



Maritime Security Challenges in the South Atlantic

Edited by
Érico Duarte · Manuel Correia de Barros

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Érico Duarte
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Introduction

Érico Duarte

WHY DOES THE SOUTH ATLANTIC OCEAN MATTER?

The South Atlantic Ocean has historically presented itself as a puzzle of world politics. Although relatively absent of great power inter-states disputes, there took place the last war at sea in Falklands in 1982. Although it never held the metropolis of an empire or global power, it was essential for the rise of the Spanish, Portuguese, and British sea power projects and was the base-area for the US World War II campaigns in North Africa.

In contemporary international security paramount, the South Atlantic does not have the same gravity of the South China Sea or the Persian Gulf, and the mighty naval power of day barely considers it.¹ Nonetheless, the South Atlantic has three global-reach impacts. First, it holds one of the largest seabed mineral and energy reserves of the world: in 2010, South Atlantic already ranked worldly at first position with 109 oil and gas floating platforms (North Atlantic had 90, Pacific 76 and the Indian Ocean only 2). The most optimist previsions figure 174 floating platforms in 2030, still ahead of other maritime areas of the globe.²

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Second, it presents the most complex “web of maritime criminality”: on the one hand, due to the great possibilities of all kinds of smuggling and trafficking through the immense shipping opportunities derived from the region’s substantial participation in the global supply chain and on the other hand, due to the joint venturing among significant black markets, cocaine barons, insurgent movements, and high-performance pirates.

Third, much earlier than the popularization of the notion of blue economy by the *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)* in January 2014, new diplomatic dialogues and security arrangements flourished across the South Atlantic, also between Northern and Southern Atlantic countries, but especially among Global South countries themselves. The relative distance from the main areas of great power politics of the day allows that several regional initiatives and agendas emerge, in which USA, Europe, China, India, and Russia are more participants than dominant players. Furthermore, the geopolitics and geo-economics of the South Atlantic are not an extension of the patterns of North Atlantic, and if forcefully addressed all together, the wider Atlantic portrays as a fractured ocean.³ More emphatically pointed out by others, the South Atlantic is, potentially, the ocean for the Global South.⁴

THE SOUTH ATLANTIC REGIONAL DIMENSIONS

To grasp the South Atlantic, one may consider at least four nexuses of political, security, and economic realities. First, West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea frame the more unstable one. Transnational and regional-networked syndicates operate in borderless areas and are entrenched in local society and production sectors. Although West African countries struggle to overcome infrastructural and institutional deficiencies, several of them are part of their colonial legacies, and the European—mainly French and Portuguese—influence and presence are still active. Accordingly, that is the South Atlantic sub-region most exposed to foreign intervention and inter-regional maritime security arrangements.

Second, on the other side of South Atlantic, its Northeast fringe comprising Brazil, Venezuela, and the three tiniest states of South America: (English) Guyana, French Guyana, and (Dutch) Suriname. That is already the wealthiest area of the region in hydrocarbon deposits. Besides

Venezuela holding the largest proven reserves of oil in the world, pre-salts deposits exist in the rest of the other three countries' offshore and other rare minerals in the Amazon River estuary. Moreover, there locate the departure or transit points of the largest and richest drug trafficking pipelines in the world. Converging the cocaine productions of Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, which travels mainly on land through Brazil and Argentina, then crossing the ocean and, then, West, Central, and Southern Africa, supplying the national markets on the way to Europe and Asia. Therefore, that South Atlantic area links the Caribbean Sea, the Southern Atlantic, and Africa and their respective legal and illegal economies. The last trend to be remarked is the illicit weapons trafficking that spreads from Colombian civil war throughout South American drug trafficking pipelines. That leads to the top regional security topic of the day in reason it can exponentially expand in case of a Venezuela's civil war or failure as a state, replicating the effects of Libyan civil war in West Africa.

Third, the Southern Atlantic has additional features and dynamics along with the several kinds of smuggling and trafficking above mentioned. Thanks to Brazil's decades of investments, the region is becoming self-sufficient and potentially exporter of energy and mineral resources. Thus, although it is deficient in law enforcement on the sea, Brazil also supports a developed regional maritime traffic system. Further, the Falklands Isles is still a critical issue in the region, impacting beyond Argentinean and British chancelleries. The British drilling of oil and gas deposits and the overlaps of exclusive economic zones' claims between the UK and Argentina (as well as Chile) anticipate the diplomatic movements regarding the Antarctic Treaty's expiration in 2048.

Fourth and last, one may consider that Southern Africa as a bi-ocean sub-region, where the reconfiguration of Western powers' presence on the continent with the creation of the United States Armed Forces' African Command (AFRICOM) and the operation of European military joint forces in the Gulf of Aden impacted on Southern Africa.⁵ That marked a new cycle of geographical location concentration of Somalia piracy in evasion of European naval forces. Instead of a single militarised response, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) presents an innovative approach of ocean governance.

The event that motivated SADC's maritime approach was the hijacking of the fishing vessel Vega 5 by Somali pirates in the Mozambique Channel in December 2010, in the Gulf of Aden. After only eight months, SADC developed its Maritime Security Strategy. It has as its primary directive the eradication of Somali piracy from Southern Africa, Western (Atlantic) Coast of Southern Africa, and the region's rivers and lakes.⁶ Parallel those developments. However, the most influential international trend consists of the direct impacts of Chinese maritime power project, with berthing naval bases in construction in Angola and Namibia, and the consequent contest by other extra-regional power, particularly India.

Therefore, South Atlantic has been the cradle of very particular trends of regionalism, state-building strategies, and governance of common areas, going on beyond the study of law enforcement compliance and oversight over offshore waters. The South Atlantic comprises distinct security realities and matters that rest on old and new developments, which solutions depend on different kinds of sub-regional arrangements and national commitments. Moreover, they are all related to some level of underdevelopment as the leading causes for the void of governance.

All that would be sufficient for the South Atlantic to be the subject of continuous scholarship publication, which, in fact, it has been not. Few grasp one sub-region or topic without correlation to others, for instance Forest & Sousa's *Oil and Terrorism in the New Gulf: Framing U.S. Energy and Security Policies for the Gulf of Guinea* (Lexington Books, 2006). In any case, the list of contemporary and comprehensive books dedicated to the South Atlantic is concise: so far, only two. With a more similar scope to this one, but entirely different in perspective and contribution, is Slauthgter and Bystrom's *The Global South Atlantic* (Fordham University Press, 2017), which focus on "postcolonial, subaltern, and comparative ethnic and third-world cultural studies", though it comprises almost only of European collaborators. Alternatively, with the similar approach, but without the same scope and depth is the German Marshall Fund's report *The Fractured Ocean Current Challenges to Maritime Policy in the Wider Atlantic* (2012).

This book is part of a project to revert this shortcoming by setting a new agenda of scholarship on South Atlantic maritime security issues. In that sense, a second and forthcoming book, also by Palgrave

Macmillan, complements this one. While *Maritime Security Challenges in the South Atlantic* approaches the South Atlantic regional security issues with maritime implications, *Navies and Maritime Policies in the South Atlantic* discusses the maritime agendas and interests of the main naval countries of the South Atlantic: Nigeria, South Africa, Argentina, UK, and Brazil.

The overall project aims to be a first comprehensive and multi-level analysis of South Atlantic contemporary maritime security issues. That is undertaken in three ways. First, that is a multinational effort, that reflects the compromise in providing Global South perspectives of South American, Southern, Central and West Africa security issues of maritime effects, without neglecting Northern hemispheric counterpoint views. Second, those collaborations offer eclectic backgrounds as political scientists, historians, defence analysts, IR scholars, geographers, diplomats, and military officers. The reader will notice in each following chapter the density and complementarity of historical reconstructions, updated data, documentation analysis, reviews of literature, and, finally, policy recommendations on national, regional, and international scopes of South Atlantic. Third, the book aims to launch further agendas of research than conclude any of its several topics to predetermined discourses of the several academic “(tribal)isms” and groupings. The authors of this book recognise that in the Global South also manifests the trend of a new epistemic community with more practical concerns and useful implications, and they subscribe to Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds’s normative proposal:

We argue that in addition to the traditional concerns of studies of sea power and the legal structures governing the sea, maritime security studies need to pay greater attention to the interconnectivity of different threats and issues, to novel forms of governance and order at sea, and to the dissemination of the new maritime security agenda through capacity-building.⁷

Therefore, to situate our contribution, it is necessary to address the recent scholarship developments regarding the ongoing changes in the nature of maritime threats, the correspondent review of maritime security sector as a whole-of-government articulation, and how academia may contribute in the overall efforts of national and regional capacity building.

THE TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY AGENDA ON MARITIME SECURITY STUDIES

The scholarship on maritime security is very recent and, since the end of Cold War, it has evolved to deal with much more than threats to coastal defence.⁸ The “nature of maritime challenges is changing and, hence, the instruments through which these challenges will have to be addressed”.⁹ The changes of the current maritime threats would be of three kinds.

First, those emanating from the sea that directly affects a nation’s territory and citizens; second, those affecting global/common maritime interests; and third, those affecting global resources at, in, or under the sea.¹⁰

If we take the conceptualization of maritime security by the range of threats, the correspondent definition would be: “the protection of a state’s land and maritime territory, infrastructure, economy, environment and society from certain harmful acts”.¹¹ The consequence of this broader definition of maritime security is the review of instruments to deal with those issues.¹² The autonomy of navies to deal with the maritime domain stands no more. Nowadays’ maritime security demands the synergy of response efforts of the whole-of-government.

The challenge today, along with effective at-sea capabilities, is effectively leveraging all governmental – and at times, non-governmental – resources that are now involved. More agencies are involved, in part, because the expertise required to address catastrophic fuel spills, biohazards, energy disruption, pandemics, terrorism, and piracy is often distributed throughout a government.¹³

It is still valid the assumption that the seas are a state business. However, the list of tasks and expertise of current maritime security urge a new paradigm of capacity building. On the one hand, governments need to design the maritime-response framework horizontally that entails processes of information-sharing and the timely deployment of assets from military, law enforcement, judicial, diplomatic, and environmental agencies. Admittedly, the range of procedures and practices should be tailored to the list of maritime risks and threats. That means “to make connections where they exist and to avoid actions in one area that may be counterproductive in others”.¹⁴ On the other hand, the whole-of-government

framework to have unity of effort has a requirement of direction from the head of state.¹⁵

Both requirements are especially challenging to the developing and underdeveloped countries of the South Atlantic Basin. Because, different from the European case, for instance, the proliferation of good practices that would support the maritime security sector reform is not given. The distribution of knowledge and skills for capacity building is generally hampered by the lack of financial, technological, and human resources. The bureaucratic and institutional mechanisms of the multiple maritime-related agencies may be weak or non-existent, and “the strengthening or rebuilding them through activities including training, resourcing and sometimes equipment or infrastructure provision” must precede the internalization of best practices in security governance.¹⁶ Worse than that, in some areas of South American and Africa, there is no such thing as the direction from the head of state over the government, as several state and non-state actors share and struggle for the provision of public security and authority over a territory and population. As the chapters of the book will address on, some initiatives in capacity building and the reform of the maritime and overall security sectors have to deal with different and inconstant instances of governmentality that follow more a logic of a market than of a hierarchical structure.

Moreover, one cannot be naïve in assuming that maritime security sector reforms will always take place immune to the effects of security dilemma and self-help interests. Particularly in the context of expansion of economic exclusives zones, great and regional powers, politics have been an obstacle to maritime security cooperation in the South Atlantic.

Hence, what is the possible scholar contribution? Bueger and Edmunds’s proposition is very precise in pointing out five areas of research: (i) the broadening of the notion of security in maritime domain which embraces sea power, marine preservation, blue economy, and human security; (ii) the new and evolving forms of maritime security governance, creatively taking the formal maritime law and informally amending it; (iii) the several instances of international security cooperation; (iv) to overcome the liminality of addressing maritime problems through the marine environment alone and the sea blindness of security studies; and (v) to provide more political-sociologic and empirical studies of recent cases of capacity building in maritime agencies and to address the political and structural constraints over target governments.¹⁷

WHAT DOES THIS BOOK OFFER?

As above mentioned, this book covers the regional perspectives of the South Atlantic maritime security challenges, complemented by a second book on the national agendas of maritime policy, naval posture, and capacity building.

This book opens with the chapter by Érico Duarte, Danilo Marcondes, and Camilo Carneiro that states the most critical security challenges in South Atlantic are the transnational criminal organizations. By proposing an amendment of maritime security studies with a review of the criminology studies, it examines the menace of piracy, armed robbery in terrestrial waters, and drug trafficking, as well as the regional responses and emerging security architectures.

Chapter 3 by Mamadou Diallo brings to the floor the African post-colonialist charge of European—firstly French—perverse legacy and current influence in West African dysfunctional security apparatus. It presents a reasonable amount of historical data to defend that the proliferation of transnational crime, piracy, and insurgent groups in West Africa is also an ultimate justification for the extra-regional power politics and influence on the South Atlantic regional maritime security agendas.

Chapter 4, by André Beirão and Beatriz Victória Albuquerque da Silva Ramos, approaches neoclassic assumptions on coalitions dynamics and international prestige to unveil Portugal's interests and agenda in pushing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to assume maritime security commitments in the Gulf of Guinea. That bursts the permanent concern that South Atlantic becomes an extra-regional area of operations like the Gulf of Aden. The limits between regional and inter-regional are thinner in the international politics of South Pole. In Chapter 5, Sabrina Evangelista Medeiros and Leonardo Faria de Mattos outline the public international law framework of the Antarctic Treaty and the confluence of territorial claims and interests among UK, Argentina, Chile, and Brazil.

Given this challenges, in the Chapter 6, Ralph Espach assesses the possibility and feasibility of comprehensive maritime security cooperation in South Atlantic. It leans to a hegemonic stability perspective to point out the centrality and limits of Brazil in playing that role. This chapter contrasts the US global experience to Brazil's specific context and capabilities in the South Atlantic.

Chapter 7 addresses the debate towards the matter of "stateness", security sector reform, and capacity building. Igor Castellano da Silva

formulates a conceptual framework from international historical sociology that correlates the dyadic relationship between the African way of warfare and the African states' shortcomings. That chapter bridges the regional and national dimensions of maritime security, arguing that one main South Atlantic challenge is to set effective capacity-building initiatives in that continent.

Finally, Brigadier Manoel Correa de Barros closes the book assessing the overall South Atlantic contemporary maritime security panorama and proposing what and how to look ahead.

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CHAPTER 2

Facing the Transnational Criminal Organizations in the South Atlantic

Érico Duarte, Danilo Marcondes and Camilo Carneiro

INTRODUCTION

The most compelling maritime insecurities surrounding the South Atlantic Ocean are not the expansionist aspirations of sovereign states, but the transnational criminal networks and the incapacity of the region's states to steward their maritime and border domains. Due to a history of governmental dysfunctionality and social underdevelopment, old threats have benefited from the overall South Atlantic economic expansion and

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integration to the global value chain. The globalization reduced the operational costs and fostered new and expanded forms of organized crime and political-criminal nexuses. Former South American and West African drug cartels, insurgencies groups, and robbery gangs evolved into much more sophisticated associations with criminal pipelines consolidated in Europe, North America, and Asia.¹

In the South Atlantic, the domestic political conditions favoured the emergence of black markets and informal economies, and very versatile and specialized crime syndicates took a share of the regional maritime industry hostage. Embedded in social degradation, legitimized by governmental corruption, and benefited by expanded infrastructures for export of commodities and energy, trafficking, piracy, and insurgencies operate in transregional networks.² Since 2004, the South Atlantic region has the world's most concentrated net of drug trafficking, and, since 2012, the Gulf of Guinea faces the most violent piracy activities. The correlations among those activities to depletion of natural resources, unsecured shipping lanes, and fractionated governments hit harder African and South American societies and their perspectives on sustainable development.

Due to few articulated and effective regional response, the USA and the European Union have supported many law enforcement and maritime security projects on both sides of South Atlantic. Following the controversial “war on drugs” in Latin America from the 1980s to late 2000s, the USA conducted a more effective maritime interdiction against drug trafficking in the Caribbean and Central America in the last decade. In Africa, its leading maritime initiative is the African Coastal and Border Security Program (ACBSP), through which the USA supplies specialized military equipment for the patrol and defence of coastal waters to African countries. However, it offers training in intelligence operations and airborne surveillance only in some cases. The provision of training follows two other programmes. Under the initiative of the African Partnership Station (APS), a navy ship serves as a continuing sea base of operations and a floating schoolhouse, and, since 2010, the annual joint exercises Obangame Express take place in the West African coasts.³

EU favoured a less militarized approach through the Cocaine Route Programme, since 2009, and the Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf of Guinea Programme (CRIMGO), since 2013. This latter one expanded to the *Gulf of Guinea Action Plan* for 2015–2020. Only in 2016, the EU's derived projects Maritime Transport Support, Gulf of

Guinea Inter-Regional Network (GoGIN), Ocean Beyond Piracy, and Germany's contribution to information-sharing systems have invested nearly 5 million euros in the maritime security capacity building.⁴ All of them focus on capacity building, data and intelligence sharing, and multinational operational coordination.⁵ At last, France and the UK command a Marine Domain Awareness for Trade-Gulf of Guinea (MDAT-GOG) from Brest and Portsmouth.

Nonetheless, although impressive and necessary, those efforts lack a coherent and effective strategy against structural sources of transnational organized crime. Otherwise, they will push a new cycle of "balloon effect",

[...] where successful law enforcement activity pushes criminal groups into different regions, has been well documented. Indeed, it was the balloon effect that resulted in West Africa growing.⁶

Several following chapters in the second part of this book cover national responses to those maritime threats by countries of the region (Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria, and South Africa). In this chapter, we aim to complement our colleagues' contributions by advancing a regional perspective of the problem of transnational organized criminal networks around the South Atlantic, as well as addressing the efforts to face them. Among the several illegal activities, we focus mainly on drug trafficking and piracy and armed robbery in territorial waters.

The chapter follows an interdisciplinary approach as suggested by Cockayne and Morselli,⁷ merging maritime security studies, political science, criminology, and strategic studies concepts with empirical research to contribute to current and future capacity-building initiatives in the security sector reforms. It brings new data on maritime criminal activities among South American and West African shores, as well as an assessment of diplomatic communication to address the matter.

Based on that, we argue that the Western support to the South Atlantic security architecture needs a strategic review. Most of the capacity-building projects, particularly those centred in the Gulf of Guinea, are designed according to the self-interest of donors or destination countries over South American and West and Central African local priorities and contexts. Therefore, they are "top-down processes with a one-way transfer of knowledge".⁸

Moreover, the European Union's commitment in the Gulf of Guinea has as background its successful role in Somalia,⁹ despite two remarkable differences. On the one hand, in South Atlantic, there is no authorization for the use of foreign military forces and private military companies due to the lack of a functioning state.¹⁰ On the other hand, the transnational criminal networks in South Atlantic differ significantly from the Somali primitive maritime bandits regarding sophistication and resilience. They operate from Colombia, Brazil, and Nigeria, with extended control, bases, and sanctuaries in smaller and weaker South American and West African states, such as Bolivia, Paraguay, Mali, and Guinea-Bissau.

That brings to the floor three additional lines of coordinated actions in South Atlantic, not just in the Gulf of Guinea: first, pressure over local political elites towards anti-corruption and anti-financial fraud inter-state cooperation; second, the combination of local development alternatives—as for instance, South Africa's Operation Phakisa—with de-legitimizing communication campaigns against socially embedded cartels; and third, the development of new methods to tackle the main component of contemporary transnational organized crime: the international criminal broker. Although globalization has reduced the costs of corruption, coercion, transportation, and finances,¹¹ the nature of criminal organization and activities limits the possibility of control over distinguished specialized operations and groups in different legal and regulatory environments.¹² Therefore, the literature has gathered growing evidence that the transcontinental logistics and decentralized operational features of transnational organized crime result from a specialized service or career able to provide foreign brokerage and to design associations among independent illicit entrepreneurs.¹³

The chapter follows as this: the next section reviews the literature on maritime security, pointing out that its current most promising branch is the scholar contribution in the organization of knowledge and proposition on capacity building and security sector reform. In that sense, the paper advances conceptual propositions relating maritime security and transnational criminal networks. Next, it approaches the piracy and drug trafficking issues in South Atlantic bringing a selection of data from United Nations Drug World Reports and South American and African law enforcement agencies, diplomatic cables, and media press publications; and reviewing the scholarship on the region's more powerful criminal organizations. Finally, it assesses and evaluates the main bilateral

and multilateral security cooperation initiatives in the region, in relation to which we discuss their challenges to succeed and introduce some recommendations.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

To address the new nature of maritime security and to assist governments to approach it, the scholarship has developed through a matrix of theoretical frameworks from international relations and security studies, covering realism, liberalism, English School, constructivism, and critical security studies.¹⁴

Evidently, the first and more traditional form of theorizing of that matrix derives from the national interests to engage one's navy in other regions and international waters.¹⁵ Second, marine safety (or maritime safety) and maritime security became associated in consequence of the US reaction to the attacks of 11 September 2001. Initially, it advanced a range of codes and norms to prevent maritime terrorism in ports and vessels, though nowadays the security concerns comprise the centrality of maritime industries in the global supply chain.

Third, the association between maritime security and economic development is recent and precludes the strategies for the sustainable development of a marine economy. Beyond the national dimension, there is an emerging literature that addresses the limits, if not collapse, of sovereign maritime governance. In some cases that expose a liberal insight that reinterprets the mantra of *Mare liberum* as the open access global commons to globally linked networks and agencies.¹⁶ In other instances, it expresses the concern with the age of Anthropocene and the following challenges of climate change.¹⁷ Finally, Buerger points out that the current understanding of maritime security also benefits from the dimension of the concept of the blue economy: the regulation of the economic development to attend the needs of individuals than states and the concern with the human security of coastal populations as victims of transitional maritime criminal activities.¹⁸

According to Bueger and Edmunds, the last component of the matrix constitutes the most innovative possibility of research agenda, so far limitedly considered in the fields of international relations and security studies: the "efforts to distribute knowledge and skills to local actors through capacity-building and security sector reform (SSR)". Hence, the present authors adhere to the proposition that maritime security studies may

have the focus on: “the interconnectivity of different threats and issues, to novel forms of governance and order at sea, and to the dissemination of the new maritime security agenda through capacity-building”.¹⁹

In that sense, the scholarship and practices of the emergent field of maritime security studies would benefit substantially from a new review of criminology studies. By assessing political science and strategic studies, it raises an alternative to the mainstream criminology that takes the criminal organization as dysfunctional or irrational groups able to perform economic enterprises under illicit conditions.²⁰ A new scholarship recognizes that criminal organizations can establish subculture or systems of governance, as well as design and update strategies and positions vis-à-vis political establishments.²¹

The hidden web of organized criminal influence operates below, alongside and even within the formal state and other political structures. The covert, criminal order is sustained not simply through criminal coercion, but through the complicity of actors—including government officials—who act in line with what they believe are its demands, norms and discipline. It is this covert governmentality that underpins some criminal organizations’ strategic success in generating and controlling criminal rents.

Strategic criminal organizations and the state compete not just to be the individual’s protector, but to be the source of the rules and discretion by which that individual is ultimately governed. As it is for legal businesses, the key to long-term profit maximization for criminal groups may be to reduce competition, whether through collusion or the creation of a monopoly. But for criminal groups the state is itself one such source of competition—because it is a supplier of governmentality.²²

Amid this market for governmentality, there is a competition for legitimacy and control over the local political decision-making and institutions, where the criminal organizations may assess their capabilities strategically regarding coercion, corruption, and communication. The political and strategic dimensions of transnational crime organizations (TCO) are necessary to understand its evolution towards networks of combined frameworks of hierarchical cartels associated with flexible and decentralized illicit groups.²³ The associational nature of current TCOs benefits the criminals in resources pooling and the enforcement of “a code of conduct among their members and thereby increasing predictability and security in an environment that is chaotic and full of risks”.²⁴ However, the transference or simple expansion of a criminal provision of governmentality from a continent to another is difficult.

