events in a regional context with African partners.⁴³

Still, it needs to be said to the credit of South African naval officers that the SAN has been playing an important role in recent years in the protection and patrolling of the country's borders in accordance with the back to the borders policy adopted by the South African government. Furthermore, the SAN's frigates, supported by its offshore vessels (converted strike craft) have been deployed to the Mozambique Channel when Mozambique was unable to meet the threat of piracy on its own. South African frigates have been deployed on a rotational basis and managed to maintain an almost permanent presence in the northern Mozambique Channel from August 2011 until December 2015. This followed the hijacking of the *Vega 5*, a fishing vessel owned by a Spanish-Mozambican company, by Somali pirates in the Mozambique Channel. Officers of the Mozambican Navy have also embarked on the South African patrolling frigates. Additionally, the SAN has also used its submarines to gather intelligence and reinforce the deterrent effect of the surface and air patrols. The SAN views these operations as successful: pirates are no longer attacking targets, the sea lanes are open, the fishing fleets are active at sea, and tourism is flourishing.⁴⁴

However, these operations mean increased wear and tear on the frigates. The requirements for protecting the country's maritime frontiers and maintaining an anti-piracy patrol in the Mozambique Channel have also

impacted severely on the SAN's ageing secondary warships. The SAN's three offshore patrol vessels have been utilized for about three decades and were not designed to operate in the rough oceans surrounding South Africa. They need to be replaced. The four mine-countermeasures vessels also have to be replaced.⁴⁵ The challenges currently facing the SAN are further exacerbated by increased personnel spending, which necessitates a reallocation of critical maintenance and repair funds.⁴⁶

What is more is that several Chinese fishing trawlers were spotted in South African waters in May 2016—a matter that attracted considerable media attention. The movements of the foreign vessels led to a formal intergovernmental call for assistance from the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) to the SAN with regard to the monitoring and inspecting of the Chinese trawlers for suspected illegal fishing in South African waters. It should be noted that the DAFF has the civilian-political responsibility and jurisdiction to act in cases of suspected illegal fishing, but the SAN has to render the needed intergovernmental support. To this end, the Valour Class frigate, SAS *Amatola*, was the first warship deployed following the DAFF appeal for support to the civilian authorities. This was followed by the further deployment of the SAN's replenishment vessel, the SAS *Drakensberg*. Eventually, four Chinese fishing trawlers were approached by the SAN and a few DAFF vessels and escorted to East London and Cape Town harbours for further action.⁴⁷

Kings⁴⁸ points out that in 1985, 13 Chinese vessels were operating in African waters. The figure is now more or less 500. It relates to China's boasting of the world's largest distant-water fishing fleet in the world; many of which stand accused of numerous suspicious and illegal activities. Given these developments, the maxim governing the world ocean, 'you cannot control what you cannot patrol', is certainly of relevance and significance to the South African case. After all, the South African conundrum is that of patrolling some 1.26 million square nautical miles of ocean with only 14 vessels,⁴⁹ some of which must be replaced. They are using banned fishing gear that is destructive to fishing resources, catching beyond limits and even catching protected species. This is causing a declining availability of fish in African markets and the net result is that Africa is the only continent where per capita fish consumption has been on the decline.

Illegal fishing is not a problem unique to Africa, but the specific problem is that African countries are particularly vulnerable due to their under-enforcement of the law, limited capacity in the management of fisheries, and sometimes even inadequate awareness of the costs of exploitation.

These problems are compounded by inadequate monitoring and surveillance efforts of the fishing sector by African governments. There cannot be any doubt that African countries must substantially upgrade their capacity to monitor and prosecute illegal fishing in African waters⁵⁰ and these matters obviously have implications for the modernization of the SAN.

In view of the above, naval officers of the SAN need to plan for the future and came up with a new plan to cater for the future needs of the SAN, called Project Biro. In brief, Project Biro retains both offshore patrol vessels and inshore patrol vessels, with the latter deployed at all the main ports around the South African coast. The idea is that new vessels would participate in border security missions and be ready to undertake mine-countermeasures and related tasks, such as seabed search. All of this, however, will be subject to public and political scrutiny, and have to be approved by Parliament.⁵¹ At the same time, defence analyst Helmoed-Römer Heitman rightly warns that it won't be helpful to 'add new ships to a fleet lacking the funding to look after what it has'; meaning that the SAN should have the required budget to carry the required operational costs as well as refits on the frigates and submarines.⁵²

On the operational side, it finally needs to be understood that—due to funding constraints—Operation Copper, the SADC counter-piracy task led by the South African government, had to be temporarily placed on hold maritime-wise since December 2015. Publicly, it was confirmed that the SAN was overstretched with regard to deployments.⁵³ This will be further discussed in the section below.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVAL DILEMMA: THREE MATTERS OF CONCERN

In 1997, three years into post-apartheid South Africa, the then Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Rusty Evans⁵⁴ made an important remark when he stated that:

The South African Navy is at present reaping the results of past policies. These directed much of the defence budget towards other branches of the former South African Defence Force. Clearly outdated and obsolete equipment is preventing the Navy from effectively exercising its maritime function to defend South Africa's coastline of 3000 km and its interests within the Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ). The Navy's usefulness as a foreign policy tool is severely curtailed and needs to be addressed urgently.

Twenty years later not much has changed and budgetary limitations are still the order of the day and highly likely to continue to constrain the SAN in the future execution of its external role. As far as the latter is concerned, the reasoning is premised on the fact that the future of the SAN is inextricably linked to that of the SANDE, of which it forms a smaller part. In this regard, three issues or factors are currently constraining a better and sufficient budget for the SAN to exercise its strategic responsibilities and tasks.

Firstly, research indicates that in South Africa, a high corruption risk is publicly associated with defence matters. This relates to allegations that political elites were benefiting from corrupt defence acquisition packages, which did not help to facilitate a sound appreciation of South Africa's defence needs and related future financial implications since the end of the 1990s. In October 2011 a judicial commission of inquiry, publicly known as the Seriti Commission, was appointed by the South African government in October 2011 to investigate allegations of fraud, corruption, impropriety, or irregularity (mainly at political level) in the Strategic Defence Procurement Packages of 1999, commonly referred to as the Arms Deal, which included the purchasing of four patrol corvettes and three submarines.⁵⁵

It should thus be understood that the defence–economic relationship in South Africa—and related political debates on defence equipment—was slowed down by controversy around allegations that there were deviations from traditional acquisition procedures during the purchasing of new defence equipment for the SAN and the SAAF. Sylvester and Seegers⁵⁶ point out that the government's Arms Deal had been the largest public controversy of the post-apartheid era. Towards the end of 2015, research conducted by Transparency International indicated that the risks associated with political corruption are indicated as moderate; financial management is high; personnel management is moderate; operations are very high; and procurement is high. Transparency International also noted in their report that, in spite of an extensive anti-corruption framework in South Africa, the effectiveness of those systems is questionable and public trust in defence institutions is low.⁵⁷ In view of this, Walker⁵⁸ rightly argues that much-needed procurement of new vessels for the SAN, for instance, has not been done largely due to the negative consequences of the SAP. The controversy over these transactions made additional military purchases economically impossible and politically difficult to justify. These matters have effectively put the SAN in an almost impossible position to purchase the new vessels it needs to ensure maritime security in the medium and longer term.

A second factor of concern is that the domestic economic growth outlook in South Africa remains extremely challenging following the contraction in GDP in recent years. Since the worldwide recession in 2008, South Africa's economic growth has been sluggish and below African average. With an International Monetary Fund (IMF) growth expectation of 0.8 per cent for 2017⁵⁹ and an unemployment rate of more than 25 per cent,⁶⁰ South African defence spending would obviously be under pressure.

As a matter of background and clarity, it should be noted that a continuous decline in military spending has been a major feature of South Africa's budgeting over the past few decades. In fact, where the defence budget was at 4.6 per cent of the GDP in 1989/1990,⁶¹ defence spending was reduced to less than 3 per cent of GDP by the mid-1990s, which is less than 10 per cent of total government spending.⁶² In real terms, the defence budget was cut by 50 per cent between 1989 and 1997.⁶³ Since then, the country's defence expenditure has been pinned down at approximately 1.6 per cent of GDP, which is between 6 per cent and 7 per cent of government expenditure⁶⁴ and levelled out at around 1.2 per cent to 1.1 per cent of GDP since 2010,⁶⁵ which should be considered against the world average of 2 per cent.⁶⁶ In an overall sense, because of cuts in defence spending in South Africa, there has been a downscaling of the military and, as a result, a number of bases have become redundant. The down swinging defence budget also translated to a cut in the personnel budget of the SANDF. As far back as March 1999, the Minister of Defence approved plans to reduce military personnel from 93,000 to 70,000 permanent posts, including civilians.⁶⁷

The declining budget is widely believed to have had and still have serious implications in terms of the maintenance of bases and equipment, and on the ability of the military to perform its conventional and non-conventional roles—and ultimately on force readiness. In fact, the Chairperson's Overview in the *Defence Review 2015* openly and sincerely declares:

The Defence Force is in a critical state of decline, characterized by: force imbalance between capabilities; block obsolescence and unaffordability of many of its main operating systems; a disproportionate tooth-to-tail ratio; the inability to meet current standing defence commitments; and the lack of critical mobility. The current balance of expenditure between personnel, operating and capital is both severely disjointed and institutionally crippling. Left unchecked, and at present funding levels, this decline will

severely compromise and further fragment the defence capability. It is clear that certain defence capabilities, if not addressed now, will be lost in the very near future. The longer this prevails, the greater the effort, time and cost will be to restore the Defence Force.⁶⁸

Another controversy directly relating to the South African defence environment played out around the so-called ‘guns versus butter’ discourse, which has also heavily affected the role and functionality of the SAN. Military sceptics or critics felt that post-apartheid South Africa (i.e. after 1994) continued to be too militarized. Abrahams,⁶⁹ for instance, pointed out that post-apartheid activists expected that the new post-1994 government would focus on human development as a priority rather than on the military, and thus move away from the highly militarized pre-1994 history of the country. Several anti-militarists in civil society articulated the importance of socio-economic issues as well as their disdain for military spending—and the Arms Deal in particular—very vocally, of which the following statement is a typical example:

[T]here is growing anger that the ANC government has failed to deliver any improvement to the lives of most of its constituents. The wealth gulf between rich and poor is even wider than it was during the apartheid era. Unemployment is 42%, and the number of people living in shacks continues to increase [...]. To the electorate however, the arms deal has become symbolic of an appalling waste of energy and resources that could go to social improvement. The credibility of our constitutional democracy is at risk.⁷⁰

The beliefs and efforts of pressure groups could be viewed in the broader context of international initiatives to exert pressure on developing states to cut back on military spending and inventories. Their beliefs coincided with post-Cold War initiatives and activism in the international community to encourage progress in the demilitarization of global politics. For many activists—also in South Africa—there was hope for peace, stability, and a stronger focus on human development rather than on military power. The concept of defence conversion accordingly became a prominent issue on the agenda of defence sceptics and critics with the idea that the redundant military resources could now be converted for civilian use.⁷¹

Today, the guns versus butter issue is still not dead. For example, the evidence leader of the aforementioned Seriti Commission, Advocate Simmy Lebala, practically continued the guns versus butter discourse

when he articulated the views of many defence sceptics in his questioning of Rear Admiral Rusty Higgs of the SAN on whether other African countries are operating submarines and frigates. In the words of Lebala:

Why do we have to behave like superpowers, given our limitations? The history of our country, socio-economic factors, surroundings, and the background inform us that our priorities are health, houses, feeding the poor, HIV and Aids [...] Still you want us to employ the military resources that we have on equating us to superpowers. Why can't we be superpowers in our own right by focusing on economic issues?⁷²

A third and last factor that also has a negative influence on the SANDF and its future prospects, specifically the likeliness to obtain a bigger portion of the national budget, relates to a growing knowledge gap on military matters in South Africa. Professor Lindy Heinecken, a respected military sociologist, rightly points out in her research that the military is no longer a national priority and that neither civil society nor the youth 'has any interest in the military'. Public interest is generally limited to public concerns, such as controversies around the Arms Deal, scandals relating to bad disciplinary conduct of soldiers, or incidents concerning the deaths of several SANDF members at the hands of rebels in conflict theatres, such as the Central African Republic in November 2014.⁷³

Heinecken⁷⁴ further explains that the military was a quite important focus area of social science research on several university campuses before and after 1994—given the pivotal role of the military in South Africa's transition. In recent years, however, the research focus has gradually shifted to issues of governance, accountability, trade, investment, and development. She quotes the Executive Director of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Jakkie Cilliers, who stated, 'The military is no longer a national priority. The shift is towards crime and related matters as well as non-traditional threats.' Besides, the relationship between the ISS, the leading think-tank on security issues in the country, and the SANDF is strained, given the often-critical stance of the ISS on defence matters. All of this implies a widening civil–military gap in South Africa.

In addition, it also seems that the required focus on and support for the SANDF from the political level is lacking. In 2015, the Joint Standing Committee on Defence in Parliament was supposed to focus on the final version of the *Defence Review*. However, in a period of six months, only one meeting on the *Defence Review* was scheduled. Frustrations in this

regard urged David Manyier, a former combat officer in the SAN and now Member of Parliament and spokesperson on finance of the official opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, to state, 'In the end, it's a disgrace that the Defence Force is being held hostage by lazy and disinterested Members of Parliament serving on the Joint Standing Committee on Defence.'⁷⁵ Manyier⁷⁶ stated that, from the start, it was clear that members of the ruling party (the African National Congress) serving on the Joint Standing Committee, had absolutely no intention of taking the *Defence Review* seriously and that they were aware of the fact that every day they wasted, accelerated the decline of the Defence Force.

All in all, the above has far-reaching implications for civil–military relations in South Africa⁷⁷ and does not bode well for an increased budget for the military to a figure of 1.5 or 1.6 per cent of the GDP, which is what many defence analysts suggest for a functional and professional military.⁷⁸

CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that the geostrategic position of Southern Africa places it centrally beside major trade routes to the East and the West—a point that has been emphasized over the years by South Africa's political leadership as well as the top commanding echelons of the SAN. Furthermore, there is general agreement among South Africa's political leaders and naval commanders that good ocean governance is important for regional security. There is also a firm official policy stance and commitment on the part of all actors that the SAN has to attend to the protection of offshore areas and resources, which relates to both national areas of maritime jurisdiction and the high seas.

Despite many constraints the SAN is playing an important role in operations against the threats and challenges it encounters in its maritime domain. A most visible aspect of these operations pertains to the point that the SAN is firmly committed to anti-piracy operations as part of its international obligations in addition to its primary war-fighting missions.⁷⁹ Positively speaking, the South African government and the SAN have always demonstrated both agency and responsibility in their approach to conflict and insecurity on the African continent. However, the SAN has not been able to fully respond to the political demands of the South African government in terms of exercising the wide-ranging maritime security responsibilities that coincide with South Africa's position as Southern Africa's largest economy and related regional leadership role.

Whereas strategy is fundamentally about the ways in which military power is applied or used to achieve political objectives, the case of the SAN is clearly one where there was always a gap between the desires of the South African government to assume more agency in security governance on the African continent and their ability to do so. This is clear from the limitations in cases where the SAN could not boast of sufficient capacity—implying that there was never a balance between the political level (ends) and the military level (means and ways). Over and above, South Africa's naval capability has always boiled down to a challenging case of political and policy objectives and demands on the one hand and budget-related constraints on the other. Again, as mentioned earlier, it should be stated that for any maritime strategy to succeed, political commitment and will must be demonstrated, adequate operational capabilities must be provided, and proper public awareness is necessary—and these matters have been problematic in the South African maritime context.

Practically speaking, the SAN needs Project Biro to be implemented in order to find itself in a position to better police its huge maritime domain. Claiming sovereignty over such a large area puts South Africa in a position where it has to exercise substantial international duties and obligations. The problem, of course, is that South Africa spends approximately 1.1 per cent of its GDP on the military as opposed to the world average of 2 per cent. In practical terms it boils down to the challenge of patrolling some 1.26 million square nautical miles of ocean with only 14 vessels—some of which must be replaced.

The *Defence Review 2015* explicitly acknowledges the fact that the SAN experiences severe pressure on its operating budget. More specifically, there is clear acknowledgement of the increased sustainment costs resulting from the increased operational work done by its frigates as well as the need to keep the obsolete offshore patrol vessels operating. In view of this, the *Defence Review 2015* makes it clear that the SAN's vessels can no longer be made ready to execute the full range of operations for which they were designed⁸⁰—all of which impact directly and heavily on South Africa's commitment to maintain good order at sea and to protect the country's national maritime interests.

The question is sometimes asked why it is taking so long to implement Project Biro. This is because the Department of Defence and the SAN have been in the process of reviewing the budget before they finalize the contracting process,⁸¹ but Walker⁸² also rightly argues that this can be attributed largely to the legacy of the 1999 Arms Deal. The controversy

over this deal made additional military purchases economically impossible and politically difficult to justify. Moreover, the economy saw a contraction in GDP in recent years and socio-economic matters are clearly taking precedence over maritime and naval challenges in political circles. This is further aggravated by much ignorance on maritime affairs among the public at large which is exacerbated by the fact that many South Africans do not seem to realize the importance of maritime (in)security. These matters have effectively put the SAN in an almost impossible position to purchase the new vessels it needs to optimally ensure maritime security in the medium and longer term.

Against this background, an old truth regarding naval affairs in South Africa seems to continue as a threat running through South Africa's naval history, namely that South Africa's existence became embroiled with local political, economic, and societal issues, rather than issues of international trade and maritime power.⁸³ Moreover, the words of the former Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Rusty Evans⁸⁴ that 'it is the task of the South African navy to convince the public that a strong navy will contribute to the prosperity of South Africa in particular, and Southern Africa in general' are today as relevant to the SAN as ever before—even more so in view of the above-mentioned growing civil-military gap in South Africa.

Acknowledgements The author wishes to note that this article is based upon work supported financially by the National Research Foundation of South Africa. Any opinion, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and therefore the NRF does not accept any liability in regard thereto.

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CHAPTER 4

The Expansion of Argentine Limits in the Continental Shelf: Implications in the International Scope

Rodrigo Milindre Gonzalez and Sergio Gabriel Caplan

INTRODUCTION

The Argentine Republic, if considering only the continental South American territory, is the eighth-largest country in the world with an extension of more than 2.7 million km². However, recognising its maritime jurisdictional spaces (i.e. the islands, and the Antarctic portion) the total of the Argentine territory amounts to 10 million km². Therefore, it holds one of the most extensive areas of the planet: approximately between 6 and 7 million km². Indeed, it has a rich diversity of resources, encompassing fishing, energy, biodiversity, and minerals, which led Argentina to present very early progress in referring the norms of its national maritime spaces.

In 1916, Admiral Segundo Rosa Storni developed a doctrine in which he claimed the right to Argentina's continental shelf and the resources

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É. Duarte, M. Correia de Barros (eds.), *Navies and Maritime Policies in the South Atlantic*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10600-3_4

contained therein. The 1944 Decree no. 1386, declared the country's continental shelf to be a mineral reserve and, two years later, in 1946, the Decree no. 14,708, based on the Truman Proclamation of 1945 on the natural prolongation of the territory, claimed Argentina's sovereignty over the Epicontinental Seaways and the Continental Slope. In 1966, the Law no. 17,094, which complies with the 1958 Geneva Convention, reaffirmed sovereignty over the soil and subsoil of areas adjacent to its territory up to 200 metres deep or beyond this limit, up to the depth that allowed the exploitation of the resources in the mentioned areas.

This contextualisation allows recognising Argentina's political wiliness in its respective continental shelf. Since the establishment of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), on 31 December 1995, the country began a work agenda that sought an expansion of up to 350 nautical miles. For this purpose, the Law no. 24,815 created the National Commission on the Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf (COPLA)¹ under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship and with the collaboration of the Ministry of Economy and Production and Naval Hydrography Service. It had the role of preparing Argentina's bid proposal to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.² However, in addressing the question of the extension to 350 nautical miles from Argentina, it resurfaces the issue of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, and the South Sandwich Islands.

The proposal submitted to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) received a favourable review,³ but it granted Argentina a mere 21% of the demand, thus discarding from the analysis the Antarctic space, due to the clauses of the Antarctic Treaty. It also acknowledged the controversy around the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, and the South Sandwich Islands and stated it was not able to recognise the claims of the contested space. Therefore, the CLCS review only referred to a minimum fraction of the total required area, which was 1,782,000 km². However, if the CLCS stated that the Argentinian presentation was well-founded, it goes without saying that the non-recognised territories should be considered as well.

Far from closure, the limited approval of Argentina's demand brings to the fore a set of regional and international controversies in the Southern Atlantic and Antarctica. Among the several interests and actors involved, Argentina has the central role in setting a more collaborative or contentious agenda to deal with them. This chapter aims to contribute a review of Argentinian maritime interests and perceived threats, and the domestic and foreign policies to address them.

This chapter presents a historical narrative of the Malvinas and Antarctica issues from an Argentinian perspective, which considers both areas as the same geopolitical bloc. The second section analyses the Argentinian submission to the CLCS of the United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea. As one can see, that submission is one of several actions. It entails that the Argentinian approach to the South Atlantic is equivalent to Till's modern states definition.⁴ It regards the Malvinas and Antarctica as core resources of national interest and power. To lose those claims means to be forced to accept lower levels of security and power. Given the asymmetric conditions of naval capabilities in relation to the UK, Argentina conducts a long-term soft-balancing strategy by investing in marine scientific and technological projects, maritime industry and infrastructure improvements in the coastal areas of Terra del Fuego and installations in Antarctica. Besides all that, it tracks constant regional and domestic mobilisations regarding the issue.

The third and fourth sections present the regional geopolitics of the Malvinas and Antarctica, assessing the divergent and convergent interests in relation to Argentinian ones. The British claims and presence are taken by Argentina as a zero-sum relationship, though Chile–Argentina bilateral relations have evolved positively since both countries' re-democratisation, and they share convergent interests regarding Antarctica. The relations with Uruguay rest on more ambiguous grounds, and there are contentions between Argentina and Uruguay in the demarcation of their continental shelves. Finally, Argentina sees Brazil as a core partner to catalyse the Malvinas and Antarctica issues into a South American agenda.

The chapter concludes presenting an assessment of Argentinian current conditions and the most recent developments regarding the Malvinas and Antarctica, mainly the shifts of policy towards the region in Macri's administration.

A HISTORY OF THE MALVINAS AND ANTARCTICA ISSUES

Spain discovered the Malvinas Islands in 1520, later occupied by France, and then taken over by Spain in the Treaty of San Ildefonso, and later by the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, becoming, in 1810, part of Argentinian sovereignty. The dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom dates back 195 years. In 1820, the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata sent a frigate, under the command of American privateer David Jewett, to the islands to reaffirm their rights over them.

In December 1831, the North American corvette *Lexington* attacked the Argentinian population living on the islands⁵ due to reports that US-flagged schooner fishing vessels—*Harriet*, *Breakwater*, *Superior*, and *Belville*—had been captured by Luis Vernet, governor of the Malvinas Islands. According to the local authority, they had failed to comply with the rule that any vessel, independently of which nation it came from, should be confiscated if caught undertaking fishing activities in the region. The United Kingdom, although not at war with the Argentine Confederation, seized the moment and attacked the islands, as well as the US corvette, and established a military garrison. In that instance, it forcibly displaced Argentine residents and authorities and maintained British presence in the archipelago.

In the twentieth century, despite the litigation, a cooperative relationship between the two countries evolved, by which Argentina provided education, health, and transportation for the islands' residents, thus keeping a connection with them. However, that environment erupted abruptly on 2 April 1982. The Argentine military regime attempted to retake the Malvinas in pursuit of domestic appeasement since the fortunes of the regime had eroded due to the economic and social crisis in the country and accusations of abuses of power. The conflict was not limited to Argentina and the United Kingdom. While Peru was collaborating with Argentina through the deployment of aircraft and armaments, Chile worked with the United Kingdom through surveillance by radars installed in Punta Arenas, in the south of Chile. At the beginning of May 1982, days after the outbreak of the conflict, the United Kingdom attacked Puerto Argentino and Puerto Darwin and later sank the cruiser *General Belgrano*, resulting in the deaths of 323 people. The conflict lasted 74 days and killed 255 Britons and 649 Argentines, mostly unprepared for that war. It ended on 14 June through a ceasefire signed between General Jeremy Moore, the British commander, and Mario Menéndez, the military governor of the islands.

The most disputed point by some states regarding the Argentine demand before the CLCS is the Antarctic matter. The country's presence began in the second decade of the nineteenth century. In 1904, Argentina started the permanent occupation of Argentinian Antarctica, and in that space, it installed bases for scientific purposes, which, in a territorial way, are under the tutelage of the Tierra del Fuego National Territory.

Along with the progress of Argentine research, other countries began to establish scientific bases in the area since the 1940s, generating a complex network of scientific institutions working together. That led to the necessity of discussing an Antarctic Treaty due to the Cold War scenario. The Antarctic Treaty is developed in a tripod: scientific activities, claims of possession, and militarisation. This tripod allows explaining the processes that led to the construction of a global framework which had the intention of disabling potential conflicts. Between 1957 and 1959, 11 countries that had conducted scientific research in and around Antarctica celebrated the International Geophysical Year. South Africa, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, the United States of America, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union met in Washington, DC, and on 1 December 1959, they signed the Antarctic Treaty, which entered into force in 1961.

The Treaty, as mentioned above, was based on the establishment of peace on the continent, leaving it very clear in Article I:

ARTICLE I. 1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited, *inter alia*, any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any type of weapons.

2. The present treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel or equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes.⁶

In this sense, the treaty at its outset prohibited the possibility of any use of the continent for military purposes. Given its year of celebration, the treaty achieved significant progress. In fact, this was the first non-proliferation mechanism in a given space, as evidenced in Article 5. The second aspect explained at the beginning of the section is the matter of territorial claims, which is the critical point to address the challenges received by UN member states, where Argentina's demand for sovereignty is part of the Antarctic space:

ARTICLE IV. 1. Nothing contained in the present treaty shall be interpreted as: (a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica; (b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of its activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise; (c) prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition or non-recognition of any other States right of or claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.

2. No acts or activities taking place while the present treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica, shall be asserted while the present treaty is in force.⁷

Notwithstanding, the above article presents a denial of sovereign order requests, dedicating the territory a continental space, even after Argentina's demands for sovereignty, up to 350 nautical miles on the Antarctic area, and declaring it Argentine territory.

There is a critical factor in the case of Antarctica: its geo-economic importance. There are already indications, through multidimensional mapping, that there are mineral reserves (oil and gas) that can supply future demand for the primary fuel consumers. It is all the more critical given the fact that by 2048 the limitations imposed by the Treaty on the exploitation of the area will be opened for review. With this, Argentina seeks to assume its preponderant role in Antarctica, due to its proximity and historical background of pursuing the country's territorial extension towards the south. From a geopolitical perspective, the Antarctic continent represents the ability to control trade routes between continents, especially if considered in combination with the British control of the Malvinas Islands and its southern area.

ARGENTINA UP TO 350 NAUTICAL MILES: THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NATIONAL DEMAND

In Argentina's case, one can observe its maritime dominions have early and consensual relevance in the domestic agenda. The development of its bid for an extended economic exclusive maritime zone took place between 2001 and 2002. Foreign companies performed the processes of craniometry, magnetometry, seismic, bathymetry, and gravimetry up to 350 nautical miles.⁸

In 2004, new surveys were carried out by the *Puerto Deseado* hydrographic ship, which performed survey tasks in the south region of Tierra del Fuego, and other hydrographic vessels completed data collection in the Antarctic sector. That led to the verification of the size of the Argentine demand which encompasses the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia, and the South Sandwich Islands and the Argentine Antarctic Sector within a range of 350 nautical miles.

In 2009, COPLA presented the report on the outer limits of the Argentine continental shelf to the CLCS. It stated: 'The technical and scientific work carried out confirms the geographical extension of our sovereign rights over the bed and subsoil resources in more than 1,782,000 km² of the Argentine continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, which add up to the approximately 4,799,000 km² comprised between baselines and 200 nautical miles.'⁹

While states are free to submit their territorial claims, the CLCS clarified that under no circumstances would considerations be given to disputed or limited sovereignty territories, such as the archipelagos of the South Atlantic and the Antarctic region, respectively. The CLCS's formal recognition of the 2016 Argentine presentation only involves non-disputed areas between the borders with Uruguay, the north of the contested archipelagos, and a small portion south of Tierra del Fuego. Antarctic territories remain under the jurisdiction of the Antarctic Treaty System. Nevertheless, even if the CLCS did not formally recognise it, the Argentine legal interpretation indicates that if the studies conducted by COPLA were considered successful, they apply to all the survey performed, including the territories in dispute, which Argentina considers sovereign.

For these reasons, Argentina will continue to strengthen the regionalisation of the dispute. Through diplomatic actions, the country will highlight that the presence of an extra-regional power will affect the strategic resources of the region in the general context. Thus, it will continue to justify its presence in the South Atlantic and Antarctica.

However, for that to happen, its physical presence will need a simultaneous strengthening of the infrastructure in Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego, mainly within the parts with access to Antarctica (for example, the development of the formation of the Logistics Pole, in Ushuaia). At the same time, and from a qualitative perspective, there will be the need to increase Argentina's presence on the white continent (through for example the creation of a Logistic Centre in Marambio or Petrel) as well as in the South Atlantic.

In this sense, it is worth noting the importance of Law 26,651 sanctioned in 2010, which establishes the obligation to use the bi-continental map of the Argentine Republic at all levels and modalities of the educational system and public display in all national and provincial bodies. This new map includes Argentine Antarctica; the archipelagos of the South Atlantic are located in the centre of the map and also reflecting the extension of the Argentine Sea and its respective continental shelf.¹⁰

The new map contributes to the strengthening of Argentina's position in the face of the conflict in the South Atlantic, as the British occupation of the South Atlantic Islands is not a matter of 'some southern archipelagos', but rather the occupation of a foreign power that affects the South Atlantic and Antarctica. Still, Antarctica is not a small part of Argentina: the new map helps to raise awareness of the relevance that the white continent has in the international system today and reinforces the importance of the Argentine presence there where all the Argentinian Antarctic bases are located. Finally, it manifests one of the main Argentinian potentialities: the sea. The Argentine Sea, as noted, has many resources along its continental shelf.

Within the field of research and industry, there is real development and technological advances that seek to promote new maritime activities, mainly in the shipping industry, but also in offshore exploration and exploitation, spatial planning, and marine science, among others. In this sense, Law no. 26,875 promulgated the creation of the Namuncurá Marine Protected Area—Burdwood Bank, in the south of the Argentine Sea—which was enacted in August 2013. It proposes to demonstrate that Argentina has the will to protect the environment, promoting scientific research and the sustainable use of natural resources, seeking to prevent the UK from being able to do so. Finally, the government of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner launched the Pampa Azul initiative, whose aim is to:

deepen scientific knowledge as a fundamental foundation of conservation and natural resource management policies; to promote technological innovations applicable to the sustainable exploitation of natural resources and to the development of industries linked to the sea; strengthen the maritime awareness of Argentine society; and to support, through information and scientific presence, Argentinean sovereignty in the area of the South Atlantic.¹¹

The strategic plan for scientific research in the Argentine Sea includes both exploration and conservation activities; technological innovation for the productive sectors linked to the sea; and scientific outreach aimed at the general public, whereby interdisciplinary campaigns will be carried out in five areas, using oceanographic vessels and remotely controlled submarine vehicles. The five priority geographic regions are the so-called 'Blue Hole'¹² of the continental slope: the Burdwood-Namuncurá bank, the San Jorge Gulf, the sub-Antarctic areas (the maritime zones of the South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands), and the estuary of Rio de la Plata.

Consequently, Argentina considers that the Malvinas, Antarctica, and the South Atlantic constitute a unique strategic system. That is because, although there are various geological and geographic conformations and different legal systems in each of the three zones, the geopolitical scenario and the actors involved are the same, with overlapping interests. For this reason, Argentina points out that its national defence system should adapt accordingly to this vision of the South Atlantic, which will become increasingly relevant in the twenty-first century. However, Argentina has challenges regarding deployment of a naval force, since it presents platforms of advanced age, budgetary constraints and no future perspective of investments.¹³ The Argentine Navy consists of:

- Three tactical submarines, on average 40 years old since their construction in Germany: the ARA *Salta* (S-31), ARA *Santa Cruz* (S-41), and ARA *San Juan* (S-42), that has gone missing recently. Even with constant modernisation, they do not present the capacity of a modern force of submarines.
- Four destroyers of Almirante Brown-class, also of German construction (MEKO 360), which, even with upgrade capacities, present an advanced age as they dated from the 1980s.
- Six Espora-class multi-purpose German-designed frigates (MEKO 140) built in Argentina. The last two were delivered between 2001 and 2004 due to budgetary issues but improved with automation of some processes.
- Three French Drummond-class corvettes dating from the early 1980s.
- Two Intéprika-class speedboats, dating from the 1970s.
- The support ship ARA *Teniente Olivieri*, of American origin and built in the 1980s, which operates mainly in UN peacekeeping operations and tugging bigger vessels.
- The ARA *Alférez Sobral* performs supplying and towing Argentine military ships and rescuing of civilian ships.
- Finally, the ARA *King* of 1943 still serves as an instruction vessel.

The Argentine naval force is between 30 and 40 years of age, most of its vessels being second-hand acquisitions. What is evident is the lag of these in comparison with other armadas, even of countries of the region. Apparently, in a short period, Argentina will have to face the expense of replacing a significant share of its fleet or live without it.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARGENTINIAN DISPUTE

The expansion of sovereign dominion beyond 200 nautical miles intensely revives the debate over the sovereignty of the Malvinas Islands archipelago. Previously, during the evaluation of Argentina's demand, this issue was received by the British delegation at the United Nations, reaffirming sovereignty over the territory. However, the issuance of a favourable review by the CLCS in 2016 revived the debate over the ownership of the territories.¹⁴

The United Kingdom does not recognise the Commission's decision by stating that it has the character of a recommendation rather than order. Also, the Commission would not evaluate claims submitted from areas that are under territorial dispute.¹⁵

Some multilateral forums replicate the dispute over sovereignty, such as MERCOSUR, ZPCSA, and UNASUR, in which the debates of groups of states are fiercer due to the British claim beyond 200 nautical miles. This claim is forcefully contested by Argentina, just as the European nation contests the Argentine expansion. The military exercises carried out in the region, added to the prospect of oil deposits, have intensified the debate between the two countries.

The United Kingdom

Addressing the question of extending up to 350 nautical miles from Argentina, it is imperative to observe the issue of sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia, and the South Sandwich Islands.

The dispute over the Malvinas Islands is a consistent policy in Argentine history. In spite of the different approaches, according to the ideology of the managing government, the will of recovering the exercise of sovereignty over the archipelagos of the South Atlantic was never abandoned. In 1994, the Reform of the National Constitution included the First Transitional Provision, which reads:

The Argentine Nation ratifies its legitimate and imprescriptible sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia, and the South Sandwich Islands and the corresponding maritime and island spaces, being an integral part of the national territory. The recovery of these territories and the full exercise of sovereignty, respecting the way of life of its inhabitants and by the principles of International Law, constitute a permanent and inalienable objective of the Argentine people.¹⁶

The Malvinas Islands are part of the continental shelf of Argentina, which implies that this territory is under Argentine sovereignty.

Established by UNCLOS, the central issue in the dispute over the sovereignty of maritime areas is that by invoking sovereignty the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland grants operating licences and exploitation of natural resources. This opening reaches a lot of possibilities from fishing and oil, to the extraction of rare land resources and the obtaining of patents on biological diversity for pharmaceutical purposes and other resources of the seabed.

Accordingly, the United Kingdom submitted and presented a report to the CLCS claiming that the continental shelf would extend from the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia, and Sandwich Islands. According to the calculation of the International Boundary Research Unit of the University of Durham (United Kingdom), the area claimed by the United Kingdom extends approximately 2.5 million km² of the continental shelf, surrounding the archipelagos of the South Atlantic, and 2.8 million km² of the Antarctic continental shelf. If we add 1,200,000 km² of Antarctic continental territory to these surfaces, the United Kingdom in reality claims a space of 6.5 million km², which is part of the Argentine territory. The British claim to seize this huge strategic area is the true scope of the conflict with Argentina.

The United Kingdom thus reserved the right to claim the platform, which also corresponds to the Antarctic sector, not only of Argentina but also of Chile. In this sense, as observed at the beginning of this chapter, the conflict by the archipelagos of the South Atlantic extends to the South Pole.

The Malvinas Islands, South Georgia, and the South Sandwich Islands have both economic and strategic potential.¹⁷ Therefore, the UK, in addition to the island territories mentioned above, makes up the British belt in the Atlantic Ocean. The islands of Saint Helena, Tristan da Cunha, and Ascension translate the search for maintenance of power since the presence of the USA in the South Atlantic is not a primary objective.

Therefore, from a strategic point of view, the control of this chain of islands allows the control of the maritime traffic that moves from the Pacific to the Atlantic, through the Strait of Magellan, especially in a scenario of closing the Panama Canal and the possible diversion of maritime traffic. The United Kingdom would have a significant advantage in the control of the sea lines that would circulate through the region.

Regarding the issue of maritime traffic, one may add the energy reserves as a variable in the sovereignty of the Malvinas Islands. Despite constant diplomatic assurances by the Argentine government, British companies have taken exploration vessels to the area and started searching for hydrocarbons, hence increasing the UK's energy capacity, which in the British exclusive economic zone (EEZ) on the islands totals approximately 60 million barrels of oil.

Proximity to the Antarctic is another strategic point. In other words, with 14 million km², and without political authority, protected through the Antarctic Treaty of 1959—in which all the signatory states pledged to freeze sovereignty disputes on the white continent—it presents substantial water richness added to the possibilities of the existence of energy reserves. Although it is an area exploited only for scientific purposes, it arouses the interest of several states, and there is a strong opposition by Argentina in relation to these other states' movement.

Consequently, the importance of the Antarctic continent contributes significantly to the geopolitics of Argentina and the region as a whole, regarding the defence of sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia, and the Sandwich Islands and their surrounding maritime spaces. The peculiarity of the Antarctic continent is that the territories south of the 60°S parallel are affected by the Antarctic Treaty. These include not only the Antarctic Peninsula but also the archipelagos of Orkney and South Shetland. As said before, the 1959 Treaty has 'frozen' all territorial claims in favour of international cooperation in scientific research and development, trying to pursue the goal of maintaining the continent as a zone of peace. This means that even if there is cooperation, there are overlapping claims among Argentina, the United Kingdom, and Chile, which have not been resolved yet. This has been the case since 1959 and the political map of Antarctica has remained unchanged.

The disputed area between the three countries is the Antarctic Peninsula, which is now an area of great geostrategic importance. That is because besides being the 'gateway' to the Antarctic continent, it is the area with the most natural resources and a more favourable climate for scientific expeditions. Therefore it is also the region of the continent that houses the largest number of research bases. For Argentina and Chile, having direct access to the Antarctic Peninsula means having the ability to control the navigation routes, representing this transoceanic passage as key to international trade.

Argentina and Chile have been historical precursors in the conduct of scientific research activities in Antarctica and have actively contributed to the establishment of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), which ensures cooperation, peacekeeping, and denuclearisation of the Antarctic continent. Over the last decades, the other countries of the region, to a greater or lesser extent, have become involved in these activities. As a result, both countries present themselves as critical countries in the process of regional integration in South America, especially in the face of the threat of an extra-regional power.

Furthermore, Argentina has the largest number of permanent bases in Antarctica, along with Russia, with six each. In addition to the summer bases, the country has a total of 13 active stations, while the British have only five bases (two permanent and three others in the summer). Also, Argentina is the only country that has maintained a constant Antarctic presence since 1904, with the installation of a meteorological station in the Orkney Islands, whereas the first British Antarctic base settled in 1943.

The cases of Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands are particular. These archipelagos are within what is known as the 'Antarctic Convergence'; which translates into an imaginary border that surrounds Antarctica in which the cold waters submerge under the relatively warm seas of the sub-Antarctic zone. For this reason, even though both archipelagos are north of parallel 60°S, they remain affected by the Antarctic Treaty System dealing with the protection of natural resources and the environment, in particular, the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR).¹⁸

However, unilaterally and circumventing CCAMLR's legal framework, the United Kingdom established, in February 2012, a Marine Protected Area around the Georgia Islands and the South Sandwich Islands, which covers more than one million km² to protect its biodiversity. Argentina opposes this action arguing that it is not the UK that manages this area.

Initially, the United Kingdom considered all these territories as 'Falkland Islands Dependencies', that is to say, they were under the tutelage of the government of the Islands. However, currently, it divides its overseas territories into three administrations in the South Atlantic, namely: the Antarctic Territory, the Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, and the Malvinas Islands as different overseas territories. Argentina, however, considers all these territories part of the same province: the province of 'Tierra del Fuego, Antarctica and Islands of the South Atlantic'.

This discussion demands an evaluation of the strategic scope since, with the sea expansion of the Argentine domain, there may be an increase in the military presence, either by Argentina to defend its space, or by the United Kingdom to reaffirm its sovereignty over the overseas territories under discussion.¹⁹ This point is made very clear by the statement of the British Secretary of Defence to increase the defence budget for the archipelago by US\$250 million.²⁰ This increase in strategic capacity, through investments, added to the military contingent already present in the archipelago, reaffirms the role of the region in the British geopolitical and strategic field. Nevertheless, the escalation of power in the area will influence the outcome of a change of the strategy of defence constructed by Argentina for the region.

Regarding this, the National Security Strategy, Strategic Defence and Security Review of 2015, to bring it closer to the debate, addresses two critical aspects of the British Overseas Territories. The first involves the defence of these territories, since they have a constitutional connection with the nation, and their interests and their self-determination will be defended against the threats that have arisen. The second point concerns the British defence of the archipelago:

4.18 We will continue to work closely with the Falkland Islanders to defend their right to self-determination, which is enshrined in the Charter of the UN. They face an unjustified claim of ownership from Argentina. We judge the risk of a military attack to be low, but we will retain a deterrence posture, with sufficient military forces in the region, including Royal Navy warships, Army units, and RAF Typhoon aircraft. We will invest up to £300 million over the next 10 years to enhance operational communications, renew the existing air defence system and upgrade infrastructure.²¹

We see that there is British willingness to increase the defence budget applied to the region. However, between 2015 and 2016, there was a US\$100 million reduction in the budget for the archipelago. Still, the amount to be invested in the area for defence is significant.²² In this sense, the military strength and the military means available in this British space include 1200 soldiers, 11 of these experts in bombs, along with the Royal Navy which contributes one destroyer with guided missiles and one permanent patrolman, the HMS *Clyde*. On behalf of the Royal Air Force there are:

- one Hercules C-130; one air transport and transport aircraft;
- two Sea King helicopters intended for search and rescue in the Search and Rescue Responsibility Area—which is their responsibility in the Atlantic Ocean;
- four Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft, coupled with the earmarked budget.

All these capacity demonstrates the UK's geopolitical longings in the South Atlantic.²³ Therefore, it is important to note that not only there is a de facto control in the Malvinas Islands Archipelago, but also there is a continuous extension of control over the South Atlantic, which in strategic cooperation with the USA, involves the monitoring of commercial routes operating in the southern area.

From the Argentine point of view, the United Kingdom lacks any legal, historical, or geographical basis that legitimises sovereign claims to the Islands, making use of different excuses to justify its presence.²⁴ An example would be the protection of the environment in the case of the Georgia and South Sandwich Islands and the support of the 'will' for self-determination of the Islanders, determined by a referendum that was organised in February 2013, and which was widely publicised.

Additionally, from the Latin country's view, these actions from the UK were an attempt to create a false legitimacy that overlaps the principle of self-determination under that of territorial integrity. The United Nations resolutions and the First Transitory Provision of the National Constitution of the Argentine Republic establish the need to respect the 'interests' of the current population in the Islands. However, that is respect for their lifestyle, nationality, and customs, not the vote of approximately 2000 Britons deployed on an island 14,000 km from the United Kingdom. Therefore, it should not have the strength of self-determination and decide the fate of several million km² of space, considered sovereign by the Argentines, as the conflict is a matter of territory, not about the people.

Chile

Like Argentina, Chile observes the need to expand its national domain of the continental shelf, since there are conditions for carrying out scientific works and exploring the natural extension of the platform beyond 200 nautical miles. In this sense, in 2009, the country presented to the

Commission,²⁵ in addition to the claim to expanded natural space, a demand identical to Argentina's, its claim to Antarctic territory.

It is the Antarctic mainland, that is, in their present physical spaces and the northern projection of the Antarctic continent, that is precisely the point of debate between both countries, and on which they have overlapping demands. But, once again, their intentions to expand the limits of state's domination within reach of the Antarctic continent are frozen by the Antarctic Treaty, which prevents the expansive ambitions of nations.

One can infer from the geographical proximity and the continuity of the geological formations that the Antarctic portion, which includes the peninsula, corresponds to the South American continent. Thus, the future of Antarctica is a critical factor for the South American countries, and that is why they must stand united, defending the continental sector that belongs to them. Also, the legal claims from both Argentina and Chile plus their historical presence in the region, leave no doubt about the legitimacy of the Argentine pretensions in the white continent.

Argentina and Chile, hence, are the leaders in the matter of Antarctica. Therefore, they represent the South American interests in the white continent in the international scene. Since the signature of the Argentine–Chilean treaty of mutual recognition of sovereignty over the respective sectors of 1948—in which both countries recognise each other's rights in the Antarctic—it was decided to grant to the portion of overlapping territory the name of 'South American Antarctica'. The treaty also established different frameworks for cooperation in scientific and logistical research, as well as a commitment to act by mutual consent in the legal protection and defence of their rights in this territory.

Before the signing of the Antarctic Treaty, this agreement was able to respond to the international context. Embodied in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (ITRA), the new post-war order had given rise to a hemispheric system of collective security. It applied throughout the Western hemisphere 'from pole to pole', and excluded any attempt at territorial control by a foreign power in the continent, mainly to combat the influence of Soviet communism. Based on the Argentine–Chilean treaty, Argentina and Chile sought to justify the rejection of British pretensions under the 'South American Antarctic', disseminating the message that regardless of whether these territories belong to Chile or Argentina, it was clear that this Antarctic portion belonged to the continent.

However, during the military administrations in both countries (Argentinian and Chilean democracies never confronted each other),

there were territorial conflicts that came close to resulting in armed confrontations: the first concerns the conflict of the Beagle Channel.

The agreement on arbitration in the Beagle Channel of 22 July 1971 called for the determination of the Argentine–Chilean boundaries in the Beagle Channel and the award of the Picton, Nueva, Lennox, and adjacent islands. For this settlement the Government of Her Britannic Majesty was designated the arbiter of the border dispute, yet the United Kingdom was to add to arbitration an Arbitral Tribunal composed of five judges of the International Court of Justice. The outcome of the litigation came six years later through the Arbitral Award of 1977. The same awarded to Chile the Lennox, Nueva, and Picton Islands, located in the Beagle Channel. While the Pinochet government immediately recognised the result, the same did not happen on the Argentine side, as it would allow Chile to project in the Atlantic Ocean, a result that was considered serious for Argentine strategists of the military regime.

By entirely following the results of the arbitration, the Chilean government installed the surveillance and signal stations under the command of Navy officers. On the other hand, the Argentine government ordered the movement of part of the naval fleet and troops to the south. Later, on 25 January 1978, the Argentine government declared the results presented by the Arbitral Tribunal null and void. Nevertheless, Videla and Pinochet met on 20 February in the Chilean city of Puerto Montt, where they signed a protocol to continue bilateral negotiations. With this, military activities in the region ceased, and freedom of navigation was ensured in the disputed area.

The negotiations were resumed later, through the mediation of Pope John Paul II. The proposal granted Chile the islands Lennox, Picton, Nueva, Evout, Barnevelt, Freycinet, Wollaston, Terhalten, and Sesambre all the way to the island of Hornos. The surrounding coastline of these islands was considered to be the Chilean Territorial Sea, while the Pope granted to Argentina the possibility of installing an aid system for navigation on the Evout and Barnevelt Islands and a joint air terminal control system in Nueva Island, for the use of regular flights to Antarctica. Also, there was a proposal to create a ‘Zone of Joint Activities and Repairs’ or ‘Sea of Peace Zone’, in which both countries would jointly explore the living and non-living resources of the seacoast and subsoil.

After the Malvinas conflict in 1982, Argentina reconsidered the 1972 Judicial Dispute Settlement Treaty. In this sense, with the return of democracy in Argentina, on 6 July 1984, before the definitive version of

the agreement, Argentine President Raúl Alfonsín called a popular non-binding consultation, in which 82% of Argentines agreed to establish an agreement to end the litigation between the countries. The signing of the Peace and Friendship Treaty (29 November 1984) concluded the Beagle Strait conflict.

Chile obtained the recognition of its sovereignty over all the islands off the Isla Grande de Tierra del Fuego (except the Argentine ones to the north side of the channel). Despite that, Chile has renounced most of the marine rights granted under international law. Both countries have negotiated navigation rights in the zone and, therefore, Argentina has renounced its aspirations in the Strait of Magellan.

Moreover, before the signing of the peace treaty between Argentina and Chile, the possibility of a conflict between the two countries was avoided during the Malvinas War, in which the Chilean dictatorship's support for the British victory in the war was fundamental. The release of documents from the conflict has allowed access to previously restricted information. This information in the regional context shows the military cooperation between Chile and the United Kingdom since the radars located in the Chilean city of Punta Arenas allowed the Royal Air Force to observe the movements of the Argentine Air Force.²⁶

In this sense, the solidarity provided by Chile to Argentina during the conflict was a deterrent, since Chile's declared public support for the United Kingdom threatened an imminent conflict in the Beagle Channel. However, the demonstration of support for Argentina prevented the reactivation of the dispute in the southern space, and by providing confidential support to the United Kingdom, Chile would receive military assistance in the event of outbreaks of hostility in the canal and improvements in its military capacity.

Despite the historical differences between Argentina and Chile, current bilateral relations indicate a strong bond of cooperation and understanding. Several declarations signed by both countries during the 1990s, together with the solution of the historical tension towards the border delimitation and the corresponding discard of the conflict hypothesis, are a sign of understanding between the two countries.

The cooperation is now clearly demonstrated by the creation of the Southern Cross Joint and Combined Peace Force for United Nations peacekeeping missions and the successful operation of the Combined Naval Antarctic Patrol (CNAP). The latter's mission is to safeguard human life at sea, to combat contamination, and ensure the preservation of the

ecosystem, in compliance with the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty. Finally, there is the strong support of the Chilean government for the Argentine dispute over the Malvinas Islands.

Also, there are areas to be increased in the Argentine–Chilean bilateral relations. To reach a joint Antarctic policy sometime in the future, the strengthening of regional governance mechanisms is needed. One way of achieving this strengthening is for example through commercial competition over the southern ports, mainly between Ushuaia and Punta Arenas, two cities calling themselves ‘Antarctic bridges’. Although the rivalry between the two cities is latent, the relationship could be predisposed to generate spaces of cooperation, based on complementary actions in several areas.

Given the long Antarctic trajectory of these countries, Argentina and Chile present themselves as key countries in the process of regional maritime cooperation, as well as calling for greater responsibility from their South American neighbours in the future developments of that area of the globe.²⁷

Uruguay

Regarding the maritime borders with Uruguay, the Treaty of Rio de la Plata and its Maritime Front of 1973 settle the boundaries between both countries, and it mentions:

Article 70. The maritime lateral boundary and the continental shelf boundary between the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Argentine Republic is defined by the equidistance line determined by the adjacent coasts method, which starts from the midpoint of the baseline constituted by the straight line between Punta del Este (Eastern Republic of Uruguay) and Punta Rasa del Cabo San Antonio (Argentine Republic).²⁸

In this sense, the resulting divergences in the demands of the two countries have a solution based on the legal tradition built mainly after the construction of the treaty. Notwithstanding, it still lacks a delimitation of this space. Therefore the discussion should be bilateral, since unilaterally, Uruguay considers the continuation of the limits already proclaimed in the treaty. Moreover, Argentina would consider that the treaty does not apply to space and, hence, it is for the CLCS to establish the limit between the two countries, putting an end to the impasse.²⁹

This argument is clear through the first representation, in which the limit is represented on the Argentine side by the Blue line, from points RA-1 to RA-15 and on the Uruguayan side, by the Red line, from points U-1 to U-30. Notably, the extremes of both demands do not coincide, even though these two countries share the same geological morphology of the continental shelf. This point causes the divergence between the claims of Argentina and Uruguay. The second image presents the surveys carried out by the two countries, showing the maximum limits of the extended continental platform, pleaded before the CLCS, which seeks, through the first image, to make evident this discrepancy of areas demanded.³⁰

Brazil

It is also worth noting the role of Brazil, which started to enter the international agenda as a global player during Lula da Silva's administration, in the direction of a leading position within the region. The South Atlantic presents itself as its natural space of projection, control, and security, meaning that its interests for participating in Antarctic activities are also increasing.

Building on and strengthening a South American identity, based on cooperation among the countries of the region, Brazil could lead a joint project that takes into account the interests of all South American countries in Antarctica, taking advantage of the broad experience and natural comparative advantages that Chile and Argentina have. In this context, we can observe that there is not only a growing interest of the South American countries towards the white continent, but also great possibilities for cooperation at a regional level.³¹

Brazil, Uruguay, Ecuador, and Peru are advisory members of the Antarctic Treaty, along with Argentina and Chile, which enables them to participate in the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCM), with voice and vote in the decision-making process. Furthermore, the states form part of the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR); and through their respective Antarctic institutes, are also members of the Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs (COMNAP).

From COMNAP in 1990 there arose the idea of creating the Meeting of Administrators of Latin American Antarctic Programmes (MALAP), which is a forum for reflection and cooperation to coordinate and optimise resources between the national programmes of Latin American countries, on the initiative of Argentina. In this forum, the six South

American countries participate in consultative status through their respective national Antarctic programmes: the Argentine Antarctic Institute (IAA), the Chilean Antarctic Institute (INACH), the Ecuadorian Antarctic Institute (INAE), the Peruvian Antarctic Institute (INANPE), the Brazilian Antarctic Programme (PROANTAR), and the Uruguayan Antarctic Institute (IAU).

Along these lines, it is relevant to notice the other cooperation initiatives that the Argentine Republic promotes in the South Atlantic: the Commission for Inland Fisheries and Aquaculture for Latin America and the Caribbean (COPESCAALC); the Commission for Conservation Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR); the Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels (ACAP); the Joint Technical Commission of the Maritime Front (CTMFM); the International Whaling Commission (IWC); and the Regional Fisheries Advisory Commission for the Atlantic (CARPAS).

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Argentine defence policy in recent years seems to be shifting and can be divided into two parts: the first during the government of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and the second, although at the beginning, through the government of Mauricio Macri. Therefore, this final section summarises the main points of this chapter in light of Macri's administration reviews of Argentina's policies towards the Argentine continental shelf, the legal possibility of extending it, and its regional implications.

First, from a strategic point of view, the expansion of the Argentine continental shelf raises the question of the state's ability to defend it. That is because the Argentine naval fleet is in a delicate situation, due to the average age of the equipment that makes it unviable to carry out an operation of more significant proportions, as well as requiring a large budgetary support for the modernisation of the fleet. Some region countries are replicating that as a trend. In other words, since an agenda for the upgrading of the state's defence mechanisms was not intended, once the region is far from the axis of conflict, it was supposed to not have the presence or the focus of the great powers in the South Atlantic region. However, this context is presenting itself in a contrary way.

During the Kirchner administration, the maritime policy was published in two important documents: the elaboration of the Defence White Paper in 2010 and the updating of the National Defence Policy Directive in

2014. These two documents outlined guidelines for the protection of national areas, whether on land borders or at sea, as discussed in this chapter. The second document, the Directive, presented the updated points of the armed forces' employment in Argentina, as well as the approach to the question of the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia, and the South Sandwich Islands. It also stated the planning guidelines for the next years of the Argentine Navy. Effectively, it is worth noticing that Argentina received four Russian vessels in December 2015.

The Mauricio Macri administration presented a change in defence policy. It sought to review the budget insolvency of military services, since 70% of it only covers personnel payments and benefits. It launched the preliminary phases for the acquisition of a class of Multipurpose Ocean Patrols and the Gripen NG aircraft, replacing its outdated or inoperative Mirages. Finally, Macri reversed Kirchner's passionate discourse on the Malvinas Islands, favouring the basis for negotiation, which may clarify a focus on seeking to modernise the armada, to possess equipment capable of responding to British demonstrations of power in the southern region.

However, during his second year in office, President Mauricio Macri completely de-funded the armed forces. This development had its high point with the disappearance of submarine ARA *San Juan* with 44 crew members on board in November 2017, of which nothing is yet known and the Argentine government seems unable to give any response. The search and rescue operations were carried out by foreign armed forces, among which that of the Russian Navy stands out. On the other hand, the handling of information regarding this issue by the government and the mass media seems to point to hiding the truth from the Argentine population.

As a second issue, the fact that the CLCS recognises the existence of a territorial dispute and that the Malvinas Islands might be within the EEZ of Argentina represents a more forceful position on the part of the Argentine government, which opens perspectives for new pressures. Therefore, discussing the topic of conflicts, the disputes that may raise due to the new demarcation of the Argentine borders in the sea are those that, relevantly, weight the regional agenda, either to a higher or lower degree. The limits regarding the Malvinas is a point which London does not recognise in the recommendations of the Commission, along with the residents of the Islands' unwillingness to identify themselves as Argentines. To widen the discussion beyond whether the inhabitants regard themselves as British or Argentine, the fact is that in the absence of a South American identity, it is impossible using a referendum to recover the spaces

in dispute, as there is not a separation between the culture of the islanders and the culture of the metropolis.