First, the reallocation to another potential host country is always a vulnerable move due to the lack of knowledge in comparison with local rivals. Second, the TCO's strategic resources and positioning vary in relation to the political-criminal framework of each country. In cases where the overall market for governmentality favours the TCO's local branch in terms of corruption and communication capabilities, the TCO will perform stable associations. In other ones, where the strategic advantage is coercive resources—in general, due to failure of a state or alienation of its military elite—the governmentality will take place through higher levels of conflict. Distinguished from a standard view, the condition of criminal endeavours in failed states favours more competition among criminals, not association or monopoly.²⁵ Therefore, that is less desirable because demands more localized resources and direct governance from a TCO, what distinguishes them from warlords and insurgency groups.

Third, there is a last trade-off between security and efficiency depending on the criminal activity. Terrorist cells demand much lengthier time-to-task networks, favouring security over efficiency. Conversely, drug trafficking cartels require a network that is shaped for efficiency ensuring as much protection as possible. If we add to the equation warlords, their social entanglement also requires security, but effectiveness over efficiency. The management of these variations throughout the same network is everything but trivial.

For this reason, Morselli introduces the role of the central participant or criminal broker, as the component that manages an international catalogue of contacts and the opportunities of resources sharing and coordination among criminal organizations of different expertise, orientations, and structures.

A broker is positioned between disconnected others within a network. These disconnected others may occupy different hierarchical roles within an organization or they may be members of different organizations that come together for a given operation. The most straightforward proposition regarding social interaction in either context is that brokers do better.²⁶

The criminal broker may or may not be a permanent component of a TCO, but more important is its distinguished role in relation to the leader of a criminal organization, and more sophisticated the TCO, more extensive will be the participation of brokers. Finally, the relationship

between criminal leaders and brokers does not interfere into the local markets for governmentality. The extraction of the broker does not result in the rupture of the network, and the removal of a leader does not result in the rise of a broker as a new leader, but it will follow the normative and organizational framework of that criminal group. However, the extraction, replacement, or conversion of brokers is constantly the opening movements of a TCO taking over a rival. The assault on the local businesses and leaders makes sense to take place afterwards.

Moreover, that scholarship on TCOs presents compelling arguments to clarify why TCOs share a current preference for Global South's middle-size transition states with economies more internationally connected, such as Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, and Nigeria.²⁷ They also point out the timing of the consolidation of South Atlantic transnational organized crime, during and after, and not before, the 2000s boom of commodities.²⁸ The TCOs benefited from the shadow of the lavishly international foreign investments in South America and the Gulf of Guinea basins and the infrastructural expansion in those regions, especially the container-port traffic,²⁹ without the corresponded investments in anti-corruption and finance regulations and social development public policies.

That South Atlantic environment offered the conditions of possibility for a market for governmentality because the costs of expansion and transformation of those criminal organizations were low. While the globalization of South Atlantic economies lowered the costs of transport, financing, and communication, the transition in the political establishments of those states under economic expansion reduced the charges of corruption. Finally, the unmet social demands of the several communities affected by uncontrolled urbanization, depletion of public services, and pollution favoured the social entrenchment of the hierarchical branches of the TCOs. Unsurprisingly, the most diversified and powerful South Atlantic cartels have original and main bases in larger urban areas of Sao Paulo, Cape Town, and Lagos.

While piracy and drug trafficking are the most critical transnational threats in the South Atlantic basin, none originates entirely from the sea.³⁰ Both activities derive from the land-based contexts inshore of societal poverty and fragmentation, state ineffectiveness, and the existence of black markets in governance gaps. They also share the frequent cycles of geographical concentration and, if left unchecked, of increasing levels of complexity and violence.³¹ The breadth of environmental and

infrastructural dimensions that sustain the “blue economy” means that these threats demand responses at the national, regional, and even trans-continental levels, going beyond military measures “to be dealt with by the full spectrum of social stakeholders”.³²

PIRACY AND DRUG TRAFFICKING IN SOUTH ATLANTIC

The piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, already manifested in the 1990s, intensified over the following decade because of coastal residents’ resentment of the lack of regulation and control that surrounds foreign oil companies in Nigeria and of the success attained by Somali pirates against shipping in the Gulf of Yemen.³³ Following environmental degradation and community impoverishment, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) emerged in 2005 and became entrenched in local society with a web of regionally connected criminal syndicates, including involvement in oil smuggling and kidnappings and ransoms—in regional-networked syndicates.³⁴ Initially, the oil was “syphoned off directly from pipelines, domestically refined and diverted to the black market in great quantities”.³⁵ Even with MEND’s demobilization between 2008 and 2010, the overall conditions for the black market in oil continued and expanded by following the successes of Somali piracy.

Criminal organizations spread from Nigeria have benefited from lack of state authority over territorial waters, for instance, targeting oil tankers located in the Beninese coast, after 2011.³⁶ Today, Gulf of Guinea’s pirates sail as far south as the Angolan province of Cabinda and the coast of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Remarkably, they achieved the mark of 400 thousand of barrels of petroleum stolen per day between 2012 and 2016, or 15% of overall production, costing the region between US\$ 500 million and US\$ 2 billion in damages.³⁷

The seamanship skills, the criminal network, and governmental co-optation and under-reporting are also features of South Atlantic piracy activities. From opportunistic sea robbers until 2007, the South Atlantic pirates became the most violent and articulated of the day. In 2014, there were 69 incidents, 35 of them violent attacks, 54 incidents in 2015, and 95 with 39 violent attacks in 2016.³⁸ Most of the violent attacks occurred in EEZs waters in Nigeria. The only positive mark was that no ships were reported as hijacked. The last trend is the increasing violence against crewmembers: 1921 seafarers were affected in 2016, 56% higher than the year before. However, it is common sense that the

official numbers are only a fraction of the reality. Besides the connivance of corrupt police forces and governmental officials, ships' owners and governments decrease the numbers of incidents or do not report them to avoid shipping costs and bad reputation. Therefore, the figures provided by security and insurance companies double those provided by International Maritime Organization and the International Maritime Bureau.³⁹

Operationally, the Gulf of Guinea piracy has four distinguished features. First, while Somali pirates use fishing vessels and skiffs as platforms and light weapons, in South Atlantic, the pirates use speedboats and heavy weapons, such as rocket launchers, grenades, and machine guns. Second, most of piracy in the world consists of low-risky robbery, and Somali pirates take advantage of opportunities to hijack crew on brown waters. Gulf of Guinea pirates can conduct surgical attacks on high seas, to control and sail ships through thousands of kilometres and to steal tons of petroleum or goods. For instance, in 2011, after assaulting the *Duzgit Venture* in Benin and failing to transfer the oil to a barge in Gabon, the pirates sailed the vessel to Nigeria, where they tried to transfer only lighter cargo and kidnapped the captain. Third, they are also able to assault ships on ports and onshore facilities, performing more versatile and complex operations. Fourth, they have a transnational criminal network on readiness to support their operations and to smuggle and trade large volumes of petroleum and goods in several countries of the Gulf of Guinea and in other continents.⁴⁰

Although further advances in regulations, foreign (i.e. European) private military companies are not permitted in West and Central Africa's territorial waters and there are controversies about their employment in economic exclusive zones. Yet, in 2016, 345 million euros was spent to contract security services provided by local companies and personnel and is the main cost related to counter-piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. There are four kinds of those services: first, state-affiliated escort service, concentrated in most attacked areas of Nigerian coast between Lagos, Warri, and Onne; second, private-contracted patrol services operating around offshore oil and gas installations; third, Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria have established "secure zones" near major ports; finally, Benin, Nigeria, and Togo provide embarked security personnel from their law enforcement agencies and government security forces.⁴¹

Beyond the short-term relieve, contracted maritime security services are potentially worse than a palliative solution. They drain human resources and investment of effective national coastguards and naval

support. In 2016, they employed around 300 missions with the cost of 214.7 million euros in hiring and liaisons costs, while all EU's financial support to region's counter-piracy organizations was of 4 million euros and most of Gulf of Guinea's states are short of effective coastguard systems,⁴² essentially due to the lack of human resources, long-range communications, and payment of subscriptions to access service providers of satellite information and telecommunications.⁴³ Further, they exacerbate the recognized problem of lack of transparency and alignment of judicial systems in the arrest and prosecution of pirates and thieves at regional courts.⁴⁴ Consequently, the effective situational awareness and repression of piracy and armed robbery "is fractured and, regardless of expensive satellite systems in Nigeria and Ghana, data is ineffectively shared".⁴⁵

Finally, the reliance on contracted local military and private security personnel is a peril if one considers the involvement of Nigerian cartels in the country's military and security sectors since the 1990s.⁴⁶ As those local "paid" companies are not compliant to any state-regulated qualification and accountability, there is the potential escalate of violence and corruption due to confrontation or association between them and the three main criminal networks operating around the region.⁴⁷

The African group with more international operations is the Nigerian criminal organizations—locally addressed as "419 syndicates". They are the main drug trafficking organizations in Africa, interlinked with global community of criminal organizations, with alliances and bases of operations in South America and Central and Southeast Asia, and distribution branches in the USA and Europe. Nigerian syndicates mastered a diversified profile: credit card fraud, money laundering, counterfeiting and the alteration of official document, and protection.

That repertoire relates to criminal organizations' role in the Nigerian fractured market for governmentality after its independence and failed democratic regime. They were bred as extensions of the ethnically cleaved military elites and regimes, particularly during Oil Boom in the 1970s and after the governmental decree no. 419 that prohibited illegal transfer of money to foreign banks. Since then, Nigerian syndicates became world leaders in money laundering and opening brokerage branches in USA, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Brazil, Colombia, Ethiopia, Italy, Ghana, Cameroon, Kenya, South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.⁴⁸ While the activates related to money laundering fraud are very centralized and professionalized in Lagos, the Nigerian criminal organizations have a second layer of brokers with logistics and

networking expertise. Therefore, they hold a huge amount of capital and share networks in four continents to perform cellular-like associations with small groups operating individually or with other African and foreign larger criminal organizations.⁴⁹

However, intercontinental drug trafficking is a relatively recent as a large activity in Africa, expanded after 2002 and profiting from other TCO's initiatives. The expansion of drug trafficking through West Africa was a "balloon effect" of US war on drugs. Because the Mexican cartels war followed the fragmentation of the Simolean drug empire and the successful interposition of drug flights and freights through Central American and Caribbean, the Colombian drug barons begun to look east.⁵⁰ They invested millions of dollars on corrupting West African authorities and military elites to have the region as intermediate base of operations. Next, they expanded its network by associating with tribes and local criminal and insurgent groups from Mauritania to Benin. The new routes proved to be cheaper and more effective in evading anti-narcotics operations than previous ones, as the drug cartels found out in Africa more available workforce and complicity from regional governments.⁵¹

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Control reports that the maritime shipping of drugs through West Africa has increased, though the apprehensions have not increased proportionally. In 2013, the exports of cocaine from South America remained stable around 400 tons, and the apprehensions in USA and Europe have decreased 65 and 18%, respectively, while the apprehensions doubled from 78 to 162 tons in Central America, but, oddly, the apprehension reports in West Africa presented no alteration. Actually, no one can provide the actual location of the cocaine that is smuggled because West African reports are unreliable, and UN estimates outdated. The UN estimated a reduction of cocaine transiting through West Africa on its way to Europe from 21 tons in 2009 to 18 tons in 2010. However, the tonnage of cocaine seized from shipping containers raised five times in the same period, and the size of individual apprehensions has reduced continuously since 2005. The only conclusion is that cocaine trafficking has succeeded in evading control through West Africa.⁵² Some sources estimate that, only from Colombia, one-third of all exported cocaine—or 130 tons—go through West Africa to Europe, mainly to Spain and Italy, from where the product is distributed by land.⁵³

The overall consequences on both coasts of the South Atlantic were tremendous. One can figure out the consequences by comparing the drug cartels' revenues to those of blood diamonds. While the latter achieved its peak around US\$ 300 million, only one ton of cocaine provides US\$ 50 million.⁵⁴ In Mali, the local Arab and Tuareg tribes used the criminal funds to rebel against traditional vassalage and the Libya's failure as state flooded Mali with heavy weaponry and mercenaries. The reduced costs of coercion produced high levels of competition and contestation among criminal, insurgent, and terrorist groups, downgrading some of their performance as drug trafficking brokers to Europe.⁵⁵ Additionally, the French-German humanitarian operation in Mali and the EU's mobilization against maritime trafficking of drugs and refugees in the Mediterranean pressured the TCOs to search new routes southwards through Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal, and then benefiting from 419 syndicates' networks across East Africa and up to the Balkans. In replacement of drug trafficking, the West African criminal pipelines are shifting to the smuggling of tobacco, alcohol, pharmaceuticals, and oil. The Libyan civil war and the overall European and Middle-Eastern refugee crises favour the illicit trade of those goods as they share lower risks of detection and sanctions.⁵⁶

A third, smaller but emergent, regional hub of syndicates is in South Africa. Since the late 1990s, the local production of methamphetamine raised together the phenomena of gangsterism among the several areas of politically disenfranchised and socially excluded communities. That and the excellent South African maritime and land infrastructures got explored by Nigerian and European criminal groups as an alternative route for heroin trafficking from Pakistan and Afghanistan as well as cocaine trafficking to Asia, and nowadays 238 small criminal groups operate in the country.⁵⁷

Nonetheless, the expansion of the port infrastructures in other African countries widens the possibilities of trafficking. For example, on 1 March 2018, Interpol authorities located a load of over 500 kg of cocaine at the Luanda port, Angola, valued at US\$ 160 million.⁵⁸ The authorities believe that the load was part of another shipment which was initially intercepted in the port of Casablanca on 11 February 2018.⁵⁹ In the Moroccan apprehension, authorities arrested a Brazilian citizen and five other individuals (of undisclosed nationality) when they were trying to secure the release of a 541 kg shipment of cocaine which had travelled

from the Brazilian port of Santos, hidden in sugar shipment, destined to Europe. Part of the shipment evaded authorities in Morocco and was diverted to another ship destined to the port of Luanda. Moroccan authorities identified the cocaine as produced in the Andean region and estimated to be of 97% purity. This illustrates the evolving nature of transnational criminal organizations trafficking drugs in the South Atlantic space (Fig. 2.1).

The US war on drugs generated further impacts on the South Atlantic cocaine trafficking transnational network. As it extended into Colombia's territory, its drug cartels moved their production to other countries as they lost market to rivals in Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia. Today, the ports of Brazil and Argentina are the main shipment bases of cocaine in the world, from which a one-third goes in containers straight to European ports, especially Rotterdam,⁶⁰ and the rest to West, Central, and Southern Africa.

Brokers and components of international criminal organizations operate there, dealing freights straight to destinations with important




Fig. 2.1 Drug trafficking logistics across the South Atlantic (*Source* Elaborated by Camilo Carneiro)

connections for logistical support in Paraguay and financial operations in Uruguay, benefiting from the country's banking legislation. In Brazil, the First Capital Command and Red Command trade money and weapons for logistical support, "mules", and protection against local law enforcement authorities. Consequently, the seizure of cocaine exploded since 2013 with 41 tons, more than 50% higher than year before, and the last update from Brazilian federal police reports 39 tons of cocaine apprehended in 2016.⁶¹ In Argentina, the foreign criminal organizations seem to operate without local brokers, and the country is becoming a main area of cocaine processing. In 2015, while the seizures of cocaine salts were low (nearly seven tons), the amount of coca leaf (113 tons) and doses of coca paste and cocaine base (250 thousand units) were very high.⁶²

Both countries have been offering special political and social conditions for criminal networks, particularly in Brazil where the nexuses among slam-gangsters, prison system syndicates, civic leaders, politicians, and police date from the 1980s.⁶³ There, state legitimacy and authority eroded in the last years due to successive scandals of public frauds and money laundering, and social degradation created huge informal and black markets.⁶⁴

Members of Colombian FARCS, Chinese "Pi Xiu", Japanese Yakuza, Mexican cartels (Los Zetas, Jalisco New Generation, and Simola), Nigerian "419 syndicates", Italian Ndrangheta and Balkan and Russian/Chechen "mafyas" were arrested operating in Brazil and Argentina in the last years.⁶⁵ Since as early as 2013, there has been an increase in the number of arrests made in Brazilian airports. A total of 32 South African nationals were arrested in Brazilian airports in 2017 on drug trafficking charges, a number higher than that of Nigerian nationals in the same period (24).⁶⁶ In the 1999–2013 period, Nigerian nationals represented 8.76% of foreigners arrested at Guarulhos airport due to involvement in drug trafficking and South African nationals represented 7.65%.⁶⁷ The arrest of Brazilian nationals involved in drug trafficking to Africa also picked up media attention. In 2017, Brazilian newspaper *O Globo* noted that the use of Africa as the main drug trafficking route between South America and Europe led to a 44.8% increase in arrests of Brazilian nationals in the African continent in the 2015–2016 period.⁶⁸

The spread and increase in the number of drug trafficking-related arrest has even drawn attention from South American authorities based in the African continent. In 2012, the Brazilian Embassy in Rabat reported about the arrest of a Latin American citizen carrying cocaine in

the Brazil–Morocco air route operated by Royal Air Maroc.⁶⁹ According to the embassy, this was the third case of arrest in the Brazil–Morocco route made public by Moroccan authorities. The Embassy also noted that Moroccan authorities suggested the need for further integration with Brazilian authorities regarding efforts against drug trafficking.⁷⁰ According to the Brazilian Embassy, 2014 was a significant year in terms of arrests related to drug trafficking; there were 107 investigations related to passengers flying in the São Paulo–Casablanca route between January and July 2014, leading to 112 arrests and the apprehension of 174 kg of cocaine.⁷¹

In 2015, the Brazilian Embassy in Rabat continued to report back to Brasília about a series of arrests made by the Moroccan authorities regarding individuals flying in the São Paulo–Casablanca route indicating that the route was being used as a “connection for cocaine from Brazil to West Africa. Apprehensions were made practically every week”.⁷² The embassy indicated that the individuals arrested were from different nationalities (there was only one Brazilian national arrested in Morocco for drug trafficking charges via the São Paulo–Casablanca route) and would use Casablanca as a stopover for other destinations in the African continent.⁷³ The embassy also indicated that the Peruvian Embassy in Morocco reported about the existence of a drug trafficking network recruiting Peruvian and Bolivian citizens to be used as drug mules. As of 2015, there were 17 Peruvian citizens arrested in Morocco on drug trafficking charges.⁷⁴ In a different message sent back from Brasília in late 2015, the Brazilian Embassy mentioned that the Moroccan airlines had implemented a series of strict security measures to “reduce the flow of illicit substances” in the route.⁷⁵ This example illustrates how the increase in connectivity between South America and the African continent, which is essential to increase trade and tourism, was also used by criminal groups.

FINAL REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In recent years, governments of the African and South American states located in the South Atlantic region have implemented measures to address the rise in criminal activity in the region, with a particular emphasis in improving maritime security. The first institutionalized regional initiative took place in Central Africa in 2008, when Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and São Tomé and Príncipe signed the

Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)'s joint maritime strategic. That followed, in 2009, the Kinshasa Protocol concerning the sharing of information and maritime law enforcement responsibilities. The Gulf of Guinea Commission launched its own maritime strategy in 2013 and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 2014. The convergence of West and Central Africa's cooperation resulted, in 2013, in the "Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa", better known as either the Gulf of Guinea Code of Conduct or the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. That established this multilateral agreement has established the region-wide maritime security cooperation and the Regional Maritime Security Centre of West Africa (CRESMAO) and the Regional Maritime Security Centre of Central Africa (CRESMAC), plus five zones to develop a Maritime Operations Centre (MOC), replicating ECCAS example, which MOC operates in Doula, Cameroon, defined since 2013 as Zone D.⁷⁶ The Zone E (Nigeria, Togo, and Benin), thanks the participation of Nigeria, is also operational with more than forty patrol boats and has its MOC in Cotonou, Benin. Its members also stepped further by an extensive legal agreement, covering from vessel identification, to hot pursuit, to ship-rider agreements and harmonization of laws. Finally, Zone F's countries (Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia, and Sierra Leone) work to launch its MOC in Accra, Ghana.

Finally, with foreign support, African states also defined the Inter-Regional Cooperation Centre (ICC) in Yaoundé, Cameroon, as an umbrella structure to articulate all those regional and zonal arrangements and to attend as a source of best practices and instruction on maritime security procedures. The ICC is also designed to be the main coordination centre with South America, Europe, and USA.

In the other side of the South Atlantic, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay share a level of cooperation in maritime traffic control through the Regional Centre of Maritime Traffic of South Atlantic Area. This institution attends most of the existing protocols for interface with European and US systems, though the articulation with ICC and other African maritime security structures is very incipient.

The inter-regional articulation between the two shores of South Atlantic is still very tentative and marked in large part by ad hoc initiatives implemented by Brazil with a specific number of African partners. As early as 2011, Brazil promoted the idea that any decision by

the Security Council regarding piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea region should indicate that countries of the region must play a leading role and that they should be supported by regional organizations. This reflects Brazil's position of supporting African solutions to African problems and a concern with a potential military and security presence in the region of extra-regional powers, including countries which are not members of the Zone for Peace and Cooperation in South Atlantic (ZPCSA).⁷⁷

The increase in criminal connections between the two sides of the South Atlantic also fostered greater Brazil–Africa cooperation against criminal activities, again, with a focus on specific African countries. For example, in 2010, the General Director of the Nigerian National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) contacted the Brazilian Embassy in Abuja about his intention of visiting Brazil and discussing the possibility of signing a Brazil–Nigeria Memorandum of Understanding on issues related to drug trafficking. According to the Embassy, the director's intention of visiting Brazil and meeting Brazilian authorities was motivated by a concern with the expansion of illicit drug trafficking networks in West Africa and with the involvement of Nigerian nationals in regional and international drug trafficking networks.⁷⁸

In addition to Nigeria, Brazilian authorities also sought cooperation with Ghana, considered to be a stable country located in the Gulf of Guinea region. By 2012, Brazilian diplomats based in Accra (Ghana's capital) began to suggest that discussions related to fighting piracy and drug trafficking in the South Atlantic could be part of bilateral discussions between the two countries.⁷⁹ In April 2013, a UK-built and recently purchased Brazilian Navy patrol ship, which stopped in different African ports on its way from the UK to Brazil, conducted naval military exercises with the Ghanaian Navy.⁸⁰ Cooperation with Ghana is important because the country can be included as an example of commitment in combating piracy in the Gulf of Guinea region. For example, in January 2015, the Ghanaian Navy was able to successfully recover a Nigerian cargo ship that had been captured by pirates.⁸¹ In addition, in December 2014, Ghana hosted a meeting of the G7 with the Friends of the Gulf of Guinea (G7++FOGG). Ghana also hosts Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade—Gulf of Guinea (MDAT-GoG),⁸² which coordinates the reports received by ships that pass through the Gulf of Guinea region and forwards them to the regional maritime authorities.⁸³

It is equally important to mention that in recent years, Ghana has attracted the attention of other South American countries. For example, in August 2013, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru inaugurated a common space to host their embassies in Accra. Ghana's Foreign Minister visited Chile and Colombia in February 2014.⁸⁴ These diplomatic initiatives could facilitate further defence and public security dialogue between Ghana and South America states regarding transnational crime. Of these four Latin American states, Colombia has already shared security expertise with West African states.