In this sense, the Malvinas issue in the Macri administration lost emphasis for two reasons: first, the public agenda is marked by much more urgent issues, such as uncontrolled inflation, mass layoffs, labour and social security reforms, adjustment policies taken by the government, external debt, and repression of social protest. The second reason is that President Macri places his commercial interests with the United Kingdom and with the International Monetary Fund above the national interests of the Argentine Republic. Clear examples of this policy are the abandonment of state policies aimed at raising awareness about the Malvinas issue among the Argentine population—the Secretariat for Malvinas Islands Affairs under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was eliminated just after the new government took office in 2015; the ‘casual’ forgetfulness of placing the Malvinas Islands on the unofficial maps of the government’s advertising policy; and the manoeuvre used in the design of the new bills of legal tender, where instead of featuring the Argentine bicontinental map (the mandatory use of which in official maps we saw above), highlights the ‘old map’ and the bicontinental figure in that famous small square in the lower right margin where before only the Argentine Antarctic Sector was featured.

However, all these policies of the current administration, with the great help of the mass media, which aim to misinform the population and eliminate the national sovereignty issues from the public agenda, do not diminish the legitimate right of the Republic of Argentina to claim its sovereignty over the Western South Atlantic. It should be noted that the historic policies of the Argentine Foreign Ministry regarding the claim on the islands remain in force, although not with the publicity they deserve, nor with the presence of the Executive Branch in international forums, such as the Decolonization Committee or the General Assembly of the United Nations, where it was customary to reiterate the claim with the previous administrations.

A third critical point is the issue of Antarctica, discussed in this chapter, as it is a delicate issue in the international agenda due to its environmental and scientific relevance. Territorial aspirations in the area are interpreted as a possibility of total control of space, and also the full exploitation of the natural resources of the continental shelf of the space. On one hand, Antarctica has always been present in the geopolitical aspirations of the great powers; however, the construction of a legal framework, which is the Antarctic Treaty, has put an end to discussions of territorial possessions in

the area. On the other hand, there is an overlap of Antarctic demands between Argentina and Chile. Even though the Commission will not consider both countries, the meeting of the two areas in the same continental platform opens space for discussion of the boundaries between countries. Furthermore, the history of the demarcation of boundaries between the two countries, which is fraught with conflict mainly because of the Chilean support to the United Kingdom in the 1982 Malvinas War, and the presence of Chilean citizens in the Malvinas Islands, represents another topic between Argentina and Chile to deal with. Therefore, it can be considered a separate point when the evaluation of the Chilean petition is on the table.

In this sense, the greater Argentina's projection at sea, the more it presents challenges for the nation. The preservation of the space regarding defence and the capacity to guarantee its exploitation require a complete debate on the national agenda. The cooperation among MERCOSUR countries with Argentina, the existence of the territorial dispute, and the scale of vessels or aircraft travelling to the archipelago, demand further discussion over cooperation, even more so with the British power escalation in the islands and the exploitation of reserves. In sum, it is necessary to reformulate the Argentine strategy for the defence of its maritime space or to seek regional cooperation in defence matters.

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CHAPTER 5

The UK and Argentina: Economic Interdependence, Informal Empire, or Just Good Friends?

Martin Robson

INTRODUCTION

While trying to strengthen Anglo-American ties during his tenure between 1907 and 1913 as British Ambassador to the United States, James Bryce found the time to publish his 1912 book *South America: Observations and Impressions*. In it he issued a pertinent warning for the domestic audience about growing economic competition with Germany and how that might be enacted in South America. He included a quotation from the American explorer Hiram Bingham, who spent much time in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, and Peru. Bingham remarked that ‘the well-educated young German who is being sent out to capture South America commercially is a power to be reckoned with [...] He is going to damage England more truly than dreadnoughts or airships.’¹

Bingham’s observations about Germany’s ability to project economic power in areas of great importance to Britain are more than just a historical footnote. Writing at a time when Britain bankrolled Argentine debt,

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built Argentine railways, and dined on Argentine beef Bingham's words suggested that change was afoot. New challenges were emerging to Britain's pre-eminent relationship with Argentina and those challenges were symptomatic of wider global changes. As Anglo-Argentine relations thaw, following a number of fractious years, and the UK looks to a future outside the European Union (details to be confirmed of course) it is useful to assess history that resonates down to us today and I will do that by analysing Britain's economic relationship with Argentina. In doing so I will employ a historical qualitative approach set against concepts of economic interdependence.

The Falklands War of 1982 still figures highly in the British national consciousness.² The focus on 1982 has, however, somewhat overshadowed the longer-term characteristics of Anglo-Argentine relations. In that sense 1982 and the years immediately before and after, plus the more recent years when Argentina was run by the leftist Kirchners and their obsession with the Falkland Islands, are not typical of the longer history of Anglo-Argentine relations. Some recent work has started to look beyond 1982 to take a wider perspective on British relations with Buenos Aires specifically and, more generally, in the South Atlantic as a whole.³

It is, however, worth pointing out that the commencement of Anglo-Argentine relations had its origins in the mutual relationship between trade and war. Is it, perhaps, not surprising that contemporary discussions are dominated by those two themes? The early period of UK-Argentine economic relations were marked not by economic interdependence but by a distinct power imbalance; of British economic influence over Argentina which lasted at least until 1914 and probably to the end of the Second World War. As we shall see, at times this relationship did almost become a symbiotic economically interdependent relationship, but that was highly contextual. This early period of Anglo-Argentine relations has considered Argentina as part of Britain's 'informal empire'. Informal empire, a concept based on economic dependency more than formal colonial rule, was formally broached by Gallagher and Robinson in 1953⁴ and remains a contested subject.⁵ It may seem somewhat 'old fashioned' to approach the subject of Anglo-Argentine relations from such an anachronistic concept as 'informal empire'. Yet, at the heart of the concept in theory and in practice were issues of power, influence, and economics.⁶

Another factor often overlooked about the projection of power in the South Atlantic is the very nature of the environment. It is a generally hostile maritime environment which was traditionally dominated by the

organs of the state and, to a large degree, still is. This serves to rebut theories of ‘new wars’, which focus on contemporary conflict on land. For example, in her most recent defence of her ‘new wars’ argument the focus on Mary Kaldor’s article is entirely on war / conflict as manifested on land.⁷ While the majority of writing about security and strategic studies has been on the rise of non-state actors, ungoverned spaces, hybrid wars, and such like, that does not translate to the sea. Maritime power and navies only make fleeting appearances in the seminal textbook for strategic studies, *Strategy in the Contemporary World* by Baylis, Wirtz, and Gray.⁸

Even those academics who have tried to revitalise the maritime domain into mainstream studies still linger in the shadow of new wars. For example Bueger and Edmunds argue the renaissance of an interest in maritime security can be traced to the rise of piracy off the coast of Somalia in the 2000s, people trafficking, especially in the Mediterranean, as well as the prevalence of other illegal activities committed by non-state actors, oil-bunkering in the Gulf of Guinea for instance. While the South Atlantic fits with their four dimensions of maritime security, comprising *national security*, ‘corresponding largely to long-established traditions of naval strategy and sea power’; the *marine environment*, focusing on environmental concerns; *economic development* or the ‘blue economy’; and *human security*, such as sustainable fishing, or illegal human activity, Bueger and Edmunds then translate those issues into four characteristics of maritime security, namely the *interconnected* nature of issues of maritime security; *liminality* in the sense that maritime security issues are inherently linked to the land; and that the seas are *transnational* as well as *jurisdictionally* complex.⁹

Of course there is not much new here for any readers of maritime theorists such as Julian Corbett¹⁰ or Geoffrey Till¹¹ nor is there anything essentially incorrect with what Bueger and Edmunds argue. Yet, their claim that maritime issues are ‘increasingly understood as a complex and holistic problematic of security, requiring extensive national, jurisdictional and public–private coordination if the challenges it presents are to be effectively addressed’ requiring ‘novel forms of association, integration and cooperation between actors’ misses a crucial point which is also evident by their use of the Western Indian Ocean as a case study.¹² Simply put, with regards to maritime security (lower case—i.e. people smuggling, piracy, etc.) and Maritime Security (upper case—i.e. national interests) it is still state-organised naval power which provides the most effective form of starting to address issues of maritime security. In terms of the South Atlantic, in the nineteenth century Britain’s economic and maritime

security concerns were safeguarded by the Royal Navy. That was also evident during the World Wars of the twentieth century, the Cold War, and the Falklands War of 1982 and it continues to do so though the South Atlantic Patrol. While the sea may be a benign security environment, ensuring that maritime security enabled requires investment in naval power. As Blagden noted, 'sea power remains a key cause of the innumerable bad things that do not happen',¹³ a comment inspired by a 2010 article by Jeremy Blackham and Gwyn Prins which focused on 'the silent principles of national security', in other words naval investment to make sure 'bad things don't happen'.¹⁴ It can be argued that many contemporary maritime security concerns, such as people and narcotics smuggling, piracy, terror, and oil-bunkering, occur in regions of the maritime environment where there has been a significant lack of naval investment to provide sufficient security to stop them becoming an issue in the first place.

So while non-state actors have exerted influence in the maritime environment, from the 2000 attack on the USS *Cole*, to the maritime arm of the Tamil Tigers, from criminal gangs smuggling people and drugs, even sometimes in submarines, to highly organised gangs stealing oil or implementing acts of piracy, none have posed a sustained threat to the global commons. The ability to mount a sustained presence in the maritime environment to provide security requires sustained investment in terms of finance, resources, and personnel that non-state actors cannot match. For the foreseeable future, while non-state actors can pose a threat, navies still 'rule the waves'. This is evidenced by the fact that effective responses to maritime security issues have come from navies. Taking Somalia as an example, while the implementation of a Maritime Security Transit Corridor by Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) highlights all four of Bueger and Edmunds characteristics of maritime security, the crucial factor is that while operating under UNSCR and in parallel with the EU's deployment of EU NAVFOR (Operation ATALANTA), both CTF151 and EUNAVFOR are composed of state-sponsored naval power deployed to the theatre to provide for security. Krause and Bruns, who also trace the renaissance of maritime security studies to the context of the post 9/11 world, come to different conclusions to Bueger and Edmunds, namely that:

states are increasingly looking to their navies to address contemporary risks [...] not least because of the dynamics of globalization, an integrated system of exchanging goods and services which rests decisively on functioning mar-

itime trade and unimpeded containerized shipping by sea. Concurrently, naval forces – given reliable doctrine and a reservoir of functioning maritime strategic thought and resources – have an increasing political and military value in international security.¹⁵

This is important when we consider the final element to add here which is the relationship between economic interdependence and the prevalence of conflict, which has been summed up by Mansfield and Pollins as: ‘open international markets and heightened economic exchange inhibit interstate hostilities’.¹⁶ This is classic liberal theory and, naturally, realists take a divergent view, often pointing to the economic pre-war links that existed between the belligerents of the First and Second World Wars. Clearly there are numerous cases where nation-states, despite strong economic links, have engaged in conflict.¹⁷ Yet, even if liberal theory was fully proven, that premise would rest on states and multinational actors taking the time and effort to invest in making sure that, to use Blackham and Prins’s phrase, ‘bad things don’t happen’. In the South Atlantic that again means states taking the lead in investing in the benign conditions to allow for security and economic prosperity.

ARGENTINA AS INFORMAL EMPIRE

With good reason Alan Knight summarises British interaction with the Spanish Empire between the Seven Years War and the 1840s as characterised by Spanish mercantilism and the exercise of British ‘hard power’.¹⁸ For the purposes of this chapter I will not delve into the eighteenth century and instead follow the lead of H. S. Ferns who argued that the modern economic relations between Britain and Argentina stem from 1806.¹⁹ That year the image of South America, and the River Plate area of Argentina in particular, as a fertile area for British trade was brought to the fore for British policy-makers and the wider public on 12 September 1806 when dispatches from Commodore Home Riggs Popham Royal Navy arrived at Portsmouth detailing the capture of Buenos Aires. The news was conveyed to London in a carnival procession: eight wagons containing around a million dollars in hard cash (liberated from the Spanish Viceroy) were escorted by 30 sailors from HMS *Narcissus*, a Royal Marine band provided suitable martial music and, so no one could miss the spectacle, a salute was fired at every major town on the route. Taken by complete surprise, the British government dithered, leading to the dispatch of a

number of reinforcements with diverse objects. By the time the reinforcements arrived in theatre, the initial expedition had been forced to surrender. British policy now resulted in a second disastrous attack on Buenos Aires on 5 July 1807, leading to another humiliating surrender to the Spaniards and the evacuation of the River Plate.²⁰ Sir Arthur Wellesley then drew up plans for maritime expeditions against Mexico, but following the revolt in Spain against French rule, South America was taken completely off the British strategic agenda. British policy after 1807–1808 was, therefore, not focused on large-scale military conquest of South America but to ‘occupy strategic points from which to establish commerce with Spanish America [...] in this way British influence could be established without requiring the burdens of direct rule over the whole continent’.²¹

Why was Britain so interested in the markets of South America to enact such a policy following military disaster? Simply put, excluded from European markets by Napoleon’s Continental Blockade and with exports to the lucrative markets of the United States halving (over £8 million down to £4 million) between 1806 and 1808, South America had become the prime region for opening up new markets for British trade. British exports to areas in the Americas outside of the USA, valued at £7.8 million in 1805, increased following the arrival of the Portuguese royal family in Brazil from £10,440,000 in 1807 to £16,590,000 in 1808. In essence, for a few years between 1806 and 1808, South America not only entered the public consciousness but ‘really *was* important to Britain’ in an economic strategic sense.²² So while after 1808 the issue of economic penetration of South America remained a subject of much interest in London, it is important to reiterate that from the outset British relations with Argentina, although dominated by economic considerations, had been instigated by Popham’s military intervention. Rebellion against formal rule by Spain broke out in Chile and Argentina in 1810, Venezuela in 1811, and Peru in 1812.

Official British policy now strove to formalise trading relations with Spanish American provinces in the form of commercial treaties but this unsurprisingly was rejected by Madrid in 1811. Uppermost in British minds was the danger of European Spain trying to put down rebellions against rule from Madrid which were spreading across South America, thereby diverting resources from the fight against France in Iberia and also forcing the South American provinces into the hands of France.²³ Controlling South American trade would, it was hoped in London, also

stop the penetration of South American markets by the United States. The looming presence of the USA would be a constant feature of British thinking for the next century and a half.²⁴

Following the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, many British sailors and soldiers sailed for gainful employment in the nascent armed forces of the South America independence movements. This led to the British government enacting legislation in the 1819 Foreign Enlistment Act forbidding British nationals from entering military service with another power.²⁵ British concerns over Latin America were heightened during the complex succession wars that broke out in Portugal and Spain during the late 1820s and early 1830s, the origins of which can be traced back to the Napoleonic Wars.²⁶ Some clarification with Argentina was achieved when that nation gained its independence from Spain in 1818; this was formally recognised by Britain in the 'Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between Argentina and the United Kingdom' of 1825, which, amongst other things, regulated trade between the two countries.²⁷ The treaty was reflective of British policy, which was, according to Kaufmann, based on 'the pervasiveness of British trade and the intangibles of prestige and example to with the general confidence of the Latin Americans'.²⁸ London was more at home brokering the peace between Argentina and Brazil in 1828, leading to the creation of the buffer state of Uruguay, than using force to enact policy.

Despite all this interest in South America, from 1806 up to the mid-nineteenth century, the Anglo-Argentine trade was not significant enough, in economic or strategic terms, to promote economic interdependence. Therefore interactions were characterised by a power imbalance, by mercantilism and hard power. As McLean has argued, 'London did not seem to worry much about Latin America beyond the need to keep its markets open and its politics independent of undue influence from either France or the United States'.²⁹ As Ferns concluded, British trade with Argentina was somewhat 'marginal' in economic terms until the middle of the nineteenth century.³⁰ British policy could do little to prevent war breaking out between Argentina and Uruguay in 1839 and hence was somewhat reactive. The subsequent deployment of an Anglo-French fleet and its blockade of the Paraná and actions in bombarding Argentine shore batteries in 1845 had a clear commercial driver. As with the Opium Wars in the Far East, in South America British naval power was utilised to enforce commercial relations. As McLean notes, the actions in the Paraná have been seen as a failure, but his revisionist account points to immediate commer-

cial benefits following on from the military action undertaken.³¹ Longer term benefits followed the 1847 lifting of the blockade culminating in 1852 with Argentine recognition that the principal tributaries of the River Plate were international waters and thereby open to the commerce of all nations.³²

This liberal approach continued into the 1860s with the River Plate opened to trade in the 1863 Treaty of Free Navigation. With Barings Bank already present, the decade also witnessed the creation of the London and River Plate Bank. Also key was the opening up of the interior and the greater ability to move commerce to and from the sea by the building of railways, often funded by British money and built with British expertise, but also reliant on the juxtaposition of London boards of control segued with local, commercial, and mercantile, knowledge.³³ The effects were tangible, Argentina experienced export growth of 4.9% between 1850 and 1870 and an export growth purchasing power growth rate of 8.2% between 1870 and the Barings crisis of 1890.³⁴ By the latter part of the nineteenth century, therefore, Anglo-Argentine relations had been normalised in an 'informal' sense through British money and engineering, based on an interest in mutually beneficial commerce recognised by Knight:

Stability fostered trade, trade generated revenue and both in turn fostered stability. Argentine exports began to grow, facilitating imports from Britain. As the first railways snaked their way across the pampas, they attracted British investment, boosted exports and, the British Minister observed, brought the benefits of 'civilization and business'.³⁵

The full commercial and economic benefits of 'informal' empire were felt because London, perhaps still lingering under the shadow of 1806–1807, resisted meddling in internal Argentine politics, religion, and civil society. From order and stability flowed riches.

Unlike other parts of Latin America, Argentine stability attracted British investment that was needed for further internal development. British goods had favoured status and the commercial relations between London and Buenos Aires were mutually beneficial; there was no need for coercion. Even the Barings crisis of 1890, when Argentina defaulted on £48 million worth of debt, did not rock the boat of Anglo-Argentine relations. Instead fiscal intervention restructured the Argentine debt, and while it took a decade for Argentina to recover, investors were not deterred.³⁶

THE END OF INFORMAL EMPIRE

In 1913–1914 British investment in the Dominions, Dependant Empire, and China totalled £1.76 billion; the largest Dominion investment was in Canada at just over £500 million. Latin America as a whole received more UK investment, £1.18 billion, than any single Dominion.³⁷ Of this the most important was the £357.7 million invested in Argentina and figures approaching £500 million were being quoted on the eve of the First World War.³⁸ In 1914 the London and River Plate Bank had assets of £32 million. In the years 1907–1913, £118,339,585 of new British capital investment was attracted to Argentina.³⁹ As noted above, overseas investments and trade go hand in hand. To take figures from 1912, the United States was Britain's largest trading partner, with a total (import and export trade) valued at £186 million, followed by British India (£137.6 million) and Germany (£107.5 million). Argentina was further down the list of trading partners with a total trade of £48 million, though the figures for 1913 show British exports at £22.6 million and imports at £42.5 million.⁴⁰ In 1913 British investments were 60% of all foreign investments in Argentina and Britain was still the major trading partner with Argentina.⁴¹

All was not rosy, however, for in the early years of the twentieth century there was, according to British Consul Francis Mark at Buenos Aires, 'something fundamentally wrong' with British business. His concerns were mirrored by reports from the British Consuls in Rio Grande do Sul and Santos in Brazil. They all voiced concerns that German trade in South America was taking over from British business.⁴² The figures back this up: in 1902 Argentina imported goods to the value of £2.3 million from Germany and £7.8 million from Britain, but a decade later was importing £11.7 million worth of German goods and £21.3 million of British goods.⁴³ So while trade was growing with both countries, the relative value of German imports had moved from a third of the value of British imports to more than half of the value of British imports. British trade continued to profit, but in Latin American markets it was losing out in relative percentage terms to the USA and Germany—between 1893 and 1913 British exports of manufactured goods increased by 121%, compared with German by 239% and American by 563%.⁴⁴ Britain's 'informal' imperial position in Argentina was under threat.⁴⁵

Raw statistics can be flawed, ignoring as they do the less visible signs of economic interaction such as banking, shipping, and insurance; more problematic is they do not cover the *nature* of trade—and it was that that

was *really* important for Britain. Between 1909 and 1913 grain imports accounted for 78.7% of wheat and flour consumption in Britain.⁴⁶ UK total grain imports in 1913 were 9.9 million metric tons with a value of £80.9 million.⁴⁷ Much of this came from the Dominions, Canada, India, and Australasia, with Argentina the second largest foreign supplier behind the United States. Argentina was, however, the largest supplier of maize to the UK.⁴⁸ The Argentinian wheat trade was controlled by four big firms, none of which were British, but were instead managed by businessmen who identified themselves as German. In 1914 British business only had a 9% share of Argentinian grain exports as opposed to the 60% share from the big four. As an importer of wheat, most of this German controlled trade was destined for Britain. In 1913 Sir Reginald Tower, British Minister at Buenos Aires, warned the Foreign Office that the German controlled firms had a stranglehold over the sinews of vital British food imports.⁴⁹

Between 1909 and 1913 imported meat accounted for 35–40% of meat consumption in Britain.⁵⁰ In 1907 Britain had obtained the majority of its imported meat from the USA, but by 1911 the largest supplier was now Argentina, accounting for 16% of the British import trade, mainly as frozen beef. The majority of South American meat was shipped from the River Plate area. For frozen and chilled beef, South America supplied 82.6% of British imports, which was 29.97% of domestic consumption, and 25.83% of mutton and lamb, equating to 11.9% of domestic consumption.⁵¹ To South American exports must be added the meat imports which came from New Zealand round Cape Horn and followed the South American routes, leading the official historian of the Great War and Seaborne Trade to calculate from official figures that in the years of peace 84% of the beef and 67% of mutton imported into Britain came from or through South American waters.⁵²

Ivan Bloch had stated in 1898 ‘You cannot fight unless you can eat’.⁵³ In percentage terms, 40% of British meat and wheat imports followed the route from the River Plate, up the Brazilian coast then through the Atlantic to Britain. In the years before the First World War the UK was the largest importer of food in the world, importing by sea more than half its food by value and at least 58% and perhaps up to 64% of its calories.⁵⁴ When looking at where this came from and how it got to the UK, it is hard not to agree with Dehne’s statement that ‘By 1914, the River Plate region had become an irreplaceable source of food for the United Kingdom.’⁵⁵ Anglo-Argentine economic interdependence, which had been based on fiscal and commercial links in the nineteenth century and had been tilted in favour

of London, had now taken on a vital strategic importance to Britain's ability to feed its domestic population.

This was ever more concerning when shipping is considered. Britain dominated merchant shipping in 1914; conventional figures point to 45–55% of world shipping flying the Red Ensign, but as Nicholas Lambert has argued when looking at the large oceangoing vessels of over 3000 gross registered tons plying the vital transatlantic trade routes, Britain and her allies controlled near to 80%, providing the means to then control the vital Atlantic trade.⁵⁶ Importantly, South American trade was entirely dependent on foreign registered shipping. In 1910 Britain owned 56.4% of shipping tonnage entering Argentinian ports⁵⁷ and by 1912 owned 61% of the tonnage at Buenos Aires.⁵⁸ In fact in 1912 more UK shipping entered the River Plate than any other destination.⁵⁹ Germany was a growing rival in shipping the Brazil and Argentine trade.⁶⁰

While South Atlantic was attractive due to the value and strategic importance of British investments and trade, and the large volume of tonnage, there was a significant factor linking all this together—the large oceangoing British registered refrigerated ships which kept the vital supply of chilled and frozen meat flowing between the River Plate and the UK. By 1914 there were over 200 British steamers working in the refrigerated trade, though admittedly not all were on the South American route. On the eve of the war Britain controlled nearly all of the refrigerated shipping on the South American route. With the Atlantic trade routes of such importance to keeping food flowing into Britain, it is no surprise that offer proposed reorienting the understanding of British strategy away from the Channel and the Western Front and towards the Atlantic.⁶¹ Knight has also recognised this:

While South America would not expend blood on behalf of the British Empire, it yielded treasure and, so long as liberal Anglophile oligarchs ruled, displayed an intangible politico-cultural sympathy which, by the 1900s, contributed to the 'Atlantic orientation' of Britain's grand strategy.⁶²

It was the importance of the South Atlantic economy to provide Britain with strategic goods, in the form of food that concerned British pre-war planning.⁶³ An Admiralty Committee Report of 4 May 1912 pointed to the effect German commerce raiding might have on food supplies and the resulting panic in the UK and rise in insurance rates.⁶⁴ By the First World War, although London seemed to be the economic benefactor of the relationship with Argentina, the nature of the trade had also turned this into a strategic weakness.

This was understood by Germany, which had assembled armed merchantmen to target this vital supply of British food. By arming merchant ships and deploying cruiser squadrons at the nodes of the sea lines of communication the Admiralty attempted to protect British shipping and drive enemy merchant shipping from the sea. In the first months of the war that was largely successful.⁶⁵ On 28 August 1914, the War Office started making its own contracts with meat companies to guarantee domestic supply and 15,000 tons per month for the army.⁶⁶ In 1915, recognising the importance of the South Atlantic supply line and the ships that plied that route, the government requisitioned all British refrigerated shipping for war service. Overall during the 1914–1918 period the British government would become the main purchaser of imported wheat and meat.⁶⁷ Remaining neutral, Argentina, at least in trading terms, reaped the benefits. From a pre-war trade balance of \$77,627 in 1914 the rapid growth of exports led to record surplus peaking at \$370,729 in 1919.⁶⁸

During the first half of the twentieth century British trade with Argentina increased as a percentage share of overall British trade with South America, from 42% in 1913 to 48% in 1928–1929 and up to 53% in 1936–1937. British capital in Argentina accounted for 12% of the income generated by British overseas investments.⁶⁹ While Germany had been the threat to the British pre-eminent position in Argentine up to 1914, the inter-war years saw the relative weakening of the British position in Argentina due to the growing influence of the USA as active trading partner for South American states. Nevertheless, in 1933 the Roca-Runciman pact, regulating the meat trade, reaffirmed Britain's importance to Argentina set against the background of an £11 million British loan to the Argentine government.⁷⁰

British thinking on the eve of the Second World War was that Argentina, with its exports of foodstuffs and its improving economic position, especially in terms of balance of payments, might do well out of a future war. With war underway in 1939 London and Buenos Aires agreed how to regulate wartime trade.⁷¹ Argentina was still reliant upon energy imports, especially coal and oil, and the closure of European grain markets impacted upon the Argentine economy. Nevertheless, remaining neutral until the final months of the war the pattern of Argentina benefiting from conflict in 1914–1918 was repeated in the Second World War, with a surplus of just £10,345 in 1938 rocketing to \$428,872 by 1945.⁷² Even the much hoped for transfer of railway ownership to the Argentine government was managed in a convivial manner after the end of the Second World War.⁷³

Fighting the total wars of the twentieth century altered Britain's relationship with the rest of the world. The rise of the USA, China, and the Soviet Union, the drawdown of empire, UK debt, and the growing importance of European unity were all far more important than relations with Latin America. As early as 1949, when Buenos Aires needed a loan to get through a balance of payments crisis the money was obtained not from a British bank but from an American bank. Argentina also sought trade agreements with other Western nations. Britain was no longer the favoured trading nation of Argentina; economic interaction was now thought of not in terms of sterling, but in dollars. Britain, itself beholden to the US dollar following lend-lease and for post-war reconstruction, was not just withdrawing from formal empire. Informal empire had ended.⁷⁴

Between 1945 and 1982, the nature of the trading relationship changed further and the importance of Argentina to Britain declined as, along with the railways, other assets were sold off and British investment decreased. Instead, the UK's focus for developing its economy was the tortuous process to membership of the European Economic Community and looked towards Europe for economic integration. This was part of a wider reorientation of UK trade away from overseas markets and towards European markets. In 1960 Australia (2nd), Canada (3rd), South Africa (5th), India (6th), and New Zealand (9th) appeared as the UK's main goods trading partners for exports. By 1970 Australia was down to 5th, South Africa 8th, and Canada 10th and by 1980 all of those five were out of the top ten. By that later date the majority of British exports went either to the USA or to European countries, with Germany topping the list.⁷⁵

This Euro-centric change to British in an economic sense was mirrored in a strategic sense. From the late 1960s through the 1970s the UK assumed that while, following a process of decolonisation, it retained some colonial interests, there would be no need to defend its overseas territory without help from allies, in particular the USA. The UK's strategic focus was as a good ally within the construct of NATO. That involved investing in nuclear deterrence, the British Army of the Rhine, and anti-submarine warfare in the North Atlantic. There would be no need for a military capacity for global power projection, as the UK did not envisage it playing such a role. This process culminated in the 1981 Defence White Paper (the so-called Nott Review) to further configure the UK armed forces for the perceived role.⁷⁶ The consequence was that the UK was signalling that not only did it not envisage playing any active role in the South Atlantic, it was removing its military capability to do so. South America was not on

the strategic or the economic agenda. That, at least, was how it was read in Buenos Aires, adding to the frustration felt by the Argentine Junta at the lack of progress in a negotiated settlement over the Falkland Islands in line with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2065.⁷⁷

Revisiting the events in the run-up to and of 1982 is beyond the scope here. Democracy was suspended in Argentina during the military coup of 24 March 1976, the fifth time Argentina had been ruled by the military during the twentieth century. Negotiations with the UK over the Falklands were at a 'dismal' impasse and the 150th anniversary of the 1833 dispute was looming on the horizon.⁷⁸ That led the Junta to decide on a bloodless occupation of the islands to provide 'a better atmosphere for negotiations'.⁷⁹ By 1982 the Anglo-Argentine economic relationship was far less important to the Junta than the domestic political imperative for a morale-boosting victory. Given the Argentine Junta's policy of overseas borrowing to fund domestic expenditure and to service the debt, it was no surprise that the country was one of the world's largest debtors, amounting to \$34 billion in 1982. UK registered banks had investments in Argentina of £5.8 billion. Defaulting on debt would have major implications for Argentine trade and finance, but that would also hurt creditors. Breaking the international rules-based system would seriously affect Argentina's standing in global capital markets and its ability to borrow externally; that in turn would restrict Argentine credit for debt management. Clearly given the Argentine economic situation and its reliance upon international finance it made no economic sense for it to rock the boat of international relations. Argentine debt was the most obvious economic weapon for the UK; the UK was, after the USA, the second largest creditor to Argentina. Argentina had \$1.5 billion of assets in the UK but in the run-up to the Argentine invasion money was transferred to New York and the UK could only freeze \$900 million of assets once it became aware of the invasion. With Argentina largely self-sufficient in energy and food, it was not susceptible to blockade and with the UK holding a modest 3% of the Argentine market, London possessed limited financial weapons, had potentially more to lose than Argentina in financial terms, and had to face the fact that economic options tended to work (if at all) over the long term. So in effect the Junta gambled on riding out the long-term financial implications of an invasion for what it conceived to be a swift military occupation, successful negotiation through the UN over sovereignty, and a quick return to normality and reacceptance in the global financial markets.⁸⁰

So while the UK and Argentina were linked together by a financial relationship, the far deeper, even economically interdependent relationship had long gone. For the Junta the implications of military action would be short term and far less important than other factors.