While bilateral initiatives have been the most visible, it is important to note that some initiatives have taken place at the multilateral level. The VII ZPCSA ministerial meeting held in Montevideo (Uruguay) in January 2013 was an important occasion in which South Atlantic countries were able to discuss issues related to South Atlantic security, including measures to address drug trafficking and criminal activity. The meeting was important for two main reasons: it was the first meeting to take place since the relaunch of the ZPCSA initiative during the Luanda ministerial meeting held in 2007, and it was the first ZPCSA meeting to include the ministers of defence of the member states, which facilitated the inclusion of discussions related to security in the South Atlantic space.⁸⁵ The plan of action that emerged out of the 2013 meeting included a section dedicated to "VI-public security and combating transnational organized crime". Nonetheless, there is relative consensus that ZPCSA lost momentum due to the lack of institutionalization.⁸⁶ The most significant example that ZPCSA initiative appears to be experiencing a new dormant period is illustrated by the fact that the VIII Summit, initially expected to take place in Cape Verde in 2015, has been indefinitely delayed.

Similarly, the Brazilian government tried to organize a Conference on Transnational Criminal Activity, which was expected to take place at the Federal Police Academy in Brasília in the second semester of 2013. Invitations were issued to ZPCSA member states, and some countries confirmed their participation (such as Cameroon), but the conference was later cancelled due to lack of sufficient participation.⁸⁷ While the conference on criminal activity did not take place, Brazil was able to host participants from ZPCSA member states in a technical cooperation seminar on "Security and Surveillance of Maritime Traffic and Search and Rescue" held in Salvador (Bahia) in October 2013.⁸⁸ This initiative

appears to have generated interest on the part of African authorities about Brazilian and/or South American expertise. For example, in 2015 Brazil hosted a delegation from the Cameroonian Navy interested in visiting the South Atlantic Coordination Centre (CAMAS), particularly to verify about possible lessons learned that could be implemented in the ICC created in Yaoundé in 2014.⁸⁹

All these efforts are relevant, but we can discuss three main challenges facing them, to which we address some recommendations. First, the South Atlantic regional organizations do not have anything equivalent to the range and functionalities of the European Union's border and maritime agencies. Regional organizations with security roles around the South Atlantic have acquired increasing relevance and functionality, but they do not perform regulatory tasks with cross-jurisdictional authority and institutional and operational structures. The maritime security components of the West and Central maritime regional organizations were not, originally, designed to collaborate among each other, and there are gaps among them.⁹⁰ Security cooperation across the South Atlantic is often limited by lack of personnel. Aside from Brazil, which created a Federal Police attaché position in its embassy in Pretoria in 2010, no other South American country maintains a permanent law enforcement presence in the African continent. For example, Argentina restarted to send police and law enforcement personnel to its missions overseas in 2016 but only sent police personnel to some of its missions located in South America, Europe, China, and to the UN in New York.⁹¹

As a prerequisite for any more robust joint anti-criminal effort, the four larger countries of the region—Brazil, Argentina, Nigeria, and South Africa—should focus on the disruption of the political conditions for TCOs to incept and consolidate, which derives from endemic corruption in the region, including in those four states, having reached peaks of scandals in the last decade due to the economic expansion on the 2000s. Although the existence of informal economies is a structural problem of developing countries, huge criminal profits require political and state authorities' connivance as it is the main element for protection and condition of possibility of profit from illicit enterprises. In that sense, the Transnational Crime Units (TCU), a UN initiative in collaboration with Interpol and ECOWAS, will have limited results if it operates just in West Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau) and without an institutionalized and technical cooperation among those four biggest South

Atlantic countries. They must jointly oversight financial and bank data with their respective national law enforcement and treasury agencies, particularly in the tracking and arrest of the regional and international criminal brokers.

Second, the South Atlantic security initiatives are very sensitive and dependent on foreign donors which tend to support more critical coastal areas or gains of economy of scale, providing more resources to inter-regional and regional security centres than to the national institutional and capacity building. Several observers already pointed out that boarding and patrolling training and exercises are not enough to face the transnational organized crime, or they will maintain the current low rates of readiness and interoperability. For instance, ECCAS' Zone D has only three boats ceded from Cameroon, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea. Consequently, they have been successful in deterring illegal fishing but not armed robbery boats, which have at their disposal, mother ships as standing maritime base to evade from national waters and conduct diversionary actions.⁹² The national security forces of the Gulf of Guinea demand education on strategic planning and command and control to be able to deal with the sanctuaries and connections on land of the regional criminal organizations, by which they can spill over from area to another.

Third, the trade-off between donors and recipients demands is also difficult because most of the South Atlantic states do not share the liberal notion that they ought to put forward legal, political, and ethical responsibilities to protect and share South Atlantic natural resources as a global common. They suspect that recent narratives on ocean governance have as ultimate goals to contribute to donor's own economic growth and well-being and identify those norms as part of a power project strategy.⁹³ Moreover, the expansion of South Atlantic transnational criminal organizations has as one of its main causes the dysfunctional development of South Atlantic states' "blues economies". Along the South Atlantic littoral, several states either cannot or do not want to take their legal commitments seriously and enforce compliance with safety and security norms over flag states, maritime industries, and port authorities. That is a dimension considered in the EU Action Plan for the Gulf of Guinea⁹⁴; however, it will have a limited chance of success without a structured and locally contextualized approach for ocean governance. In addition, initiatives by outside players should not risk alienating previously existing South Atlantic institutions such as ZPCAS, as this will generate opposition from Brazil and other players.

In that sense, there is a lot to learn from the region's more innovative maritime development project. Beginning in 2014, President Zuma launched the ambitious Operation Ocean Economy Phakisa (Sesotho for "Hurry up"), by which South Africa's government articulates private and public stakeholders in short-, medium-, and long-term programmes.⁹⁵ It includes detailed plans for maritime transport and manufacturing, offshore oil and gas exploration, marine protection, and ocean governance.⁹⁶ Supporting that regional context and consensus, South Africa also embraces the blue economy as the next frontier of regional economic growth. Accordingly, South Africa's leading role has a collaborative character in an all-embracing economic maritime region. The Blue Economy Concept Paper for Southern African Development Committee (SADC) was important not only because it launched the international debate on blue economy, but because it also generated SADC's blue economy development strategy as a core component of the regional Industrialization Strategy Roadmap since 2015.⁹⁷

The main foreign donors of South Atlantic security initiatives—USA and EU—could contribute to the strengthening of SADC's maritime development agenda, as well as designing general notions from South Africa's project to be widened and gradually adapted in the rest of the South Atlantic. They should proceed without imposing a standardized approach to the whole area, but by presenting positive results and a reservoir of lessons learned, which may enhance the chances of engendering shared notions on the maritime governance and development throughout the South Atlantic.⁹⁸ If this strategy is pursued, there could be more space for cooperation and engagement with countries like Brazil, Argentina, and Angola, but as well as the USA, which have historically interpreted that it is important for countries of the region to take responsibility for their regional security.

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CHAPTER 3

The Impacts of Neo-colonial Security Frameworks in the South Atlantic: The Case of French Presence in Western Africa

Mamadou Alpha Diallo

INTRODUCTION

International terrorism and organized crime in West Africa have become real threats to South Atlantic security and development. Whether considered as old or new threats, the emergence or existence of international terrorism, piracy and drug trafficking in Africa led to a break with a new positive cycle in the attempts to consolidate state and inter-African cooperation structures, and to attain an autonomous insertion in the international system.

The important issues that must be addressed during this complex transition cycle include piracy, drug trafficking and related public disorder, and unsafety throughout South Atlantic, since these are common issues in both the North and South of today's globalized world, and at both its centre and periphery, as realities that affect and concern all in the twenty-first century. Bearing in mind the case of sub-Saharan countries,

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these so-called new international threats are placing the African continent at the centre of the security debate, challenging African governors, intellectuals, and new partners to prove their capacity to organize and act, and rendering their transition cycle even more complex.

On the one hand, the reality and the potential of these new threats cannot be denied, neither their danger and disruptive power; on the other, they are used as the primary basis for justifying and maintaining Western neo-colonial projects in Africa. It is curious that the visibility of new international threats in West Africa coincides with a new Western project to reoccupy the continent, as a result of the reorganization and re-emergence of Africa in the processes to restructure regional organizations such as the African Union and regional integration arrangements (such as ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD, and ECCAS) with new international actors (China, Brazil, India, and Indonesia, among others) from the viewpoint of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

West Africa is one of the most important African zones in the South Atlantic and is unique in several aspects.¹ It includes the largest black nation (Nigeria) and the oldest republic of the continent (Liberia) and is the seat of black Africa's first state to conquer political emancipation (Ghana). Ghana's nationalism served as inspiration for Ahmed Sékou Touré's ability to exert a unified opposition to General De Gaulle's project of a French community, and in the process that led Guinea-Conakry to become the first French-speaking African country to attain independence. Similarly, it was in West Africa that the first military coup d'état took place in the continent after its independence cycle, when a covert operation by leaders of Togo's armed forces assassinated president Sylvanus Olympio in January 1963. Since then and until the end of the Cold War, West Africa underwent a succession of coups d'état. From the 15 countries of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), only Cape Verde and Senegal have not experienced such power seizure methods. The other 13 ECOWAS member states experienced an average of three coups between 1960 and 1999.²

In the post-Cold War period in West Africa, internal conflicts emerged in Liberia (1989–1996), Sierra Leone (1991–2002), Casamance in Southern Senegal (1982–2005), and Guinea-Bissau (1998). These conflicts brought some important questions to the centre of the debates regarding African regional security, and for ECOWAS, such as: which are the real security problems of West Africa? Are these new elements or are they part of a “package” that followed the emergence of its states?

How can and should regional integration organizations such as ECOWAS face such challenges? Which are the internal and external insecurity factors in this region? In short: Which is the security trajectory that makes West Africa one of the key international security concerns of our days?

Based on William's analysis, I argue that in the African case these questions can only be understood with the apprehension of the history of colonization and the processes of construction and state management during and after the Cold War. The multiplication of wars and conflicts on the continent during and after the war led to the incorporation into the African vocabulary of the concept of "foreign intervention", in the sense of involving agents, agencies, and foreign countries in internal conflicts.³ The debate on this concept is quite complex, as while intervention violates the principle of sovereignty it is often justified by the need to protect such sovereignty. As Schmidt summarizes:

For the policy analyst or social justice activist trying to make sense of and support or oppose today's interventions, factual information is almost always incomplete, and the motives of those involved are mixed. There are no simple formulas. Supporting (or opposing) an intervention simply because the United States, the African Union, or the United Nations supports it, for example, would be a recipe for ignoring the realities of particular cases and the contradictions within the policies of these States and institutions themselves. The concept of purely humanitarian interventions simply to aid is an illusion. An intervention with a limited mandate, such as to protect corridors for relief supplies, may or may not be justified in a particular case. Yet it will have political consequences, it will weaken some forces and strengthen others. So, of course, will unilateral or multilateral intervention designed to combat terrorism, reverse a coup against an elected government, or "protect civilians" against human rights abuses by a repressive regime or rebel movement. However, ruling out all interventions ignores the fact that inaction also affects the outcome of any conflict, by deferring *de facto* to the most powerful and ruthless force on the ground.⁴

Therefore, the debate on intervention is highly controversial, and we have argued throughout this text against Western and particularly French intervention on the continent. That is not because we disagree with the importance and necessity depending on the intervention case, but because we understand that such interventions are guided by the principles of neo-colonialism and *Françafrique* as François-Xavier Verschave would say. In any case, one must admit the contradiction that exists between the

logic of international interventions under the auspices of the UN, strongly marked by the dynamics of the members of the Security Council, and the evolution of local politics where these interventions occur.⁵

In this author's view, the international community tries to impose a specific set of formal institutions, by which local power groups exercise *de facto* control over the relevant processes, contributing to perpetuating state fragility. In addition, peacekeeping operations (PKOs) tend to develop their activities in an "undefined zone" between human security initiatives and national security initiatives, and local groups derive advantages from international resources without contributing to real change and sustainable development in the humanitarian situation. In short, the literary scope of this debate is broad and includes those dealing with peacebuilding, peacemaking, and peacekeeping.⁶

This chapter works on neo-colonialism concepts from post-colonialism theories, which define and analyse the different sorts of dependence relationships between centres and peripheries, as well as alternative ways for the state construction and consolidation in the recently independent countries of Africa and Asia.⁷ From my point of view, the neo-colonialism has as essence the provision of all external ornaments of a sovereignty state, nevertheless, the political and economic systems, in fact, are drive from outside the country. As basic analytical concepts, the chapter works with the definition of conflict as the pursuit of incompatible objectives by different groups, and war as the organized use of violence for political goals that result in causalities.⁸ In adherence to Williams' propositions, I argue that the West African reality can only be understood by the apprehension of colonization history and the processes of state's construction and management during and after the Cold War.

Other important concepts of this text are security and securitization. Security is understood as the absence of a military threat of external origin to the survival or sovereignty of the state in an anarchic international system. Likewise, security can be defined as a synonym of securitization and understood as the movement that takes politics beyond established rules of the game, framing the question as a special type of policy or as something above politics.⁹ Securitization assumes that security is characterized as a "specific problem" and that to understand it we must analyse the field of security practice and certain operations that are typical of it. According to the securitization theory, it is possible to "identify a specific field of social interaction with a specific set of actions and codes that becomes known to a particular set of agents as the field of security".¹⁰

The application of these concepts, in an after Cold War context, has been relevant in spaces that go beyond borders and encompasses regional and global scopes, thus the importance of the regional security complex theory of Buzan and Weaver¹¹ which understands that the key variable to define a regional security agenda is both exogenous and outside the state. Following reasoning, when analysing the regional complex of South America,¹² it is important to highlight these factors given that the regional South American security complex has a differentiated characteristic when compared to other complexes in the world (where the perceptions of threats are either state owned or are mixed, as it appears to be the case for the West African regional sub-complex). This means that perceived threats from Western countries—France, UK, and the USA—are state owned or mixed, causing as consequence an external security dynamic originated from a securitized vision of societal problems, which are related to perceptions of security threats by Western powers and also accepted by countries in the region, no matter what sub-complex they belong to (examples that better fit these descriptions are the Gulf of Guinea and the issue of maritime safety in the region).

Global security has been threatened by the so-called organized crime, presented as the dark face of globalization,¹³ and defined as being the collective that operates crimes regularly, which modality is inserted in the intersection between economic motivation and diffuse prejudice and developed organizational, coercive, and technical skills and policies that are functional to the execution of these crimes, whether wholly or partially illicit. Within this broad field of international organized crime, we are more concerned with the concept of international terrorism, which is regarded as a political concept, meaning “the creation and deliberate exploitation of fear through acts of violence or through violence in the pursuit of political change”.¹⁴ Marcos Ferreira,¹⁵ citing the US State Department, defines the term terrorism as premeditated and politically perpetrated violence against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents. Finally, theoretically, this debate is broad and encompasses international security theories¹⁶ debates on democracy and terrorism (Abdullah 2004) and dialogues with discourses on “The Global War on Terror” which,

Like its Cold War antecedents increased foreign military presence on the African continent and generated new external support for repressive governments. Throughout the periods under consideration, foreign

intervention tended to exacerbate rather than alleviate African conflicts and to harm rather than help indigenous populations. Conflicting interests that sometimes hurt the people they were intended to assist marred even international humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts.¹⁷

Schmidt, in the citation above, sums up the argument advocated by me throughout the text, which is to reaffirm the conviction that despite the need for international cooperation to combat organized crime and international terrorism in Africa, the French presence and their respective military interventions on the continent do not seem to solve security problems, but rather increase them. Obviously, this will not be the point of view of African governments and integration organizations such as the AU and ECOWAS, let alone the experts, and Western governments such as France, which defends the humanist character in its interventions on the African continent.

THE (IN) CONSTITUTION OF THE WEST AFRICAN STATES AND THE PRIVATIZATION OF SECURITY

Kinsey and Krieg define inclusive public security in connection with good governance, characterized as “the degree of public inclusiveness with which the State is able or willing to protect the interests of the public”.¹⁸ According to them, although no country has effectively attained total inclusiveness in the promotion of public security, the liberal Western states have nearly provided inclusive public security to all persons, members, and minorities of their societies. From this perspective, the security sector was rarely public in African societies, and the African states have lacked a sense of public cohesiveness and mutual responsibility in relation to their individuals as a public association.

From a historical standpoint, as one analyses the issue of security in Africa in general, and in its western part, in particular, it is important to consider the international context of the emergence of post-colonial African states. Most African states are not a product of the free will of individuals with a common history, language, religion, or ethnic background who set out to constitute a public association. Instead, they are a result of the foreign partition of the continent by former colonial powers for merely administrative purposes.¹⁹

A direct consequence of this fact is that the many African states are now highly plural entities in terms of the ethnic, religious, tribal, or

linguistic affiliations of its citizens, which, oftentimes, prevail over their feeling of national belongingness. Therefore, non-public, subnational forms of affiliation frequently overshadow the individuals' feeling of affiliation to a public entity. This somehow shows the disruption caused by colonization in the African sociopolitical evolution processes and strengthens the reasoning that both the processes of state construction and regional integration in Africa consider and are based on the colonial era as their starting point, in contrast to the historical reality of African society. To an extent, this fact strongly opposes integration between individuals and their communities, and the willingness of individuals to serve their communities as citizens. In precolonial days, Africans kept strong affiliations with more homogeneous communities and were willing to take arms in order to provide for public security. The feelings of national affiliation are traditionally extraneous to African societies, and the states that emerged out of the colonial era were faced with the task of cultivating the consciousness of public belongingness beyond subnational identities, in order to establish inclusive public security domains for all individuals within their frontiers.²⁰

Such situation was a result of the fact that the administration of security in the African states at their independence was private by nature since their priority was to protect the lives, power, and access to a wealth of their ruling elites and main internal and external allies. During the independence period, the main concern of these states was to ensure the security of the ruling governments (the permanence of authority) and their physical structures, and territorial frontiers, without necessarily considering the local societies. In other words, the provision of state (or non-state) security was essentially concerned neither with providing public security nor with seeing it as a public good—a fact that must be considered when analysing Africa's regional security challenges. In this regard, Cepik²¹ points that the emergence of post-colonial African states took place under the aegis of the United Nations Charter and of International Law, which proscribed war as a foreign policy instrument. They emerged, therefore, amidst unique circumstances as a system of states that counted with the international order to defend their frontiers, which, on their turn, had been erected during the Cold War period with its bipolar context.

The African states emerged in this tense and dangerous context, characterized by ideological rivalries, which both, directly and indirectly, drove the key Cold War actors and their allies to interfere subversively

in African national affairs. From the independence of African countries to the 1980s and 1990s, episodes of unrest and coups d'état organized with foreign support were relatively common in African countries. Such interventions led the ECOWAS member countries and their leaders, as well as the remaining part of the continent, to enter the Cold War game despite their self-declared membership in the Non-Aligned Movement. The African regimes' concern with internal security instigated ideological rivalries that produced a polarization and opposition between the Monrovia and Casablanca organizations: the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and ECOWAS, respectively. Such polarization, in turn, prevented both the emergence of a common thought in relation to war and authentic cooperation in issues of security and defence.

African policy makers were primarily concerned with development challenges, and neglected the task—otherwise, so important for national revolutions—of establishing national armies, industrial defence infrastructures and even an understanding about the role of national logistics for war.²² The concern of public leaders and of the political elite was to ensure the security of their regimes and protect the state against eventual attacks in the bipolar context but not of establishing solid security and defence structures—despite the fact that the international security environment permanently favoured mutual suspicion and distrust among African rulers.

It can be said that security challenges have always been a key concern for the countries of this region, but, since any construction related to them opposed French local interests, local “black rulers” continuously rejected them. Instead of adhering to an African initiative, these rulers relied on the advisors of their former colonial power to undertake French-African humanitarian cooperation actions. African leaders always had a political willingness to solve the security issue, but their strategies failed after they aligned to neo-colonial views. They accepted the easy path and indulged in the temptations of international cooperation with former colonial powers, in particular France, instead of seeking the autonomy proposed by Kwame Nkrumah and his followers. Therefore, the security dilemma emerged at the very outset of African states, in addition to their economic and political vulnerabilities inherited as two central consequences of the colonial age.

The first of these two consequences is explained not only by the destruction of traditional structures and productive systems, with the introduction of monoculture practices that depleted the local soils, in

addition to exploitation via forced labour and the extraction and appropriation of soil and underground resources, but also, and especially, by the establishment of several economically unfeasible units as states on the eve of local independence processes. The creation of political units with insufficient state capacity placed them beforehand in a situation of dependence on foreign help and rendered them politically vulnerable. Such situation was reinforced in the Cold War context, with the independence of African countries, which became an element of pressure over the new African rulers.

Furthermore, the constant search for zones of influence by the key political powers and the emergence of domestic problems and conflicts historically conditioned African political elites to look for foreign protectors.²³ In West Africa, France became the main partner and protector of the newly emerged political units via the well-known French-African cooperation institutionalized by the referendum proposed by De Gaulle, which defined political independence within a French union and enabled the perpetuation of colonial practices in new ways (neo-colonialism). The big security mistake or problem in West Africa since independence is the continuity of the colonial administration with its bureaucratic apparatus in more sophisticated versions that include outsourcing and privatization. Such situation produced a complex network of foreign dependency and converted the new African leaders and presidents into servants with an obligation of governing their territories on behalf of, and for France, as put forward by De Gaulle at the Brazzaville Conference in 1944, when he vindicated the need to train black rulers.²⁴ Their circumstances are a result not only of French imperial ambitions but also of the geopolitical importance of Africa in the new international order, which started to be delineated after World War II (1939–1945). One of the reasons behind the French claim to a permanent seat in the UN Security Council at the end of World War II was the existence of its colonial empire. African independence could threaten such position, and so France developed a neo-colonial strategy for its former colonies, which still continue to closely follow the positions of their former European power at multilateral forums such as the UN.²⁵

The second legacy, therefore, was engendered when decolonization officially took place in 1960, when general De Gaulle offered—actually, imposed—a package that tied the newly emerging African states to France and placed their regimes under the protection of Paris. France became responsible for providing technical, military, and financial assistance to African countries in exchange for their support to French international

policies.²⁶ Some of these agreements even preceded the independence of African countries. According to Granvaud,²⁷ the French-African community, including clauses by which the parties committed themselves to provide mutual support in case of foreign aggression, signed the first military agreements before independence on behalf of the common defence. For instance, Article 1 of the French-Gabon defence agreement provided that France and Gabon would prepare and ensure their common defence and the defence of the community to which both republics belonged. In other words, if a neighbour attacked an African signatory to these defence agreements, it would receive support by the French Army. And if France were invaded by the Soviets, it would count with the shooters (such was the nickname of the African armed forces who fought in World War II) and with African military bases. In both cases, it was agreed that African armed forces would automatically serve the French Army's command and control during operations.²⁸ Thus, France maintained an even more open and direct form of neo-imperial power in relation to Africa after its alleged departure from West African and French Equatorial African territories in 1960. A set of bilateral mutual-defence agreements and covenants were then signed to grant the former colonial power of these regions the right to intervene militarily as a means to protect their own interests. In practice, the legal framework of these agreements opened the path for a new occupation and domination pattern with mechanisms such as covert operations. The establishment of French bases in Africa starting in the 1960s was a product of the French decision to make its new colonial arrangement more efficacious and nimble while keeping the African countries of the region under its dominion.

The colonial covenant authorized the construction of military bases and granted free access and circulation to foreign troops in Africa. It also demanded that all military equipment and materials of African countries should be purchased from France. The capacity building and training activities of African troops were delegated to their previous colonial power, which imposed that French companies should be authorized to maintain a monopoly of key economic sectors (water supply, energy, ports, airports, transportation).

Thus, in their economic and political vulnerabilities, the new African states not only originated from a colonial system but were also prevented from developing their security systems from within. Consequently, their security sectors were induced to outsourcing and privatization practices, and their allegedly modern state structures were divested from one of

their main functions and a key symbol of autonomy, namely the role of protecting and ensuring internal security and the safety of its institutions. And so, the provision of security—originally, a duty of the state—became a task of non-governmental (private) actors, similarly to what was taking place in the fields of trade and finances.²⁹

The consequences of this final colonial legacy were tragic and continue to be so since it became one of the main reasons behind the political instabilities experienced in the post-Cold War period and contributed to the outbreak of several civil conflicts in the first decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Thus, political instability in West Africa from 1960 to 1990 was in practice a product of disputes among elites for individual and/or ideological interests, which became visible in several power seizure episodes and other military attempts.