BREXIT AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICIES

The events of 1982 allow me to pick up where I opened this chapter, but they also allow us to look to how Anglo-Argentine relations have developed since armed conflict. This is especially pertinent given the growing Euro-centric nature of British trade noted above, and the likely implications of Brexit.

Europe still figures highly in the UK's economic position. In 2015 UK imports from the EU were £290,621 million with imports from the rest of the world of £229,245 million. Exports, on the other hand, were £259,955 million with the rest of the world and £230,031 million with the EU. Within the EU Britain's largest trading partner is Germany, with an imbalance caused by the UK importing £70.4 billion and exporting £48.5 billion worth of trade. The UK imports more from Germany than it does from the USA, with imports from the USA at £59.3 billion yet the UK exports £96.4 billion worth of trade to the USA. Clearly, for the UK to maintain a prosperous economy it must maintain its trade with the USA and with EU countries like Germany. In context, UK trade with China once again produces a deficit, with imports at £38.4 billion and exports at £16.7 billion. Set against these figures, trade with South America is small fry in pure economic terms though since 2011 the UK has maintained a trade surplus with South America. The key economic relationship is now with Brazil, which accounts for 69.1% of the UK trade with South America. Trade with Brazil produces a modest surplus with exports of £3.8 billion set against imports of £2.5 billion. Brazil is by far the most important UK trading partner in South America, with Argentina (imports £0.7 billion, exports £0.6 billion) lagging behind. Globally, Brazil sits as the UK's 27th largest export destination and in return Brazil is the 32nd largest import partner.⁸¹ Moreover, Brazil is a destination for UK investment, with assets held by UK investors in Brazil between 2010 and 2011 doubling from £6.4 billion to £14.1 billion. UK investment in Brazil in 2014 was £14.7 billion.⁸² Clearly, if the UK can be considered to have a favoured trading partner in South America that country is now Brazil. Argentina figures in British thinking about the South Atlantic in a strategic context that

involves more than just the Falkland Islands, to include the Overseas Territories (OT) of Saint Helena, Ascension & Tristan da Cunha, and South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands.⁸³

The UK is, moreover, now behind the key players of the USA and China in a scramble for Latin American markets and risks being caught between those two trading superpowers, both of which will be integral to making a success of Brexit. Up to 2010 the USA was Brazil's major trading partner; since then China has led the trade, accounting for around 18% of Brazilian exports and imports, with the USA coming second and then in terms of exports, Argentina, and imports, Germany.⁸⁴ The situation has been fully recognised in the UK with Robert Capurro, Chief Executive of Canning House, noting in August 2016 that the UK was 'terribly far behind our European, Chinese and American competitors [...] We're punching well below our weight.'⁸⁵

One key question for UK policy-makers has to be whether to reinforce success by focusing on Brazil or diversifying and adding resilience to UK trade by enhancing economic links with other South American countries, in particular Argentina. That would inevitably involve some kind of discussion about the role of the Southern America Common Market, MERCOSUR.⁸⁶ Here the UK would be entering into direct competition with the EU, which sees MERCOSUR as an important trading partner. Since 2010 the EU has been progressing with negotiations to implement a free trade agreement with MERCOSUR, and from which post-Brexit the UK would be excluded. Yet, this wider approach has not stopped the EU from engaging in bilateral partnership and cooperation agreements with the key MERCOSUR countries of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. For those countries within the MERCOSUR context, the EU is the most important trading partner accounting for 21% of trade. So not only will the UK be in competition with the USA and China for further penetration of South American markets, it will also be in competition with the EU. In 2015 the EU exported €46 billion and imported €42 billion from MERCOSUR and exported €20 billion of commercial services while investing €387 billion in the region, making the EU the largest foreign investor in MERCOSUR.⁸⁷

Argentina once again seems to be a logical choice for expanding British economic influence in South America. Figures from Oxford Economics for the fourth economic quarter of 2016 show the Argentine economy was finally growing after a deep recession in 2015, with a continued forecast of GDP growing by 2.5% in 2017, mainly due to the domestic economic policies of President Macri.⁸⁸

If that is to happen there are some strategic realities that are starting to be addressed. Under the leadership of first Néstor then Cristina Kirchner, the years 2003–2015 witnessed a war by other means over the Falkland Islands, with every opportunity utilised to raise the Argentine claim. Moreover, this period included some novel/bizarre publicity stunts alongside diplomatic efforts through the UN and economic warfare against the Islanders.⁸⁹ All aspects of state power short of military action were used to try and change the political status quo. Argentine unwillingness to take the military option during these years may be more reflective of the poor state of Argentine military forces after years of neglect than a desire to act more responsibly domestically and internationally than the military Junta in 1982.⁹⁰

In the face of this UK foreign policy has been and, to a degree, remains, about preserving the status quo. That included the 2013 Falkland Island referendum. That does not really help solve any of the strategic challenges faced in the South Atlantic that have in the past impinged upon economic considerations, but a ‘wait and see’ policy with regards to strategic challenges allows economics to take the lead in enhancing Anglo-Argentine links. The Falkland Islands have been depicted as a strategic gateway for the UK,⁹¹ an open wound souring UK relations with South America,⁹² or a frozen conflict akin to the situation in Cyprus or Kashmir.⁹³ None of these analogies are really particularly insightful for the strategist. Instead, a recent thawing of relations between the UK and Argentina has been largely due to changes in Argentine domestic politics, specifically the fall of Cristina Kirchner and election of President Mauricio Macri set against the context of the UK willingness to take advantage of that change following Brexit to develop economic and diplomatic links. If that is the case, the problem for British policy is that Argentina could (though the evidence seems to suggest it will not in the short term) once again engage in economic sparring with the UK in order to obtain political leverage over the Falkland Islands especially if the domestic political makeup changes in Buenos Aires once again.

With Argentina and Brazil both reliant upon a globalised trading environment and set against a declining Brazilian economy which Argentina is heavily dependent upon, a return to the economic warfare policies towards the Falkland Islands seems unlikely under President Macri. With regard to offshore hydrocarbons, Argentina cannot go it alone, and there remains scope for revenue sharing between the Falkland Islanders, the UK, and Argentina in line with the Joint Declaration on Cooperation in Offshore Activities in the South West Atlantic, which was signed in 1995 and from

which Argentina withdrew in 2007. This withdrawal from collaboration was also evident in Buenos Aires pulling apart the 1999 Joint Statement which outlined cooperation over access, air travel, and fishing.

Such collaborative initiatives are now back on the table, with the UK and Argentine governments issuing a new Joint Statement on areas of mutual cooperation on 14 September 2016.⁹⁴ It is worth reiterating that this has less to do with Brexit and more to do with changes in Argentine domestic politics. In May 2016 Lord Price, the UK Trade and Investment Minister, led the first UK trade mission to Argentina for a decade stating that: 'The growing economies of Latin America offer huge opportunity for British business.'⁹⁵ Faced with an uncertain future with regard to European markets, is this British economic opportunism akin to the period 1806–1808? Lord Price's trade mission laid the foundations for a visit to Argentina in September 2016 by Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister Sir Alan Duncan. Talks were productive with both governments agreeing to work towards lifting restrictions that have inhibited the exploitation of oil and gas, the free passage of shipping, and fishing around the islands. Also discussed were other areas of possible cooperation including much-needed foreign investment into the Argentine economy, science and technology, as well as approaches to tackling corruption and organised crime.⁹⁶

While the sovereignty of the Falklands Islands was not discussed, with both the UK and Argentina keen to talk on areas of collaboration, the issue of the Argentine claim will not go away, written as it is into the Argentine political constitution. In March 2016 the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) placed the Falkland Islands in expanded Argentine waters. This, as the UK government pointed out, did not impinge in any way upon sovereignty, over which the CLCS has no jurisdiction, while pointing out the UN had recognised that in considering the Argentine submission for an expanded continental shelf it did consider this to include claims relating to the Falkland Islands.⁹⁷ On 16 October 2016 Argentina complained about planned UK military exercises in the Falkland Islands while President Macri backtracked from a claim he had discussed 'sovereignty' with UK Prime Minister Theresa May.⁹⁸ Set against that in November 2016 the Argentine Foreign Minister Susana Malcorra was reported as stating 'we can't deny the existence of the Malvinas inhabitants with whom we have been distanced for too long', thereby starting to recognise that under the UN the Falkland Islanders do have the right to self-determination.⁹⁹ This had always been denied by Argentina.

So while there are areas of continued disagreement, what is clear with the Macri regime is that mutually beneficial business can be done *around* the issue of the Falkland Islands. This will become more important post-Brexit, given the fact that 70% of Falkland Islands GDP depends on access to the EU markets. With the Falkland Islands recognised as a UK Overseas Territory, Brexit has the potential to leave the Islanders weakened but clearly the UK government have been acting to strengthen the position of the Islanders as part of a wider approach to UK–Argentine relations. What this means is that while the UK Overseas Territories in the South Atlantic do have the potential to impinge upon the UK being seen as a regional partner, the UK is actively aware of this and is focusing on an economic renaissance with Argentina. Unlike in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this will be based upon mutually beneficial terms, not an imbalance of power.

In a political sense, there will be no dialogue on sovereignty unless the Falkland Islanders want it. This is in stark contrast to thinking in the run-up to 1982 where the concerns of the Islanders hardly counted. Now, at least from a UK perspective, the Falkland Islands do not have to dominate the UK–Argentina relationship, an understanding that also seems to be driving policy in Buenos Aires.

According to Oliver Williamson, in an economic sense opportunism ‘refers to a lack of candour or honesty in transactions, to include self-interest seeking with guile’.¹⁰⁰ Political realists would certainly agree with that, as would many writers on strategic studies. The object of policy and strategy is to achieve self (national) interest using all the levers of power, including some aspects of guile. If ‘a lack of candour or honesty in transactions’ drives UK policy in the South Atlantic, or it is seen to be, then a blossoming relationship with Argentina will fall apart amid cries of British colonialism/imperialism and the memories of British intervention and informal empire during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. So the UK has to be genuine, even in transactional relationships. Supporting Susana Maclorra’s failed bid to become the UN Secretary-General can be seen as part of being a credible partner, as can UK support for Argentina’s bid for presidency of the G20 in 2018.

Whatever the character of Brexit, once there is clarity to Britain’s economic and political relationship with Europe, the South Atlantic offers some economic promise for the UK. Clearly, achieving UK interests in the South Atlantic involves a good working trading relationship with Brazil and Argentina.

Here Antarctica and West Africa come in as areas for further or new collaboration or normalisation between the UK and Brazil and Argentina beyond the Falkland Islands. So while the Falkland Islands have been seen as a strategic gateway into the region, the posit here is that the UK Overseas Territories in the South Atlantic cement the UK not as an external actor, but instead as an actor with direct, tangible economic interests in the South Atlantic. Hence while the UK has had a tendency to focus on the Argentine relationship, *vis-à-vis* the Falkland Islands, that also cannot be separated from Argentine–Brazilian relations and UK–Brazilian relations. They are all part of the same context and important because actors and roles are relative to context and to other actors. If we consider Brazil playing a role encompassing autonomy from global powers (evidenced by ZPCAS), as a regional leader, and as an influential power (upholder of the rule of law)—it all gives Brazil much in common with the UK. Both are keen to uphold international rules-based order, to be good global citizens, and to respect the sovereignty and rights of peoples.

So in this environment what can the UK do to further enhance economic relations? ZPCAS itself and some South Atlantic countries are not keen on formal UK involvement in the region, but there is certainly scope for enhanced bilateral and informal links between the UK and Argentina and Brazil in terms of knowledge sharing, best practice, and capacity building to deal with security concerns. Of value here is the UK defence attaché network promoting shared education, research, teaching, best practice, applied strategic thinking, doctrinal understanding, and the presence of Brazilian and Argentine officers on Professional Military Education courses in the UK.

This all raises the issue of a renewed UK interest in soft power, which was the subject of the House of Lords Committee on Soft Power and the UK's Influence appointed in May 2013 to report on the subject. This chimes with the Brazilian approach, as Roberto Jaguaribe, the Brazilian Ambassador to the UK, noted in evidence to the Committee: 'Brazil has perhaps been occasionally recognised as the first big soft power because we do not have hard power.'¹⁰¹ Jaguaribe went on to tell the Committee:

Brazil has had the opportunity over the past 30 or 40 years to consolidate the perception of being among the leading countries of the emerging, developing world. That generates a lot of positive benefits, such as hosting the Olympic Games or the World Cup. We were chosen because we generate good will in the people who are choosing. The candidates from Brazil tend to be elected. Brazil tends to be elected in all multilateral elections. All that has an effect.¹⁰²

Interestingly the UK has ramped up its soft power initiative with Brazil. In October 2015 both countries confirmed that the Newton Fund to tackle global challenges including infectious and neglected diseases, sustainable agriculture, issues on water, waste, and energy across Brazil, will be funded to the value of £45 million by each partner. Enhanced academic links between UK and Brazilian educational institutions to share knowledge, provide staff and student educational visits, and to formulate and deliver collaborative research projects are already in place to address global issues that impact upon both countries and areas of mutual concern, like the South Atlantic. This is crucial work for the benefit of all, and the UK and Brazil can foster links that also need to be developed in conjunction with Argentina if there is to be further economic benefits to all.¹⁰³

CONCLUSION

This chapter has tried to posit a historical qualitative approach to Anglo-Argentine relations, with a nod to aspects of International Relations and contemporary security and economics. It has argued that, certainly with regard to Argentina, and possibly wider Latin America, British involvement in the region was forged out of a combination of conflict, strategic pressures, and economic interests: a combination of economic development and security concerns. The long lens of history seems to suggest that not much has changed; the UK still desires an enhanced economic presence in South America and retains concerns over aspects of security. Within that context, the Anglo-Argentine relationship developed in the nineteenth century into one of interdependent informal empire marked by two phases. The first was based upon British capital investments and infrastructure development to the point where the efficiency of the Argentinian meat industry provided much-needed food imports for Britain. That in turn led to a second phase of interdependence where the reliance upon Argentinian food imports became a strategic liability in time of war. Set against that were the introduction of new players in the South American markets, specifically Germany and the USA. Post-1945 with Britain refocusing, in both economic and strategic terms, on Europe, Argentina dropped off the radar only to reappear in 1982. By doing so the Falklands Islands and the 1982 war still exert a strong hold on the British national consciousness. Only since 2015 and the election of President Macri has there been a return to some kind of normality in Anglo-Argentine relations and the willingness to talk economics around strategic

challenges. With a renewed attempt by both London and Buenos Aires to enhance their economic relationship, one can only hope that the quotation from the very start of this chapter from Mansfield and Pollins rings true: ‘open international markets and heightened economic exchange inhibit interstate hostilities’.¹⁰⁴

NOTES

1. Cited in Philip Dehne, *On the Far Western Front: Britain's First World War in South America* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010), 14.
2. This is quite true of writers assessing a range of topics, for example a recent *RUSI Journal* article by Sir Lawrence Freedman assessing the importance of high quality military advice to political leaders, ‘speaking truth to power’ deploys a case study of decision making and military advice from the Falklands War; certainly not surprising when Freedman is the author of the UK official history of the Falklands War, but it proves the point that 1982 still resonates highly in UK academic and military thinking. Lawrence Freedman, ‘On Military Advice’, *RUSI Journal*, no. 3 (July 2017); 12–18.
3. See for example Klaus Dodds, ‘Stormy Waters: Britain, the Falkland Islands and UK–Argentine Relations’, *International Affairs* 88 (2012): 683–700 and his ‘Consolidate! Britain, the Falkland Islands and the Wider South Atlantic/Antarctic’, *Global Discourse* 3, no. 1 (2013).
4. J. Gallagher and R. Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, *The Economic History Review* 6, no. 1 (1953).
5. For an informative and succinct discussion of this see Alan Knight, ‘Rethinking British Informal Empire in Latin America (Especially Argentina)’, *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 27, suppl. 1 special issue (2008): 28–30.
6. I have avoided use of the term ‘soft power’, which is a much wider concept including aspects of culture and values. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ‘Soft Power’, *Foreign Policy* 80 (1990): 153–171.
7. M. Kaldor, ‘In Defence of New Wars’, *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 2, no. 1 (2013): Art. 4, <https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.at>.
8. While containing chapters on cyber security and WMD, there is no comparative chapter on maritime security, seapower or maritime studies in J. Baylis, J. Wirtz, and C. S. Gray, *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

9. C. Bueger and T. Edmunds, 'Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda for Maritime Security Studies', *International Affairs* 93, no. 6 (2017): 1293–1311.
10. J. S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (London: Longmans Green, 1911).
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12. Bueger and Edmunds, 'Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda for Maritime Security Studies'.
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CHAPTER 6

Gateway and Neighbourhood: Brazilian Perspective on South Atlantic Security

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O oceano impõe deveres

Rui Barbosa ('The ocean imposes duties'. All other quotes from texts originally written in other languages were translated by the authors into English, for the convenience of the reader.)

INTRODUCTION¹

From a global perspective, the South Atlantic has been one of the least strategically relevant among the world's oceans throughout the twentieth and early twenty-first century, for reasons both economic and military. From the perspective of Brazil and other coastal states, however, the strategic relevance of the South Atlantic cannot be overstated. It serves as a vital conduit for commercial flows, offers a bountiful trove of mineral and living maritime resources, and acts as an invisible web that connects the region. Its relative peacefulness is an asset for its coastal states, since it is conducive

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to their long-term development. For Brazil, the very preservation of peace and stability in the South Atlantic is, therefore, a prominent and permanent strategic objective.

The present chapter aims at analysing current factors that influence the security environment in the South Atlantic from a Brazilian perspective, focusing not only on 'hard' or state-centred threats, but also on 'soft' threats derived from actors at the sub-national level such as piracy, drug-trafficking, and other forms of transnational crime.

In recent years, a series of discoveries of vast oil and gas reserves along the Brazilian coastline, in addition to the inclusion of specific references to the South Atlantic in national defence policy documents, have led many analysts to assert that the region has been gaining a new status as a priority in Brazilian foreign and defence policies. However, it is the view of the authors that these recent developments do not represent an entirely 'new' approach, but rather an intensification of long-standing trends, a point the chapter will illustrate by means of an examination of the historical background of Brazil's relationship with the South Atlantic.

On this basis, the chapter will examine the relevance of the South Atlantic for Brazil from the points of view of its foreign and defence policies. It will also analyse the actions being undertaken by the Brazilian government to foster a climate of cooperation among coastal countries and to preserve stability in the region, and forestall potential security threats.

STRATEGIC RELEVANCE OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC

Defining the limits between the North and South Atlantic is not an entirely uncontroversial matter. Geographically, the Equator would be the natural boundary between both regions of the Atlantic Ocean, as is the case in the definitions used by the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) in its publication 'The Limits of the Oceans and the Seas'.² However, from a geopolitical point of view, this demarcation makes little analytical sense. Many refer to the Tropic of Cancer (the 23°N parallel) as the dividing line between the North and South Atlantic Ocean, since it is the southern border of NATO's 'area of responsibility' as defined by Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. More recently, in 2010, the then Commander of the Brazilian Navy referred in more specific terms to the South Atlantic as the area between the 16°N parallel and the Antarctic continent, and between the western shores of Africa and the eastern shores of South America.³

From the point of view of international navigation and trade, the South Atlantic played a vital role as the only direct sea link between Europe and Asia since the age of exploration until the late nineteenth century. However, its commercial relevance has declined sharply with the opening of the Suez and Panama Canals (1869 and 1914, respectively), which eliminated the need for circumnavigation of the African and South American continents in routes connecting the Persian Gulf, Europe, and the western and eastern seaboard of North America, which currently are responsible for the bulk of global maritime shipping.

That notwithstanding, the South Atlantic retained its importance for global trade, notably as an alternative route for vessels that exceed specifications in maximum tonnage and dimensions that can transit through the Suez and Panama Canals, even if such restrictions have been eased by major expansion works in both passageways, concluded in 2015 (Suez) and 2016 (Panama). Twenty per cent of all maritime routes to and from the United States transit through the South Atlantic, and its importance tends to increase as economies in the region grow and integrate into the global supply chain.⁴

In contrast with the relatively limited relevance of the South Atlantic for global trade, its importance for the trade flows of coastal countries in Western Africa and South America cannot be overstated. In 2015, 95% of Brazilian trade by volume was carried out through the country's seaports.⁵ A similar percentage (90%) of African trade is also done by maritime routes.⁶ Both figures are well above the overall percentage of world trade carried out by sea, which is estimated at 70% of the value and 80% of the volume of world merchandise trade by the UNCTAD,⁷ indicating that seaborne trade is even more crucial for the economies of countries in the region.

As regards the exploitation of natural resources, the South Atlantic displays a similar pattern of limited relative global relevance contrasting with its absolute centrality for its coastal states. Regarding oil reserves, its coastal countries account for approximately 4.1% of world total.⁸ In terms of living marine resources, the South Atlantic is not among the most productive area for capture fisheries (far below the Northwest Pacific, followed by the Western Central Pacific, the Northeast Atlantic, and the Eastern Indian Ocean). Beyond the areas under jurisdiction of its coastal states (exclusive economic zones and continental shelves), the seabed of the South Atlantic offers potential for extraction of mineral resources. To date, however, the South Atlantic has attracted little interest in this regard, in comparison with more promising areas in the Pacific and Indian Ocean.⁹

As in the case of maritime transportation, however, the limited importance of economic resources of the South Atlantic on a global scale contrasts with their centrality for the coastal states of the region. This is particularly true for Brazil, whose energy security is vitally reliant on its offshore oil and gas production: 95% of its proven oil reserves and 88.4% of its natural gas reserves are located offshore.¹⁰

SOUTH ATLANTIC SECURITY: RECENT TRENDS

In addition to its relatively low economic importance for the global economy, the main factor influencing South Atlantic security is its distance in relation to the centres of economic and military power, which explains the fact that the region has not been a flashpoint for geopolitical disputes for naval supremacy throughout the twentieth century.

Despite becoming a secondary scenario for global great power confrontation between the USA and the USSR during the Cold War, and after a surge in tensions in the early 1980s with the Malvinas War, the security environment in the South Atlantic went through a marked improvement during the latter part of that decade and the early 1990s. The creation of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZPCSA), formalized in 1986 by UN General Assembly Resolution 41/11, constituted a response of countries of the region to the threat of engulfment in the global geopolitical dispute of the Cold War, and particularly to the risk of nuclearization, while also providing a framework for intra-regional security cooperation. Lingered regional tensions were greatly reduced with the settlement of territorial disputes between Argentina and Chile, the rapprochement and intense confidence-building between Argentina and Brazil, and the rise of South American integration. On the African side, the independence of Namibia in 1990 and the end of the apartheid regime in 1994 removed some of the last major stumbling blocks for intra-regional security cooperation in Southern Africa.

Despite the relative peacefulness of the South Atlantic, several countries of the region still have active territorial disputes that can offer some potential for tensions. The most notable and long-standing among such disputes is, of course, the one involving Argentina and the United Kingdom around the sovereignty of the Malvinas Islands (along with South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands), which pitted both countries in a short but bitter war over the archipelago in 1982. Currently, given the reiterated commitment of both parties to addressing the issue

through exclusively peaceful means,¹¹ the threat of military confrontation over the issue is very low. Less visible, but also concerning are the lingering territorial disputes between African coastal nations, which, if left unresolved, may hamper efforts aimed at improving regional cooperation in maritime security and fostering economic development through the use of maritime resources.¹²

Another relevant aspect of the South Atlantic security situation is its status as a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ). Initially stated as one of the main objectives of the ZPCSA at its inception in 1986, it has come to fruition in 1996, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Pelindaba, which, together with the Treaty of Tlatelolco (1968) and the Antarctic Treaty (1961), legally established the entirety of the surrounding areas of the South Atlantic (and their respective EEZs) as nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The importance of this status can be illustrated by a few episodes in which the South Atlantic has been touched by the nuclear arms race. In the heyday of the Cold War, the region was the scenario for a nuclear weapons test, carried out in 1958 by the United States through Operation 'Argus' in international waters off the South African coast, 1800 km southwest of Cape Town. In 1979, in what became known as the 'Vela Incident', two flashes of light were detected in waters close to Antarctica (around the limits between the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean) by an American 'Vela' surveillance satellite, indicating the possibility of a nuclear detonation. Although considerable controversy remains regarding the incident, many elements point to a possible clandestine nuclear test that might have been carried out in secret either by South Africa or Israel, or jointly by both countries, which are known to have cooperated in their respective nuclear weapon programmes.¹³ In addition, recently declassified information from the British Ministry of Defence confirmed that in 1982, during the Malvinas War, the British naval task force sent to reclaim the islands carried nuclear weapons, and some uncertainty remains as to the possibility that their use against Argentina may have been threatened, directly or indirectly.¹⁴

As shown above, from the point of view of inter-state relations, the South Atlantic region is quite stable, and the few contentious issues still extant offer very limited risk of military confrontation. In recent years, however, the relevance of non-state factors in the South Atlantic security environment has increased, particularly with the rise in cases of piracy and armed robbery at sea, the intensification of the transatlantic trade in drugs and small arms and light weapons (SALW), and illicit, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing.

The Gulf of Guinea has been the focus of such concerns, given the rapid growth in the number of pirate attacks since 2009. After 2012, the number of such incidents in that region surpassed those recorded in East Africa, where international efforts have been successful at pushing back Somali piracy. Most of the attacks in the Gulf of Guinea have occurred off the coast of Nigeria, which is the place of origin of most of the individuals and groups involved in that criminal activity (some of which have proven to be offshoots of armed groups involved in the Niger River Delta conflict). Over the years, however, and especially from 2014 onwards, attacks have become progressively more widespread in geographic terms, with increasingly routine occurrences in shores as far as Angola.

For Brazil, the issue of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has become an increasingly important issue in its strategy towards the South Atlantic. In addition to its general interest in maintaining peace and security in the region, this interest is motivated by the growing economic and commercial ties between Brazil and West African nations. The trade links with countries in the region have intensified very strongly in the past few years, in particular with Nigeria. Imports from Nigeria have jumped from US\$700 million in 2000 to US\$9.5 billion in 2014, thus making Brazil the fourth largest importer of Nigerian goods (mainly oil and LPG), absorbing 8.1% of its total exports that year. In addition, the state-oil company Petrobras has investments in offshore oil production in the country.

Another issue of rising concern is the transatlantic drug trade between South America and continental Europe, driven by rising demand for narcotics (especially cocaine) in the European markets, and facilitated by varying degrees of weaknesses in law-enforcement capabilities in all countries involved in the supply chain, from production to transit to destination. A multitude of sea, land, and air routes are being utilized by traffickers, but most of the transatlantic drug trade utilizes container shipping, exploiting weaknesses in inspection methods.¹⁵ Even though the transatlantic drug trade might have negative effects vis-à-vis international and regional security, military-centred solutions in the style of the infamous ‘war on drugs’ waged in South and Central America would be profoundly misguided. A comprehensive answer to this scourge should articulate, *inter alia*, demand-reduction initiatives in countries of destination with improvements in police cooperation, capacity-building, and intelligence-sharing and among all states involved.

From Brazil’s perspective, the issue of criminal activities in the South Atlantic has a potential negative impact on the region’s security environ-

ment and on conditions for sustainable development of its economies. It might also lead to an undesirable expansion of extra-regional military presence in the region. In this regard, it should be noted that even though effective surveillance and patrolling of jurisdictional waters are essential to combating illicit maritime activities such as piracy, armed robbery, IUU fishing and trafficking in drugs and SALW, these problems cannot be adequately addressed by purely military responses. As Till¹⁶ argues, there are two-way linkages between good order at sea and good order inland, and in the case of piracy and armed robbery, the root causes of such problems are located ashore, and result from a complex interplay of security, rule of law, and socioeconomic development issues.

THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AND BRAZIL'S FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY

In order to properly appraise the recent evolution of the country's foreign and defence policy towards the South Atlantic, it is useful to examine the history of the country's relationship with that maritime region and of its place in Brazilian strategic thought.

Since its earliest moments as a Portuguese colony, the Atlantic Ocean has been the defining geographic reference for the occupation of Brazilian territory. This process began with the establishment of a virtual 'archipelago' of colonial outposts throughout its extensive coastline, each acting as a hub for the colonization and economic exploitation of the hinterland.¹⁷ Despite efforts to promote interiorization of development, most of the population and economic activity of Brazil is still concentrated along the Atlantic shoreline to this day.¹⁸ This pattern of territorial occupation made sure that the country's fortunes would become tied to the Atlantic Ocean, with all its consequent advantages and disadvantages: while facilitating overseas trade and access to marine resources, it also created a major vulnerability to seaborne external threats.

During the colonial era, Portuguese rule over what would become Brazil was challenged many times by colonial competitors. After its independence in 1822, the use of the fledgling naval power at the disposal of the new Brazilian Empire was crucial to ensure national unity and to defend against attempts at recolonization by Portugal.

At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century, the prosperity and hegemonic aspirations of Argentina led to an intensification of the strategic

rivalry between both countries, in which Brazil saw itself in a position of marked weakness, particularly in the naval realm. This weakness also exposed the country to 'gunboat diplomacy' by European powers, such as Britain and Imperial Germany.

During its early years as a Republic, Brazil sought to address its vulnerability to maritime threats by launching in 1906 a naval rearmament programme of astounding ambition, which included the purchase of two British-built Dreadnought-type battleships, which were, at the time of their commissioning, in 1910, the most powerful and technologically advanced warships in operation in the world.¹⁹

During the First World War, Brazil remained neutral during most of the conflict. In 1917, however, Imperial Germany's submarine fleet started attacking Brazilian merchant ships bound for ports of the Allied powers, which prompted Brazil to declare war against Germany, and to send a naval flotilla to the Mediterranean, marking the first wartime deployment of the Brazilian Navy outside the region.

Brazil's involvement in the Second World War was in turn far deeper and more consequential, and again provoked by seaborne threats. After a brief period of 'pendular diplomacy' earlier in the war, during which it oscillated between the Allies and the Axis powers, in late 1941 Brazil started leaning towards the former. This prompted Germany and Italy to retaliate by starting a submarine campaign against Brazilian coastal shipping, beginning in August 1942. The attacks caused widespread public outcry and prompted a decision by the Brazilian government to join the war effort, by sending a 25,000-strong Expeditionary Force to fight Nazi Germany in Italy.

After the end of the Second World War, amid the rapidly-intensifying rivalry of the Cold War, Brazil positioned itself firmly in the Western, pro-US bloc. Together with nearly all other South and Central American nations, it signed the 1947 'Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance' (commonly known for its Portuguese and Spanish acronym TIAR), which created a formal military alliance with the United States against foreign aggression, directed primarily at deterring Soviet encroachment. During the Cold War, Brazilian naval thinking was subordinated to American strategic concepts, and oriented itself to anti-submarine operations in order to deter and defend against Soviet attacks against sea lines of communication in the South Atlantic.²⁰

At the same time, Brazil started its decades-long struggle to assert a legal title to its contiguous maritime zones: after the precedent set by the

1945 'Truman Declaration', by which the United States asserted its rights to 'jurisdiction and control' over the resources of its continental shelf, a flurry of legal claims to contiguous maritime zones evidenced the need for a clear and universal legal regime for the economic use of maritime resources made possible by rapid technological advances, particularly in the oil sector. The UN sought to address this legal void with its three Conferences on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I, II, and III), a protracted process that lasted from 1956 to 1982. In this context, there came a crucial moment for Brazil's assertion of its rights over its maritime resources: the so-called 'Lobster war', a diplomatic-military incident with France in 1963 over lobster fishing close to the Brazilian northeastern coast.²¹ After repeated occasions in which French fishing boats were intercepted and apprehended by the Brazilian Navy (and later released), both countries engaged in difficult bilateral negotiations over the issue, to no effect. In 1963, after President João Goulart cancelled an ad hoc authorization for a lobster fishing expedition he had previously issued under intense French pressure, President de Gaulle ordered the destroyer *Tartu* to accompany fishing boats bound for the Brazilian coast, in a classic example of 'gun-boat diplomacy'. Brazil responded by sending a naval task force that kept *Tartu* and its entourage of fishing boats under constant surveillance, but fortunately no shots were fired. The incident galvanized public interest in the continental shelf and led to subsequent extensions of Brazil's jurisdictional claims.

Even though the risk of Soviet encroachment in the region was relatively limited,²² the issue was very much present in the concerns of US strategic thinkers.²³ Such concerns were behind the idea of establishing a 'South Atlantic Treaty Organization' (SATO), a treaty-based collective security defence arrangement for the region, similar to initiatives led by the USA in South East Asia (SEATO) and in Central Asia (CENTO).²⁴

Throughout the late 1970s, however, Brazilian and US strategic interests began to diverge, as Brazil sought to break free from the straitjacket imposed by the bipolar world order, as demonstrated by the pursuit of a more independent foreign policy that did not shy away from improving relations with the communist bloc. In 1975, the Brazilian Navy adopted a new naval policy document ('Basic Policy and Guidelines') in which it distanced itself from the emphasis on an anti-submarine warfare role subordinated to US strategic concepts and began to develop a naval posture based on conflict scenarios more in tune with Brazilian national interests.²⁵

Two years later, it launched a programme aimed at building an indigenous nuclear-powered submarine, then under a veil of secrecy.

It was against this background that Brazil opposed proposals for the establishment of a SATO floated by US officials in the early 1980s, amidst resurgent tensions with the Soviet Union. In a seminal classified work presented internally in the Ministry of External Relations in 1982 (later declassified and published in 2016),²⁶ José Viegas Filho, a career diplomat who would later serve as Minister of Defence (2003–2004), characterized the idea of a SATO as reflective of a ‘clearly instrumental view of the US regarding South Atlantic countries’. Although Viegas conceded that US and Brazilian interests regarding the South Atlantic coincided to a large extent, he posited that the idea of a SATO had a ‘potential to divide the region in rival fields’,²⁷ and that it was in the Brazilian national interest to avoid direct involvement in the East–West confrontation.

In lieu of a formal alliance structure that would firmly frame the South Atlantic as a point of friction in the context of the Cold War geopolitical struggle, as envisaged in proposals for a SATO, Viegas Filho proposed a treaty-based security and cooperation framework for countries of the South Atlantic basin, inspired by the experience of the 1978 Amazon Cooperation Treaty (ACT). Although the proposal as such never came to fruition, the vision expressed by Viegas in his work has been carried forward by the efforts of Brazilian diplomacy in proposing the creation of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZPCSA), which was established through the adoption, in 1986, of UN General Assembly Resolution 41/11.

At a time in which the region was still very much divided by ideology, Cold War geopolitical struggle, colonialism and apartheid, the ZPCSA initiative sought to lay out a political groundwork for intra-regional cooperation that went well beyond the realm of peace and security, including also issues such as social and economic development, protection of the environment, and conservation of marine resources—in a manner consistent with the conceptual approach promoted by Brazil and many developing countries regarding the two-way linkages between security and development. As Abdenur²⁸ put it, ‘instead of adapting to a bipolar world order, its [ZPCSA’s] underlying rationale was to autonomously change the power structure within the South Atlantic’.

The end of the Cold War, in the early 1990s, removed the immediate threat of great power confrontation in the South Atlantic. The global security architecture, suddenly unencumbered by the straitjacket of bipo-

lar geopolitical disputes, gave way to a rising importance of regional security complexes. Despite such deep changes in the global and regional security, the participating states of the ZPCSA reaffirmed the validity of the initiative's principles at its third meeting (Brasilia, September 1994), and adopted a series of important commitments, chief among which were the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the South Atlantic and the establishment of a Permanent Committee. After the Brasilia meeting, however, ZPCSA entered a long period of inactivity, due to factors such as a focus on intra-regional integration mechanisms on both sides of the ocean (Mercosul, ECOWAS, ECCAC, and SADC), as well as economic crises in some of the biggest countries in the region, such as Argentina and Brazil, which limited their range of foreign policy actions.²⁹ In 2007, ZPCSA states decided to revitalize the initiative, through the convening of a ministerial meeting in Luanda, where a number of political commitments and an action plan were adopted. Another ministerial meeting was convened in 2013, in Montevideo, and for the first time it convened ministers of foreign affairs and defence of its member countries. Since then, annual meetings of the ZPCSA have been taking place on the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York.

Described by some analysts³⁰ as a vehicle for Brazil to project influence in the region over the South Atlantic region, through the conceptual framework of 'consensual hegemony' proposed by Burges,³¹ the ZPCSA is, in truth, a framework for intra-regional cooperation that responds to the political and strategic interests of all countries in the region. It is not defined by an exclusionary impetus: the initiative does not aim to reject any contributions and partnerships by extra-regional countries; on the contrary, it only seeks to ensure that such partnerships respect the specific nature of the South Atlantic security architecture, as defined by its own members.

In May 2004, Brazil submitted its proposal to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), the second member state to do so. It claimed an area of 911,847 km² as its continental shelf, which, after a 2005 technical revision, increased to a total of 953,525 km². Together with 3,539,919.22 km² of its EEZ, the maritime area claimed by Brazil adds up to more than half of the country's total land mass (8,515,767 km²).

At the turn of the twentieth century, the global strategic profile of the South Atlantic began to rise: as offshore oil production increased in South America and West Africa, both regions became increasingly interesting alternative purveyors for the world's major petroleum importers, which

sought to diversify their sources away from more geopolitically unstable regions. In tandem with the emergence or intensification of potential threats to regional security, such as piracy, drug-trafficking, and illicit trade in SALW, this confluence of factors led to an increase in the interest and involvement of extra-regional powers in the South Atlantic, which are examined in depth in other chapters of this book.

Of note in this regard are the Portuguese efforts aimed at involving NATO in the South Atlantic, portrayed as the alliance's 'southern flank', and described by the country's 2013 defence policy ('Strategic Concept for National Defence', or CEDN in the Portuguese acronym) as part of a 'strategic unity' of the Atlantic Ocean. Seabra³² describes the goal of this move to emphasize a supposed 'Atlantic wholeness' as a move to 'capitalize on Portugal's professed bridge-building traits between the two sub-oceans, while presenting the country as an indispensable partner in such process'. Although understandable as a means for Portugal to achieve a greater role within NATO,³³ the idea has been met with unequivocal opposition from Brazil, expressed at the highest levels of government by both the Defence and Foreign Affairs Ministers.

Brazil's resistance to a NATO presence in the South Atlantic might seem contradictory at first sight, since it maintains friendly relationships with all NATO countries, including dense military cooperation links with many of them. Brazilian concerns, however, are related to the fact that NATO, as a military alliance, is more than the mere sum of its parts: since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of its nemesis, the Warsaw Pact, NATO's main *raison d'être* disappeared, and the alliance began to behave as a 'solution in search of a problem', continuously attempting to redefine its purpose. In the process, it has increasingly sought roles for itself that went above and beyond its original mandate for collective defence of its member states against external aggression, as per Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In doing so, it has authorized military operations outside of its 'area of responsibility', at times without a mandate from the UN Security Council. It should also be recalled that NATO continues to rely heavily on nuclear weapons for deterrence, including the legally questionable practice of 'nuclear sharing', as the policy of stationing nuclear weapons in the territory of non-nuclear-weapon states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is known.

Taken together, these elements underpin the Brazilian understanding that possible NATO involvement in the South Atlantic is unnecessary and undesirable, not only due to the obvious incompatibility between NATO's

approach to security and the ZPCSA framework, but also because states in the region are capable of maintaining the ocean's stable, peaceful, and denuclearized security environment without extra-regional intervention or tutelage.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: DEFENCE POLICY DOCUMENTS AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION

The strategic importance of the South Atlantic for Brazil has been reflected in the defence policy documents, which, after the establishment of the MoD, in 1999, constituted key steps in the development of a unified and coherent framework for defence planning: the National Defence Policy (Política de Defesa Nacional – PDN), the National Defence Strategy (Estratégia Nacional de Defesa – END), and the White Paper on National Defence (Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional – LBDN).³⁴ Their initial versions were published respectively in 2005, 2008, and 2012, and in accordance with Complementary Law 136/2010, these documents should be regularly updated every four years—from 2012 onwards—and submitted to Congress for legislative approval.

In addition to providing clarity and transparency regarding Brazil's key defence objectives, as well as to the ways and means that should be employed to pursue them, these documents represent an invaluable instrument for articulating top-level military planning with the country's broader foreign policy goals. These developments set the stage for a constant growth of channels for dialogue between both Ministries, both formal and informal, that facilitate mutual understanding and joint action, which can clearly be seen in the case of Brazil's approach towards the South Atlantic.

Beginning with the 2005 PND, South America and the South Atlantic are defined as part of Brazil's 'strategic milieu' (*entorno estratégico*). The concept of 'strategic milieu' was not clearly defined by the policy itself, but it might be understood as the adjoining geographic region whose security and stability are inextricably linked to Brazil's own national security, and therefore where Brazil should concentrate its diplomatic, economic, and military efforts, in keeping with its long history of peaceful and cooperative relations with its neighbours. Accordingly, the 2005 PND states that the priorities for Brazil's defence cooperation are South American, Southern African, and Portuguese-speaking African countries. In 2008,

the PND was supplemented by the National Defence Strategy (END), which defines the actions to be taken to attain the objectives determined by the former policy document, and where the South Atlantic is again mentioned as one of Brazil's defence priorities. In the first update to both the PND and the END, in 2012, the definition of Brazil's 'strategic milieu' is further refined, but the South Atlantic is clearly defined as a priority. This was also the case with the 2016 updated version of the PND, submitted to Congress for approval and, at the time of the writing of this chapter, still considered a draft document.³⁵

After the inclusion of specific and prominent references to the South Atlantic in the PND and END, it has become almost commonplace to argue that only in the 2000s did the region attained a level of strategic importance in Brazil's foreign and defence policies, and that prior to that, the region was not among the country's military priorities. Even if there is truth to that assessment, views that point to a fundamental change of approach towards the region in recent years should be taken with a grain of salt.

As an example of that approach, Seabra³⁶ points out that the evolution of the definition of Brazil's 'strategic milieu' reflects a 'clear tendency to focus Brazilian interests in Africa to the Atlantic coastal States', which is explained on the basis of a 'growing importance of the South Atlantic in official discourse'.

Along the same lines, Abdenur and Neto³⁷ argue that prior to the early 2000s, the South Atlantic was not one of Brazil's strategic priorities, and that the major perceived threats to Brazilian sovereignty were the Amazon and the River Plate region, due to the rivalry with Argentina. This argument overlooks the fact that, until the creation of the Ministry of Defence, in 1999, each of the branches of the Brazilian armed forces had defined their own priorities more or less independently. It can be argued that for the Brazilian Army, the River Plate basin was indeed the focus of its strategic planning until at least the early 1990s, when the near-eradication of tensions with Argentina allowed for a gradual refocusing on the Amazon, with a corresponding shift in resources and personnel towards that region. However, for the Brazilian Navy, the South Atlantic has always been its top priority, as demonstrated by the sheer imbalance between the expenditures in its riverine patrol capabilities (both in the Amazon and River Plate basins) and on oceanic warfare assets, with the latter getting the lion's share of the force's budget. One could counter-argue that oceangoing assets are by their very nature more expensive to acquire and operate,

but the very fact that the Brazilian Navy has so consistently pursued those capabilities demonstrates its perception of the strategic value of the South Atlantic.

This does not imply, however, denying the fundamental importance of developments since 2003 in the fields of foreign and defence policy in general, and with regard to the South Atlantic in particular.

One key element has been the reinforced priority given by Brazil's foreign policy to its relationship to Africa, demonstrated by its determination to further political, economic, and security ties to the continent. This gave further substance to Brazil's efforts aimed at building a sense of community and a shared identity among South Atlantic nations, as demonstrated by its numerous diplomatic initiatives in the region (including the convening of the Africa–South America Summits, the promotion of trade and investment, and the expansion of its network of embassies in the continent).

This period also witnessed the launch of a number of major naval acquisition programmes with a view to reinforcing the Brazilian Navy's capabilities in terms of deterrence and maritime security.

And finally, in 2007, the discovery of a whole new area of deep-water oil reserves under the 'pre-salt' layer has given new impetus for Brazil's struggle for energy self-sufficiency, and opened the prospect for the country to become a net oil exporter, thus raising the importance of protecting its maritime resources.

Important as they are, however, such recent developments do not represent a break with the past, but instead as a continuation of a long history of adaptation to changes in the region's strategic configuration, during which the South Atlantic always played a key role in the country's history and occupied a central place in Brazilian strategic thought and military planning.

Thus, rather than as a simple increase in strategic priority, the changes in Brazil's approach towards the South Atlantic since the early 2000s are better understood as a combination of factors: (i) developments in the institutional framework for defining and implementing defence policy, as well as improvements in its articulation with foreign policy objectives; (ii) as a consequence of the aforementioned, greater synergy between Brazil's foreign policy efforts towards Africa as a whole and the more specific, security-related concerns with the South Atlantic and its coastal states; (iii) changes in the region's strategic configuration, with the emergence of new opportunities (steady growth in petroleum production and the discovery

of new reserves in both margins) and risks (such as the rise of piracy and the increased prospect of extra-regional influence); and (iv) the country's strong economic performance, notably during the 2004–2011 period, which enabled a more assertive and ambitious external agenda and greater investments in its military capabilities.

As Mattos et al. argue,³⁸ 'the preoccupation with the South Atlantic has deeper roots in the development of Brazilian society, as well as the Brazilian state and its foreign policy; it did not only emerge from the above documents [the PND, the END and the LBDN], or from foreign policy under the Lula administration, but developed, and was strengthened, over time'.

Brazil's Naval Power and the South Atlantic

As for the measures called for by the END, those pertaining to the Navy have directly influenced how Brazil positions itself as a naval power in the South Atlantic. The policy document establishes three 'strategic tasks' for the Brazilian Navy: (i) sea denial; (ii) control of maritime areas; and (iii) projection of power. These tasks are not seen as equivalent: both the 2008 and 2012 versions clearly prioritize sea denial as the basic organizing task of Brazilian naval strategy, with the view to ensuring adequate means to prevent 'any concentration of forces from reaching Brazil by sea'.

This hierarchy is clearly discernible in the number of significant naval development and acquisition programmes that have been launched by the Brazilian Navy since the first iterations of the PND and the END, among which the Submarine Development Programme (PROSUB), most clearly associated with the 'sea denial' task, stands out as a priority. The Navy's ambitious long-term capital investment plans have been severely curtailed by the economic crisis that hit the country from 2014 onwards, which has imposed drastic budgetary restrictions on the Brazilian government in general and in the Brazilian Navy in particular. However, by looking into which initiatives were prioritized during this period of hardship, one can have a clear insight about the primary concerns guiding Brazil's naval strategy and its outlook for South Atlantic.

Initiated in 2008 based on a 'strategic partnership' agreement with France and with a €6.7 billion budget, PROSUB is the largest ever defence acquisition programme in Brazilian history. It involves the construction of four *Scorpène*-class conventionally powered submarines (diesel-electric propulsion), designated S-BR or *Riachuelo*-class in the Brazilian Navy, as well as the construction of one nuclear-powered submarine, dubbed

SN-BR, or the *Álvaro Alberto* class. In the case of the latter, French assistance will be limited to the non-nuclear-related parts of the warship (hull, sensors, combat and weapon systems), while the design, construction, and integration of the nuclear propulsion system will be the sole responsibility of the Brazilian Navy.

The Navy's dogged determination in pursuing its objective of equipping itself with nuclear-powered submarines survived 40 years of political change and periods of extreme economic hardship. The importance it attaches to the nuclear programme derives not only from the technological gains derived from its development, but also from the high tactical deterrence value of such vessels: conventional (diesel-electric) submarines are extremely difficult to detect while submerged and running on electric power, but they must periodically come to the surface to recharge their batteries using their diesel engines, which need outside air, and in so doing they become vulnerable to detection and to anti-submarine weaponry. In contrast, nuclear-powered submarines run for years on a single fuel load, generate their own oxygen on board and might sail underwater for months at a time, which gives them unmatched stealth and range.

For these reasons, PROSUB remains the Navy's foremost priority, having been largely spared from budget cuts and preserved from the legal troubles that engulfed its main contractor from the Brazilian side. Despite delays in the original schedule, the first conventional submarine (*Riachuelo*) is scheduled for launch in the second semester of 2018.³⁹ Work on the development of the nuclear reactor for the SN-BR is underway.

The primary purpose of the nuclear-powered submarine is to discourage foreign aggression (or the threat thereof) by a superior naval power or coalition of powers, including those that might be motivated by disputes over maritime resources. However unlikely that scenario might seem today, it constitutes a 'low probability/high impact' threat that needs to be taken seriously.⁴⁰ Even against vastly superior naval powers also equipped with nuclear-powered submarines, possessing a credible deterrence capability (enough to elevate the cost of aggression beyond an unacceptable threshold) contributes to preventing such potential threats from ever materializing.

As for the tasks of controlling maritime areas and of maintaining maritime security, the Navy also announced plans for the acquisition of surface combat vessels (also based on nationalization and technology transfers) dubbed PROSUPER, comprising six multi-purpose frigates, five oceanic patrol vessels (OPVs), and one logistical support ship, to be supplemented

by the construction of new indigenously-designed corvettes. The Navy planned to acquire 46,500-tonne coastal patrol boats of the *Macaé* class.

Even though budgetary restraints have delayed the bidding process for PROSUPER as well as the beginning of construction of new corvettes, the Navy seems to be determined to move forward in enhancing its maritime patrol capabilities: a real capability leap has been achieved with the 2013 purchase of three OPVs of the *Amazonas* class, the first patrol boats of the Brazilian Navy that were purpose-built for oceanic maritime security operations. These vessels are being employed extensively in long-range patrols of the Brazilian EEZ and have become essential tools for Brazil's 'naval diplomacy' and cooperation in maritime security with West African states.

The Navy also drew up long-term plans to enhance its capabilities in the 'power projection' mission after the first editions of the PND and the END, chief among which were the programme for the acquisition of two amphibious assault ships (PROANF) and another aiming at the procurement of two 50,000-tonne aircraft carriers (PRONAE). Its current carrier, the *São Paulo*, would be modernized and continue to serve for another two decades, while the new units are designed, built, and commissioned.

Among the three 'strategic tasks' described by the 2008 and 2012 END for the Navy, the area of power projection, however, seems to be the one that was hit the hardest by the budgetary restrictions, with none of the planned major programmes having gone beyond the drawing board, a notable exception being the acquisition of amphibious assault ship *Siroco*, formerly operated by the French Navy (renamed as *Bahia*), and of the ex-Royal Navy HMS *Ocean*, an amphibious helicopter carrier. Due to its excessive cost, the plans for modernization of *São Paulo* were abandoned, and the ship was decommissioned in February 2017.

DEFENCE COOPERATION WITH SOUTH ATLANTIC COUNTRIES: CREATING A 'GOODWILL BELT'?

Another key element of Brazil's approach to contributing to the maintenance of peace and security in the South Atlantic has been the strengthening of defence cooperation with countries in the region. Although far from being a novelty, such cooperation initiatives were expressly mentioned as one of the objectives of the END and are an essential component of Brazil's wider approach towards its relations with countries of the African continent.

The objective of these efforts, as defined in 2012 by then-Minister of Defence Celso Amorim, is the creation of a 'goodwill belt' in the South Atlantic.⁴¹ Many analysts, such as Abdenur⁴² and Mattos,⁴³ point to a similarity between Brazil's approach to security in both South America and the South Atlantic. In both cases, Brazilian diplomacy and the country's defence establishment have been seeking to build a stable framework for regional security based on cooperation and confidence-building.

This approach has been described by Mattos⁴⁴ as an attempt at creating a South Atlantic regional security complex (RSC), understood as 'a region where the securitization and desecuritisation processes cannot be analyzed separately from one another', as per Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver's conceptual framework for regional security analysis.⁴⁵ These efforts would be a stepping stone towards transforming the region in a 'security community' as defined by Karl Deutsch, in other words, a region in which war between its members has become highly unlikely. Brazil's military-to-military cooperation initiatives play a central role in this effort: due to its sensitive nature, defence cooperation can only occur in an atmosphere of mutual trust, and its continuation and strengthening over time change mutual perceptions in a positive manner.

These efforts date back to at least 1994, when Brazil and newly-independent Namibia celebrated a naval cooperation agreement, whereby the Brazilian Navy structured, trained, and equipped its fledgling Namibian counterpart. A naval mission has been established in Walvis Bay, and since then hundreds of Namibian naval officers and NCOs have been trained in the Brazilian Navy's schools. A Brazilian Marine Corps Technical Support Group has also been established and tasked with aiding in the formation of Namibia's own naval infantry unit.

Since 2003, an unprecedented flurry of defence cooperation initiatives (particularly in the naval field) with African countries have sprouted, as documented by Seabra:⁴⁶ formal defence cooperation agreements have been adopted with South Africa (2003), Guinea-Bissau (2006), Mozambique and Namibia⁴⁷ (2009), Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, São Tomé & Príncipe and Senegal (2010), and Cabo Verde (2016). In 2014, a naval mission was activated in Cabo Verde, and that same year a Technical Support Group of the Brazilian Marine Corps was established in São Tomé & Príncipe, together with the donation of a patrol boat and weaponry to the country's coastguard.

In addition to direct cooperation, Brazil has taken part in a dense web of naval exercises involving South Atlantic nations: Atlantic Tidings

(Angola, Brazil, Namibia, South Africa), ATLASUR (Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Uruguay), BOGATUN (Brazil and Chile), FRATERNAL (Argentina and Brazil), IBSAMAR (Brazil, India, South Africa), Obangame Express (Brazil, USA, and 20 African countries), and UNITAS (Chile, Mexico, Peru, UK, USA).

Cooperation in the Fight Against Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea

Brazil's direct involvement in the Gulf of Guinea began in 2013, when, by invitation of Cameroon, the host state, Brazil participated as one of the observer countries in the 2013 Yaoundé Summit on Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea, organized by ECOWAS, ECCAC, and the Gulf of Guinea. Since then, the Brazilian government has been following up on the efforts of countries in the region towards implementing the commitments deriving from the summit.

The newly-acquired oceanic patrol vessels (OPVs) of the *Amazonas* class have become important tools for the cooperation ties that Brazil has been developing with the Gulf of Guinea in the realm of maritime security, beginning with their maiden voyages in 2013, all of which included port calls to countries in the West African coast. During these visits, the crew carried out bilateral naval exercises with the respective partner navies, involving, inter alia, techniques for boarding and inspection of suspicious vessels.

Another aspect of Brazil's cooperation with Gulf of Guinea countries is in the field of maritime domain awareness (MDA), with a focus on maritime traffic control. The Brazilian Navy has amassed considerable expertise in building and operating its maritime traffic information system (SISTRAM), as well as expanding its experience in regional information-sharing with Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay under the regional data centre of the South Atlantic Maritime Area (AMAS).⁴⁸ In addition, the Brazilian Navy is engaging in discussions with its Cameroon counterpart in order to identify possibilities for support in the operationalization of the Inter-Regional Coordination Centre (CIC) established in 2014 in accordance with the 2013 Yaoundé Summit on Maritime Security.

The Brazilian Navy is also inviting countries in the region to join its regional data centre (RDC) for the Long-Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) system, established in 2006 by the IMO in the framework of the 1974 Convention on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). By participating in the Brazilian RDC, countries in the region will be able to

share information on maritime traffic, thus increasing substantially their maritime domain awareness.

It should be noted that Brazilian naval cooperation with African countries in the fight against piracy is restricted to training, capacity-building, naval doctrine, and maritime domain awareness. In contrast with the actions of other partners in the region, such as the USA or France, it does not include operational activities, which, as in the case of any military deployment outside Brazilian territory, would require a proper international mandate and prior approval by Congress, in accordance with Federal Law 2.953.

This flurry of defence cooperation initiatives over the past few years has led to an increasing recognition of Brazil's role in contributing to peace and security in the African continent as a whole and in the South Atlantic in particular.⁴⁹ However, the pace of these initiatives has slowed down significantly in the past two years, prompting some analysts, such as Seabra,⁵⁰ to point to 'evidence of declining engagement'. This slowdown in the pace of defence cooperation in the South Atlantic is, however, not due to a political decision, but merely a logical consequence of the dire budgetary crisis faced by the Brazilian government in the past few years. Even in this restrictive economic context, the Brazilian government has given many signs of its continued commitment to fostering ties with Africa and to maintaining its engagement in the South Atlantic, as evidenced, *inter alia*, by the African tour of Foreign Minister Aloysio Nunes Ferreira in May 2017 (during which he visited Namibia, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, and São Tomé & Príncipe), as well as by the continued engagement—despite strenuous budgetary constraints—of the Brazilian Navy with West African counterparts over the past two years, ranging from port calls to bilateral and multilateral naval exercises.