These cooperation agreements enabled the abusive use of force against groups and figures identified as enemies and threats. They also legitimized the rule of an elite minority and the exploitation of the majority of the population, thus disseminating the grounds for “ethnic and/or tribal conflicts” in the post-Cold War years in countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and Senegal (Casamance). An additional consequence of these agreements was the low level, not to mention the non-existence of national security forces capable of facing new security challenges such as organized crime, terrorism or the mere containment of internal uprisings. Such lack of capacity resulted in the need for “help” from Paris, which, in addition to maintaining its military bases in different strategic points of Africa, has held special operations to the present in many countries with various justifications.

FRENCH INVOLVEMENT IN WEST AFRICA IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD

In the twenty-first century, French interference in Africa appears as humanitarian assistance in defence of civil society and democracy. However, a closer look at the relations between France and its former African colonies reveals that there is nothing of philanthropic or humanitarian in French actions, and even less in terms of a defence of democracy. Instead, there is a continuation of strategic defence actions linked to the neo-colonial enterprise launched at the time of African independence, when General De Gaulle is reported to have stated: «*J'ai desserré*

fewer liens avec le continent avant qu'ils ne se rompent—“I will loosen the ties with the African continent before they are severed”.³⁰

The current French involvement in Africa continues to follow the three patterns of the previous period³¹: defence of friendly nations under attack; provision of emergency help to friendly governments threatened by political opposition; and support in efforts to depose hostile governments. In this sense, the military interventions in West Africa during the Cold War were examples of armed interference in civil or regional conflicts. As a rule, these interventions had the effect of compromising the institutional foundations of the states and societies involved in them.³² The recent French interventions in Ivory Coast (2011), Libya (2011) and Mali (2012), along with the current French presence in the Central African Republic (CAR) are the latest cases involving the constant and continuous French interference in Africa, which has taken place since the independence period, as shown in Table 3.1.

The continuity of the Western foreign policy of interference in African affairs restricted the sovereignty of African countries and placed them at risk whenever the interests of large powers and their African allies were allegedly threatened. Recent Western and French interventions in Libya (2011), Ivory Coast (2011) and Mali (2012) showed a continuity of neo-colonial mechanisms, as well as the logistics of their operations, despite changes of discourse and of involved individuals. In this regard, Keylor³³ reminds that during the Cold War, Paris used the territories of Senegal and Gabon both as bases for covert operations and sites where French counter-insurgency experts trained the security forces of several client states. Likewise, interventionist French troops in Mali were sent from Dakar, and the Ivory Coast operation drew from the logistical bases of Dakar, Libreville, and Bangui.

Despite its numerical decrease since the Cold War, French military presence in West Africa continues at the same geo-strategic points established by the cooperation agreements of 1960. The French Army had 30,000 men in Africa in 1960, 15,000 men in 1980 and 5000 men in 2011.³⁴ And in 2016, France sent 10,000 troops on a permanent basis to former Sub-Saharan colonies. France also has permanent bases in Libreville in Gabon, Dakar in Senegal, and Djibouti, and makes occasional operations in Chad and Ivory Coast.³⁵ In the present, France also has six parachute infantry regiments in a state of readiness in its own territory, which can quickly intervene in case of necessity, in addition to a naval fleet that patrols the African coasts regularly.³⁶ Furthermore,

Table 3.1 French military operations in Africa in the post-Cold War period

<i>Year</i>	<i>Operation</i>	<i>Objective</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Descriptive notes</i>
1986–2014	Epervier	Support allies	Chad	The objective of this operation was to protect allies in power (Hissène Habré, followed by Idriss Déby) against Gaddafi's Libya and different uprisings. French presence allowed the internal control of governmental actions despite its declared attempt to protect it
1990	Corymbe	Establish a navy in the region	Guinea	An attempt to control the Guinea Gulf through the presence of the French Navy in the entire region
1992	Iskoutir	Protect Hassan Gouled Aptidon	Gulf Djibouti	Despite presenting itself as humanitarian, the aim of this operation was to protect the local (allied) government against the Afar uprising
1994	Turquoise	Suppress an uprising, ensure the innocence of the forces and help them flee to Zaïre	Rwanda	Under a humanitarian pretext and legitimized by a UN mandate, this operation had the aim of suppressing the uprising, protecting the genocide forces and later infiltrating them in Zaïre
1996	Almandins 1 & 2	Protect Patassé	CAR	After supporting Bokassa, Ange-Félix Patassé becomes a French ally in the CAR
1997	Secret mercenary activities	Support and protect Mobutu	Zaïre	A common practice during the Cold War was to support friendly governments. Such practice was carried out once more to protect Mobutu and his government
1998	Ireko	Support Nino Vieira, who included his country in the CFA Franc zone in 1997	Guinea-Bissau	This operation was triggered one year after the adherence of Guinea-Bissau to the CFA Franc zone, created in 1947 as one of the pillars of French neo-colonialism in Africa. Armed troops from Senegal and Guinea-Conakry participated in this operation
2002–2014	Lincome	Support the uprising against Gbagbo	Ivory Coast	This operation allegedly intended to interpose its forces between two warring groups and avoid their confrontation. But the true reason for its intervention was to legitimize the uprising and press Gbagbo's regime, which was threatening to denounce and/or break with the France-Ivory Coast agreements and move towards a coalition government

(continued)

Table 3.1 (continued)

Year	Operation	Objective	Country	Descriptive notes
2002–2013	Beali	Support the government	CAR	Support to the country's armed forces against uprisings under different pretexts
2013	Mamba	Suppress the uprising that threatened the government of François Bozizé	Congo	This so-called humanitarian action with the alleged objective of containing pro-Rwanda militias was seeking to protect the “friendly” dictatorship of François Bozizé against an uprising and secure French interests
2006–2007	French intervention	Protect François Bozizé in power	CAR	Sought to protect the government and its interests
2008	Occupation of the airport of Ndjamena by special forces	Support Idriss Déby in his combat against the uprising	Chad	It is important to remember that Idriss Déby took the power through a coup d'état with French support since December 1990, toppling president Hissène Habré, who was later accused of a crime against humanity by France (which had previously supported him) in defence of French interests
2008	Sending of French soldiers to the border of Eritrea in friction with Djibouti	Support Djibouti	Djibouti	Protect one of the strategic points held by France as a fundamental point to protect its African <i>pré-carré</i>
2009	Sabre	Sending of special French forces to the Sahel region	Sahel Region	Declared objective: to fight terrorism. It is curious that after their presence, problems multiplied in the region (Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Algeria, etc.)

(continued)

Table 3.1 (continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Operation</i>	<i>Objective</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Descriptive notes</i>
2011	Harmattan	Protect civilians against Gaddafi's violence	Libya	This operation allowed toppling the Libyan president, who was engaged in the fight for autonomy and for the defence of African interests against Western and French neo-imperialism
2012	Sangari	Fight against terrorism	CAR	A permanent operation that allows controlling and exerting influence over the actions of the local government, besides preventing any possibility of establishing another partnership with China or any other emerging country
2013	Serval	Protect the allied country against invasion	Mali	This operation started with the sending of 4000 troops in February 2013, followed by 2500 additional troops in January 2014, to expel "integrist" fighters from the north of the country. It also and especially enabled to change the local government, with the appointment of a right-hand man—despite the fact that he was "democratically" elected—and to resume control over the sources of strategic resources in the country

Source Produced by the author based on the data presented by Survie and Raphaël Granvaud (Survie, *L'armée Française en Afrique* (Montreuil: Survie, 2016). And Raphaël Granvaud, *De l'armée coloniale à l'armée néocoloniale* (1830–1990). Collection des "Dossier noirs", n. 23 (Montreuil: Survie, Agone, 2009), 57)

foreign presence seems to have expanded with the establishment of the *United States Africa Command*,³⁷ in 2007, bearing in mind the convergence between AFRICOM's declared objectives and the objectives promoted by France:

Disrupts and neutralizes transnational threats, protects U.S. personnel and facilities, prevents and mitigates conflicts, and builds African partner defence capability and capacity in order to promote regional security, stability, and prosperity.³⁸

The broad military presence ensured by the security agreements signed among African heads of state and former colonial powers, which, instead of leading to the construction of national armies, enabled the establishment of combat units and military bases commanded from abroad, led to what Castellano da Silva³⁹ calls self-weakening state measures, in contrast to self-strengthening measures. Since the days of independence, instability and security challenges in West Africa, as well as in the rest of the continent, have been caused by such self-weakening measures, which allow the continuity of many types of operations, among them covert operations, to defend the interests of ruling elites and foreign allies, in detriment to the African populations. The defence agreements and French military bases enabled and continue to enable several interventions by the *gendarmes* in Africa to protect their interests and support their allies, or simply to eliminate enemies.

If, on the one hand, there have been significant changes in the relations between Africa and the rest of the world since the end of the Cold War, especially since the establishment of the African Union in 2002, on the other, the West African security dilemma still hinges on the maintenance of umbilical links with former colonial powers and, in particular, with the perpetuation of French interventionism, as well as on the use of security measures to benefit private groups in detriment to local societies.

THE LIMITS OF WEST AFRICAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURES

West Africa's shortfall in providing regional security organizations in the post-Cold War is related to the institutions, structures, and systems, which were installed on the continent after independence and aligned with the international political context, marked by the bipolarity of the international system. In this sense, as Schmidt points out, the economic

collapse and political divisions accompanied by the actions and operations of the “warlords” led instead to the: consolidation of new security structures, continuation of the wars of national independence and the dismantling of the newly created African Nations States.⁴⁰ This means that the difficulties in building and/or consolidating regional security organizations in West Africa as in the rest of the continent can be explained on one hand by the economic, political and social weakness of the African state, which leads to the maintenance of external dependence permeated by the shade of French and Western neo-colonialism. Therefore, considering the transformations and uncertainties of the international panorama of the post-Cold War period, they had a direct impact on the security concerns of states and populations besides opening a space for the concept of Human Security.⁴¹ In Cravo’s opinion:

The recognition of the importance of a variety of sources of insecurity that escapes the military and state-centric logic was the basis of the need to revise the foundations of this concept at the definition level of the threat, the identification of the object of security and the legitimization of the actors and of the means used to combat threats. In this sense, the strictly military agenda began to encompass economic, social, political and/or environmental issues, the state’s reference unit was transferred to individuals and communities, and entities and types of intervention that had been marginalized until they were incorporated, such as civil society organizations and humanitarian assistance.⁴²

An analysis of both the traditional security concept and this new concept of human security shows that African countries are not adequate structures⁴³ to provide security organizations since they depend on autonomy, state capacity and cooperation among States. The struggle for autonomy continues and is far from being won as African countries depend not only on solid, transparent and democratic political entities but also on their own economic and financial structures capable of meeting social demands and sustaining modern security structures. This structures besides being aligned with the international system must not lose the local authenticity and local African traits, or the sight of the possibility of redefining intra-African relations and redefining Africa’s relations with the world based on African values and referential. Therefore, West Africa’s main deficiency in providing security organizations lies in the abandonment of African values and references.

African security structures must incorporate good practices from outside, but they cannot be entirely based on imported experiences.

Peacebuilding should not be interpreted as a universally defined set of procedures and practices, but rather a set of multiple ideas, relationships, and experiences that are embedded in the hierarchies of power and knowledge.⁴⁴ The author acknowledges that hierarchies exist (within and between peacebuilding institutions, within peacebuilding knowledge, and within peacebuilding finance) but these hierarchies are not fixed or immutable. This means that West Africa as a region must seek its own way of conflict resolution and peacebuilding, rescuing the traditional forms that have worked and mixing them with good practices. In this way, we disagree with the idea of importing structures and practices from the West to the African continent, considering that Africa is the cradle of humanity. It is well known that there were ways of conflict resolution and peace—as Curtis affirms:

The idea that conflict resolution and peacebuilding mechanisms in precolonial Africa had a significant degree of success in maintaining order and ensuring the peaceful coexistence of groups.⁴⁵

Therefore, the search for imported solutions as a unique way of thinking about peace in West Africa is a shortcoming and a barrier to the success of regional organizations. There is an urgent need to make local practices more valued. International collaborators need to recognize the importance of such practices and avoid conditioning their aid in the application of their solutions. It is important to emphasize that this conditioning is due to the economic and financial difficulties of the region, which, to act in security depends on the financial assistance coming mainly from the European Union.

A second deficiency in the promotion of security organizations in West Africa lies in the idea of a rivalry between “French-speaking and English-speaking” countries, built in the national imagery of the post-independence period and fuelled by the interests of the ruling elites of the national states. This imaginary of rivalry, fed by the creation of structures contrary to the idea of regional integration, even though they were presented as such, can be seen in examples such as the integration of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) with its single currency—CFA franc. The UEMOA, although of economic importance in member countries, hampers the relationship within ECOWAS and limits trade, thus contributing to the economic and security vulnerability of the region.

Therefore, despite the efforts of ECOWAS to strengthen its security sector without financial and institutional autonomy,⁴⁶ the effectiveness of the security organizations will be questionable, and the region will continue to suffer from the devastating effects of internal instability, international terrorism, and interference in the region. In addition, the duality and multiplicity of regional integration architecture in West Africa suffers from its institutional architecture characterized by the division between Anglophone and Francophone countries and to some extent Portuguese-speaking countries.⁴⁷ In short, West Africa's deficiency in providing regional security organization is related to institutional and structural weaknesses.⁴⁸ They are newly emerging states of conflict, with porous and poorly guarded borders and facing endemic and systemic corruption, where criminal activities can be quite profitable.

Knowing that context, useful lessons can be learned in comparing West Africa and Southern Africa recent paths. It can be considered that the regions of West Africa and South Africa have faced, and do face, the same problems even after the Cold War. Thus comparatively, it can be said that the regions of West Africa and South Africa have gone through the same situations regarding colonization and independence processes. However, while the unstable South Africa (Angolan conflict, Mozambique, Apartheid in South Africa) found an end of conflicts, with the termination of the Cold War, West Africa, went the other way around, as the period that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall symbolized the beginning of civil wars (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Casamance and Guinea-Bissau).

Thus, while SADEC can focus on economic and development problems, the major concern in ECOWAS was how to solve security problems. This concern for security only increases in the continent during the post-Cold War period, as armed conflicts within countries have become more serious and in Hobsbawm's view,⁴⁹ they could continue for decades. In this sense, the instability and insecurity that settled in the ECOWAS countries in the post-fall period of the Berlin Wall led the region to become more concerned with the management and resolution of internal conflicts in detriment of economic integration. Hence, after several interventions by the ECOWAS Ceasefire Control Group, better known by its ECOWAS Fire Transfer Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the Organization has institutionalized its security policy, adopting in December 1999 its Protocol on the Mechanism of Prevention, Management, Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security. Therefore,

if the ECOWAS, in its creation in 1975, aimed at raising the standard of living of the population through the economic integration of its member states, since the end of the Cold War, as the region had been shaken by many internal conflicts, it was demanded towards the management and resolution of those conflicts, making it spend less time on issues of economic integration.

In the opposite side of the ECOWAS member states, under SADC the instabilities and conflicts were more intense during the Cold War, leaving less space to think about economic integration. Indeed, the fall of the Berlin Wall, especially the end of Apartheid in Africa South relations, Namibia's independence and signing of the Bicesse (Portugal) Peace Agreement between MPLA and UNITA in 1991, and later the end of the Angolan Civil War in 2002, marked by the death in combat of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi,⁵⁰ turned SADC one of the main economic blocks of the African continent, while ECOWAS stands out in the area of security with ECOMOG. Notwithstanding, since its inception, ECOMOG has been active in the search for security on land and most of the time seeking to mediate the dialogue between known and recognized insurgent groups and central governments of their respective countries. Additionally, in recent times, the region has not only faced unknown threats (International Terrorism), but also maritime threats. According to the report of the International Crisis Group (2012),⁵¹ crime on land and rivers allows gangs to become rich and better prepared to commit their crimes at sea. This new space and form of organized crime only increase the challenges and difficulties of West Africa in providing effective and efficient regional security organizations.

THE MARITIME SECURITY DIMENSION: FOREIGN PACKAGES VS. STATE CAPACITY BUILDING

To address on maritime security in Africa at the beginning of the twenty-first century is not anything new since sea has always been a threat to African countries and their population. Also, it is important to remember that Atlantic slavery and colonization are threats that came from the sea. And, in modern, independent and supposedly autonomous Africa, the more than eighty United States strikes on the continent between 1960 and 1990 would not be feasible without the forward presence from the sea. Therefore, if the perpetrators did not come by waters, their weapons certainly did. In addition, it is important to bear in mind

that the life of fishing and other types of maritime activities, since the 1990s, has been hampered by an economic liberalization that opened the African maritime space to western fishing companies in detriment of livelihoods activities of local populations. Finally, the maritime pollution is also relevant, as it is caused by the use of African coasts to deposit toxic wastes. In this way, Africa can be an illustration of the affirmation that throughout human history, the sea has been a zone of danger and insecurity and this “undesirable desert where a land is a comforting reference point” continues to challenge Africa and Africans.⁵²

Therefore, the importance of creating a regional, sub-regional or continental organization as “Inter-Regional Centre for Maritime Security” cannot be questioned. However, the success or attainment of the objectives can be questioned considering the context in which the organization was created. The real ability of countries to pursue these goals with their own means, and ultimately if the objectives are achieved, will really be beneficial to African countries and their population, or will be at the service of the great multinationals, the great powers, and the ruling elite?

In terms of context, it is interesting to note that the main documents supporting the organization and operation of the Inter-Regional Centre for Maritime Security, as well as the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy), are produced and published between 2009 and 2014, following UN Resolutions 2018 and 2039 published respectively in 2011 and 2012. In other words, it can be affirmed that the creation of African institutions responds more to an international demand that recommends the elaboration and implementation of a regional, sub-regional and regional strategy of maritime security. In this sense, there is an African alignment with the ideas and interests coming from international partners, specifically from Europe, thus reinforcing the dependence and subordination of the continent to imported ideas without necessarily benefiting the population. Similarly, this alignment can be perceived if we consider that threats from the sea have historically been detrimental to African countries, without taking any specific action prior to the adoption of Maritime Strategies by the USA, NATO, UK, France, and the EU, G7 on Maritime Safety in 2015.⁵³

The conclusion of the negotiation on the Integrated Maritime Strategies for Africa (AIM 2050) in 2014 and the preparation of the Charter on Maritime Safety, Security and Development in 2016, is in line with the follow-up to the current international agenda. This means that given the interconnectivity and interdependence characteristics of the

Table 3.2 General figures and defence expenditures of West African countries

<i>Country</i>	<i>Extension (km²)</i>	<i>Population (million)</i>	<i>Armed forces</i>	<i>GDP (US\$ billion) 2012</i>	<i>GDP per capita (US\$)</i>	<i>Defence expenditures (US\$ million)</i>	<i>% of GDP spent in defence</i>
Benin	112,620	9,598,787	6950	7.54	786	7.4	0.01
Burkina Faso	274,000	17,275,115	11,200	10.27	594	132	1.28
Cape Verde	4033	523,568	1200	1.87	3572	9.0	0.47
Ivory Coast	322,463	21,952,093	40,000	24.27	1106	625	2.58
The Gambia	11,295	1,840,454	800	0.94	511	6	0.64
Ghana	238,533	24,652,402	15,500	40.12	1627	109	0.27
Guinea	245,857	10,884,958	9700	5.74	527	42	0.73
Guinea- Bissau	36,544	1,628,603	4450	0.88	540	25	2.84
Liberia	111,369	3,786,764	2050	1.77	455	16	0.90
Mali	1,240,192	15,494,466	15,150	9.60	620	227	2.36
Niger	1267,000	16,344,687	10,700	6.56	401	50	0.76
Nigeria	923,769	170,123,740	162,000	510 ^a	1602	2.04 (billion)	0.75
Senegal	197,722	13,711,597	11,700	13.95	1076	210	1.5
Sierra Leone	71,740	5,485,998	10,500	3.82	696	13	0.34
Togo	56,785	6,961,049	8550	3.62	520	59	1.63

^aData from 2013 (PEC 2014). Available at <http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/>

Source Mamadou Alpha Diallo (*África Ocidental: Oportunidades e desafios da Integração regional frente as Relações InterAfricanas desde os anos 1960*. Doctoral Thesis, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, 2015)

maritime security, it is unlikely that African countries will be able to confront and overcome threats from the sea. Thus, recognizing the importance of maritime security and the relevance of creating a regional and sub-regional strategy for securitization of the maritime space, the means of achieving the objectives of African states are being questioned, since the African states are having difficulties in terrestrial security.

Indeed, maritime security requires more technical, know-how and logistical resources to combat the threats both within the maritime space and on land where a large part of maritime structures are located. In addition, the maritime security agenda, despite its importance for the Guinean Gulf region, is an agenda formulated by actors and external interests to the continent, and in this perspective, tends to reinforce the Western reconquest and reoccupation of the African continent and does not necessarily correspond to the interests of the continent, as well illustrates Burger and Timothy:

In practice, the extent to which external actors take local ownership seriously varies considerably. Often, it can be applied in a limited and even paradoxical manner, meaning the extent to which locals come to accept the (externally driven) security-building agenda on its own terms. At other times, it can be more nuanced and include the substantive engagement of local elites in the formulation, planning, and evaluation of projects. Even so, notions of local ownership can expose important differences of priority between external donors and local actors. (...). Either way, the prevalence of local ownership discourse in these activities is indicative of the extent to which the maritime security agenda goes beyond a series of merely technical or instrumental responses to new security challenges. It also seeks to install and embed these responses in target regions and to do so through mechanisms that strive to refashion and indigenize specific practices of governance in the recipient states concerned.⁵⁴

Finally, although we recognize the importance and relevance of maritime security for the African continent, (as historically the most devastating threats have come from the sea), we believe, however, that the creation of the Inter-Regional Centre for Maritime Security should be viewed with caution, as it is not a properly African initiative. It is just another regional organization created in accordance with the interests of the “friends” of Africa, and it will certainly depend on the “help” of the International to function.

State capacity can be understood as the relative strength of a state vis-à-vis its society. In practice, it is an attempt to measure the balance between the state and its society with a focus on the state’s ability to extract resources from the society, while providing security, rights, well-being and services that add sustainability to its relations. These relations are considered regarding three types or dimensions, of capacities: extractive, coercive and administrative. Applying this notion to the African states in general, and specifically to the ECOWAS countries, their GDP, the size of their security forces and the amounts involved in their defence expenditures show that the two first dimensions of state capacity are not yet attained. Consequently, the third dimension cannot be attained either, since the two first dimensions are necessary prerequisites for it.

Despite the fact that some countries of the region, such as Guinea-Bissau (2.84%) and Mali (2.36%), spend a higher percentage of their GDP with defence, it can be said that the countries of West Africa, as a rule, need to strengthen their security structure. With a GDP of US\$510 billion and over 55% of the regional GDP, along with the largest

territory (923,769 km²) and the largest population of the continent, Nigeria is an exception in Africa. In terms of “Defence Expenditures”, Nigeria also stands apart from its neighbours, despite spending less than 1% (to be precise, 0.75%), of its GDP with military expenditures. After Nigeria, the countries with the largest defence budget are Ghana (US\$30.14), Ivory Coast (US\$26.30) and Senegal (US\$12.82) respectively, in absolute terms (Table 3.2).⁵⁵

The weak national structures of the region have been eroded by the infiltration of drug dealers, for instance in Guinea-Bissau, and by individuals who identify with one of the many international terrorist groups of the present, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Sahel countries, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and Islamic State or ISIS in many other countries of the continent. Along with their presence and threat, there are several Western military bases that allegedly serve in the combat against those groups, but also occupy important geopolitical spaces and exploit resources such as gold and diamonds in northern Mali, uranium in Niger and Chad, and oil and gas in the Sahel region. It is also important to point that, whatever military force arrives in these areas, local resources are exploited, and local populations are expelled to become immigrants and increase the African statistics on hunger, malnutrition, and poverty. The impacts of that are and will continue to be tragic for present and future generations, since they hold Africa back in an allegedly surpassed stage in which states are deprived of the ability to control the exploration and trade of local resources, and, consequently, of their entire capacity to fight parallel groups such as terrorists, drug dealers, pirates or multinational companies in search of precious metals and energy resources.