CONCLUSIONS

Over the course of the country's history, the South Atlantic Ocean has been a central driving force that helped shape and consolidate the Brazilian nation. At the same time, it has been the conduit for some of the gravest threats faced by Brazilian society, ranging from colonial and neocolonial offensives to the menace of disruption of its vital trade links with the world. More recently, as technological advancements heightened the value of marine resources and expanded the possibilities for their exploitation, it has become one of the greatest assets for the country's prospects for long-

term development. Claiming and securing such resources has been and will continue to be a permanent joint task of Brazilian diplomacy and the armed forces.

The designation of the South Atlantic as part of Brazil's 'strategic milieu' and as a strategic priority for its defence planning is, therefore, not a novelty or a turning point; it is but the recognition of an undeniable fact, that calls for appropriate measures to be taken to safeguard the country's interests in the region.

In keeping with the overall foreign policy objectives of a country that can pride itself in being at peace with its ten neighbours for over 140 years, such interests are not guided by any putative desire for domination or expansionism. In truth, they are tied to the preservation of the current peaceful and stable environment of the South Atlantic and to the promotion of ever-deepening cooperative ties among its coastal states, while at the same time discouraging external influences that are not aligned with the region's security architecture.

At the same time, Brazil cannot afford itself the luxury of forgetting the lessons of the two World Wars: twice in the course of less than three decades, it had to confront foreign and unprovoked threats which, despite coming from distant shores, put Brazilian lives in peril and jeopardized the backbone of its economy. It did so from a position of marked weakness, due to years of neglect of its necessary military capabilities.

Even if the regional situation is benign and the threats looming over the international system seem distant, Brazil needs to continue to invest in the procurement of credible means of deterring and preventing aggression through the sea, which are the most efficient way to ensure that such threats never materialize.

NOTES

1. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors only, and do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs or of the Brazilian government. The authors would like to thank Captain (Brazilian Navy) Silvio Aderne Neto and Mirka Wendt for their contributions to this chapter.
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Brazil and the Construction of Its Power to Defend the South Atlantic

Juliano da Silva Cortinhas

INTRODUCTION¹

The importance of the South Atlantic to Brazil is undeniable. The country possesses the biggest coast of the Atlantic Ocean and one of the largest in the world. The coastal distance between the cities of Oiapoque, in the Amazon, and Chuí, in Rio Grande do Sul, amounts to 7491 km. Historically, Brazilian ties with Europe and Africa have profoundly influenced its formation and due to the importance of these connections its population is strongly concentrated along the coast. Approximately 96% of Brazilian exports flow over that ocean, according to the National Agency of Waterway Transportation.² In October 2017, the country extracted 95.2% of its oil and 79% of its natural gas from the bottom of the South Atlantic.³ The potential for increasing these numbers once the pre-salt reserves achieve full production is significant and recent studies indicate that several other mineral resources may be available, both in Brazil's exclusive economic zone and in its extended continental shelf.

Brazil has several responsibilities in the South Atlantic, especially if it wants to assure that it will be able to autonomously decide how to explore

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its resources and to minimize possible risks to its interests. At the same time, any possible threat to maritime security in the South Atlantic concerns Brazil and can menace its existence due to its oceanic dependence. The country's geographic and economic dimensions position it as a necessary player and as a probable leader in the region and it is necessary, therefore, that the country actively pursues ways to maximize its capacities and to minimize its vulnerabilities in the region.

Although there is an extensive literature on the Brazilian leadership⁴ in South America, not a lot has been written about the initiatives developed by the country to build tools to lead its South Atlantic partners into the creation of a more autonomous region, in which the influence of extra-regional countries is minimized. This chapter will argue that if Brazil intends to play a role, it must develop its power toward the region, what can be achieved by initiatives that seek to influence the regulations about the use of the sea (what Strange⁵ calls structural power) or by creating capabilities that will increase its capacity to affect the behavior of other countries (what Strange calls relational power⁶). In both cases, power can be exercised through soft and/or hard means, options that vary according to the situation and the tools available, as Nye⁷ points out.

The chapter will analyze three initiatives developed by Brazil to increase its power toward the South Atlantic. Two of them will focus on the construction of the country's structural power, which has been the historical focus of its diplomacy. The third one will examine the recent efforts that the country has been implementing to increase its relational power by reinforcing its military, a goal that has been emphasized at least since the approval of the National Strategy of Defense in 2008. Despite the differences between these initiatives, the chapter will state that there are several important limitations in all of them, mainly because Brazil does not commit enough resources to maintain the structures in the region or, in the case of its defense, the excessive spending in personnel and the consequent insufficiency of resources applied for new equipment and technologies limit its effectiveness.

The chapter is divided into four sections. Firstly, a brief analysis of the strategic presence of extra-regional powers in the South Atlantic will be presented. These countries can affect positively or negatively the Brazilian capacity to influence the main events in the area. Secondly, it discusses the concepts of leadership and power in order to understand what are the possible strategies that can be applied by Brazil in the region. Finally, the last two sections will discuss Brazil's main initiatives to develop both dimen-

sions (structural and relational) of its power and how limitations in these efforts minimize the country's capacity to lead regional countries into a more autonomous project.

THE MILITARY PRESENCE OF EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC

Even after the demise of colonial rule, several extra-regional powers have maintained a constant military presence in the South Atlantic. In its southern portion, the islands of South Georgia, South Sandwich, and Malvinas (Falklands) are at the center of disputes between Argentina and the United Kingdom. In Ascension, the UK maintains a strategic air base that the Royal Air Force and the American Air Force use for military activities in the South Atlantic and in Africa. The islands of Santa Helena, Tristão da Cunha, and Gonçalo Alves (Gough Island) were also colonized by the United Kingdom and are still under its auspices. Besides the UK, other European powers, such as France in Guiana, maintain overseas or ultramarine territories in the South Atlantic.

But European countries are not the only powers that operate in the South Atlantic. In the last few years, the United States has increased its presence in the region.⁸ In July 2008, for example, the American Navy decided to reinstall its Fourth Fleet.⁹ Although the US government emphasized that the decision was related to the necessity to promote maritime navigation safety, to combat drug trafficking, and to strengthen its friendship with Latin American countries by the use of medical ships, the Fourth Fleet increases the projection of the American power over the South Atlantic and it sends an important message to the region, since the Fleet had been disestablished since 1950.

The creation of AFRICOM, the United States African Command, has also increased the American military presence in the South Atlantic. With AFRICOM, the USA added one more to the six geographic divisions that organize the American armed forces and their preparation to engage abroad. Though the American focus in combating terrorism and insurgency can be used to justify the country's decision to establish the command, it seems that the growth of the US military engagement in Africa has been exaggerated if these are the goals to achieve. According to Gerson, the continent

[...] has been the focus of a major U.S. military build-up, reinforced by the newly created Africa Command. With bases in Morocco and Egypt, the new focus is south of the Sahara, where a “family” of military bases is being created. This “family” includes major installations for brigades of up to 5,000 troops “that could be robustly used” [...]. “Host” nations for the new family are to include Cameroon, Guinea (which has also been targeted as a major source of oil), Mali, and São Tomé and Príncipe, with Senegal and Uganda providing refueling installations for the air force.¹⁰

Besides maintaining the American presence in the region, AFRICOM has invested heavily in the installation of radar systems that feed the US forces with very important information about the region. This worries regional countries, since intelligence and technical cooperation are one of their most important demands and the United States seems to be avoiding a more desirable multilateral approach when it denies at least a share of those data.

China is another important actor that has been increasing its engagement in the South Atlantic. It has been strongly increasing its regional presence in Africa not only by enormous investments in infrastructure and in the exploitation of natural resources, but also by participating in peace-keeping missions and offering humanitarian assistance in the continent.¹¹ Additionally, China has been investing in close ties with countries like Argentina, where it has recently established a satellite base in order to support its outer space activities. The base has raised many uncertainties among Argentinian politicians, other countries in the region, and global powers.¹²

Finally, Russia has been recently investing in the re-establishment of its global military engagement, focusing especially in Eurasia, but also in the South Atlantic, where this renewed posture can be associated with three strategies. Firstly, Russia has been investing a lot in the construction of a strategic partnership with China that has focused on Africa and Latin America,¹³ regions that are especially attractive because they are far from the intrigues that sometimes separate both countries in Eurasia. Secondly, Russia has been unilaterally developing a ‘charm offensive’ toward Africa and especially toward Angola, where it has been selling many weapon systems and projecting its interests.¹⁴ Russian weapon systems have also been sold to several South American countries.¹⁵ Finally, Russians have reactivated their submarine fleet that navigates in South Atlantic waters.

As can be noted, extra-regional military presence in the South Atlantic has been growing in the last decade. This posture not only tends to go against the UN resolution that declared the South Atlantic a nuclear weapons-free zone (specifically article 3 of UNGA 41/2011, which created ZPCSA), but it is harmful for South American countries' interests for two reasons: firstly, because the rivalries that emerge among great powers can affect the region, leading to conflicts in its seas and lands; secondly, because the increased presence of these extra-regional powers minimizes the coastal countries' capacity to define their own destinies and how they use their natural resources.

Today, none of these presences impose a direct threat to South Atlantic nations, but even peaceful countries can be driven into the rivalries of global power politics if they don't acquire enough tools to maintain their autonomy. To achieve that, there is only one possible option on the table: regional nations need to develop enough power to back their interests and, if necessary, to dissuade possible adversaries. Although this is a shared concern, Brazil has the richest economy, the largest population, and the biggest coast in the region and these conditions increase its responsibilities. Before examining how the country has been addressing this issue, it is necessary to briefly analyze the concepts of leadership and power and how they can be developed.

LEADERSHIP AND POWER

Brazil's geographic, demographic, and economic conditions are important power assets, but they are not directly translated into the ability to achieve desired results if Brazilian decision makers do not take the necessary measures to do so. None of the country's assets would be able to assure its regional leadership, a position it must hold if it expects South Atlantic security to be assured mainly by coastal nations.

For many decades, many Brazilian diplomats and decision makers have avoided stating that the country could or should lead other regional countries into a joint project to maximize their capacity to protect the South Atlantic.¹⁶ Instead of that, they preferred to emphasize the necessity to create consensus in the region, a discourse that seems to presuppose that these are contradictory options.¹⁷ In contrast, this chapter agrees with the notion that leadership can be exercised through coercion or payoffs, the tools described by traditional International Relations theories, but also

through ideational initiatives that focus on building bridges among leaders and followers, a strategy called cooperative or consensual leadership.¹⁸

Because of the conceptual misunderstanding that led these diplomats and decision makers to confuse leadership with imposition, they emphasize that the country's international insertion must avoid a stronger posture and should be exclusively based on the strict respect of international principles and concepts that they relate to multilateralism and consensus building.¹⁹ To them, Brazilian views and preferences would be naturally accepted in the South Atlantic if they are based in these principles. If that were true, Brazil would be able to exercise a cost-free leadership.

Although historically important among the country's diplomats, this view seems to be losing ground in the last few years. There is a growing perception inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Brazil has throughout its history used its armed forces to protect its sovereignty and that the military have provided an important support to many of the country's diplomatic initiatives.²⁰ Thus the defense of international law and principles does not imply that Brazil should avoid developing its power and being a leader does not necessarily mean that it will impose its agenda over other regional countries. This is a better understanding about how Brazil should plan its international insertion. If it wants to lead, Brazil needs to understand that followers, especially the ones that need considerable resources to support their international insertions, will only adhere to ideas and projects in which they see possible gains.²¹

As will be later discussed, the lack of effectiveness perceived in most Brazilian initiatives in the region shows that although it is possible to exercise leadership without imposing a country's will over others, at least some sources of power are necessary to engage others in a joint project. Authors who have developed the concepts of leadership and power agree that leaders can use several different strategies to achieve their goals,²² but they all emphasize the importance of power if a country desires to lead. The authors who address the issue, in that sense, agree that 'leadership involves power',²³ which means that leadership can be exercised without domination, but not without power. Pedersen's contribution on the strategies employed by regional powers to promote regional institutionalization, for example, notes the importance of leadership for the achievement of shared objectives.²⁴ The author develops a benevolent version of the hegemonic stability theory, which has interesting implications for the study of regional cooperation, since concentration of power is expected to contribute to stability. With those premises in mind, the main objectives of this chapter

are to briefly discuss power, to analyze how Brazil has been developing it, and what are the main limitations of this process.

Baldwin performs one of the most complete analyses on how International Relations theories have addressed power.²⁵ The author examines the concept and the different theoretical approaches of the discipline about issues such as the measurement of power, which are the most important tools to acquire power, and what are the analytical perspectives related to it. To him,²⁶ throughout the development of the debate among IR scholars, many different concepts of power have emerged. This chapter perceives power as an essential asset in the construction of regional leadership by Brazil in the South Atlantic and, in that sense, the discussion will concentrate on how the country is developing the tools to achieve that condition. While doing so, it will refer to authors who have overcome the traditional view that focuses exclusively on military means as sources of power.

Susan Strange, for example, provides a good contribution to that discussion, emphasizing that there are three tools for a country to achieve its goals: force, wealth, and ideas.²⁷ This notion is very similar to Joseph Nye's definition of the dimensions of power.²⁸ To him, in specific conditions states can achieve desired results by using their 'hard power', which is exercised through force or wealth to convince others. On other occasions, states can choose the attractiveness of their culture, their political ideals, and their policies (or what Strange calls ideas) to achieve their goals. That is what Nye calls soft power.²⁹ It is important to note that the two authors agree that both dimensions of power (hard and soft) can only produce results if they are developed in association. Soft power without hard power is not enough to assure that a country will be able to protect its interests if others contradict them. On the other hand, if a country invests exclusively in its hard power, it will maximize the costs of imposing its leadership and it will probably lose this condition shortly.³⁰ In a more recent contribution, Nye goes further in that argument and develops the concept of smart power: 'some contemporary theories that define leadership as synonymous with the soft power of attraction miss another part of the reality. In practice, effective leadership requires a mixture of soft and hard power skills that I call *smart power*.'³¹

Having defined which tools states use to exercise power, Strange argues that they can be combined in different settings and occasions to develop the two different types of power that are necessary for a country to prevail internationally. The first type is called relational power, which is 'the power

of A to get B to do something they would not otherwise do'³² or, in other words, the power of A to impede B from doing something it might otherwise do. The second type of power, which the author calls structural power, is much more complex and it can only be developed by a combination of different tools and efforts. According to her, it is the power to 'shape and determine the structures of the global political economy within which other states, their political institutions, their economic enterprises and (not least) their scientists and other professional people have to operate'.³³ This means that for a country to achieve its goals in a certain arena, it can do so by influencing other states directly or by changing the rules of the political game. In both cases, this country could act through force and wealth (hard power) or by emphasizing new ideas (soft power).

To sum up, there are three important conceptual notions that will ground this chapter's view on the Brazilian leadership in the South Atlantic: (a) leadership is a necessary tool to stabilize the region and to assure its security; (b) leadership can be exercised cooperatively, but not without power, what means that there is no cost-free leadership; (c) power is originated from both material and ideational sources, which means that leadership can only be established through a complex combination of force (military and monetary) and diplomatic assets.

Translating these theoretical notions into the Brazilian situation in the South Atlantic, and considering that the country's main goal in the region is to secure its interests, it becomes clear that it should invest in developing enough power to assure its capacity to impede other states from threatening such interests and to promote the enforcement or change of the rules that regulate the use of the sea. Without power, Brazil will not be able to assure that its investments and the flow of goods from and to the country will be maintained during a crisis, for example. In other words, to maintain its security and to engage other countries in a joint project to protect the South Atlantic in today's complex environment, Brazil has to acquire more smart power, combining military with political strategies to increase its presence in the South Atlantic.

These capacities will only be achieved if some measures are taken. Firstly, Brazil should invest in the idea that leadership can be exercised cooperatively and that a consensual leader's most important responsibility is to assure the prevalence of coordinated policies over unilateral ones. Secondly, since there is no cost-free leadership, the construction of the country's leadership must be the result of a political project that accepts

that important resources will have to be compromised to achieve that condition. Pedersen emphasizes that leaders should demonstrate ‘commitment capacity’,³⁴ which is crucial to the emergence of a cooperative hegemony in a certain area. Thirdly, and more specifically, Brazil should assume that one of the most important costs of a leader includes the development of a power project. The protection of the South Atlantic and the maintenance of Brazil’s core values in the region are dependent on the development of elements of power by the country,³⁵ especially in a continent in which most economies are weak and there are several extra-regional states actively present. Brazilian decision makers, therefore, should not question if they need to develop power to exercise leadership in the South Atlantic. The real question is how different combinations of power tools can be used to acquire leadership.

The chapter will now examine if these measures are being taken by describing how the country has been developing both its diplomatic and material sources of power, emphasizing the limitations of these processes. Firstly, we analyze Brazil’s efforts to work through institutions and to change the rules of the game, which will lead us to the conclusion that its structural power has yet to be improved. The focus of this analysis will be on the construction and reinforcement of institutions and multilateral initiatives that seek to increase security in the South Atlantic, since bilateral cooperation is a relational power tool, not a structural one.³⁶ Later, the chapter will concentrate on the development of Brazil’s relational power by examining its naval power, the most visible asset in that dimension of power.

BRAZIL’S STRUCTURAL POWER IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC

As was previously mentioned, Brazil’s international insertion is based on the respect for international institutions and on the emphatic defense of international law for the solution of controversies among nations. This posture is considered especially important in strategic and security issues, in which Brazil emphasizes the idea of ‘principled action diplomacy’,³⁷ meaning that foreign policy decisions in this realm tend to respect the limits imposed by treaties and international norms.

In relation to the South Atlantic, Brazil strictly maintains its belief in the legal and institutional frameworks that regulate the use of its maritime space and natural resources. Two good examples of how the country has been developing its structural power by contributing to the creation and

enforcement of international rules are its leadership role during the institutionalization of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZPCSA) and its efforts to support the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Brazil strongly believes that ‘a culture of tolerance based on shared rules is the key to providing states with new arrangements to govern their common challenges’.³⁸ Both ZPCSA and UNCLOS have been important to increase Brazil’s role in the region and to the creation of what has been called a South Atlantic identity,³⁹ but they haven’t been able to overcome some of the most relevant limitations to the construction of Brazil’s structural power in the region.

The ZPCSA, created in 1986, is the main cooperation initiative led by Brazil to reassure its position and interests in the South Atlantic. The initiative was articulated as an alternative to the Argentinian and South African proposal to create the South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO), a project similar to NATO in the region.⁴⁰ Instead of backing SATO, Brazil understood that it was necessary to consolidate the South Atlantic as a nuclear weapons-free zone, delivering a clear and strong message to both Cold War superpowers. Besides that, it wanted to maintain a strategic distance from Argentina and from the apartheid regime.

ZPCSA gathers 24 countries with coastlines in the South Atlantic, among which there are three South American and 21 African nations that agreed to avoid the Cold War logic⁴¹ and committed not to base their international insertions on the development of nuclear weapons. The institution was created by the UN General Assembly after an expressive approval from 124 of its members, eight abstentions,⁴² and only one disapproval, from the United States.

Brazil played a leading role during the creation of the Zone, but the country unfortunately didn’t have the necessary power tools to maintain the initial importance of this cooperation effort. Since the beginning, it was clear that regional countries would obviously have difficulties if they needed to enforce their will and the rules that they abided by. One of the first analyses on the importance of ZPCSA published in Brazil argued that it would have very little practical effects because none of the countries in the region could impede the United States or the Soviet Union from using the region militarily.⁴³

Without a clear leader, ZPCSA has gone through difficult times. Since its creation, seven ministerial meetings have happened and the most important of them were the sixth, held in Luanda in 2007, and the seventh, held in Montevideo in 2013. In Luanda, ZPCSA’s Action Plan was approved.

The document made three important statements: (a) the UN Security Council lacks representation and it must be reformed; (b) the Zone's trade investments were too low and needed to be improved; (c) nuclear investments for pacific use are legitimate. This last statement generated some controversies among extra-regional countries. The creation of AFRICOM and the re-establishment of the Fourth Fleet by the USA have already been associated with these differences.⁴⁴

The Montevideo meeting was the first to also include Ministers of Defense. During the event, there was a feeling that ZPCSA's members needed to discuss issues more pragmatically. Several measures of the Luanda Action Plan were not applied because most members did not see ZPCSA as a strong institution and therefore there was no pressure for them to abide by its rules. The most important result of Montevideo was a more emphatic Action Plan.⁴⁵ But again, not a lot has been achieved. Since the approval of the document, two ZPCSA seminars were held in 2013 and in 2015, both in Brazil. They addressed technical issues such as search and rescue and vigilance and security of maritime transportation in the South Atlantic, United Nations peacekeeping operations, and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. Although Brazil thought that focusing on specific technical issues would lead to more important results than if political differences were addressed, no concrete cooperation initiatives emerged from these events.

So far, ZPCSA has been an important tool to gather South Atlantic countries and to approximate their interests in several issues related to the stability of the region, but the level of implementation of its documents is very low. During the last ministerial conference, for example, it was agreed that ZPCSA ministers would meet every two years, which hasn't been happening. There was also a commitment to gather annually in parallel to the UN General Assembly meetings, but again members have failed to do so. While some authors have related this lack of effectiveness to international pressures from extra-regional powers that maintain a constant presence in the South Atlantic,⁴⁶ it is necessary to consider that these powers are constantly welcomed by smaller regional countries that see them as the only possible source of technical cooperation.⁴⁷ If Brazil does not improve its capacity to back the institution and to increase contributions, it will be in a difficult position to criticize extra-regional presences.⁴⁸ In that sense, the main reason for the political and coordination difficulties that ZPCSA has had over the last decades is more closely connected to the lack of technical capacities of its members and to the Brazilian limited commitment

capacity to a regional project than to external pressures. Again, there is no cost-free leadership.

In parallel with its efforts toward the consolidation of ZPCSA, Brazil has invested in the enforcement of the legal basis that assures its sovereignty over South Atlantic waters. If multilateral initiatives impose a series of costs and coordination difficulties, increasing its structural power through direct demands to the legal institutions that regulate the issue has apparently produced better results. Brazilian diplomats understand that supporting the laws that regulate the use of the sea allows the country to actively influence its contents, which increases its structural power through soft tools.

Brazil has been making efforts to map and to assure its rights over a large section of the South Atlantic since the 1960s, when it started to emphasize the necessity to create and implement international norms and institutions that regulate the exploitation and use of sea resources. After the establishment of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the most important multilateral document that addresses the issue,⁴⁹ it seemed that Brazil's pledges were being heard. The country has supported the institution continually at the United Nations⁵⁰ and domestically it has created many institutions that focus on its implementation. The most important one, the Interministerial Commission for Sea Resources (ICSR), acts under the coordination of the Brazilian Navy and its main objective is to implement the National Policy for the Resources of the Sea (PNRM). Working jointly under the Commission, several institutions of the Brazilian government seek to assure that the country will have the liberty to decide which are the best strategies to assure the protection and the sustainable use of its resources.⁵¹ A necessary step in the implementation of these strategies is the definition of the country's continental shelf,⁵² something that UNCLOS regulates.

Because Brazil considers its continental shelf as an essential source of revenues, as soon as the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) of UNCLOS started receiving proposals for the extension of the shelf from its members, Brazil presented its demand. Its request was the first to be considered and thus this case has been paradigmatic to the Commission. Both CLCS and the Brazilian government have been learning by doing, a process that has required several efforts to improve human resources to engage in the discussions.

In its initial proposal for the extension of the Brazilian continental shelf, presented in 2004, Brazil demanded that CLCS include a total area of

960,000 km² over the 200 nautical miles recognized by UNCLOS. Of the total area demanded by Brazil, 190,000 km² are still under discussion, but there is a good chance that the Commission will approve the request in the near future. If the country's claim is fully accepted, its jurisdiction over the Atlantic Ocean will amount to 4.5 million km², corresponding to roughly the size of the Brazilian Amazon. The size and natural richness of this territory have led first the Navy and then the entire Brazilian government to call it the 'Blue Amazon'. The concept, by itself, is an example of how the country has been developing its soft power to protect its interests in the South Atlantic.

While working to map its continental shelf and formulating arguments to convince CLCS that it has the right to autonomously explore the Blue Amazon, Brazil has invested considerable resources to obtain expertise about the bottom of the ocean and to acquire vessels, maritime means, and modern equipment to improve its capacity to produce credible data about the configuration of the Atlantic Ocean. This set of knowledge and equipment will be important power assets to the Brazilian government and since this is the first request that CLCS is fully analyzing, the country understands that it will be able to provide technical cooperation to other countries once the final result is concluded.

Brazilian efforts to back UNCLOS and to assure its rights through its legal framework show how the country has been investing to mold the rules that regulate the use of the sea. It has done so through soft power, creating means to attract others to support its positions and to see Brazil as a possible source of technical cooperation in the area. The government understands that the domestic and systemic efforts that it has been implementing can produce two very positive results. Firstly, they will assure the country's rights over a very extensive area that possesses immense resources, even against the will of powerful countries such as the United States, which has not recognized UNCLOS. Secondly, Brazil will become an example and a know-how exporter to other countries that have similar demands. These benefits will lead to a definite increase in Brazil's structural power over South Atlantic issues. The country's capacity to build both innovative arguments and new jurisprudence while possessing a modern set of equipment to consolidate its continental shelf have the potential to pay off, producing positive political feedbacks.

As can be noted, Brazilian efforts to increase its structural power in the South Atlantic have produced important results as the country is considered one of the strongest supporters of UNCLOS. On the other hand, the

results achieved by ZPCSA have been very limited. The country's initial 'commitment capacity' wasn't maintained over the years and the lack of leadership has been prejudicial to the initiative. The chapter will now turn the discussion to the country's relational power desires and efforts.

BRAZIL'S RELATIONAL POWER IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC

Building structural power in the region is important, but not enough to assure that Brazil will become a regional leader or acquire the capacity to decide how it is going to use its natural resources in the long run. To achieve that, the country needs to develop both hard and soft means to exercise relational power. This chapter will focus on the first of those tools, offering some contributions to the discussions on how Brazil has been investing to improve its hard power, which will potentially increase its capacity to influence others.⁵³

As the concept clearly indicates, the only way to understand if Brazil's effort is enough is by comparing its capacities vis-à-vis the other states that operate in the region. Due to space constraints, the comparison presented here has two limitations: firstly, it is concentrated on data from Brazil, the United Kingdom, and France. These countries provide good comparisons because they are strategically well placed in the region and have similar economies.⁵⁴ Comparing Brazil with the United States, China, or even Russia would certainly lead to exaggerations. Secondly, the comparison will look in greater depth at the naval power of each country, even though the protection of the South Atlantic can only be fully achieved through a combined effort of the three armed forces⁵⁵ and therefore some of the data presented consider the three countries' entire defense establishments. Even with these limitations, the analysis hopefully provides an understanding of a broader picture of Brazil's limited relational power in the region.

In November 2016, the Presidency sent to congress a new version of the Brazilian national defense documents, which present, among other things, the country's naval power necessities: the National Defense Policy (NDP),⁵⁶ the National Strategy of Defense (NSD),⁵⁷ and the White Book of Defense (WBD).⁵⁸ Since legislators haven't approved them yet, they still constitute a provisional version of how Brazil sees its defense establishment, but there are already sufficient signs of what capacities the Executive intends to develop in the following decades. Whoever reads the new version of the NSD, for example, is led to think that Brazil is willing to become a naval powerhouse in the near future. It states that the country's

Navy should possess means to detect and neutralize any threats in the Brazilian jurisdictional waters and that it should fully be able to control its maritime waters, to deny the sea to any possible adversaries, to project power on land, and to dissuade foreign powers.⁵⁹

The NSD also states that the Navy will be structured in steps, but that all of its components (surface, submarine, amphibian, and aerial) should be developed concomitantly through investments that will lead to a constant mobility advantage. The priority of the force shall be to maintain maritime security by dissuading any concentration of hostile forces in waters where Brazil's national interests are at stake. When specifying how the above-mentioned components will be acquired, the document again seems to project the development of a first class Navy with surface naval ships (including very large ships and a fleet of aircraft carriers) and a 'considerable submarine naval force, composed both by nuclear propelled submarines and conventional ones'.⁶⁰ The NSD also mentions that Brazil will develop its capacity to project power and will seek autonomy for the development of cyber technologies to guide submarines and weapon systems.

These ideas are not new: the first version of the Strategy of National Defense was approved in 2008 and, like its most recent version, it was very ambitious. If these documents were implemented, it would be possible to say that Brazil was creating the kind of Navy that it needs to exercise leadership in the South Atlantic. But, as could be expected in a country where long-term planning is far from being the rule, not a lot has been done to fulfill the promises of the original 2008 version. In the last ten years, international⁶¹ and domestic variables have contributed to increase the gap between Brazil's military capacities in comparison with other powers that operate in the South Atlantic. The focus of this chapter will be on the domestic side of the story.