Therefore, it seems clear that the condition of possibility to tackle the several criminal and security nexuses of threats to South Atlantic demands to empower the West African states as autonomous political, economic, and sociocultural entities. That is, to face and overcome the regional security challenges in West Africa, it is necessary to break once and for all, at the international level, with the colonial pact and with the historical ties of foreign dependency that attach the countries of the region politically, economically and institutionally to their former colonial powers, particularly France. Such break would not mean to become an enemy of France or any other country; instead, it means to revoke cooperation agreements that produce dependency, which was unilaterally drafted by the European powers and accepted by the African ruling elite

at the time of their independence, and to establish new mutual-benefit partnerships. At the local and regional levels, it is necessary to solve the problems of leadership and management of public goods. To do so, a new African strategy must be devised to enable the local actors to tackle and lessen their dependency in relation to their traditional partners; to seek new partnerships with a view to increase the control of the state and of regional integration organizations for the security sector; and, above all, to avoid or at least minimize the impacts of outsourcing and privatization in this sector.

In this regard, it is important to prioritize the emerging countries, because after nearly one century of European domination (1884–1975) via colonization, and half a century of partnerships with the same European countries, African progress remained below all expectations—a fact that leads one to doubt whether African development could really be attained as a product of Western help. On the contrary, the overall situation of the African continent in the present shows a new attempt of occupation and domination of strategic points from a perspective of continuing to exploit local energy resources in detriment to the African society. Despite the doubts and uncertainties in relation to the presence of emerging countries (China, India, Brazil) in Africa, the presence of these actors intensified itself in the recent decade, and the approximation between African countries and southern regions of the globe has led, up to the present moment, to better results in terms of infrastructure, income generation, and social well-being. The continuity and intensification of these relations are desirable since it seems that with the progression of this dynamism, it will be better to intensify relations with emergent countries than to continue the previous neo-colonial relations with the West. Further approximations with countries of the South Atlantic shores must serve first to lessen poverty and social inequalities, to appreciate the human resources of the continent (with training and education), and to allow the local and reasonable exploration and transformation of the natural resources. These opportunities can lead to a decrease in the internal conflicts, and to a decrease in the presence of Western multinationals, which were known to have fuelled local conflicts with the exchange of weapons for natural resources. Therefore, such approximation can lead to increased security levels in the region, as well as to the preservation of its strategic resources with a view to a future of social, political and economic development. Second, a strengthening of South-South relations can contribute to stabilizing the international

system, considering that a unipolar world is not the most reliable source of international stability. Finally, after decades of unceasing attempts to establish North-South ties in the expectation of importing magical solutions from the North to deal with problems of the South, it became evident that the solutions to the African and Latin American challenges would emerge from South-South cooperation.

The possibility of South-South cooperation and collaboration, particularly between Brazil and the West African countries in the combat against drug trafficking and piracy, is a welcome possibility, considering that cooperation and joint engagement in the South Atlantic will certainly contribute indirectly to the fight against terrorism in West Africa. To this end, it would be important to strengthen the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZPCAS). Its members are currently facing the same security problems linked to the new themes of international relations (piracy, arms and drug smuggling, and terrorism), and it is desirable that these countries strengthen their ties and act in a joint and coordinated way against such phenomena. For African countries, this cooperation can become a basis, so they may build capacity and strengthen their national and regional defence forces, to cope with their current challenges and avert their strenuous and humiliating submission to the West, which, instead of solving their problems, renders them even more complex.

FINAL REMARKS

From a retrospective analysis of the relations among West African countries—which can be extended to Sub-Saharan Africa and even the entire African continent—it appears that the new wave of Western and French interventionism with the justifications of the war on terror and organized crime, along with the defence of democracy and human rights, is only the beginning of a new Western strategy to exploit the mineral and geo-strategic resources of Africa, and maintain the control of its space while avoiding the presence of new international actors such as China, India and Brazil as emerging partners of this continent that served as a base for imperialism and capitalism in detriment to its native populations (considering that the wealth obtained from the exploitation of African resources was never converted into development and welfare projects). This, moreover, is one of the challenges of Africans in relation to any international partner, whether from the North or South, great power

or emerging power alike. This is one of the criticisms that have been directed to the Chinese presence in Africa since China has been seen at once as a new colonial power for Africans, a paragon of globalization and of the end of the international balance, and a geopolitical shaker.⁵⁶

Although the biggest challenge for Brazil and many of its Latin American neighbours in the South Atlantic countries is to convert their current and expected hydrocarbon exports and their accompanying commerce into sustainable development, on the African coast, it can and must be relativized, especially in relation to the countries of West Africa, where the commerce of resources depends neither on the countries themselves, nor on their rulers, but, instead, on former colonial powers such as France. For this reason, the strengthening of South-South relations in the South Atlantic is more important and challenging for African countries, since with this cooperation, they must seek to consolidate their own nation states and attain effective control of their resources, first by defining the ways of exploring and trading them, and then converting their current and expected exports, along with their accompanying commerce, into sustainable development.

We are currently witnessing a worrisome situation, in which Europeanized Africa is conducting its vertical and horizontal relations in such a way that it is compromising all possibilities of emancipation and self-management. We also live in a period when regional confederations and integration processes are being transformed into new forms of neo-colonial relations to suit the present circumstances, especially after the invasion of Libya and the assassination of Libyan leader Gaddafi in 2011—an operation that divided the members of the African Union in favour and against the invasion. Likewise, ECOWAS forces are being more and more mobilized to defend actions in which Western interests play a leading role, while the risks and costs of direct Western interventions have increased, as the cases of Guinea-Bissau in 1998 and Mali starting in 2013 showed.

The first African challenge, therefore, is to attain true independence and autonomy, so this continent may rise from its mythic stage and express its intrinsic capacity to recompose, adapt, transform and advance amidst its difficult and sometimes tragic historical conditions. Such conditions clearly emerged in recent conflicts that were characterized as ethnic conflicts, in addition to other internal or political conflicts, such as in Guinea-Bissau, starting in 2009 with the killing of Nino Vieira, and in Ivory Coast in 2010–2011. This capacity to adapt and recompose has been recurrent

indeed, even though it met with constant ruptures and discontinuities resulting from a clear opposition or clashing interests between attempts to develop and strengthen the African continent, on the one hand, and the interests of its leading historical partners in the West, on the other. It is thus important to create new forms of continuous and constant assertion, so that Africa may attain a stage in which it will sovereignly decide about its own resources. This process necessarily includes the rebuilding of human reserves and the rebirth of hope divested from the previous expectations of “help from Africa’s friends”, with an attitude of engagement in a new and long cycle of recomposing and adaptation, described by Djibril Samb as a complex transition. According to Samb, this transition will demand an adaptation to particularly lucid and intelligent strategic views and decisions, especially in the fields of education, culture, science, and technology, which are genuine drivers of any economic and social organization.⁵⁷

The South Atlantic can play an important role in this new complex transition cycle of West Africa, since it is evident that this region needs international partners and successful examples to be emulated, beyond its traditional North-South partnerships, which have proved to be inadequate for the African continent and certainly for many South Atlantic nations. In agreement with the need to adapt strategic views and decisions in the fields of science, technology, education and culture, it is evident that important new changes started to emerge in terms of a geopolitics of knowledge,⁵⁸ in which African and African-descendant students from Latin America and from the South Atlantic have been sharing the same circuit and concerns, with a strengthening of ties between both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. In the specific case of education, not only the cooperation agreements between Brazil and many African countries (the Brazilian Programme for Students of the PEC-G Agreement for Undergraduate Studies, and the Students Programme of the PEC-PG Agreement for Graduate Studies) but also state programmes such as *ProUni* and *Reuni* are now successful and well-accepted examples in Africa. Obviously, there are also similar programmes in European countries that contribute to development. They are positive, in a way, for Africa, but they also serve to justify relations that perpetuate domination and exploitation, including the training of elite members to be opportunely used upon the seizing of national power, or in situations that demand regime shifts to favour France-Africa or Europe-Africa cooperation.

The current security situation in West Africa clearly shows that Africans did not yet conquer the right to handle their own economic and social issues, especially considering the continuity of humiliating

domination and of constant neo-colonialist interventions by the West. Since African countries emerged in a historical period when imperialism became stronger, more rampant, more experienced and more dangerous in its international associations,⁵⁹ the task of tackling the economic and sociopolitical challenges—as the period from 1960 to 2017 revealed—calls for not only the end of the colonial regime but also of the neo-colonial regime in Africa.

This task must be carried out both at the internal and external levels. To implement it, it is first necessary to relinquish at least part of the colonial legacy, which insists to perpetuate a state of subordination, dependency and, especially, of inability to address the African problems at the national, regional or continental levels without the mindset of a *fonctionnaire*⁶⁰ of the West or of international organizations such as the UN, IMF, WB or OIF. Second, it is necessary to undertake self-strengthening reforms—which, according to Castellano da Silva, increase the economic capacity of states (and regions)—to expand the military forces and to have political leaders capable of developing wise strategies. It is important to stress that the ideas under this second topic have not yet been implemented, especially in West Africa, as a consequence of the untimely political elimination of leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah, Modibo Keita, and Mamadou Dia, who were hindered by coups d'état, and of the West-driven bias of the local ruling elite, exemplified by figures such as Léopold Sédar Senghor, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, Omar Bongo, and Moussa Traoré, in addition to the marginalization of intellectuals such as Cheikh Anta Diop, who recognizes that:

There is not yet a political work capable of radically transforming the local mentalities in order to prepare people for the hostile tasks that independence demands. This situation is a product of the fact that no [African] State has a systematic renewal policy based on its national language; no State is using an African language as a governmental tool, and much less is it creating a powerful modern army, a strong aviation, civil education and the ability to tackle the historical security tasks that can be still waiting for our action. We run the risk of having only embryonic armed forces with out-dated material, no aviation, and no ballistic devices of any type, which could counterbalance an ultra-modern dictatorial police.⁶¹

Cheikh Anta Diop's words suggest a third and final necessary topic: the struggle against the privatization of the security sector, as well as of other

important sectors for the preservation of the autonomy of the state, bearing in mind the historical self-weakening trend that results from the other two topics above. It must be emphasized that due to the privatization of the security sector, most post-colonial regimes in Africa tried to secure its private interests against popular uprisings and riots in the domestic security sector, based on the support of private parallel forces, to counterbalance the public security forces. Instead of providing security as a public good, such parallel forces provided security as a private good to the elites linked to the ruling regime. Likewise, authoritarian regimes in Africa have traditionally worked to dissociate the security sector from society based on ethnic, tribal or partisan favouritism.

As an inheritance of the colonial system, such strategy was certainly taken to a new level by the new African rulers in their attempts to set limits between the public security sector and their societies—which, on their turn, should be protected by this very sector. Such pattern led to the recruitment of state allies for the key leadership positions in the field of public security, instead of the use of criteria based on ethnicity, tribal background, family or ideology for this end.⁶² It can be said, in broad terms, that the solution for the security problems experienced in Africa starts with the establishment of a national security force capable of defending the autonomy of the state against internal and external threats. This role of defending the autonomy of African states has been delegated to actors who managed to ensure private interests in detriment to the general interests of society, by resorting to outsourcing in the security field. Such outsourcing trend must be revised for key state sectors such as the security and monetary sectors, which were left to former colonial powers. The main challenge to be tackled, thus, is the challenge of “de-privatizing” or, at least, controlling the operations of these sectors, and such task calls for a consideration of internal and external actors and factors. The outsourcing of the use of force led to a pernicious permeability between the public and private spheres, to the point of affecting the approval of the governmental guidelines for the allocation of public resources for military defence.⁶³ It is therefore necessary to establish a defence mechanism at the continental level, or at least a South Atlantic partnership, in order to avoid the well-known different types of operations carried out by the West, particularly, by France, which has been for quite a long time the main actor to justify its military presence and direct interference in the affairs of many African countries by alleging the existence of instabilities.

On the one hand, the current security threats to the African states are connected either to civil wars or to domestic problems. On the other, the internal politics or affairs of these states are closely linked to the foreign environment, especially due to the fact that their foreign policy and security issues continue to be in the hands of their former colonial powers after their independence. Thus, from an international relations' perspective, it can be said that in the case of Africa, the state has not been the central player for a long time, since it never took up the functions of maintaining peace within its borders, and even less provided for the security of its citizens against foreign aggression. The maintenance of peace has been delegated to militias, warlords or local groups, while security became the object of military cooperation with former colonial powers and non-aggression agreements among African elites. In a few words, West African countries are exceptions to the realist premise of international relations, that all states perform the function of providing for domestic stability and security vis-à-vis foreign threats since they have widely privatized these two functions. The West African states do not hold the monopoly on the legitimate use of force domestically. This fact certainly explains their categorization as failed states and promising security markets in areas ranging from weapon manufacturers to private security groups and companies. Consequently, these features reinforce even more the relations and interactions among internal and extra-regional actors in the attempt to cope with security challenges in West Africa, while countries display a low capacity for internal interactions, especially in terms of technological and social infrastructure for transportation and communications, in addition to other acute vulnerabilities.⁶⁴ The situation of these states is mainly a result of political instabilities and of a deep social development deficit. Their low level of domestic interaction is an outcome of the lack of state capacity, or aptitude, to permeate the society and change the distribution of resources, activities, and interpersonal connections.⁶⁵

NOTES

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plans, industrialization and infrastructure networks to distribute development throughout the different regions of the country, while linking them to the central power); and the granting of rights and individual guarantees to the general population, with additional ways of enforcing the legitimacy of the State. In this regard, see the chapter by Igor Castellano.

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CHAPTER 4

The Possibility of NATO and Portuguese Presence in the South Atlantic Ocean

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INTRODUCTION

Initially, the proposed title seems to be an axiological nonsense. If the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is designed to the North Atlantic, one should not consider possible actions of the Alliance in the South Atlantic—unless there were concrete threats emanating from the South Atlantic to NATO members in the North Atlantic. However, it does not seem credible the possibility of state or even non-state threats originating from the South Atlantic towards the North. Why then think about the possibility of NATO action in the South Atlantic?

The first sign of this possibility was due to the enlargement of NATO interests to conflict regions exogenous to its original environment, but which effectively involved threats to its members. This action can be seen from the East (Afghanistan), in the Middle East—as a gateway to

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the Mediterranean (Persian Gulf) or even in the fight against piracy on the Somali coast and adjacent areas (justified by the risk on the merchant flow with the Mediterranean). In 2011, NATO published its “Alliance Maritime Strategy” stating that “[t]he maintenance of the freedom of navigation, sea-based trade routes, critical infrastructure, energy flows, protection of marine resources and environmental safety are all in Allies’ security interests”, meaning that their interests could be extended to where necessary, and this would not exclude the South Atlantic. Even before this official enlargement of NATO, the then Brazilian Minister of Defense, at an event in Lisbon in 2010, was adamant in stating that he saw “with reservations, any initiatives that seek to somehow associate the North Atlantic to the South Atlantic – being the south a geostrategic area of vital interest for Brazil”.

South American and West African countries have been concerned about the security in the South Atlantic Ocean. In 1986, the United Nations General Assembly created the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS, in the acronym in Portuguese). ZOPACAS’s aim is to “promote further regional co-operation, [...] the conservation of living resources and the peace and security of the whole region”. It also calls upon states of other regions, in particular the militarily significant ones, “to respect the region of the South Atlantic as a zone of peace and cooperation, especially through the reduction and eventual elimination of their military presence there”. In this context, external presence in the South Atlantic has been a preoccupation to South American and West African countries, since it potentially hinders cooperation opportunities and allows extraneous geopolitical interests to affect the dynamic of the region.

Portugal once was a world empire. After the empire’s downfall, its international relevance was substituted by the ascendance of other powers. Even though Portugal is a member country of the European Union (EU), it does not play a significant role in it, due to its marginal geographic position and weak economy. The country has been trying to regain its relevance internationally outside EU, and the South Atlantic has been historically an area of interest to Portugal.

Portugal, however, does not come alone. In addition to being a part of the EU, it is a founding member of the NATO. Portugal did not have the means to guarantee its national defence and international security. Its traditional European allies, such as the UK, were not willing to commit to Portugal in this matter. In the Cold War (1947–1991) context,

the USA needed positions to serve as bases for its military operations. Portugal has Azores and Madeira, two archipelagoes that have strategic position in the North Atlantic Ocean. From them, the USA could protect and control the maritime routes that go through the region. Besides that, these two archipelagoes could function as a trampoline to naval and aerial operations.

Therefore, the USA had strategic interests concerning the Portuguese archipelagoes and Portugal needed an ally to help the country ensure its defence and security. That way, as said before, Portugal became a NATO founding member in 1949, mainly because of the circumstances the country faced at that time. However, over time, Portugal saw the participation on NATO and on its international missions as a way of improving its international prestige. Thus, Portugal began to take pride on being a NATO member and on taking part of its military operations, such as those of counter piracy.

This chapter deals with the possibility of NATO presence in the South Atlantic Ocean, mainly through Portugal. This particular scope was chosen because Portugal has been trying to increase its presence in the South Atlantic, by means of cooperating with its former colonies—CPLC countries. Portugal takes part on NATO's counter-piracy operations as a way to augment its international prestige. The concept of international prestige will be addressed posteriorly, but it can be understood as a country's desire to induce other nations to believe in the power it really enjoys or which it believes, or wants other nations to believe, it enjoys. That overlaps with the agenda of other South Atlantic countries, especially Brazil, which aspires to consolidate its role as a collaborative leader both in the South American continent and among the West African countries, especially among the Portuguese speaking ones, due to the common heritage and culture. The Brazilian defence documents emphasize the importance of cooperating with the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLC), particularly in the field of defence.

NATO's counter-piracy operations were carried out as a result of piracy acts near Somalia, located in the Horn of Africa, which is a peninsula in Northeast Africa. Although Somalia and other countries affected by the acts of piracy are not former Portuguese colonies, Portugal believes that its participation in military operations that benefit countries of said continent could potentially improve its international prestige among them, especially among the members of the CPLC. Thus, Portugal would be seen as a security provider, which is a valuable

image since there are considerable security issues in the maritime domain, especially at the area in question. The enhanced prestige could help Portugal to offer programmes of technical-military cooperation to CPLC members. Cooperation with CPLC members in this matter is a directive of Portugal's Strategic Concept of National Defense, released in 2013.

Hence, this work hypothesis is that external military presence could exist in the South Atlantic Ocean due to Portugal's attempt to increase its presence in the region. This chapter's objective is to analyse the possibility of NATO presence in the South Atlantic Ocean. NATO members, such as the USA, France, or UK, could mobilize the organization to act in the South Atlantic Ocean, especially on matters associated with the piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and off the coast of Nigeria. Portugal has been trying to become a more important actor in the international arena, especially among CPLC countries. If NATO carries out an operation in the South Atlantic Ocean, it is plausible that Portugal will be part of it, due to the country's interests in the region.

Portugal participates in NATO's counter-piracy operations aiming to improve its international prestige, and the actions said country takes are directed to accomplish its national defence policy, which commands the participation in alliances and international operations as a way of improving its international prestige. NATO operations could be seen as a trampoline for Portugal: with them, the country may modernize its armed forces, strengthen its international prestige, deepen its ties with more countries through technical-military cooperation, and then have a more prominent role in the international arena. The exploratory method was used by means of the bibliographical and documental revision on the subject.

This chapter is divided in this introduction; a panorama on the ocean's relevance focused on Brazil and Portugal relationship, in which we present some information about NATO's creation, what the defence documents of Brazil state about the South Atlantic, Portugal's entrance in NATO and the directives of both NATO's and Portugal's Defense Strategic Concepts; a section on a theoretical explanation on international prestige and participation in international military operations; a section on NATO's counter-piracy operations that Portugal participated in and their legal base; and a conclusion.

A PANORAMA ON THE ATLANTIC OCEAN'S RELEVANCE, THE SOUTH–NORTH RELATIONSHIP: BRAZIL AND PORTUGAL CASE

The Ocean's Relevance

According to a report prepared by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2016, the ocean economy is the sum of the economic activities of ocean-based industries, and the assets, goods, and services of marine ecosystems.¹ The same report states that the ocean economy is fundamental to the future welfare and prosperity of humankind, since it is an important source of food, energy, minerals, health, leisure, and transport.²

Maritime industries are traditionally composed by shipping, fishing, and offshore oil and gas activities, but the aforesaid industries are under remodelling and diversifying processes. As stated by the OECD report, the new industries are that of offshore wind, tidal, and wave energy; oil and gas exploration and production in ultra-deep water and exceptionally harsh environments; offshore aquaculture; seabed mining; cruise tourism; maritime surveillance; and marine biotechnology.³

However, economic activities in the ocean carry a plethora of risks, regarding the safety and the security areas. From a safety approach, most of the world's shipping fleet engaged in international activities is well regulated. The international regulatory system under the direction of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) advances as the ocean environment gets more complex.⁴ Here, ZOPACAS is also a forum that promotes the strengthening of regional cooperation, helping to deepen social and economic development. This serves to briefly illustrate the safety domain. However, in this paper we are more interested in the security domain.

The world is witnessing a shift in the distribution and balance of power and influence among its actors. It is becoming more multipolar as new national and regional players arise, along with non-state actors, such as corporations, NGOs, and terrorist and piracy organizations. This changing structure poses challenges to the international governance and cooperation. International institutions struggle to cope with the diffusion of power, which also happens in the maritime realm. Since

there is a growing interdependence among actors, events that appear to be national or regional could have a spillover effect on the world, thus creating instability. International tensions, conflicts, both intrastate and interstate, and terrorism are some of the most critical risks to the ocean environment.⁵

The operations of interest for this chapter took place in the regions of the Gulf of Guinea, mainly after the experiences from the world's engagement at the Horn of Africa. This focus was chosen because NATO led operations in the region. Although the Gulf of Guinea is a significant offshore oil-producing area, mainly because of Nigeria and Angola,⁶ and also a target for piracy and terrorism, NATO has not led operations there.

The Mediterranean Sea is connected to the Red Sea by the Suez Canal. The Red Sea connects to the Gulf of Aden through the Bab el-Mandab Strait. The Bab el-Mandab Strait can be considered as a chokepoint, as stated by Mahan,⁷ or a focal point, according to Brodie.⁸ The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) defines world oil chokepoints as narrow channels along widely used global sea routes. Chokepoints are a critical part of global energy security because of the high volume of petroleum and other liquids transported through their narrow straits.⁹ According to the EIA, it is estimated that 3.8 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum products were transported through the Bab el-Mandab Strait in 2013 (Fig 4.1).

According to information provided by the European Union Maritime Security Centre—Horn of Africa's (MSCHOA) website,¹⁰ 20% of the global trade passes through the Gulf of Aden. Thus, it is a region of relevance to Europe and the USA. Security threats to ships that go through this region could potentially affect their trade revenue and the insurance prices.

Portugal's concerns with the security on the maritime domain are well founded. Piracy is a phenomenon that has been happening and preoccupying the international community. Furthermore, Portugal holds a close relation with the sea and has been aspiring to become more prominent in the geopolitical stage. Thus, the aforementioned country is trying to develop a security provider image, which can be done through the participation in international military operations, such as the ones performed by NATO.¹¹




Fig. 4.1 Community of Portuguese speaking countries members (*Source* Elaborated by Camilo Carneiro)

NATO's Strategic Concept

NATO's "Active Engagement, Modern Defence" Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the Members of the NATO was adopted by heads of state and government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, held in 19–20 November 2010. Portugal's then Prime Minister José Sócrates attended this Summit.

In NATO's Strategic Concept preface, the heads of state and government of the NATO nations affirm that they are determined that NATO will continue to play its unique and essential role in ensuring their common defence and security. The Strategic Concept also commits the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts, and stabilize post-conflict situations, including by working more closely with its international partners, especially the United Nations and the European Union.¹² It also states that it is expected from NATO to defend Allied nations, deploy

robust military forces where and when required for its member's security, and to help promote common security with its partners around the globe.¹³

In the section dedicated to NATO's core tasks and principles, the cooperative security subject emerges:

The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organizations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament.¹⁴

In its security environment section, NATO's Strategic Concept states that countries rely increasingly more on communications, transport, and transit routes on which international trade and energy security depend. These activities require greater international efforts to ensure their resilience against attack or disruption, or quick recovery after problems. NATO countries are to become more dependent on foreign energy suppliers, and these energy supplies could be increasingly exposed to disruption, inasmuch as they are transported across the globe. It is also avouched that environmental and resource constraints will shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations.¹⁵

In order to ensure the security of NATO's countries, it is asserted that NATO will develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines.¹⁶ Considering that crises and conflicts beyond NATO's borders can pose a direct threat to the security of Alliance countries, NATO will thus engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations, and support reconstruction.¹⁷

After perusing NATO's Strategic Concept, it can be argued that this Alliance is concerned with the security of its members and partners. The energetic and economic domains are included in said concept of security. Therefore, NATO can and will intervene in conflict when deemed necessary. According to NATO's website,¹⁸ for one of the original drafters of the treaty, Theodore C. Achilles, there was no doubt that NATO operations could also be conducted south of the Tropic of Cancer and basically worldwide.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Portugal's Entrance

Following the end of World War II (1939–1945), the Cold War (1947–1991) began. It was marked by conflicting interests and political ideologies. The capitalist block, led by the USA, feared that the communist ideology would impose itself upon Europe. Since the end of World War II and because of its impact on the economy of Western countries, they started to diminish their defence establishments and demobilize their forces. In January 1948, the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin pleaded for a treaty of alliance and mutual assistance within the framework of the UN Charter, signed in 1945. However, the USA would only concur to provide military support for Europe if it were united. That is when Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the UK signed the Brussels Treaty in March 1948, thus creating the Western Union. The Vanderberg Resolution was adopted by the US Senate, allowing the country to take part in a mutual defence system in times of peace.

After successive talks about the writing of the treaty, on 4 April 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington, DC.¹⁹ NATO provides the formal structure that enables the goals of the Alliance to be implemented. According to its website, the treaty derives its authority from Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which reaffirms the right of independent states to individual or collective defence. With only 14 articles, the treaty allows NATO to be flexible.

Article 5 of the NATO founding treaty concerns the principle of collective defence. It is a principle that binds the Alliance members together: “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that [...] each of them [...] will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith [...] such action as it deems necessary”. In other words, it means that an attack against one single member of the Alliance is considered an attack against all members of the Alliance. It is important to emphasize that, as it will be said ahead, even though the principle of collective defence states it only applies to Europe and North America, NATO can and will act south of the Tropic of Cancer when and where be deemed necessary.

Telo²⁰ argues that Portugal's entrance into NATO inserted the country into the Western system, extinguishing the possibility of it staying as a non-inserted zone. After the end of World War II, Portugal's Second Republic (1933–1974) went through a new phase, in which it adopted a

defensive posture in relation to the world changes. The US growth concerned Portugal, since the thriving power began to occupy positions that traditionally belonged to European powers. Portugal was also troubled with the US pressure to create a dollar-based international economy system, which could potentially hinder the traditional economic ties among European powers and their colonies. Another concern regards the beginning of autonomy movements.²¹

In sum, Salazar soon realized that the international order and system were changing. However, the Portuguese leaders kept believing that the Eurocentric system had not ended and that UK's power would continue to maintain its status. Thus, Portugal's Second Republic vision was that Europe as a whole should align with the UK to reconstruct the continent based on traditional values. In this sense, Portugal approaches the UK with a proposal for the creation of a permanent defence commitment between the two countries, aiming to insert Portugal in the Western's defence. This proposal was not well received by the British government, since it intended to bring the USA to Europe's collective defence and, besides that, it was negotiating the Brussels Treaty. During the more than 550 years of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, the UK had always avoided committing to a permanent defence plan with Portugal, and it was not eager to change that.²²

The USA was, nonetheless, very much interested to bring Portugal to its side, especially in military terms due to the interest in the Azores. The Azores position is crucial to the North Atlantic control and to the European strategic reinforcement.²³ From continental Portugal, Azores and Madeira, it is possible to control and protect the sea lines of communication that connect North Europe and the Mediterranean with America, Africa, and the Far East. Azores has great functional value, since it can serve as trampoline to the naval and air movements of reinforcement and refuelling, from the USA and Canada to Europe, as well as force projection from the USA to Europe and the Middle East.²⁴

Thus, the US invitation to Portugal to enter the Alliance was mainly due to geopolitical and geostrategical factors. Portugal did not have much else to offer to NATO besides its geographical position, since its armed forces were not so modern as the American ones. Azores was a very important asset during World War I and World War II and would become part of NATO's defence strategy in the event of an offence coming from the East.²⁵ England supported the US invitation, but France was sceptical because Portugal was not, at the time, a Western pluralist

democracy. However, the invitation still stood, inasmuch as the USA saw the relevance of the Azores for its strategic plan.²⁶

When Portugal realized that the UK's relative international relevance had dropped, it turned to the USA, since its national defence was not guaranteed only with its armed forces. Portugal's national defence needed an external alliance, and the traditional Anglo-Portuguese alliance was not fit anymore. The alternative was to join the USA in its collective defence alliance—NATO. Pereira²⁷ argues that Portugal did not have the capacity to guarantee its external security alone. The traditional and fundamental principle of its foreign and defence policy was still valid: to ally with a maritime power to do so.

Portugal's War Minister at the time, Santos Costa, was favourable to the country's entrance to NATO, because he believed that it was a way to implement the rearmament plans. The army was backing up his opinion. Portugal's navy endorsed the entrance since it already had military cooperation programmes with England and the USA, and it was willing to deepen them. The liberal wing of the Second Republic was also favourable to NATO because it could be a way to amplify Portugal's connection and to encourage internal evolution of the regime.²⁸ The armed forces were supportive of Portugal's entrance into NATO because the US military aid could contribute to the professional modernization and the technical re-equipment of the Portuguese armed forces.²⁹

Portugal's Strategic Concept of National Defense

According to the Resolution of the Council of Ministers n.19/2013, the Strategic Concept of National Defense defines the state's priorities on defence matters, in line with national interest, and it integrates the national defence policy.³⁰ Portugal's newest strategic concept came into force in 2013.

Portugal's strategic concept states that among its fundamental values lies the defence of the stability and the European, Atlantic and international security. Additionally, Portugal's interests are to affirm its presence in the world, consolidate its insertion in an alliance network, defend the state's external credibility, praise the Portuguese communities, and contribute to the promotion of peace and international security. Portuguese armed forces are an essential element to consolidate the country as a co-producer of international security, inasmuch as the military means are a way of projecting international prestige.³¹

Portugal recognizes that piracy affects vital maritime routes of international trade, and thus, it is a threat not only to national security, but also to international security.³² In this sense, Portugal must continue to engage in counter-piracy missions within the framework of its alliances and contribute to the security of the world's common resources.³³

The aforementioned country sees the participation in international organizations as a natural manner to guarantee a position of relevance in international politics. Also, its participation on NATO is necessary to the territorial integrity defence and national cohesion. The recognition of Portugal as a co-producer of international security and its participation in external missions takes place primarily within the framework of NATO. Furthermore, the internationalization and modernization of the Portuguese armed forces result from the integration of Portugal into the Atlantic Alliance.³⁴

Among Portugal's short-term national objectives, it can be found the defence of Portugal's international prestige. Defending the country's international position includes reaffirming the strategic relevance of Portugal's presence on NATO, as well as its bilateral alliance with the USA. It can also be done by participating actively in missions that contribute to peace and international security, within the framework of international organizations.³⁵ Additionally, the defence of Portugal's international prestige could be seen as a driver for a greater engagement of the country with CPLC members in the South Atlantic Ocean area, which is also a Portuguese objective.

Portugal's strategic concept does not include in its strategic areas of interest the Horn of Africa and Eastern Africa, the areas in which NATO's counter-piracy operations take place. However, engaging in those operations is set in the 2013 strategic concept, as a means to improve Portugal's international prestige.

International Presence in the Gulf of Guinea

As previously argued, the Gulf of Guinea is an area of major geopolitical relevance due not only to its offshore oil production but also because of its importance as a maritime route. There are different interpretations about which countries are part of this area. Some are stricter; some consider more countries as belonging to the region. In this work, the delimitation of the Gulf of Guinea takes into account the possession of the energy resources—oil and gas. Thus, the region in question would

consist of the part of the west coast of Africa that goes from Nigeria to Angola, since it is in this area that are the main known oil blocks.³⁶ The countries in this interpretation are part of the Gulf of Guinea Commission, which was created in 2001. Its current members are Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, and São Tomé and Príncipe.

Nigeria holds proved oil reserves of 37.1 thousand million barrels, which accounts for 2.2% of the world's reserves. In 2016, it produced 2053 thousands of oil barrels per day. When it comes to gas, Nigeria holds proved reserves of 5.3 trillion cubic metres, which accounts for 2.8% of the world's reserves. In 2016, it produced 44.9 billion cubic metres of gas. Angola holds proved oil reserves of 11.6 thousand million barrels, which accounts for 0.7% of the world's reserves. In 2016, it produced 1807 thousands of oil barrels per day.³⁷

Nigeria and Angola produce millions of oil barrels a day, but only a limited amount of it is refined domestically. In 2016, only 2.6% of the world's refinery throughput took place in Africa.³⁸ This means that the oil has to leave the countries to be refined, and the countries buy refined fuel. Thus, the oil is a target for piracy when being exported and imported.

From these numbers, one can notice how geopolitically important the Gulf of Guinea is. In 2017, there were 180 actual and attempted pirate attacks in the world, and 36 of them took place in the Gulf of Guinea. Of these attacks, 33 happened in Nigeria, 1 in São Tomé and Príncipe, 1 in Angola, and 1 in Congo.³⁹

The existence of actual and attempted pirate and even terrorist attacks poses a threat to the security of the South Atlantic Ocean. This scenario could lead to NATO operations in the region, aimed at securing the sea lines of communication and guarantying oil and gas supplies.

In 2016, countries from West Africa exported 216.5 million tonnes of crude oil.⁴⁰ Countries such as France, the USA, and China have interest in maintaining the region secure in order to keep the flow of oil exportation and the security of maritime routes.

The USA, through its US Naval Forces Africa (NAVAF), conducts yearly an at-sea maritime exercise called Obangame Express. This exercise takes place in the Gulf of Guinea and signatory nations from the Yaoundé Code of Conduct⁴¹ and other partner nations⁴² engage on it. Obangame Express is designed to strengthen cooperation among Gulf of Guinea Nations to increase maritime safety and security in the region.

In 2016, it was announced that Chinese soldiers were to join anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Guinea. The country intended to aid Western African nations by helping to build the necessary infrastructure to weaken pirate activities.⁴³

Since 1990, France carries out the *Corymbe Mission*, which allows it to maintain forces permanently in the Gulf of Guinea. At the time of its conception, this mission aimed at strengthening the links between the French navy and the navies of the francophone countries of the Gulf and also to preserve the interests of France in the region, mainly those related to the exploitation of oil. Currently, *Corymbe* aims to safeguard French interests, promote naval diplomacy, intervene in cases that offer security risks to the region, and collect information on the sea that are of interest to France.⁴⁴

From this brief overview, one can see how there is international military presence in the Gulf of Guinea. The presence of a military organization such as NATO could be seen as offensive, so nations like France, China, and the USA prefer to negotiate bilaterally with West African countries to maintain military presence in the region. Their presence may potentially decrease acts that can hinder the maritime safety and security in the Gulf of Guinea. However, if the situation deteriorates, there is a possibility that NATO could deploy forces to act in the region, just how it happened on the Horn of Africa.

INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE AND PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS

One of the most prominent scholars of international relations' classical realism theory reasons that the policy of prestige is one of the basic manifestations of the struggle for power on the international scene. Prestige is seldom an end in itself—it is an instrument to achieve objectives. It is through the reputation of excellence that an actor can gain the measure of security, wealth, and power that he believes to be his due. The purpose of the policy of prestige is to impress upon other nations the power one's own nation really enjoys or which it believes, or wants other nations to believe, it enjoys. The display of military force serves the policy of prestige.⁴⁵

That scholar also claims that the policy of prestige uses military demonstrations as means to achieve its purpose, since military strength

is a traditional way to measure one country's power. Navies, because of their inherent high mobility, are able to bring the flag and power of a nation to all corners of the world.⁴⁶

Additionally, it does not matter what the strategic objectives of a nation's foreign policy are. It is its prestige—its reputation for power—that is always important and sometimes a decisive factor in determining success or failure of its foreign policy.⁴⁷

However, pursuing a policy of prestige is not enough. Building its prestige upon the appearances of power rather upon its substance is dangerous.⁴⁸ Portugal benefits from its participation in NATO because the Alliance requires the modernization and internationalization of Portuguese armed forces, and there are incentives to do so.

Gilpin,⁴⁹ another realist scholar, reasons that in international relations, prestige is the functional equivalent of authority in domestic politics. Power and prestige serve to ensure that the lesser states in the system will comply with the directives of the dominant states. Because of prestige, the lesser states will potentially follow the leadership of more powerful states, since they accept the legitimacy and utility of the directive. Powerful and prestigious states supply public goods (security, economic order, etc.) that give other states an interest in following their lead.

Prestige is the reputation of power, with emphasis on military power. Power refers to the economic, military, and other related capabilities of a state. Prestige refers to the perception of other nations with regard to a state's capacities and its ability and willingness to exercise its power. Prestige is achieved primarily by means of successful use of power, especially through victory in war.⁵⁰ In Portugal's case, it is of its interest to improve its military power and prestige, so it can be more relevant in world politics, especially with regard to CPLC countries. Participation in NATO's operations helps augment its prestige, since they are a demonstration of power to stop piracy.

According to Santos,⁵¹ the Portuguese armed forces can act as an instrument of support of the country's foreign policy. So, that is the question? Where and how could Portugal build this engagement? South Atlantic Portuguese speaking countries could be the main effort for it. For a geographically small country like Portugal, the capacity to produce security and apply it in isolation or in alliance with other countries is highly important, aiming to neutralize threats to national and international security. The attribution of armed forces to international missions is not an easy task, since the price is high, and they require highly trained

forces. Nevertheless, Portugal's national interest is to continue participating in those operations, because it creates far-reaching positive political effects for the countries that engage in said missions. In other words, employing Portuguese armed forces in international military operations helps to improve the country's prestige.⁵²

Santos⁵³ identifies the aforementioned operations as the most relevant instrument of defence of the national interest and projection of Portugal in the world. Portugal engaged in military operations not only within NATO's framework, but also under the United Nations and European Union mandate. Santos⁵⁴ compiled information about Portugal's participation in international missions, from 2000 until 2010, and they are continuously increasing.

Furthermore, Portugal's constitution, in its article n. 275, subsection 5, states that it is incumbent upon the armed forces to meet the international commitments of the Portuguese State in the military field and to participate in humanitarian and peace missions undertaken by the international organizations of which Portugal is a member.

The participation of Portuguese armed forces on different international military operations supports the country's foreign policy aimed at the South Atlantic Ocean and CPLC countries. Taking part in these operations aids Portugal to modernize its armed forces and to learn the best practices of military operations. The country's ability to engage on NATO operations is improved, as well as its ability to engage on technical-military cooperation with CPLC countries.

NATO'S COUNTER-PIRACY OPERATIONS

According to its website, for a long time NATO remained as a vigilant and prepared military alliance, but it did not get involved with any actual military engagements. After the Cold War, however, there were changes in the international security environment, with some new and reemerging threats. Then, NATO began to assume a proactive role in the world, conducting military operations, such as the Operation Anchor Guard (10 August 1990–1999 March 1991), during the first Gulf War in Turkey; Operation Ace Guard (3 January 1991–1998 March 1991), in Turkey; Operation Allied Goodwill I & II (4–9 February & 27 February 1992–24 March 1992), in Russia and other Commonwealth of Independent States nations; and Operation Agile Genie (1–9 May 1992), in Central Mediterranean.

In addition to these first operations, NATO acted in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–2004); in the USA (2001–2002); in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2001–2003); during the second Gulf War (February–April 2003); after Hurricane Katrina (September–October 2005); after an earthquake in Pakistan (2005–2006); assisting the African Union (AU) in Darfur, Sudan (2005–2007); in Libya (February–October 2011); in Iraq (2004–2011); and in Afghanistan (2003–2014).

Some of the mentioned operations had a military character, and some had humanitarian character. The fact is that NATO can and will operate where and when it is of its interest. Hence, if NATO is interested in the South Atlantic for some reason, this ocean is not clear from NATO presence.

NATO's presence in Africa is not a brand new experience. At the request of the AU, NATO had provided different forms of support to the AU since 2005, not only with regard to acts of piracy. The first NATO mission on African continent was in Darfur, Sudan.

Chalk⁵⁵ avows that the dangers regarding contemporary piracy are complex and multifaceted. Piracy attacks pose direct threats to the lives and welfare of people from many different flag states. It also poses impact on economy since cargos are stolen, trips are delayed, insurance prices hike, and it could potentially thwart a maritime state's trading ability.

Menefee⁵⁶ asserts that pirates off Somalia's coast usually target different vessels, from dhows and fishing trawlers to general cargo vessels and bulk carriers. Pirates are armed with AK47 and machine guns. They operate from speedboats, generally in groups of five to twelve men. Their objective is not mere robbery, but ransom by means of holding the vessels' crews and sometimes the vessels themselves.

The 2009 International Maritime Bureau (IMB)⁵⁷ annual report shows the numbers of actual and attempted pirate attacks during the 2005–2009 period. In the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea regions, the numbers were: 2005—10; 2006—10; 2007—13; 2008—92; and 2009—131. All these attacks are attributed to Somali pirates. In Somalia, the numbers were: 2005—35; 2006—10; 2007—31; 2008—19; and 2009—80. The image above shows the locations that shared more than two-thirds of the total reported incidents, i.e. 287 from a total of 406 reported attacks for the 2005–2009 period. Thus, Somalia, the Gulf of

Aden, and the Red Sea hold, together, 51, 97% of the total reported attacks from the period.

The 2014 IMB⁵⁸ report shows the number of actual and attempted pirate attacks during the 2010–2014 period. In the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea regions, the numbers were: 2010—78; 2011—76; 2012—26; 2013—8; and 2014—8. All the attacks are attributed to Somali pirates. In Somalia, the numbers were: 2010—139; 2011—160; 2012—49; 2013—7; and 2014—3.

Lastly, the 2017 IMB⁵⁹ report shows the number of actual and attempted pirate attacks during the 2015–2017 period. In the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea regions, the numbers were: 2015—0; 2016—1; and 2017—4. The attacks were attributed to Somali pirates. In Somalia, the numbers were: 2015—0; 2016—1; and 2017—5. It is important to show the timeline of actual and attempted pirate attacks to understand why there were counter-piracy operations and the impact they had on the cases.

According to Geiß and Petrig,⁶⁰ three different NATO operations have been deployed in the region of the Gulf of Aden and Somalia due to acts of piracy: Operation Allied Provider, Operation Allied Protector, and Operation Ocean Shield. Somali government did not have the military capacity to fight piracy in the region, so it asked for international help.

There are other NATO's countries interested in operating at the region. Mainly, those with presence there long before the Africa's independence wave. France, for example, has a strong cooperation with Senegal and Cameroon.⁶¹ Belgium is building new arrangements with their ex-colonies. But all of these movements are under their foreign policies more than military isolated actions. They are currently operating in multinational's military and training actions at the region. European countries are moving fast to the Gulf of Guinea.⁶²

Operation Allied Provider took place during the period ranging from 24 October to 13 December 2008. Its origin lies at the request made by the Secretary General of the United Nations on 25 September 2008 to NATO's Secretary General. This operation was responsible for naval escorts to World Food Programme (WFP) vessels, patrolled the waters around Somalia and helped to deter acts of piracy that continued to threaten the region. However, Portugal was not directly involved in this operation.

Operation Allied Protector

This operation took place from March 24 until August 2009. Operation Allied Protector's main objectives were to deter, defend against, and disrupt pirate activities in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa. Standing NATO Maritime Group One (SNMG1) vessels conducted the first phase of this operation, which went until June 29. SNMG1 command was in the hands of Portuguese Rear Admiral José Pereira de Cunha, and Portuguese frigate NRP Corte Real was the flagship of SNMG1. According to a communication by the Joint Force Command Lisbon, the results of the SNMG1 were very encouraging. It prevented 16 of the 37 attacks against vessels and confiscated weapons.

From 29 June 2009, Standing NATO Maritime Group Two (SNMG2) took over the responsibility from SNMG1. SNMG2 had conducted Operation Allied Provider, NATO's first counter-piracy operation.

Operation Ocean Shield

According to Geiß and Petrig,⁶³ Operation Ocean Shield was approved by the North Atlantic Council and launched on 17 August 2009, thus replacing Operation Allied Protector. This operation's mission is to contribute to international efforts to reduce maritime piracy and support capacity-building efforts with regional governments, while protecting one of the world's busiest shipping lanes.

During Operation Ocean Shield, SNMG1 and SNMG2 took turns with regard to command and flagship of the mission. From 29 November 2009 to 25 January 2010, Portuguese frigate NRP Álvares Cabral was the flagship of SNMG1. The command was again in the hands of Rear Admiral José Pereira de Cunha. From June to December 2011, frigate NRP Dom Francisco de Almeida was deployed to aid SNMG1.

The Chicago Summit Declaration,⁶⁴ issued by the heads of state and government who participated in of the North Atlantic Council May 2012, asserted that NATO welcomed the extension of the mandate of Operation Ocean Shield until 2014. However, during the NATO Wales Summit, held on September 2014, NATO decided to continue its counter-piracy involvement off the coast of Somalia until the end of 2016, employed a focused presence to optimize the use of NATO assets.

The Warsaw Summit communiqué, issued by the heads of state and government who participated in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, on July 2016, states that NATO's Operation Ocean Shield had achieved its military strategic objectives, thus contributing to the international efforts to fight the piracy off the coast of Somalia. It reaffirmed NATO's intention to terminate the operation at the end of 2016. In this sense, as asseverated, NATO formally concluded Operation Ocean Shield on 15 December 2016.

The 2015 IMB annual report shows a vertiginous fall on pirate attacks.⁶⁵ The Gulf of Aden and Red Sea regions hold together, the following number of actual and attempted attacks: 2011—76; 2012—26; 2013—8; 2014—8; and 2015—no attacks recorded. In Somalia, the numbers are: 2011—160; 2012—49; 2013—7; 2014—3; and 2015—no attacks recorded. Hence, these numbers illustrate that the military presence of NATO, the European Union, the United Nations, and other international organizations and actors was indispensable for the management of the situation in the region.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this chapter was to discuss the possibility of external military presence in the South Atlantic Ocean. Portugal's participation on NATO was highlighted, although there are other NATO's countries acting at the region. Portugal participates on NATO's counter-piracy operations as a way to improve its international prestige. We presented information about the economic relevance of the ocean and the piracy-affected areas. We also disclosed information about NATO's creation and Portugal's entrance in this organization. NATO's and Portugal's strategic concepts were explained, as well as a theoretical description on international prestige.