If Brazil were to engage in a war, the most credible scenarios indicate that this would be a technologically intense event. Despite that, Brazilian armed forces have constantly privileged the increase of their personnel over research and development of new equipment. To acquire the capacities and to achieve the objectives established in the country's national defense documents, the Brazilian Navy, for example, does not need many thousands of men and women, but several modern and well-equipped ships that are capable of fighting foreign fleets equipped with efficient weapon, communication, and satellite systems.

Although the NPD and NSD seem to understand that, the comparison between the Brazilian, the French, and the British navies tells a different

story. The three countries' economies have similar sizes, but the configuration of their navies and the list of their most important equipment are very distinct. Over the last years, Brazil has privileged personnel spending while France and the UK have been increasingly investing in equipment. This led to the modernization of both European naval forces, which are now able to command and control bigger extents of water, to mobilize much quicker, and to deny the sea in a more effective way than the Brazilian fleet. Since this chapter considers that mainly its Ministry of Defence holds the responsibility for planning and structuring a country's defense establishment, the comparison will be based on data from 1999 (the year in which the Brazilian MoD was created) to 2016. Unfortunately, the establishment of the institution hasn't done much to improve the quality of the country's defense establishment.

In 2016, Brazil held the eighth biggest GDP in the world, the UK had the fifth and France had the sixth.⁶² Although these European countries have much smaller territories to protect, they have historically had worldwide interests and their armed services have been operating throughout the globe for many decades, forcing them to rationalize their spending and maximize the effectiveness of their armed forces. With similar economies, the amount of equipment held by the three navies is very different, as can be noted in Table 7.1.

Brazil possesses only five diesel-propelled submarines. Both the French and British navies possess ten nuclear-propelled ones, among which there are four strategic submarines and six carry only conventional weapons. In their strategic submarines, both countries have ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles). The French Navy can also launch ASMP-A nuclear missiles from 20 of its several Rafale jets.

The *Charles de Gaulle* aircraft carrier is another very important weapon system held by the French Navy. It can launch different helicopters and jets and is fully operational. The UK has recently launched a new carrier, the HMS *Queen Elizabeth*. It is the biggest ship ever built for the Royal Navy and it can carry up to 40 aircraft.⁶³ A second one, the HMS *Prince of Wales*, is already being built and it will be delivered to the Royal Navy in 2019.⁶⁴ Brazil, on the other hand, retired its only fixed-wing aircraft carrier, the *São Paulo*, in February 2017, but very recently acquired former helicopter carrier HMS *Ocean*, now *Atlantico*.⁶⁵

The three navies maintain fleets of destroyers and frigates, but Brazil has the lowest number of these vessels and one of its three destroyers is in low readiness, while the other two are technologically incapable of fighting battles against modern navies.

Table 7.1 Naval composition of Brazil, France, and the UK^a in 2016

	<i>Brazil</i>	<i>France</i>	<i>United Kingdom</i>
GDP (US\$ billion) ^b	1798.66	2463.22	2629.19
Defense budget (US\$ billion)	23.68	55.75	48.25
Share of GDP to defense (%)	1.3	2.3	1.9
Submarines	5	10	10
Aircraft carriers	1	1	1 ^c
Destroyers	3	11	6
Frigates	10	11	13
Patrol and coastal combatants	48	20	22
Mine warfare	5	18	16
Logistics and support	100	145	26
Combat capable aircraft	12	79	12
Helicopters	73	84	96

Source: Table designed by the author with data from the International Monetary Fund^d (GDP) and from the IISS Military Balance 2017^e (all the other data in the table)

^aFor the United Kingdom, the data includes the Royal Fleet Auxiliary

^bCurrent US\$. Available at: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/weodata/index.aspx>, accessed 13 April 2017

^cThe Military Balance 2017 (IISS – International Institute for Security Studies, *The Military Balance: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics*. London: IISS, 2017) did not mention the British aircraft carrier since the HMS *Queen Elizabeth* was only commissioned by the British Queen on 7 December 2017

^dIMF – International Monetary Forum, *World Economic Outlook Database*. Available at: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/weodata/index.aspx>, accessed 13 April 2017

^eIISS – International Institute for Security Studies, *The Military Balance: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics* (London: IISS, 2000–2017)

Another datum that should be qualified is the number of helicopters in the table. Among the 73 helicopters of the Brazilian Navy, there are only 22 anti-submarine helicopters and of the 51 transport helicopters, 38 are light ones. The French possess 35 anti-submarine, 49 multi-role, and 2 transport helicopters. The UK has a total of 75 anti-submarine, 9 early warning, and 12 transport helicopters, a group that greatly increases its battle capacity.

Not only is the equipment possessed by the French and British navies more numerous, but it is also much more modern and would certainly assure those countries a victory against most of the navies in the world, including Brazil's. Their vessels are supported by modern communication, navigation, weapons, and cyber-warfare systems that are very distant from the reality of the Brazilian fleet.

One important explanation for this discrepancy is the amount of resources invested by France and the UK in the construction of their defense establishments. Over the last decades, the European nations have invested a greater share of their GDP in defense. Since 1999, they have constantly invested more than 2% of their GDP in defense, while Brazil has only come close to that level in 2001, when this function occupied 1.97% of the country's GDP.

Besides the percentage of the GDP invested in defense, France and the UK have maintained bigger economies than Brazil in the last decades (with the exception of a few years when Brazil surpassed Britain). These two variables combined mean that Brazil has an important spending gap in relation to both European powers. According to the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, in the last 18 years, France has spent a total of US\$965.77 billion on defense, the UK has spent US\$944.78 billion, and Brazil has spent only US\$379.31 billion, less than half of the other two.

There are two reasons for the Brazilian defense establishment's incapacity to acquire more money. Firstly, defense is an issue that is far from being a priority in Brazil, a country that has several political, social, and economic problems. It would be almost impossible to increase the percentage of the GDP that goes to defense, especially since the current government decided to freeze any possible increase in defense investments for the next 20 years as part of a contingency plan that would supposedly improve the economy. Secondly, in a multi-party coalition system that generates crises and chaotic political alliances, defense is not an issue that attracts electoral attention. Therefore, it is very unlikely that the Brazilian defense establishment will be able to assure that more money will be available to it. In fact, the country is constantly decreasing the share of its GDP that goes to defense, especially since 2001. This reality alone compromises any serious Brazilian leadership project toward the South Atlantic since the country's lack of commitment to defense investments decreases its capacity to lead. On the other hand, and this will be the focus of the budgetary debate in this chapter, even with the current limited resources, the country could be building a much more effective and efficient defense system. Before asking the President and Congress for more money, the MoD should focus on how to improve the composition of its budget.

Since its creation, the Ministry has allocated an average of 75.5% of its budget to personnel and social costs, with a record spending of 82% in 2003. From 2012 to 2016, that amount increased from 71% to 76%, showing that this excessive spending has not been addressed by the country's politicians.

During the same 18 years, France has spent an average of 54.2% on personnel and social costs, but that number decreased from 60.3% in 1999 to 47.9% in 2016. The UK has spent an average of 38.2% on personnel and social costs, maintaining it below 40% over the years, with the exception of 2005 and 2006, when that share of the budget reached 42.5% and 40.4%.

Table 7.2 presents the three variables discussed above, illustrating that France and the UK not only have constantly spent more than Brazil on

Table 7.2 Percentage of the GDP spent on defense, total defense spending, and percentage of the defense budget to personnel in Brazil, France, and the UK since 1999

<i>Year</i>	<i>% of GDP to defense</i>			<i>Total defense spending (US\$ BI)</i>			<i>Personnel spending (% of the budget)</i>		
	<i>BR</i>	<i>FR</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>BR</i>	<i>FR</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>BR</i>	<i>FR</i>	<i>UK</i>
1999	1.68	2.59	2.34	9.87	38.90	36.45	74	60.3	37.9
2000	1.76	2.47	2.28	11.34	33.81	35.25	73	60.4	38.2
2001	1.97	2.41	2.31	10.93	33.28	35.33	73	60.5	38.7
2002	1.91	2.42	2.37	9.66	36.40	39.66	76	60.7	39.8
2003	1.52	2.48	2.42	8.39	45.92	46.94	82	58.9	39.6
2004	1.47	2.50	2.35	9.78	53.01	53.97	79	57.4	39.8
2005	1.54	2.40	2.29	13.59	52.91	55.15	75	58	42.5
2006	1.51	2.34	2.23	16.40	54.52	57.48	80	56.5	40.4
2007	1.50	2.27	2.23	20.49	60.59	65.99	77	57.1	38.8
2008	1.48	2.26	2.35	24.45	66.01	65.62	79	57.4	36.5
2009	1.58	2.48	2.51	25.65	66.88	57.91	77	49.3	37.5
2010	1.59	2.34	2.41	34.00	61.78	58.08	73	47.6	35.7
2011	1.49	2.26	2.33	36.94	64.60	60.27	75	49.4	37.6
2012	1.51	2.24	2.24	33.99	60.04	58.50	71	49.1	38.9
2013	1.46	2.22	2.12	32.87	62.42	56.86	72	49.2	37.9
2014	1.39	2.24	2.01	32.66	63.61	59.18	72	48.5	36.6
2015	1.39	2.29	1.89	24.62	55.34	53.86	75	47.8	36.8
2016	1.34	2.27	1.86	23.68	55.75	48.25	76	47.9	34.8
Average	1.56	2.36	2.25	379.31	965.77	944.78	75.5	54.2	38.2

Sources: GDP percentage and total defense spending were obtained from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Military Expenditure Database, 2017^a. The percentage of the defense budget spent on personnel and social costs by Brazil was obtained from Siga Brasil^b, while the percentages of the defense budget spent on personnel and social costs by France and the UK were obtained from NATO^c.

^aAvailable at: <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>, accessed 20 March 2017

^bSiga Brasil, *Painel Especialista*. Available at: <http://www9.senado.leg.br/QvAJAXZfc/opendoc.htm?documento=Senado%2FSigaBrasilPainelEspecialista.qvw&host=QVS%40www9&anonymous=true>, accessed 23 March 2017

^cNATO – North Atlantic Treaty. *Information on Defence Expenditure*. Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/eu/natohq/topics_49198.htm, accessed on 10 March 2017




Chart 7.1 Investments share of the defense budget in Brazil, France, and the UK since 1999

defense (both as a percentage of their GDP and in absolute terms), but they have also been reducing, in the case of France, or maintaining low, in the case of the UK, their spending on personnel and social costs.

The consequences of Brazil's excessive spending on personnel and social costs⁶⁶ are severe. As has already been noted, this imbalance has decreased its capacity to invest in new equipment and to maintain the equipments that it currently holds. When the investment share of the Brazilian defense budget is analyzed in comparison with the French and British, again there is a great discrepancy (see Chart 7.1).

From 1999 to 2016, France used an average of 23.52% of its defense budget for investments, while the United Kingdom committed an average of 22.90%. In the same period, Brazil destined only an average of 8.33% to the investments account, a percentage that contradicts the determinations of its most important political documents. Although there was a noticeable increase in that amount from 2003 (when the investments account reached its lowest percentage—3%) to 2012 (15%), in the last four years it again dropped to 8%. As can be noted, not even a political document as strong as the NDS was able to definitely change Brazil's historical pattern of low spending in new equipment and technologies.

Although the balance of the country's defense budget is far from ideal, one could expect a different situation if only the Navy's budget was

analyzed. Among the three armed forces, the Navy is the most technologically intense one. Any country that wishes to possess an updated naval force needs to perform research and development efforts to acquire modern ships⁶⁷ that must be ready to operate in the most aggressive conditions and a fleet of nuclear-propelled submarines, which are the most technologically intense weapon system in the world, according to the Brazilian Navy.⁶⁸

Despite the intensity of the technological requirements for the construction of an advanced fleet and the political guidance to focus on investments and equipment modernization, both the MoD and the Brazilian Navy have been neglecting the investment share of the force's budget. Surprisingly, the balance between the accounts of the Brazilian Navy's budget is worse than the balance of the country's general defense budget (see Chart 7.2).

The Brazilian Navy spent an annual average of 80.2% of its budget in personnel and social costs since 2001. In 2006, that amount reached a high of 90.51%, preventing any opening for adequate investments in new technologies and equipment. From that year until 2012, the share of personnel spending decreased to 70.8%, but since then it has again grown to 80.13%. As a consequence of that reality, the Navy hasn't been able to




Chart 7.2 Brazilian Navy's appropriations (percentage of spending in different accounts since 2001)

acquire adequate equipment to modernize its fleet. Since 2001, an average of only 8.22% of its budget has been applied to investments.

Besides its insufficiency, another characteristic of the Navy's investments account that compromises the force's capacity to acquire new weapon systems is its instability. From 2001 to 2008, only 1.81% of the budget was used for investments! From 2009 to 2014, on the other hand, that average rose to 16.95%, a number that could lead to the conclusion that the idea of a modern Navy as defined by the NDS of 2008 was being implemented. Unfortunately, that was not true. Since 2014, the investments share of the Navy's budget was cut in half, from 14.07% to 7.13%. With that high irregularity in investments, it is impossible for the Brazilian defense industries to predict if they will be paid adequately for their research and development programs and their capacity to think about long-term objectives becomes very limited. Again, the contradiction between reality and the national defense documents is visible.

When the new version of the NSD mentions budgetary issues, it states that the total defense spending should be increased to 2% of the country's GDP. Although this is an amount that would be justifiable in comparison with what other countries spend, the document does not address the main problem of the country's defense budget: the imbalance between accounts. Among the several Defense Strategies (DS) developed in the document, DS 5 addresses 'budgetary regularity' and its goal is to 'promote better conditions for planning budgetary resource allocation in the defence sector and, therefore, to rationalize the budgetary use, making the defence spending more efficient. Additionally, it seeks to adjust the defence budget to the country's size in the world.'⁶⁹ The document seems to presume that more financial resources will lead to rationalization, when it is well known that the contrary tends to be the case. Both the National Policy of Defense and the National Strategy of Defense do not stipulate how this rationalization will take place.

Historically, when larger amounts of financial resources become available to the Brazilian Navy, they are destined to personnel costs, not to technology, with the exception of the period from 2009 to 2014. Since then, however, personnel costs have regained their previous status and apparently the demands for higher technology will be ignored in the future years. Based on the idea that it needs more people, not more vessels, the Navy plans to gradually increase its personnel until 2030, according to the preliminary version of the 2016 Brazilian White Book of Defense.⁷⁰ In fact, Brazil has been implementing this increase in personnel




Chart 7.3 Brazilian, British, and French navies' active military contingents since 1999 (thousands)

for some years already, a tendency that contradicts what most of the modern navies that operate around the globe have been doing. France and the UK, for example, have kept the size of their navies' military personnel steady. Chart 7.3 illustrates these differences.

During the period, while Brazil has increased the size of its Navy personnel from 48,600 to 87,100 (an increase of 79%), the United Kingdom has maintained almost steady numbers, which varied from 43,770 in 1999 to 44,150 in 2017 and France has decreased the size of its personnel from 49,490 to 42,100. That increase in its contingent has obviously imposed budgetary pressures on the Brazilian Navy's investments and maintenance accounts. France and the UK, on the other hand, have been modernizing their vessels, which can navigate with fewer personnel than older ships. Since the same number of people can defend bigger spaces by operating more modern and faster ships, modernization opens room for more investments in technology because it allows a further reduction in personnel.

With those numbers in mind, it becomes clear that Brazil hasn't been preparing its Navy to exercise power, and therefore leadership, in the South Atlantic. On the contrary, the country has been quickly losing ground to the most important actors that are present in the region. If current trends are not reversed by a change in the balance of the Navy's

budget, there is no sign that it will be able to expand its power in the South Atlantic. The bad news is that it is very unlikely that a country that does not prioritize its defense over other issues and that is facing one of the worst political and economic crises of its history will be able to fulfill the promises of the NPD, the NSD, and the WBD, which defend the technological improvement of the Navy. Leadership involves power and hard power involves technology. Brazil is far from following this recipe.

As was previously stated, the main goal of this chapter is to analyze the limitations of the country's power in the region, not to examine the reasons for the deficiencies that were examined. Nevertheless, it is important to note some of the hypotheses that can explain why Brazilian decision makers have been unable to deliver the policies and priorities established in the national defense documents. These hypotheses need further investigation, but two seem to be the most credible reasons for these inconsistencies.

From one side, the elected politicians of the Executive and Legislative who decide how the defense budget is going to be allocated focus on issues that can maximize their chances of keeping their mandates. In that sense, maintaining a large number of bases and personnel spread all over the country, even though several of them don't exercise any mission that is directly related to Brazil's defense, seems to be politically smart. Moreover, using the Navy and its Marines for subsidiary missions, especially combating crime in the 'favelas' or near the Brazilian border and providing social assistance in the Amazon are very attractive ways to capture the attention and support of Brazilian voters who don't identify any credible foreign threat to the country. But that political decision comes with a price. Over the last decades, it is clear that Brazil has been losing relational power in the South Atlantic. The recent demands that not only the Navy, but also the Army and the Air Force have been receiving from the federal government weaken their preparedness and efficiency, a tendency that has already been widely perceived.⁷¹

At the same time, since the Brazilian MoD is a very young institution, the military have historically had the political independence to privilege bureaucratic and parochial interests over the rationalization of their budgets. During the military regime, in which they fought the 'internal enemy', this logic was even clearer: salaries and benefits were more important issues than the acquisition of new and modern weapon systems. After the redemocratization, accepting subsidiary missions has become a way to develop public information and media campaigns that show how necessary

and professional the military are. The problem is that this professionalism has little to do with their ability to defend the country, but is mainly focused on their capacity to improve the quality of life of different communities while maintaining presence in the country's most isolated areas. Over the years, it seems that the Brazilian armed forces have been achieving their political goals, since these practices have assured them a high level of public support.⁷²

Given their historical political freedom, the posture of the armed forces can be considered predictable. In the absence of civilian control, every military institution in the world has the natural tendency to protect its bureaucratic interests over the national ones, especially in relation to personnel and budget. What is lacking in the Brazilian case, therefore, seems to be a stronger Executive branch (Presidency and MoD) that is willing to impose the content of the national defense documents. In a democracy such as Brazil, Bruneau and Goetze Jr.⁷³ state that the 'MoD is the preferred mechanism to match the democratic legitimacy of elected civilians with the professional expertise of the military'. To them, the MoD is the institution that should assure the efficiency and effectiveness of the armed forces.⁷⁴ This is exactly what is missing in Brazil. The responsibility for the weaknesses of the Brazilian relational power toward the South Atlantic falls on the political institutions (the Presidency and the Ministry of Defense) that should be exercising control over the military, rationalizing their spending and defining their priorities toward the region.

CONCLUSION

The South Atlantic has been an environment of peace and cooperation for many decades. Today, with the exception of specific border disputes, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea and other places in Africa, it is very unlikely that rivalries will emerge among South Atlantic countries, which have engaged in unique cooperation efforts such as the ZPCSA. This tendency of stability has allowed them to focus their foreign policies on topics related to development and growth, instead of engaging in power politics around the globe.

On the other hand, the permanent presence of extra-regional colonial powers and the recent increase in the engagement of global powers such as the USA, Russia, and China in the region can affect the stability of the South Atlantic. The Angolan Civil War is just one example of how differences among great powers can lead to conflicts in the periphery of the

system. South Atlantic countries, therefore, cannot simply presume that the current situation of peace and stability in the region will be maintained forever. On the contrary, only if they develop credible power sources will they have the capacity to autonomously assure the region's stabilization.

Due to its economic, demographic, and geographical assets, Brazil is the only regional country that can exercise the necessary leadership in the South Atlantic countries' quest for more autonomy in their international insertion. To achieve that condition, Brazil should increase its commitment capacity, which means that it should invest a considerable amount of effort in the translation of its power potential into power itself, an essential tool if it intends to exercise a leading role in the construction of adequate solutions to naval and maritime problems in the region.

Over the years, Brazilian decision makers have tried to assume an initial protagonist role in projects such as ZPCSA and at least in the last decade the country's national defense documents have proposed the construction of an important military power by Brazil, but the chapter demonstrated that these promises were not fulfilled. Albeit there are important achievements in Brazil's relation with South Atlantic counterparts, the country's initiatives to increase its structural or relational power have had many flaws. In general, with the exception of the efforts to assure the legal recognition of its sovereign rights over an additional portion of waters in the region, Brazil could have been doing much more to improve its capacity to influence the region's destinies. So far, it is notable that its commitment to the region has been low and its power assets haven't been translated into the capacity to lead. Brazil will only be perceived as a leader by coastal and extra-regional countries if its decision makers decide to ascend to this position.

The first step in that direction would be to invest in soft power measures, both in the structural and relational dimensions of power. It would be important if Brazilian diplomats believed that the country can and needs to lead regional institutional frameworks. Relaunching ZPCSA ministerial meetings with a more technical approach and increasing the funds to support African multilateral initiatives to improve their capacity to monitor their waters are interesting measures that could be proposed. Relational power could be maximized, for example, if the country improves its participation in the fight against piracy in the South Atlantic and enhances its technical assistance to African countries, which constantly have to invoke extra-regional powers to fulfill their needs.

Although these can be important measures, hard power will also be necessary if the country is willing to fulfill the measures that are planned by its defense documents and therefore exercise leadership in the South Atlantic. Although there are flaws in the Brazilian soft power initiatives, it seems that hard power is the weakest dimension in the country's project to increase its leadership in the region. Since the creation of the MoD, Brazil has supposedly been improving the capacity of its armed forces and its official documents emphasize the necessity to develop modern equipment and to prepare the military for engaging in wars against any possible threat. But as the chapter showed, based on comparative analyses between the Brazilian, the British, and the French defense budgets and the size of their active contingents, the country's decision makers have been contradicting the determinations of its national defense documents. Worse than that, future tendencies indicate that the Navy's compromise to increase the size of the force and the political economic crisis that has been affecting Brazil will worsen the situation. According to the most credible scenarios, the good news is that there is still time to prepare the Brazilian Navy for the possible threats that may arise in the long term. The bad news is that the country should have already started to develop the capabilities that will be necessary to dissuade these threats and it does not seem to have understood that yet. Although the Navy published long-term plans to re-equip the force and to acquire new technologies, no plans were designed to decrease its personnel and to open room for more investments, for example. It is urgent that the Brazilian MoD starts to consider not only which technologies it wants to develop, but also the design of its armed forces for the future.

Over the last decades, Brazil has constantly criticized the presence of extra-regional power in the South Atlantic and has tried to engage other countries in regional initiatives to maintain the stability of the region. Although important, these initiatives will not produce any concrete results if Brazil doesn't empower itself to lead them. Unfortunately, as the chapter has demonstrated, in the foreseeable future the idea of a more autonomous South Atlantic will be just that: an idea.

NOTES

1. The author thanks Antonio Jorge Ramalho da Rocha and Pérola Abreu Pereira for their valuable contributions to some of the arguments developed in the chapter. The author also thanks professors Sean Burges, Thomas Bruneau and the anonymous reviewers of this chapter for very careful readings and many insightful comments and suggestions. For their essential support during the collection of data, the author thanks Irma Fink

- and Greta Marlatt, from the Dudley Knox Library of the Naval Postgraduate School, and Augusto Teixeira Junior.
2. ANTAQ – Agência Nacional de Transportes Aquaviários, *Panorama da Navegação Marítima e de Apoio 2012*, <http://portal.antaq.gov.br/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Panorama-Aquaviário-2012-.pdf>, accessed 26/3/2017.
 3. ANP – Agência Nacional do Petróleo, *Boletim da Produção de Petróleo e Gás Natural*, http://www.anp.gov.br/WWWANP/images/publicacoes/boletins-anp/Boletim_Mensal-Producao_Petroleo_Gas_Natural/Boletim-Producao_Outubro_2017.pdf, accessed 15/12/2017.
 4. A. Malamud, 'A Leader Without Followers? The Growing Divergence between the Regional and Global Performance of Brazilian Foreign Policy', *Latin American Politics and Society* 53, no. 3 (2011): 1–24; S. W. Burges, 'Without Sticks or Carrots: Brazilian Leadership in South America during the Cardoso Era, 1992–2003', *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 25, no. 1 (2006): 23–42; and S. W. Burges, 'Consensual Hegemony: Theorizing Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War', *International Relations* 22, no. 1 (2008): 65–84, provide very interesting analyses about Brazil's leadership in the region, the limitations of its efforts and some of the responses that the country has received from its South American counterparts. According to Burges ('Consensual Hegemony'), Brazil has over the years invested in the creation of a 'consensual hegemony' in South America, a kind of leadership that avoids dominating other countries. Brazil's project has several specificities that lead to good results, but its excessive focus on ideational tools has important limitations when dealing with countries that are not always ready to accept a leadership that cannot provide the material resources demanded by these nations. The present chapter focuses exactly on these limitations.
 5. S. Strange, *States and Markets*, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Continuum, 1999).
 6. Ibid.
 7. J. S. Nye Jr., *The Powers to Lead: Soft, Hard, and Smart* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
 8. The dissatisfaction generated by the American military presence abroad is great (see C. Lutz, ed., *The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts* (New York: New York University Press, 2009)), but it hasn't avoided the growth of these movements in the South Atlantic.
 9. An interesting analysis of the rationale behind the establishment of the Fourth Fleet is provided by J. D. Maclay, M. Potter, R. R. Scott, and M. W. Sibley, 'The Fourth Fleet: A Tool of U.S. Engagement in the Americas', CSIS – Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2009, http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/The_Fourth_Fleet.pdf, accessed

- 23/6/2017. On the limitations of the re-establishment of the Fleet as an international strategy of the USA, see J. Battaglini, 'A reativação da IV Frota e o novo paradigma de controle global dos Estados Unidos', *Política Externa* 17, no. 4 (2009): 31–45.
10. J. Gerson, 'U.S. Foreign Military Bases and Military Colonialism: Personal and Analytical Perspectives', in Lutz, ed., *The Bases of Empire*, 62–63.
 11. A. E. Abdenur and D. M. Souza Neto, *China's Growing Influence in the South Atlantic*, Working Paper, Rio de Janeiro: BRICS Policy Center, 2013.
 12. C. Pérez, 'A misteriosa base que a China está construindo na Patagônia argentina', *BBC Brasil*, 19 March 2016, http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/2016/03/160318_china_base_patagonia_fn, accessed 19/7/2017; V. R. Lee, 'China Builds Space-Monitoring Base in the Americas', *The Diplomat*, 24 May 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/china-builds-space-monitoring-base-in-the-americas/>, accessed 25/1/2017; U. Goñi, 'Argentinian Congress Approves Deal with China on Satellite Space Station', *The Guardian*, 26 February 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/26/argentina-congress-china-satellite-space-station>, accessed 19/7/2017; M. Dinatale, 'Preocupa a EE.UU. y a Europa la base espacial de China en Neuquén', *La Nación*, 17 March 2015, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1776764-preocupa-a-eeuu-y-a-europa-la-base-espacial-de-china-en-neuquen>, accessed 19/7/2017.
 13. A. Korybko, 'Washington's Nightmare Comes True: The Russian-Chinese Strategic Partnership Goes Global', *Oriental Review*, 21 August 2014, <http://orientalreview.org/2014/08/21/washingtons-nightmare-comes-true-the-russian-chinese-strategic-partnership-goes-global-i/>, accessed 24/1/2017; A. Korybko, 'Hybrid Wars and the Geopolitics of South Atlantic Africa: The Russia-China Strategic Outpost', *Global Research*, 12 February 2017, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/hybrid-wars-and-the-geopolitics-of-south-atlantic-africa-the-russia-china-strategic-outpost/5574213>, accessed 10/3/2017.
 14. G. P. Dos Santos, 'Russia's "Charm Offensive" in Africa: The Case of Angola', *IPRIS Viewpoints* 184, Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS), 15 October 2015, <http://www.ipris.org/?menu=6&page=52>, accessed 20/1/2017.
 15. D. Negroponte, 'Russo-Latin American Arms Sales', *America's Quarterly*, Winter 2015, <http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/russo-latin-american-arms-sales>, accessed 20/1/2017.
 16. BBC Brasil, 'Para América do Sul, liderança brasileira ainda é promessa', 10 March 2008, http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/reporterbbc/story/2008/03/080303_ams_abre1_diplomacia.shtml, accessed 20/7/2017.