Our argument was that Portugal recognizes the relevance of taking part in international alliances, especially the military ones. Since the power of a country is usually measured by its military power, participating in a military alliance could improve the international position and prestige of a country.

Portugal went through a slight change of vision with regard to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It was invited to join NATO because of Azores' strategic position. Portugal had to accept said invitation since its alliance with England was no longer enough to ensure its

national security, so it needed another maritime power to fill England's role—the USA. Portugal's presence in NATO benefitted its armed forces, which went through modernization. Today, this allows Portugal to project power, and NATO's role in it was vital.

Portugal has been trying to get closer to its former colonies, but it is still met with a certain resistance. The attempt to improve its prestige and emerge as an international security provider is a way to approach CPLC countries. Some of these countries are facing maritime security issues and are seeking international assistance.

Even though NATO's specific operations did not take place in any of the CPLC countries, they have helped Portugal to present itself as a security provider that could aid them through programmes of technical-military cooperation. CPLC countries are of strategic interest to Portugal, as stated in said country's Strategic Concept of National Defense. In this sense, thus, Portugal is engaging in international military operations so it can better its prestige, making it easier for it to pursue cooperation ties with CPLC countries.

Since Portugal is trying to exercise a greater role in the international arena and particularly among CPLC countries, Brazil worries that Portugal could bring NATO alongside. It is not of Brazilian interest the presence of external actors in the region of the South Atlantic, especially when it comes to a military alliance—NATO. Brazil has been trying to keep the region peaceful. Thus, NATO presence could hinder that effort and present a threat to the regional stability.

There are other actors such as China, France, and the USA that have interests in the South Atlantic Ocean, mainly because the Gulf of Guinea is an important oil producer. These countries desire to keep the region as secure as possible, even by military presence, in order to maintain the oil production and the security of the maritime trade routes.

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Antarctica as a South Atlantic Maritime Security Issue

Sabrina Evangelista Medeiros and Leonardo Faria de Mattos

On 1 December 1959, in the city of Washington D.C., twelve countries celebrated the Antarctic Treaty. Seven of those had already formally claimed territory on that continent—the UK was the first in 1908, New Zealand in 1923, France in 1924, Australia in 1933, Norway in 1939, Argentina and Chile in 1940. Otherwise, during the Cold War, whereas India would put in place new proposals for the internationalization of the Antarctic, the old arrangements would prevail almost as they were born.

L. Frederick E. Goldie was a law professor of Syracuse University who anticipated much of current debate on the marine environment as a security issue. He also had written one of the most important analyses from the period right before the signing of the Antarctic Treaty.¹ He had pointed out that, despite not presenting demands in terms of territory, US and Soviet (USSR) would not reveal their plans for the region in advance, reserving the right to make a territorial claim later. The official Soviet policy for Antarctic would be expressed by not requesting a territory specifically but guaranteeing its participation in any important initiative upon demand. At the other side, USA would be the most relevant actor in the

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inspections carried out those subsequent years from the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) implementation (signed in 1959, effective in 1961).

According to the Treaty, Article 4:

Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as: (a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica; [...] 2. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force.²

The above article preserved the interests of the seven claimants and made it impossible for new claims to be presented in the future by countries that would accede to the Treaty. Among those, it is relevant to analyse Argentina, Chile, and the UK because their claimed areas face the South Atlantic, and their recent economic exclusive zones' expansion submissions have re-emerged the Antarctic issue with new levels and players in the dispute. In that sense, we highlight the Brazilian involvement.

Brazil was not represented at the 1959 conference and only acceded to the Treaty in 1975. Its first official expedition took place in 1982, and since 1983 Brazil became a consultative member of the Treaty, with voting rights. However, its scientific station on that continent, "Comandante Ferraz", is located within the areas claimed by those three countries, which are partially overlapping. That was not a security issue until very recently, when, on 25 September 2013, through Legislative Decree No. 373, Congress approved the new version of the National Defence Policy (2012), and in it the Brazilian government included Antarctica as part of its "strategic environment".³ Moreover, it can be seen in the last defence documents (2017 editions of the National Defence Policy, National Defence Strategy, and National Defence White Paper).

There is no definition of the term "strategic environment" neither in the National Defence Policy, nor in the Glossary of Armed Forces, also edited by the Ministry of Defence. In this way, the following definition proposed by Professor José Luiz Fiori⁴ will be considered, as a region where Brazil wants to radiate, preferably, its influence and its diplomatic, economic and military leadership.

This chapter aims to analyse the current position of three territorialist countries—Argentina, Chile, and the UK—and whether and how their claims have interfered in Brazilian regional strategic assessment.

The chapter is divided into three parts. In the first, a historical synthesis is made of the presence of the three territorialist countries chosen for this work, from their first explorers to the present day. Next, some considerations about the Brazilian interest in Antarctica are presented, until the signing of the contract for the construction of the new Brazilian scientific station. In this part, it is also analysed what characterizes the insertion of Antarctica in the Brazilian strategic environment, mainly in terms of strategic reflection, in contrast to the position of the three territorialist countries analysed.

We conclude that Brazil has gathered arguments in favour of the Antarctic as a land free of territorialization but, still, considers chances of militarization from actors involved in resources disputes. Finally, we try to offer some considerations on the proposed questions as to inspire further research on the theme.

THREE TERRITORIALIST CLAIMS OVER THE ANTARCTICA

United Kingdom

From the end of the eighteenth century, the English had tried to prove the existence of the Sixth Continent. The English navigator, James Cook, was the one who most closely approached to Antarctica on his second circumnavigation voyage from 1772 to 1775, having reached the 71°10'S latitude on 17 February 1774 (the jurisdiction area of the Treaty of Antarctica is latitude 60°S). On 14 January 1775, Cook discovered the islands of South Georgia (54°S)—initially believing it to be the icy continent. After a few days of exploration, he discovered that it could be more than an island. However, the first explorer to reach the Antarctic continent was the Russian Fabian Gotlieb von Bellinghausen, in 1820. However, explorers from other countries, such as the USA, the UK, and France, were already very close to this feat. This was the case of the English William Smith and Edward Bransfield.⁵

During the nineteenth century, whale oil was the most coveted commodity in Antarctic waters, and there were few scientific expeditions in there that period. The first great scientific expedition came only in 1837, commanded by the French Dumont d'Urville. In 1838, the first official US expedition arrived, commanded by then Lieutenant Charles Wilkes. In 1839, the British expedition led by Admiral James Clark Ross,

with the mission of discovering the magnetic South Pole (Ross had discovered the magnetic North Pole in 1831).⁶

From the end of the nineteenth century, a series of scientific expeditions began to the continent, including during the Antarctic winter. This was the case of the Belgian Antarctic Expedition commanded by the Lieutenant of the Belgian Navy, Adrien de Gerlache, and the Norwegian Roald Amundsen as one of his officers, who remained from 1897 to 1899 trapped in that continent, although it was not an expedition with this intention. The first expedition that intentionally spent a winter on the mainland was the British Antarctic Expedition of 1898–1900, led by the Norwegian Carsten Borchgrevink, who remained with his group of 10 people in Cape Adare in the winter of 1899, in service of the British government.⁷

In the early years of the twentieth century, the race to reach the geographical South Pole becomes the challenge to be beaten. The feat was reached on 14 December 1911 by the expedition led by Roald Amundsen. Commander Robert Scott of the British Navy only reached the pole on 17 January 1912 but his expedition failed to survive because of the difficult weather conditions. The Polar Research Institute of the University of Cambridge (Scott Polar Research Institute), founded in 1920, and one of the most renowned in pole-related research, was named after him.

During this search for the Pole, the UK in 1908, the largest economic and military power in the world at that time, claims an area that not only contained part of the Sixth Continent, but even included the Falklands, these, already occupied by them since 1833. In 1962, after the entry into force of the Antarctic Treaty, the British government decided to separate this region into two separate territories. Since then, the British Antarctic Territory (BAT) corresponds to the British claim on the Antarctic continent, from 20°W to 80°W and from the parallel 60°S to the geographical South Pole, separate from the Falkland Islands Dependencies.⁸

During the World War II, it is possible to emphasize the accomplishment by the British based on the Operation Tabarin, in 1944/1946, officially to fight the presence of German ships in the waters Antarctic and sub-Antarctic. In fact, it was also to secure the country's interests over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas and the British Antarctic Territory. The islands have been a cause of dispute with Argentina since 1833 and, in 1940, Argentina had also claimed territory in Antarctica. During the War, Argentina, although formally neutral, showed a certain

approximation with the Nazi regime. At the time of Operation Tabarin that the UK established its first permanent stations on that continent.⁹ According to Haddelsey¹⁰:

In the minds of the individuals concerned, however, the real nature of the threat to British interests in the region was very different [...] The aggressor, they feared, was not Germany or Japan, but neutral Argentina.

The BAT is administered by the Department of Polar Regions attached to the Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, in London. Currently, the UK has three scientific stations in Antarctica: Halley (1956), Rothera (1975), and Signy (1947). Of the 14 British offshore territories in various parts of the world, the BAT is the largest of them (6 times larger than the entire territory of the UK). The June of 2012s document *Overseas Territories: Security, Success, and Sustainability* note the commitment of the British government to its territories. In the Introduction, Prime Minister David Cameron said “This Government is ambitious for our Territories as we are ambitious for the United Kingdom”. For the purpose of this study, it also seems relevant to cite part of the *British Antarctic Territory Strategy 2014–2019*, whose second strategic objective is clear by reinforcing the sovereignty of the country over its territory in Antarctica:

To promote the United Kingdom’s sovereignty of the Territory, including by increasing awareness of British current and historic interests in the region

Although no specific mention of Antarctica has been found, in the review of the British National Security Strategy, launched in November 2015, is predicted to be an assignment of the country’s Marines:

Royal Marines of 3 Commando Brigade who are trained and equipped to provide specialist amphibious and Arctic warfare capabilities.¹¹

In the same document, it is expected that the National Security Objective 1 “is to protect our people - at home, in our Overseas Territories and abroad, and to protect our territory, economic security, infrastructure and way of life”.¹² The two documents show Britain’s concern to defend its interests in Antarctica, considered one of its overseas territories, and

to have its marines ready to be employed in a polar environment. These British concerns about their Antarctic territory create a relative justification for the territorial claims of two other Antarctic countries.

Argentina

Argentina has been present continuously in the Antarctic region since 1904, with the weather station established on the Laurie Island. Its territorial claim ranges from the 74°W to 25°W, from the parallel 60°S to the South Pole (totally within the sector claimed by the UK and partially coincident with the Chilean sector). The Department Argentinean Antarctica is part of the Province of Tierra del Fuego, Antarctica and Islas del Atlántico Sur, whose governor is in Ushuaia. The first official Argentine maps showing the claimed territory were edited by the *Instituto Geográfico Militar* in 1940 and in the Official Atlas of the Argentine Republic, of 1947. The Argentine justification for territorial claim was based on historical reasons: occupation and geological considerations. They argue that there are records of the presence of Argentine seal hunters in the vicinity of the Antarctic Peninsula, at the time of Bellingshausen's arrival in 1820.¹³

As expected, World War II greatly reduced expeditions to Antarctica. Nevertheless, in 1940, Argentina and Chile, which are the closest countries of that continent (about 1000 km away from it), formalized their territorial interests, being the last two countries to claim territory in this continent. The intended areas coincided with each other and, in part, with the territory claimed by the UK, all considering the Antarctic Peninsula as belonging to their respective countries, as can be seen on the map (Fig 5.1).

It was the beginning of a period of serious problems among these three countries with respect to these areas, only partially resolved by the bilateral agreement between Argentina and Chile, where they recognized the claimed areas of one and the other. Besides that, there was not an agreement on the Antarctic Treaty, finally celebrated in 1959, which froze any territorial claim on that continent.¹⁴

In September 1974, the Argentine government instituted February 22 the date of the inauguration of the Meteorological Station (current Base Órcadas), on Laurie Island, as Argentine Antarctic Day. On that day, according to Law no. 20,827/74, the national flag would be raised to the top in public buildings of the Nation and there would be




Fig. 5.1 The Antarctic territorial claims (*Source* Map courtesy of the Australian Antarctic Division © Commonwealth of Australia 2008)

acts allusive to their considered inalienable rights of sovereignty over the Argentine Antarctic, in all educational establishments. At that time, the government, and especially the Argentine media, was concerned about Brazil's increased interest in Antarctica, especially with the territorial ideas of Professor Therezinha de Castro, corroborated by Federal Deputy Euripides Cardozo de Menezes.

Argentina's concerns about the territorial claims of Brazil in Antarctica were greatly reduced as a result of Brazil's accession to the Treaty, in 1975. The issue later involved the construction of the Itaipu Hydroelectric Plant

in 1979 and the Brazilian support to the Argentines on the conflict of 1982 against the UK, in the dispute for the Malvinas/Falklands Islands. Those measures finally changed the Argentine position in relation to Brazil on the subject of its presence in Antarctica, including the presence of Argentine officers aboard the ship “Barão de Teffé”, from the Brazilian Navy, on the first Brazilian scientific expedition to Antarctica in December 1982.¹⁵

The relationship of Argentine nationalism with the territorialist question was thus described by Argentine professor Vicente Palermo:

But nationalism is not the same everywhere. Ours has the peculiarity of being deeply territorialist [...] for an elite that had to govern a country of immigrants and plagued with localist sentiment, it was natural that from the beginning the common thing, what primarily identified us, was the soil, not language, history or reciprocal obligation pacts.¹⁶

According to Child,¹⁷ the Argentines have taken a series of measures to consolidate their claims to sovereignty in Antarctica, including the operation of radio stations, mail, and the establishment of entire families at their bases in the continent, including birth and registration of Argentines born in Antarctica. According to Colacrai,¹⁸ at the end of the 1970s, 10 families with 16 children were at the Argentinian Base of Esperanza, where children were born. Chile had a similar experience at Villa Las Estrellas, as part of the Eduardo Frei Base complex. Villa Las Estrellas was created in 1984, on the military government of General Augusto Pinochet, and still has about 200 people living there, with public school, mail, and even a bank branch.

Argentina maintains six permanent bases and seven temporary bases in Antarctica. The National Antarctic Directorate (DNA) and the Argentinean Antarctic Institute (IAA) are the institutions of the Argentine government responsible for the Antarctic programme of the country, including the carrying out of the expeditions and the operation of its bases on the continent. Both are linked to the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Chile

The third territorialist country analysed is Chile. The country's interest in Antarctica dates back to the earliest whalers and the Chilean support to several Antarctic expeditions, mainly from the port of Valparaíso, still

in the nineteenth century. In 1906, the country participated for the first time in a conference on the Polar Regions, in Brussels. In that same year, the Chilean government began negotiations with the Argentine government to delimit its sovereignty sectors in the Antarctic continent. As an Antarctic Commission was created, among other activities, it has issued the first permission for a Chilean businessman to fish in the waters near that continent. A fact of great historical importance for Chile was the rescue mission of the British explorer Sir Ernest Shackleton and the *Endurance* crew, in August 1916 (on the southern winter) on the Elephant Island, with temperatures close to -30°C .¹⁹

However, the territorial claim would only come in November 1940 and the first Chile official expedition, in the summer of 1946/1947. In this expedition, Chile installed its first base on the continent, the Antarctic National Sovereign Base (later called the *Base Capitán Arturo Prat*), in February 1947. In 1948, a second base was inaugurated, *General Bernardo O'Higgins*, with the presence of President Gabriel González Videla, first Head of State of any country to visit Antarctica, indicating the relative weight that the Chilean political power gave to the continent. It is worth mentioning that the territory claimed by the Chileans (between the meridians 53°W and 90°W , parallel 60°S and the South Pole) is officially considered part of the Region of Magallanes and the Chilean Antarctic, with the capital in the city of Puerto Williams, and it appears in all official maps of the country.²⁰

According to Pinochet,²¹ until the last moment of the negotiations on the Treaty in Washington D.C., the head of the Chilean delegation, Dr. Marcial Mora, reaffirmed the country's sovereignty over the Chilean Antarctic Territory, and soon after the ratification of the Treaty by the respective congresses of Argentina and Chile in June 1961, both countries issued a Joint Declaration, reiterating their willingness to resolve differences by peaceful means.

In 1963, Chile created its Antarctic Institute, directly linked to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and responsible for coordinating, planning and carrying out scientific activities in the Chilean Antarctic Territory. In 2003, the government transferred the headquarters of the Institute of Santiago to Punta Arenas, in order to politically strengthen the *XII Region of Magellan and the Chilean Antarctic*. In 2000, the current version of the Chilean Antarctic Policy was approved, whose first objective is *protecting and strengthening Chile's Antarctic rights, with clear geographic, historical and legal bases, is the first and most permanent task of the National Antarctic Policy*.

Chile currently has four permanent bases and four summer bases in Antarctica. The station called Base President Eduardo Frei, whose Aerodrome Lieutenant Rodolfo Marsh was inaugurated in 1980, is the main support for the Brazilian Ministry of Defence missions to that continent. Punta Arenas is also the main logistics point of support for the Brazilian Antarctic Program receiving the Brazilian ships and receiving the Brazilian Air Force aircraft before they can go to Antarctica.

Reinforcing the weight that the Chilean government attributes to the presence of the country in Antarctica, in January 2014, President Sebastián Piñera inaugurated the Union Glacier Scientific Station, a station operated only in the summer, which, together with the Kunlun Chinese Base, is the base closest to the geographical South Pole, where the US Amundsen-Scott Base is already located. In his speech, the Chilean President stated:

(...) we are the country with the closest geographical proximity to Antarctica, and even more, because the South American continent and the Antarctic continent have platforms that converge, which establishes Chilean sovereignty and rights over this continent.²²

As seen, the above-cited three countries maintain their interests in Antarctica, not giving up the territorial claims made more than seventy years ago. All the bases that these countries have on that continent are located within their respective claimed areas. Although the three Antarctic programmes are administered by the respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the armed forces of these countries have a close relationship with the programmes, including the direct administration of the bases, as in the case of both Argentinians and Chileans. In the case of the British, the presence during the summers of the Royal Navy HMS Protector, with the mission of providing a UK sovereign presence in the British Antarctic Territory, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands and their surrounding maritime areas, shows their availability of military means for the benefit of their sovereignty maintenance.

In the next section, we are going to offer an overview of how the Brazilian government deals with the Antarctic question, starting with a brief historical synthesis about the country's interest in that continent until its inclusion as part of Brazil's strategic environment.

ANTARCTICA AS PART OF THE BRAZILIAN STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Before properly starting the discussion about the inclusion of Antarctica in the Brazilian strategic environment, its meaning and repercussion in the Brazilian defence documents, some considerations on the history of Brazil's interest in Antarctica should be considered. Throughout the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, the Antarctic continent was the theme of only a few newspaper articles with the news of the achievements of other countries, as well as the logistical support for certain scientific expeditions in that continent, which used the port of Rio de Janeiro as a logistics stop. In May 1958, Brazil was not invited by the Americans to participate in the negotiations that would lead to the celebration of the Antarctic Treaty and, because of that, Brazilian representative sent a diplomatic note of protest to the government of the USA on 30 July 1958. In fact, the country had not made an expedition to Antarctica until that moment, as was the case in the twelve participating countries of the meeting.

The first Brazilian to step on Antarctic soil was Dr. Durval Rosa Borges who was invited by the Americans and was at the McMurdo Science Station between February and March 1958 to collect subsidies for his articles. During the International Geophysical Year of 1957–1958, the Brazilian Navy conducted scientific research outside the region considered Antarctic by the Treaty, which was south of the parallel of 60°S. In the Brazilian military milieu, the first record is a study made by Lieutenant-Colonel Wladimir Fernandes Bouças, of the Army General Staff, where he defended the position that Brazil should claim territory in Antarctica, forwarded in March 1955 to the National Security Council. This study was returned with the following dispatch: “the work had been examined with attention and interest, but no initiative on the subject seemed to be timely”.²³

The first relevant articles on the subject were published in the second half of the 1950s. In 1956, Professor Therezinha de Castro and Professor Delgado de Carvalho, both of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, at the time directly subordinate to the Presidency of the Republic, wrote to the *Revista do Clube Militar*, an article called “The Question of Antarctica”. The authors argue that Brazil should claim territory in Antarctica using the so-called Sector Theory (*Têoria da Defrontação*), which supposedly would entitle Brazil

to part of the Antarctic territory, considering the meridians passing through Martim Vaz and Arroio Chuí. In 1957, Therezinha returned to writing on the subject, this time without Delgado de Carvalho, also in the *Revista do Clube Militar*, now with the article entitled “Antarctica, the subject of the moment”.²⁴

After a decade of 1960 with few advances in relation to the Brazilian interest in the Sixth Continent, the decade of 1970 begins with a pronouncement, on 28 November 1970, in the National Congress, of the deputy Euripides Cardoso de Menezes defending the Brazilian rights to own a territory in Antarctica. Euripides, influenced by Therezinha de Castro, continues his campaign and presents a detailed work in the Superior War College (ESG), entitled “Antarctica: National Interests”, during his higher studies course, in that school in 1972, reaffirming the strategic importance from the mainland to Brazil.²⁵ On 7 September 1972, the Brazilian Institute of Antarctic Studies (IBEA), with headquarters in Rio de Janeiro, was created. Its main objective was to carry out the first Brazilian scientific expedition to Antarctica, which did not occur due to a strong boycott of the Brazilian government, which did not want an unofficial expedition to the mainland.

With pressures from society and the oil crisis of 1973, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE) sends an explanatory statement to President Ernesto Geisel on 28 May 1974, for the country to accede to the Treaty. Concerned about relations with Argentina, unstable for the construction of the Itaipu Hydroelectric Plant, Geisel only decided to join the Treaty on 16 May 1975.

After years of political indecision by the Geisel and Figueiredo governments in December 1982, the first Brazilian scientific expedition to Antarctica began, with the ships *Barão de Teffé*, from the Brazilian Navy, and *Professor Besnard*, from the University of Sao Paulo. In the same year, the Brazilian Antarctic Program (PROANTAR) was approved, which is headed by the Brazilian Navy through the Secretariat of the Inter-Ministerial Commission for the Resources of the Sea (SECIRM), in coordination with the Ministries of Science, Technology and Innovation, Foreign Affairs and Environment, among others.

In September 1983, Brazil became part of the select group of countries with voting rights in the Treaty meetings as an advisory member. The following year, the Antarctic Station Commander Ferraz (EACF), on King George Island in South Shetlands, was inaugurated. In February 2012, the EACF suffers a serious fire that killed two Navy personnel and

destroyed the Brazilian station. The presence of the country in that continent continued through Antarctic emergency modules and the ships of the Brazilian Navy. In August 2015, the Brazilian government signed a contract with a Chinese company to build the new station, expected to be ended in the summer of 2018–2019.

In the Brazilian official documents related to the theme of defence on Antarctica, there is only a brief mention in the National Defence Policy of 1996, as *to promote scientific knowledge of the Antarctic region and active participation in the decision-making process of their destiny*.²⁶ The document was launched even before the creation of the Ministry of Defence itself in 1999.

The term “Strategic Environment” appears for the first time in official documents in the National Defence Policy of 2005, in sub-item 3.1:

The subcontinent of South America is the regional environment in which Brazil is inserted. Seeking to deepen its cooperation ties, the country envisions a strategic environment that goes beyond the mass of the subcontinent and included the projection along the South Atlantic border and the neighbouring countries of Africa.²⁷

In relation to Antarctica, specifically, the 2005 National Defence Policy (PDN) did not bring any new developments when compared to 1996 document. It includes one of its strategic guidelines: “to participate actively in the decision-making processes of the Antarctic region’s destiny”,²⁸ similar to the already constant in the previous PDN.