17. Even in 2006, when Brazil's economic performance and diplomatic efforts increased regional expectations that it would ascend to a leadership position, President Lula declared that 'South America doesn't need a political leader, but the "collective understanding that there is no individual exit" to the continent in the current context of a globalized world. "We need to join our experiences, to enjoy the similarities of each country. This is what will assure that we won't need a leader, but a collectivity that thinks with the same objective"' (Congresso em Foco, 'Lula Sinaliza com Manutenção de Mantega e Meirelles', 10 November 2006, <http://congressoemfoco.uol.com.br/noticias/lula-sinaliza-com-manutencao-de-mantega-e-meirelles/>, accessed 20/7/2017).
18. T. Pedersen, 'Cooperative Hegemony: Power, Ideas and Institutions in Regional Integration', *Review of International Studies* 28, no. 4 (2002): 677–696; Burges, 'Without Sticks or Carrots: Brazilian Leadership in South America during the Cardoso Era, 1992–2003'; Burges, 'Consensual Hegemony: Theorizing Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War'.
19. P. R. Almeida, 'Brazilian Diplomatic Thought: Methodological Introduction to the Ideas and Actions of some of its Representatives', in J. V. S. Pimentel, ed., *Brazilian Diplomatic Thought: Policymakers and Agents of Foreign Policy (1750–1964)*, Vol. 1 (Brasília: Funag, 2016), 19, for example, mentions principles such as 'an undeniable adhesion to international law; the absence of the recourse to force to resolve disputes among States; nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries; the observance of human rights; and a set of values unique to our civilizing heritage'.
20. J. P. S. Alsina Jr., *Rio Branco, Grande Estratégia e o Poder Naval* (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2015); Almeida, 'Brazilian Diplomatic Thought: Methodological Introduction to the Ideas and Actions of some of its Representatives', 19.
21. Malamud, 'A Leader Without Followers? The Growing Divergence between the Regional and Global Performance of Brazilian Foreign Policy'.
22. Nye Jr., *The Powers to Lead*, x–xi; D. A. Baldwin, *Power and International Relations: A Conceptual Approach* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016); Strange, *States and Markets*.
23. Nye Jr., *The Powers to Lead*, x.
24. Pedersen, 'Cooperative Hegemony: Power, Ideas and Institutions in Regional Integration', 678.
25. Baldwin, *Power and International Relations*.
26. Ibid., 102–122.
27. Strange, *States and Markets*, 23.

28. J. S. Nye Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990); J. S. Nye Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004); Nye Jr., *The Powers to Lead*.
29. Nye Jr., *Soft Power*, x.
30. Ibid., 7.
31. Nye Jr., *The Powers to Lead*, x.
32. Strange, *States and Markets*, 24.
33. Ibid., 24–25.
34. Pedersen, ‘Cooperative Hegemony: Power, Ideas and Institutions in Regional Integration’, 688–693.
35. Burges, ‘Consensual Hegemony: Theorizing Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War’, 74.
36. We recognize that bilateral cooperation, especially with African countries such as Namibia and Angola, to mention only two examples, is also an important asset in the implementation of the country’s leadership in the South Atlantic. But since structural power is related to multilateral initiatives, the next section of the chapter will be concentrated on the broader efforts that Brazil has been implemented in the region.
37. A. J. Ramalho, ‘Brazil and the Global Security Order: Principled Action and Immediate Responses to Long-term Challenges’, in B. A. Smith-Windsor, ed., *Enduring NATO, Rising Brazil: Managing International Security in a Recalibrating Global Order*. NATO Defense College Forum Papers Series, 2015, http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/current_news.php?icode=761.
38. Ibid.
39. A. E. Abdenur and D. M. Souza Neto, ‘O Brasil e a cooperação em defesa: a construção de uma identidade regional no Atlântico Sul’, *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 57, no. 1 (2014).
40. A. Hurrell, ‘The Politics of South Atlantic Security: A Survey of Proposals for a South Atlantic Treaty Organization’, *International Affairs* 59, no. 2 (1983): 179–193.
41. ZPCSA’s members perceived that different rules of engagement, founded on cooperation and institutional efforts, were the best way to assure the stability of the region during a time in which balance of power was the rule.
42. The abstentions came from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Portugal.
43. S. Miyamoto, ‘Atlântico Sul: zona de paz e de cooperação?’ *Lua Nova* 3, no. 3 (March 1987), http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102-64451987000100005&lng=en&nrm=iso, accessed 20/12/2016.

44. P. M. S. S. Abreu Pereira, 'Segurança Marítima e Pirataria no Atlântico Sul: um balanço do ano de 2013', *Revista da Escola de Guerra Naval* 19, no. 2 (2013): 322.
45. The document is divided in six major cooperation areas and several tangential ones. Among the priorities established in the new Action Plan, the following seem to be the most important: mapping and exploration of the bottom of the ocean, with incentives for countries to delimitate their continental platforms; environmental cooperation and protection of the living marine resources; cooperation on aerial and maritime transportation and port security; cooperation on maritime security; cooperation in defence; and others. In addition to establishing several areas of action, the plan defines the necessity to articulate meetings and seminars related to them.
46. Abdenur and Souza Neto, 'O Brasil e a cooperação em defesa: a construção de uma identidade regional no Atlântico Sul'.
47. P. Penna Filho, 'Reflexões sobre o Brasil e os Desafios do Atlântico Sul no Início do Século XXI', in G. F. Gheller, S. L. M. Gonzales, and L. P. Melo, eds., *Amazônia e Atlântico Sul: desafios e perspectivas para a Defesa no Brasil* (Brasília: IPEA, 2015), 162.
48. L. E. Rocha Paiva, 'O Jogo de Poder na Faixa Atlântica do Entorno Estratégico Nacional e seus Reflexos para a Defesa e Projeção do Brasil', in Gheller et al., eds., *Amazônia e Atlântico Sul*.
49. UNCLOS negotiations were concluded in Montego Bay (Jamaica) on 10 December 1982. The Convention entered into force in 1994 with the signature of its 60th member and since then each country was given ten years to present proposals for the extension of its continental shelf to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), an institution that was established in 1997 under UNCLOS. Officially, the purpose of CLCS is to 'facilitate the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (the Convention) in respect of the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles (M) from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured'. See United Nations, *Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS): Purpose, Functions and Sessions*, http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_purpose.htm#Purpose, accessed 15/7/2017.
50. A. R. Almeida Silva and J. A. A. Moura, 'The Brazilian Navy's Nuclear-Powered Submarine Program', *The Nonproliferation Review* 23, no. 5–6 (2016): 617–633.
51. The main plans and programmes of the Interministerial Commission are mentioned in its webpage, <https://www.mar.mil.br/secirm/ingles/principal.html>.

52. The continental shelf is defined by UNCLOS in its article 76. In this area, countries have the right to explore natural resources, including living sedentary species that are only capable of moving through constant physical contact with the bottom of the ocean or are immobile when captured, and minerals or other non-living resources in the seabed and subsoil. They also have the exclusive right to regulate scientific investigations, the construction and operations of structures, and the protection and preservation of that environment.
53. The bilateral cooperation that the Brazilian Navy offers to African nations such as Namibia and Angola, for example, or the Brazilian private and public investments in the continent are also important relational power strategies, but instead of examining these cases, the chapter will focus on the dimension in which Brazil seems to have more difficulties to improve.
54. Albeit Brazil has recently lost ground in relation to the rest of the world, the sizes of these countries' economies are still comparable. According to the IMF World Economic Outlook Database, in the last decade Brazil experienced years of strong growth and in 2011 its GDP overtook that of Britain. Since then, on the other hand, it has again lost ground to both European countries.
55. For example, the Army can deliver many contributions to the protection of an important share of the area by developing a coastal artillery capacity and the Air Force is an essential tool in the dissuasion of foreign threats that emerge from overseas.
56. The previous version had been approved in 2005 and the original one in 1996.
57. The previous version had been approved in 2012 and the original version dated from 2008.
58. The original version had been approved in 2012.
59. Brasil, *Política Nacional de Defesa / Estratégia Nacional de Defesa* – preliminary version under the appreciation of Congress, 29 September 2016, 26, http://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/2017/mes03/pnd_end.pdf, accessed 20/7/2017.
60. Ibid., 27.
61. Internationally, the country has suffered several technological constraints from developed countries, following the same pattern that has been applied to Brazil at least since the aftermath of the Second World War (see Almeida Silva and Moura, 'The Brazilian Navy's Nuclear-Powered Submarine Program'; W. P. Longo, and W. S. Moreira, 'O acesso a tecnologias sensíveis', *Tensões Mundiais*, Fortaleza, 5, no. 9 (2009): 76–98; W. P. Longo, and W. S. Moreira, 'Contornando o cerceamento tecnológico', in E. M. Svartman, J. M. Arias Neto, and T. R. P. Godoi, eds., *Defesa, Segurança Internacional e Forças Armadas – III Encontro da ABED* (Campinas:

- Mercado de Letras, 2010), vol. 1, 309–321). These restrictions decreased Brazil's capacity to develop advanced military equipment but Brazil's trade restraints cannot fully respond for the country's limited technological development. Brazilian political and military institutions have never considered the acquirement of new equipment and technologies as a priority.
62. Italy had the seventh biggest economy in the world, with a GDP of US\$1850.74 billion. The complete data is available at the International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook Database, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/weodata/index.aspx>.
 63. *The Guardian*, 'HMS Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier to take to the seas', <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/26/hms-queen-elizabeth-aircraft-carrier-takes-to-the-seas>, accessed 30/12/2017.
 64. Aircraft Carrier Alliance, 'HMS Prince of Wales floats out', <http://www.aircraftcarrieralliance.co.uk/hms-prince-of-wales/latest-news/2017/21-12-2017>, accessed 20/3/2018.
 65. The equipment had been purchased from France in 2000 and it arrived in Brazil in 2001, having maintained its full capacity for only three years. Due to its age (56 years old) and the long time without proper maintenance, its revitalization costs would be too extensive and the Navy finally decided to decommission the ship.
 66. NATO, for example, recommends that its members spend only 40% of their total defence budget on personnel in order to leave room for higher investments in research and development of new equipment, considering that technology will be an essential asset in any future conflict.
 67. These ships must carry several weapon, radar, communication and sonar systems, to name a few.
 68. A nuclear propelled submarine such as the one that Brazil is developing has more than 950,000 parts and it takes more than 8 million hours to be produced. In comparison, a fighter aircraft carries only around 30,000 parts and can be produced in around 57,000 labour hours. See L. Padilha, 'Submarino Nuclear Brasileiro "Álvaro Alberto" (SN 10)', *Defesa Aérea & Naval*, 7 December 2012, <http://www.defesaareanaval.com.br/submarino-nuclear-brasileiro-alvaro-alberto-sn-10/>, accessed 13/6/2017.
 69. Brasil, *Política Nacional de Defesa / Estratégia Nacional de Defesa* – preliminary version under the appreciation of Congress, 29 September 2016, 35, http://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/2017/mes03/pnd_end.pdf, accessed on 20/7/2017.
 70. Brasil, *Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional* – preliminary version under the appreciation of Congress, 29 September 2016, http://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/2017/mes03/livro_branco_de_defesa_nacional_minuta.pdf, accessed 20/7/2017.

71. *Washington Post*, 'Brazil defense minister: Troops to fight violence in Rio', 28 July 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/brazil-defense-minister-troops-to-fight-violence-in-rio/2017/07/28/694ec2fc-734a-11e7-8c17-533c52b2f014_story.html?utm_term=.62a5e389aca0, accessed 28/7/2017; *The Economist*, 'The Brazilian army is turning into a de facto police force. Its plodding infantry are ill-suited to repel threats to natural resources', 6 July 2017, <https://www.economist.com/news/americas/21724839-its-plodding-infantry-are-ill-suited-repel-threats-natural-resources-brazilian-army>, accessed 14/7/2017.
72. IBOPE – Instituto Brasileiro de Opinião Pública e Estatística, *Índice de Confiança Social (ICS) 2015*, <http://www.ibope.com.br/pt-br/noticias/Paginas/Instituicees-politicas-perdem-ainda-mais-a-confianca-dos-brasileiros.aspx>, accessed on 3/7/2016; IPEA – Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, *Sistema de Indicadores de Percepção Social (SIPS): Defesa Nacional*. Brasília, 2011, http://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/images/stories/PDFs/SIPS/120417_sips_defesanacional.pdf, accessed 13/7/2015.
73. T. C. Bruneau and J. R. Goetze, Jr., 'Ministries of Defense and Democratic Control', in T. C. Bruneau and S. D. Tollefson, eds., *Who Guards the Guardians and How* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 71.
74. *Ibid.*, 80.



Conclusion

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The purpose of writing a book to aid in the resolution of problems arising from a given complex situation has the obligation of defining the roots of the problem, its environment, what is at stake, the threats, the weaknesses, the advantages, and finally the possible paths necessary to solve or, at least, to minimise negative results. When several authors with different backgrounds, experience, and ideas write the book, it gains weight as different views, knowledge, opinions, and imagination are always a plus-value. Fortunately, this is what happened with this book.

To provide conclusions after the reading of the former chapters turns out to be an easy task, as much that should be analysed about the Nigerian, South African, Argentinian, British, and Brazilian navies and maritime policies for the South Atlantic is already done. Those chapters have adopted different lenses and treated the issues at different depths, but the problem is well defined. Thus, in this conclusion, I would like to add a more general array of ideas, contributions, and points of view and call attention to some important aspects. This involves, essentially, a ranking of capabilities and an apprehension of the threats and institutional challenges that face the navies and maritime policies of the South Atlantic.

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THE SOUTH ATLANTIC NAVIES: COMPOSITION AND CATEGORISATION

The previous chapters took the leading navies of the South Atlantic in themselves, limited by their national agendas and perspectives. Now it is time to complement them with a comprehensive, but still systematic, perspective of all South Atlantic navies.

By considering Table 8.1, one can conclude that, of the 21 countries under analysis, only Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and Venezuela have significant oceanic capability. Nigeria and Uruguay have limited offshore capability. Regarding the capability for coastal action, besides the six indicated above, two more have a reasonable capability, Angola and Ghana, and the remaining navies have this capability reduced. It is fair to note that some countries, notably Benin and Togo, with a very small coastline do not need a large fleet for their defence and patrolling.

The problem with that kind of listing is that it does not capture qualitative and performance data such as tonnage, speed, autonomy, armament, crew, and, very important, the age of each ship. For a proper

Table 8.1 South Atlantic navies' compositions

	<i>Personnel</i>	<i>AC</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>DD</i>	<i>FF</i>	<i>PS</i>	<i>PC</i>	<i>PB</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>LS</i>	<i>LC</i>
Angola	1000							5			
Argentina	18,500		2	1	13	3	4	6			6
Benin	500							6			
Brazil	69,000	1	5	2	9	3	13	28	4	3	16
Cameroon	1500						4	13			4
Congo, Dem. Rep.	6700							16			
Congo, Rep.	800						4	4			
Equatorial Guinea	250					2	2	7			
Gabon	500						2	9		1	13
Ghana	2000						12	2			
Guyana	200						1	4			
Ivory Coast	1000							7			2
Namibia	900					1	2	3			
Nigeria	8000				2	4	7	107	2		4
South Africa	7550		3		4		3	3	5		2
Suriname	240							10			
Togo	200							3			
Uruguay	5400				2			15	3		3
Venezuela	25,500		2		6	3		6		4	3

(continued)

Table 8.1 (continued)

	<i>Naval aviation</i>			<i>Marines</i>				
	<i>Personnel</i>	<i>Aircraft</i>	<i>Helicopters</i>	<i>Personnel</i>	<i>AFV</i>	<i>Artillery</i>	<i>PC/PB</i>	<i>Aux</i>
Argentina	2000	20	10	2500	56	89		
Brazil	2100	11	70	16,000	105	65		
Namibia		1	1	700				
Nigeria			5	200				
Uruguay	210	6	7	450				
Venezuela	500	9	19	15,000	68	30	22	5

Source: IISS, *The Military Balance* – 2018. London

AC aircraft carrier, *SS* submarines, *PB* patrol boats, *DD* destroyers, *MS* minesweepers and minehunters, *FF* frigates and corvettes, *LS* landing ships, *PS* patrol ships, *LC* landing crafts, *PC* patrol crafts, *PB* patrol Boats, *AFV* aux

analysis of the capabilities of the fleets belonging to the countries of this enormous region, it is not enough just to list figures of personnel and ships that exist in each one. Thus, to have an idea of the type of navies of the different countries by their potentiality, I use the categorisation proposed by Eric Grove's 'The Ranking of Smaller Navies Revisited'.¹ It proposes nine ranks of navies regarding capabilities. According to the number and classification of vessels, we can indicate what rank each navy belongs to.

Based on that and the figures of Table 8.1, one can state that the first three levels of global projection are not applicable to the South Atlantic (with the exception of the British Royal Navy). Then, we only can rank the South Atlantic navies from ranks four to nine, as proposed below:

- Rank 4: Regional force projection navies: Brazil.
- Rank 5: Adjacent force projection navies: Argentina and South Africa.
- Rank 6: Offshore territorial defence: Venezuela, Nigeria, and Uruguay.
- Rank 7: Inshore territorial defence navies: Namibia and Equatorial Guinea.
- Rank 8: Police and constabulary: Cameroon, Ghana, Guyana, and Gabon.
- Rank 9: Token navies: Angola, Togo, Benin, Suriname, and Ivory Coast.

The contrast between the original categorisation formulated by Grove at the end of Cold War and the actual capabilities leads us to some updates. First, Grove pointed out that Brazil and Argentina ranked four as they had fixed-wing aircraft carriers. Both have disbanded that category of vessel, and old age and lack of maintenance of their surface ships challenge their

operational readiness. However, while Brazil has just acquired a well-refurbished rotary-wing aircraft carrier, Argentina has concentrated resources to patrol its EEZs and tackle drug trafficking. Therefore, we can still rank Brazil as four, but Argentina needs to be lowered, though it is still the second most powerful navy in the South Atlantic. Finally, as previous chapters have addressed, both countries have severe budgetary problems and doubts remain about whether they will be able to keep those ranks.

The next level addresses navies with some ability to project force well offshore. At the time of Grove's original analysis, the only country in the region included in this level was South Africa. That was recently confirmed by its counter-piracy operations in Namibia and North Mozambique waters.

Rank six includes navies with high levels of capability in operations up to about 200 miles from the shore. These navies have the sustainability offered by frigates and large corvettes and submarine force. At the time of the original categorisation, the only navy thus appointed was the Nigerian Navy. Today, probably the navies of Uruguay and Venezuela are fit for that rank, too. This last is shadowed by its current social and economic degradation, though its amphibious capability is still the second largest in the region.

Rank seven addresses navies capable of littoral combat rather than just constabulary duties. At this level, we could perhaps include Equatorial Guinea and Namibia because they hold patrol ships, although they demand further qualitative analysis. Equatorial Guinea is a vital area to build up capacity against transnational threats and receives some support from France. Namibia is a compelling case because it is supported by Brazil and China, from which its patrol vessels came. While the first has additionally provided continuous naval education to Namibian officers for more than a decade, China has supported infrastructure renovation. Still, Namibia has benefited from SADC's joint exercises and operations.

The last two ranks included those navies only capable of constabulary duties and token navies with formal organisational structure and a few coastal craft, but little else. Even so, in the case of West Africa, the distinction between the coastguard's capability and no capability at all is relevant, given the piracy and drug trafficking plaguing the region. The distinction is also relevant given the pooling of resources to face those threats, and the ranking should indicate navies that really contribute to those efforts and whose contribution is just symbolic. Countries such as Cameroon, Ghana,

and Gabon have made significant efforts, as well as received US and European support, to raise its former token navies to reasonable coastguards. Gabon and Guyana's constabulary capabilities are reasonable and, at some level, extensions of their special relationship with France.

Among rank nine navies, one may be perplexed to figure out how Angola, one of the region's largest economies, was unable to raise, at least, a coastguard. The Ministry of Fisheries has one patrol coast offshore and five patrol coastguards dedicated to combat illegal fishing—a more reasonable coastguard than the Angolan Navy's five patrol boats. Therefore, its oil drilling infrastructure camps are exposed as prime targets for Niger Delta piracy and smuggling. Angola is one of China's primary suppliers of energy, which explains the high Chinese interest in economic and naval interdependence. However, Angola has fresh memories of exclusive partnerships of the Cold War era, and it looks forward to more balanced options of partnerships keeping open conversations and joint activities with South Korea, the United States, and Brazil.

The high oil and commodities prices of the twenty-first century's first decade financed most of the naval programmes' expansion and modernisation in the South Atlantic, while spillover impacts of the financial crises of 2008 now challenge those programmes directly and indirectly. Directly, countries like Brazil and South Africa have postponed and suspended acquisition and development projects. Indirectly, members of ECOWAS and the Gulf Cooperation Council depend on US and European aid. Therefore, it is possible to anticipate possible future changes in that naval ranking if we consider the figures in Table 8.2. For instance, one can notice the significant differences in the share of the defence budget per GDP. In 2017, it goes from a high of 6.2 per cent in the Republic of Congo, 3.4 per cent in Namibia and 2.2 per cent in Angola, to a low of 0.4 per cent in Ghana and Nigeria and 0.6 per cent in Liberia.

THE SOUTH ATLANTIC NAVAL AND MARITIME THREATS

As we read in previous chapters, many of the existing threats in the maritime environment are familiar to most coastal states, even if with different incidences. The most common threats in the South Atlantic evolve from illegal activities aiming at the exploration of maritime natural resources, threatening the native biodiversity, and the several sorts of smuggling and trafficking.

Table 8.2 Defence budgets and personnel

	<i>Coastline</i>	<i>Defence budgets</i>		<i>Personnel</i>		
	<i>Km</i>	<i>US\$ mi</i>	<i>in % GDP</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Navy</i>	<i>% of total</i>
Angola	1600	3063	2.2	107,000	1000	0.9
Argentina	4989	5681	0.9	74,200	18,500	24.9
Benin	121	116.1	1.2	7250	500	6.9
Brazil	7941	29,283	1.4	334,500	69,000	20.6
Cameroon	402	408	1.3	14,400	1500	10.4
Congo, Dem. Rep.	37	295	0.7	134,250	6700	5.0
Congo, Rep.	169	484	6.2	10,000	800	8.0
Equatorial Guinea	296	–	–	1450	250	17.2
Gabon	885	299	2.1	4700	500	10.6
Ghana	539	189	0.4	15,500	2000	12.9
Guyana	459	57.3	1.4	3400	200	5.9
Ivory Coast	515	496	1.3	25,400	1000	3.9
Liberia	579	13.7	0.6	–	–	–
Namibia	1572	434	3.4	9900	900	9.1
Nigeria	853	1621	0.4	118,000	8000	6.8
South Africa	2798	3618	1.0	66,350	7550	11.4
Suriname	386	–	–	1840	240	13.0
Togo	56	88.4	1.9	8550	200	2.3
Uruguay	660	1242	2.1	24,650	5400	21.9
Venezuela	2800	465	0.5	123,000	22,300	18.1

Data: SIPRI Military Expenditure Databases: <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex/>; IISS, *The Military Balance* – 2018. London

More complicated and dangerous, even if still localised in African shores, are actions defined as armed robbery against ships (ARAS) or maritime piracy. In the South Atlantic, the area that has suffered most from this type of action has been the Gulf of Guinea, with particular incidence on the Niger Delta. According to data published by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), among the last 100 incidents that took place on all oceans in 2018 (from February to August), 43 were in the South Atlantic. Of those, 25 were armed robbery against ships actions – 7 took place in South American countries and 18 on African coasts; and 19 were piracy acts in the Gulf of Guinea. Ten actions of armed robbery had material consequences, and the other 15 were aborted or had no consequences. Nine piracy acts were aborted or had no consequences, and five had only material consequences, but four had material and human consequences (wounds and kidnapping).² As far as maritime terrorism is concerned, there are no examples to date in the South Atlantic.

Nonetheless, the most significant perception of threat in the South Atlantic still involves extra-regional power politics, in diverse forms. These forms range from illegal fishing to direct or disguised aggression, as in the case of ‘gunboat diplomacy’. Great powers have tried and, in some instances, succeeded in claiming maritime spaces that hinder or damage the territorial interests of other countries. Indeed, these affected countries were genuinely borderline and holders under international law of the rights to these spaces.

Interesting in this regard is the description of such attacks in Chaps. 4 and 5, involving the aggressions of the United Kingdom to Argentina and Chile, specifically in the Falklands War in 1982, and the dispute on the territories of Antarctica. Also, Chap. 6 describes the aggressions suffered by Brazil at the hands of the Portuguese, French, and British. As I expressed in a rare opportunity of debate between Angolan and Portuguese representation on naval and maritime affairs:

If it is true that theoretically at this time, the great powers only consider essential the freedom of navigation in the seas where the goods that interest their economies circulate, this position can change. For example, in the case of the mining of minerals on continental shelves, I showed [that change is] viable and rewarding. In a previous lecture, I questioned whether the greatness of the ‘goodness’ of the great powers was not alien to freely distribute what was considered ‘as a patrimony of humanity’ by those who were closest to that patrimony [...] This though finished pointing the probability of a short repetition of the Berlin Congress of 1884–85 might come to define the new rules for the exploration and occupation of this immense territory, based on arguments which only benefit the great.³

The analyses in previous chapters of the possible threats from the great naval powers—notably from the United Kingdom, France, the USA, China, and Russia—clearly show the extent to which this type of threat can reach, albeit in different ways in terms of what each aggressor wants to achieve, as well as in the forms that this aggression takes.

It is interesting to go deeper and observe, in Chap. 2, the role of AFRICOM, and in Chap. 4 the military struggle and means available for the UK in the Falklands Isles, and the UK’s military exercises in the area.

Angola’s example with the then Soviet Union, regarding illegal fishing, is symptomatic of the way the ‘friendly’ country has achieved total impunity to practise fishing without any control. President Agostinho Neto, at the beginning of the Angolan People’s War (MGPA) on 10 July 1976, warned that:

To protect our national territory, this Navy is necessary [for] protection of our territorial waters, where so far, they have come to pirate many foreign vessels, which do the fishing [...]. It is a fact that we must neutralise, we must avoid in the future [...] those who, in any case, want to steal what exists in our country, or who may try, through the seas, to attack our country.

Unfortunately, the interests of this ‘friend’ overcame Angolan self-interests and managed to convince the politicians that, instead of the creation of a navy for coastal defence, Angola should create a civilian constabulary navy to tackle illegal fishing. By (bad) chance, this friend also managed to control it, leaving Angola unable to effectively control this problem. How much did it cost and still cost Angola’s Treasury? Professor Julianio da Silva Cortinhas rightly describes this kind of defence relationship in Chap. 7: ‘the increased presence of these extra-regional powers minimizes the coastal countries’ capacity to define their own destinies and how they use their natural resources’. However, before they face that challenge, there is a preliminary one that most of the South Atlantic small navies must overcome first.

SMALL NAVIES AND INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES

Sea blindness is usual on the part of the politicians, since they are much more concerned with the problems encountered on land, where most populations are born, educated, work, and die. They are also concerned with creating and maintaining the conditions for these same populations to be able to carry out all these activities. These are the people that will give the politicians the support and votes that allow them to retain their seats. The maritime area, however necessary it may be, will never provide votes, and so it will always occupy the back stage.

Linked to this problem is the lack of importance that non-coastline populations give to maritime threats and issues. If there is little commitment and political will to solve such critical problems, it is logical that little effort is made to convince the populations of the need to understand the issues, and to do something to tackle them. Furthermore, the problem is aggravated in times of financial difficulties, when it is even harder to convince taxpayers to agree on investment in maritime safety. Chap. 4, for example, discusses how more importance is given to internal issues than to international trade and maritime power. Similarly, Chaps. 3 and 6 describe

the confusion of decision makers over leadership and the allocation of scarce resources. Moreover, previous chapters pointed out, in diverse ways, that those problems are aggravated when defence matters are publicly associated with cases of corruption. In that sense, a South Atlantic seapower looks more like a myth than reality.

The lack of leadership is also a weakness with regional consequences, as it is quite challenging to be a regional naval leader without the human, material, and financial means to solve the rising maritime problems. Consequently, it is difficult to persuade the South Atlantic countries to buy into the idea of regional pooling of naval resources and multinational maritime security initiatives without the support of extra-regional powers.

The lack of or weak regional and even national cooperation and coordination have an additional cause. Mutual suspicions and dilemma security behaviours still prevail and undermine regional initiatives. This problem is evident in West Africa's difficulty in sharing information among members of its several zones of maritime security. Some smaller nations are more concerned about losing their sovereignty to regional organisations than to former colonial powers. As addressed in Chap. 2, that condition imperils ECOWAS and the development of its maritime security initiatives. Strikingly, this is a challenge that also prevails domestically—among national security forces.

WHAT CAN BE DONE?

The future of the South Atlantic relies on a global seapower balance or rebalance that is complex and unpredictable. There are significant threats, some with familiar patterns, but others arising through unknown or unusual paths, some coming from known enemies, but others launched in dubious terms by proclaimed friends, making it much harder to devise possible answers.

However, due to historic naval institutional weaknesses throughout the South Atlantic states, the states themselves—stakeholders of the immense wealth in the waters and ocean depths—are weakening their response-capacity and are currently incapable of obtaining acceptable results.

The solution, as this book has argued, lies in improving the material and immaterial naval means to address the known and unknown threats by investing in knowledge diffusion, quality, training, cooperation, leadership, and public discussion to allow citizens' engagement with politicians in developing better answers for the South Atlantic in the future.

I hope this book will serve as a useful vehicle for a greater understanding of the problem of maritime safety and security in the South Atlantic and ensuring a better future to all the peoples of the region.

Thanks for reading!

NOTES

1. Eric Grove, 'The Ranking of Smaller Navies Revisited', in M. Mulqueen, D. Sanders, and I. Speller, eds., *Small Navies: Strategy and Policy for Small Navies in War and Peace* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), 15–20.
2. All data are available at: <https://gisis.imo.org/Public/PAR/Default.aspx>.
3. Manuel Correa Barros, 'Security in the Gulf of Guinea: An Angolan Maritime Vision' (Conference at the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon, 2014).

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¹ Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

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