The National Defence Policy (PND) of 2012, approved by the Congress in September 2013, brings the inclusion of Antarctica as part of the Brazilian strategic environment:

South America is the regional environment in which Brazil is inserted. Seeking to deepen its cooperation ties, the country envisages a strategic environment that goes beyond the South American region and includes the South Atlantic and the neighbouring countries of Africa, as well as Antarctica.²⁹

It is not specified in the document which part of the Antarctic continent is part of the strategic environment. Considering the great dimensions of that continent, this definition would be desirable in a forthcoming revision, in order to allow a coherent strategy of action with the country’s

objectives for that continent. It should be mentioned that among the eleven National Defence Objectives contained in the PND 2012, it is possible to correlate Antarctica in two of them: II, “defend national interests and Brazilian people, assets and resources abroad”; and VI, “intensify Brazil’s projection in the concert of nations and its greater insertion in international decision-making processes”.³⁰

The permanently occupied Brazilian scientific station, besides the presence of researchers in refuges and other points on the Antarctic continent, can be included in objective II, above mentioned. This leads to the need for the Brazilian Armed Forces to be prepared to act in the defence of national interests, if necessary. Considering that, the Treaty prohibits the presence of military personnel and military exercises on the continent, such preparation should be conducted in regions of similar physical characteristics, but not in Antarctica itself. However, what seems to be more relevant is to be clearly defined in the official documents which of the Forces must be equipped and qualified for operations in Polar Regions, in this case on the Antarctic continent, in order to protect national interests, if necessary.

With regard to objective VI, in order for Brazil to have more weight in the decision-making process regarding Antarctic matters, a greater investment in terms of scientific research and a greater effective presence in that continent is necessary. According to Brady,³¹ Brazil is not among the ten largest budgets for Antarctic programmes and in relation to scientific production: “at present, the Treaty remains effectively a select club dominated by the claimant nations and the Cold War warriors (USA and Russia)”.

In addition to the reconstruction of the Antarctic Comandante Ferraz Station, Brazil could already plan the second station, in another position, preferably with its own runway to support the Brazilian Air Force aircraft. India and China, two countries that also became advisory members only in the 1980s, already have larger Antarctic programmes, having two and four bases, respectively, on that continent. Brazil should make it clear to the international community that the inclusion of Antarctica as part of its strategic environment was not done by chance and that the country considers that continent as a region where it wants to “radiate its influence and diplomatic, economic leadership and military”.

In 2017, it was established an agreement between Chile and UK that reveals some of the controversies in between the South America countries: The Bilateral Dialogue on Antarctic Affairs (2017–2022). The

Declaración sobre la Ccooperación Antártica entre la República de Chile y el Reino Unido sets the joined actions from Chile and UK until 2022, and it was signed by the DIRANTARTICA (Chile) and Polar Region Department of Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK) representatives. The regime was planned to take place during the formal meetings of the Antarctic Treaty (RCTA) or the sessions of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR).

In this scene, although Brazil had been promoting the non-territorialist view of the Antarctic continent on behalf of its diplomatic view of the multilateral agreement on more beneficial approach to all parties and the region, cooperation in between actors of the South Cone is very limited. Fundamentally based on research cooperation agreements, parallel regimes were being built firming structures that reinforce the maintenance of the status of the Treaty, but that doesn't mean that prospective on the rethinking of the territorial claims won't be redefining understandings and legal instruments in the near future.

Proximity between the other actors outside of the Chilean, Argentinean, and UK claimed areas, like New Zealand and the USA, has been done in benefit of sharing services and joint research, and it's been a sign of regime consistency. Thus, with the existence of the territorialist states, there are still demands that, whenever treated by the actors, developments on the possibilities around the delimited areas are in place. This can be exemplified by an agreement between France and Australia that made possible the delimitation of the maritime borders or the joint initiative named *Antarctic representative system of marine protected areas*, of Australia, France, and the European Union.

On the other hand, regimes that were built to enhance development, environmental protection, or maritime and marine security among regional actors of the South Atlantic are aside those of the Antarctic Treaty. However, even with the agreement on the peaceful settlement between Chile and Argentina without considering solving the problems of the overlapping claimed areas in the Antarctic, it was possible to promote cooperation in between those countries. Nevertheless, cooperation between Chile and Argentina in Naval Patrolling environmental protected areas does occur for almost two decades (*Patrulla Antártica Naval Combinada*—PANC, since 1998), but this initiative could not represent consistently in favour of South American regimes involvement on the theme.

Maritime jurisdiction cases in between Argentina and Chile were present since the first expeditions to Antarctic were taking place, at the end

of the nineteenth century. If arbitration and negotiation were not successful between the parties in the 1970s years, the Falklands/Malvinas War led to creating a more important litigious with the British, although the Chilean had no good relations with them also.

COAMAS, the Coordination of de Maritime Area for South Atlantic, had been gathering those south cone partners on maritime exercises, simulations, and monitoring that are based on preparedness for combatting illegal commerce, trafficking, irregular immigration, illegal fishing, but also, humanitarian crisis like the natural disasters and effects on the environment. The 2017 Transamerica IX exercise count on Argentina and Chile collaboration among others, but could not, still, include Antarctic as possible agenda in terms of the common themes, such as research and environmental protection.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Of the seven countries claiming territory in Antarctica, before the Treaty was concluded in 1959, none of them has so far officially waived this claim. If scientific research for the benefit of all humankind is indeed the great goal of the presence of the countries on that continent, at first sight, it does not seem to make much sense for these territorial claims to be still in force. There is, then, the need to implement a comprehensive strategy for joint action by the various bodies involved. By including Antarctica as part of the Brazilian strategic environment, in its highest-level document in the field of Defence, Brazil is compromising itself with the future of its presence in that continent.

Antarctica is under the Antarctic Treaty regime, which is, according to Villa³² a set of norms and principles created by politically rational actors who have opted for cooperation and peace before having to opt for the less rational choice of reaching a conflict at the time of Cold War. However, if Baylis and Wirtz's statement is correct that "(...) in an international system without effective government, states will agree to laws when it suits them, but will disregard them when their interests are threatened"³³ the position of the territorialists becomes more coherent.

In this chapter, we have seen the position of three territorialists, which even after more than fifty years of the celebration of the Treaty, did not give up their claims. Argentina and Chile even make it clear in their official documents that the areas claimed in Antarctica are an effective part of their territories. In the case of the UK, the option was considered one

of the Overseas Territories but also is inside the umbrella to be eligible from the protection of the central government. Daniella Sampaio points out that,

Critical perspectives about the Antarctic Treaty has focused only on a colonialism reminiscence in Antarctic practices; and on how sovereignty claims should be addressed in the future for the sake of peace in the region. Post-colonial analyses identified that the claimant states still perform in similar terms to the times before the Treaty was signed. Science and environment protection would be used as power-control devices by claiming states to maintain their influence over their claimed territories.³⁴

In this sense, posture on claims may reveal that the Treaty is the best tentative to reinforce the model still in place but may not be a good way to deal with the future prospective. Postponing it and dealing with it laterally, submitting demands to different subcommittees and thematic regimes is quite a good approach to mark the non-solution model.

As already occurred in the sharing of the African continent in the late nineteenth century, the dispute over natural resources could result in the physical occupation of the Antarctic territory. Current interest in the Arctic (new sea routes and oil and gas exploration) gives us indications of what may happen in Antarctica by the end of this century.³⁵

Since 2012, the *Plan Antarctica* in Chile has put the country in one of the most important budgets for the unexplored continent, setting a long-term policy focused on science and as to ensure Chile as a gateway to Antarctic. It is worth to say, also, that Chile had evolved its capacities in order to guarantee its claims considering, as said from the Chilean authorities, that the region has valuable minerals such as coal, nickels, iron, and gold, but also, around 80% of the water reserves of the world. Then, the use of military means for peaceful purposes is what makes possible the plans, but also, makes relations more complex.

By 2048, when the subject of mineral exploration can be contested by a simple majority of voting members, or perhaps even earlier, countries like China and India, together with the USA, may propose the beginning of exploitation of strategic resources, bringing again the question of sovereignty in that continent. Countries that have claimed territory and still maintain this position, as is the case of the three analysed in this article, should try to exercise that sovereignty fully, which could lead to a conflict, as already happened in 1982, with the dispute over the Falklands/

Malvinas Islands—between Argentina and the UK, two countries which, by the way, have almost identical claims on the Antarctic continent.

Brazil does not seem to need to exploit mineral resources in Antarctica, at least for a predictable time horizon—considering the prohibition included by the amendment to the Treaty in 1991. For Brazil, the importance of Antarctica would be more related to other factors, such as the environment conditions, research and the security of the South Atlantic.

The meteorological influence of the Antarctic continent in the Brazilian climate seems to be a consensus on the part of the scientific community. A significant change in the environment of that continent due to a possible change in the current rules that prohibit mineral exploration can bring great negative impacts to the climate of Brazil, the sixth country geographically closer to Antarctica. The world population, currently at 7.3 billion, continues to grow, with an expected population of 11.2 billion in 2100.

With the inclusion of Antarctica in PND 2012 and the theme's deepening in the 2017 document as to increment Brazilian participation on the Antarctic scene decision-making process, Antarctic is definitely part of the Brazilian strategic environment plan. The government, with its the military apparatus, should plan the next steps of the Antarctic programme, taking a more strategic view, considering the status that the country aims for in the international scenario and the positioning of other interested actors in that continent. The country must discuss the Antarctic issue in more depth, not only from the point of view of scientific research but also from the point of view of defence and security. It is within this context of the debate that we consider the participation of society as a whole essential, especially through institutes and centres of strategic studies.

In the light of the contribution of other researchers, it is suggested that research should be carried out on the meaning of the concept of strategic environment, investigating the use of this concept by other countries. Findings suggest that there is an incremental³⁶ change in the way actors behave in such particular environment reducing eventual litigious. Thus, it may create more complexity in terms of the framework inside and outside the Antarctic Treaty, which finally can induce more robustness in the confidence system.

In addition, it is essential to set up and agenda to continue research on the presence of the other territorialist countries and the main actors

of the international system already present in the Antarctic, as is the case of the USA, Russia, China, and India. The future of that continent lies largely in the hands of these countries, who hold, together with the UK and France, the effective means of power to exercise their wills in the international system.

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Reflections on the Ends, Ways, and Means of Maritime Security Cooperation in the South Atlantic

Ralph Espach

At times of war, security cooperation at sea can determine whether a nation is blocked from critical resources, whether its ports and coastline are safe or under attack, and whether it can support operations abroad. Maritime security cooperation (MSC) can be critical to determining victory or defeat.

During peacetime, nations also engage in MSC. There are no boundaries at sea, and threats like storms, pollution, illegal fishing boats, smugglers, and pirates cross international lines. Cooperation at sea, from the sharing of information to the agreed-upon crossing of maritime borders in the line of duty, to actual joint operations, can enhance public safety and security. Money is saved, and effectiveness improved when neighbours agree to share information from their radars or sensors, operational infrastructure, lessons learned from recent operations, and intelligence. Security cooperation has strategic benefits: dialogue and cooperation on matters of security promote international understanding, confidence,

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and peace. For all these reasons, promoting and engaging in MSC are a great deal of what most coast guards and navies do on a daily basis.

And yet, at least in the USA (the country with which I am most familiar), the extensive operations of the US Navy, Coast Guard, and other forces to promote and support international MSC come frequently under question. Because these efforts are so diverse in nature and are spread across numerous forces, fleets, programme offices, and schools, their total cost is elusive. Measured against vague objectives, such as to strengthen partnerships, support regional stability, and enhance US access and influence, the effectiveness or benefit/cost assessment of security cooperation is difficult to know. One can observe improvements in a partner navy's capabilities, or its increasing involvement in cooperative international maritime security efforts, without knowing why those changes in action or attitude have occurred, whether they are likely to be sustained, or to what degree they reflect greater alignment with and affinity for US values and interests—or opportunism. In some cases, navy-to-navy ties are strong even while the broader bilateral defence and political relations are poor. In these instances, it is questionable how much MSC truly contributes to the achievement of desired end-states or is driven more by the professional and institutional interests of those forces themselves.

MSC can be cost-effective, especially when it involves the sharing of information and assets with nearby neighbours. In national waters, some aspects of MSC can be conducted effectively with the help of commercial maritime traffic. But operating outside of a nation's 200-mile economic exclusion zone (EEZ) raises the logistical, financial, and institutional costs of promoting cooperation. Transoceanic maritime engagement requires access to ports and operating locations, supply lines, ships, and administrative offices. It also requires a diplomatic and legal infrastructure for cost and risk management.

This chapter discusses the risks and potential benefits of greater MSC in the South Atlantic. It does so with a focus on Brazilian interests and efforts and approaches the topic with the assumption that Brazil could lead this endeavour, which in recent years has been the case. The issues discussed are informed by observation of MSC efforts by other navies, especially those of the USA, with partner nations around the world including in the South Atlantic. The aim is to bring to the attention some lessons from other nations' experiences promoting MSC, so that efforts in the South Atlantic enjoy a greater likelihood of success.

I approach MSC through a strategic and operational lens. When is MSC worth its costs and how can a navy reduce the associated risks of failure or frustration? More specifically, what costs, risks, and benefits does Brazil face when engaging in MSC with its Atlantic partners? The traditional conceptual framework common to strategic planning, of ends, ways, and means, provides structure for the discussion.¹

ENDS: WHAT ARE THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES OF MSC IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC?

MSC tends to be most advanced, and most successful in terms of building and supporting active, results-oriented cooperation, in cases where there is a clear threat or objective on which the various contributing nations agree. For example, several international task forces cooperate to deter and capture pirates in specific waters, such as in and near the Malaccan Straits and in the Gulf of Aden,² or to respond to migratory crises as several European maritime forces currently are doing in the Mediterranean Sea.³

When the strategic goals of cooperation are less relevant, or not completely shared, the cooperation tends to be less effective—though it may still continue. For example, during the late years of the Cold War, a leading objective of the US Navy and Defense Department for their MSC with South American partners was to build capabilities for anti-submarine operations. Because many of the partner forces and their governments preferred cooperation for other missions, their interest in MSC declined and the utility of the exercises and other MSC efforts fell. In recent years, the US Defense Department and US Southern Command have stressed in their MSC efforts with Latin American partners the objective of disrupting or interdicting the maritime flow of narcotics. The degree to which the partner nation and its navy or coast guard force are committed to that mission affects the results of those engagements.

This raises several questions: What are Brazil's objectives for MSC in the South Atlantic? Are they compelling enough to justify the investment and efforts required? Do its partners share those views?

Brazil and the South Atlantic

For Brazil, the South Atlantic is important for national defence, as a zone for critical economic activity, and as an operational theatre.⁴ Most of

Brazil's trade comes and goes by sea. That maritime traffic is economically vital to the nation, and its safety and security, as well as that of any other maritime industry and operator in Brazilian waters. There are also important economic resources in the ocean off Brazil's coastline: for example, oil and gas deposits, other minerals and seabed resources, and fishing stocks. Brazil's Navy must defend those resources from poachers and illegal exploitation. They also must try to stop nefarious actors from entering Brazil or exploiting Brazilian territory for their illicit operations. We also cannot ignore the possibility—however, remote it may currently appear—that in the future the South Atlantic may be a venue for military competition or conflict, as it was during World War II and the Falklands/Malvinas conflict in 1982.

All these missions except for the last—defence against a foreign military attack or intervention—are typically conducted by a coast guard-type force operating within a nation's 12-mile zone of legal territorial waters (TTWs) and, episodically when required, within its 200-mile EEZ. Virtually every nation of the world with a coastline has a coast guard-type force (many of which are called navies but are capable only of coast guard-type operations) to provide safety and security and for law enforcement at sea.⁵ Naval operations even at this scale are expensive and difficult to conduct. They require not just boats and trained crew, but logistical and communications systems as well as port infrastructure. Beyond this capability, relatively few nations support navies capable of operating on “blue water” or outside of their EEZs. Blue-water capabilities require another magnitude of expense and technological sophistication, and much larger and more specialized teams of personnel. Relatively few governments perceive a compelling reason to support such a significant investment.⁶

Although the navies of South America have conducted MSC for decades,⁷ Brazil's National Defense Strategy and other official statements of policy under the Lula da Silva presidency (2003–2011) elevated MSC within the South Atlantic as a key component of the government's vision of enhancing Brazil's role not only in regional affairs, but globally.⁸ That became even more marked when da Silva's Minister of Foreign Policy was appointed Minister of Defence under Dilma Rousseff presidency. Thereafter, he speeches several times about the relevance of ZOPACAS and other political and security regional initiatives to “multilateralise multipolarity”.⁹ Brazil perceived itself as one of a set of rising powers, including China, India, South Africa, and Russia, which would reshape

global geopolitics and the post-Bretton Woods international institutional system so that the benefits of international cooperation were more evenly distributed.¹⁰ This reformist vision was reflected in Brazil's support for the creation of several new international organizations which would exclude the USA and the countries of Western Europe and curb their influence, including the BRICS, UNASUR, and the CELAC.¹¹ Brazil also pursued a relatively active foreign policy, both within international institutions and by involving itself in international crises such as the fall-out from a coup in Honduras and efforts to contain Iran's nuclear weapons programme.¹² While the Rouseff administration was more inwardly focussed, and less ambitious in its actions abroad, this vision continued to shape the nation's foreign policy.¹³

One element of this more active global policy was increased economic, cultural, industrial, scientific, and defence outreach to their African neighbours. These efforts capitalized on Brazil's historic and cultural ties with several African (particularly Portuguese-speaking) nations. They built upon various existing agreements and projects between Brazil and other South American and West African coastal countries, including the Zone for Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS), recognized by the United Nations in 1986. They also further developed long-standing defence and military ties that Brazil had with Namibia and other countries.

The stated objectives of Brazil's commitment to the South Atlantic community included the promotion of regional development and shared security free from the presence of, and interference by, external powers. Although ZOPACAS was originally intended as an agreement to prohibit the development or passage of nuclear weapons in the South Atlantic, by the early 2010s its objectives were less well defined. Brazil's interest in reinvigorating the ZOPACAS grouping was not only driven by a desire to capitalize on and expand its growing trade, cultural, and political relationships with West African nations, but also in part a response to arguments from observers that the NATO alliance needed a new mission—because Russia was no longer seen as a threat—and that security cooperation across the wider Atlantic community, south as well as north, should be a part of that. Beyond a more prosperous and inter-connected community of neighbours, Brazil envisioned a sphere of strategic influence.¹⁴

Brazil's efforts to construct a South Atlantic security community through new ties with African governments and security forces created

some uncertainty in regard to its South American security relations.¹⁵ Brazil has cooperative security relations, especially in the maritime realm, with Uruguay and Argentina. Under the strategic concept of South Atlantic security cooperation, those relationships were assumed to continue, or improve, without explicit attention about how this was to occur. In reality, neither Uruguay or Argentina were investing in those years in naval capacity or security cooperation. During the 2000s and the early 2010s, the Kirchner governments cut the budgets and thinned the leadership of Argentina's defence sector and Navy. Although friendly with Brazil, neither regional partner shared Brazil's enthusiasm for enhanced relations with West Africa. Their foreign policies were more modest and focussed on regional issues, especially their evolving relations with Venezuela's President Chávez and the Bolivarian regional alliance he led.¹⁶

The Lula government and its strategic vision have receded into the history books, another cycle in a repeating pattern of ambitious foreign policies fuelled by high commodities prices, followed by introversion as the nation addresses the political and economic turbulence that comes with collapse. The Workers' Party (PT) governments of Lula and his successor, Dilma Rousseff, left behind an exceptionally destructive wake caused by rampant corruption at a staggering scale. At the time of writing, Brazil suffers from an economic recession and political turmoil, the result of an ever-expanding set of scandals related to kickbacks, bribes, and political-party slush funds from some of Brazil's largest and most lucrative state-associated companies Petrobras and Odebrecht. Since 2013 the budgets for Brazil's Navy and maritime security projects have been slashed. Also, Russian invasions in Ukraine and aggressive military actions in the Baltics have reinvigorated and refocussed the NATO alliance, so that presence and interests of external powers in the South Atlantic remains minimal. To the degree that Brazil can still invest in ambitious foreign policy initiatives, it is worthwhile to revisit Brazil's strategic interest in improving its ties and influence across the South Atlantic community.

Relations with Africa

What are Brazil's strategic objectives in West Africa,¹⁷ and what role can MSC—if successful—play in support of those objectives? If Brazil's interests in its relations with African countries are largely economic,

diplomatic (as political allies within the United Nations and other venues),¹⁸ and cultural, how do military relations and especially navy-to-navy relations support those interests? In the case of the USA, there is little evidence to support the belief that navy-to-navy engagement or cooperation significantly affect a partner nation's political or diplomatic behaviour towards Washington and its interests. It can help support efforts to promote partner nation purchases or use of US (or, in Brazil's case, Brazilian) maritime defence or security equipment, but is hardly necessary for the success of defence industry exports. Indeed, there is little evidence that MSC efforts during peacetime yield significant results beyond building navy-to-navy relations. Those inter-service relations improve familiarity and understanding and, if practised consistently, can build interoperability for cooperation on maritime security. But only in few instances does MSC contribute significantly to a strategic relationship.

Brazil may pursue MSC with African partners because it is interested in attaining a level of regular or permanent operational presence in West Africa. For that objective, MSC seems a more appropriate instrument. An active MSC programme in international waters or in the EEZs of other countries instils familiarity with those waters and their physical and human terrain. It requires the development of legal, diplomatic, and physical infrastructure and arrangements which widen the operational range of the navy. International engagement efforts to promote MSC can be viewed as training because they train personnel for future operations in those waters and with those partners.

Strategy is essentially about the building, sustaining, or weakening of coalitions and their use for accomplishing strategic goals. It requires careful consideration of the interests and calculations of other nations' leadership, and the institutions through which they operate. The prospects for MSC in the South Atlantic community depend upon the extent to which potential partner countries join Brazil in perceiving such cooperation as useful, and to what extent they have the political and material resources and institutional competence to contribute to that cooperation.

It is unusual for partner countries to reject security cooperation, especially MSC which does not require any foreign forces on land. MSC is essentially helpful for public security, and it often involves support or assistance from the partner in the form of new information and training. MSC with the USA tends to be well-received in part because it comes with US funding for the training and the required materials including

fuel, and it is often part of a larger programme to help equip and modernize a partner's forces to improve their operability with those of the USA. The US Defense Department sees such "capacity building" as important for its strategic interests and has dedicated funds for such efforts.¹⁹ Naturally, the effectiveness of those efforts largely depends on the degree to which the partner nation has its own strategic or institutional reasons to invest its own resources into improving its capacity. Often, benefactor nations place conditions on the MSC assistance which require that the receiving nation also contributes its own resources and effort.

A frequent refrain among US military planners and commanders in relation to security cooperation is: "You can't want it more than they do". This reflects a perception that the US military often spends more on promoting and supporting partnership than it gains in return from many foreign partners.²⁰ Brazil's planners must consider to what extent their vision of cooperation in the South Atlantic is shared by partners, or what elements of it are attractive to them, and to what degree.

A good point to begin from is to observe which countries already invest in maritime security and appear committed to improving their capabilities for maritime security, independent of prospects for cooperation. Many coast guards and navies are poorly funded by their governments and are limited operationally because of a lack of resources. Many are also poorly managed, so that the great majority of their costs go to pensions and salaries, not to operations or the maintenance or building of capabilities. In these cases—typical of most South Atlantic African nations—whatever security cooperation exists risks being largely one-sided: one partner will support the cooperation with its resources and most likely will define its scope and purpose, and the other will accept the cooperation as long as it comes with resources for its execution.

In this light, it would appear that prospects for MSC in the South Atlantic are significantly limited by two factors. First, most countries of the region have the barest of capabilities for conducting maritime security in their territorial waters within 12 miles of their coastlines, much less across their 200-mile EEZs. Many West African navies struggle to train, equip, and retain good personnel and incentivize good performance or to maintain and supply their boats and other equipment to keep them operationally effective.²¹ MSC can still be developed in these cases, but partner nations will tend to be receptive to MSC to the degree that others provide the resources. Until the forces' administrative and

institutional capacities are improved, it is difficult to improve their operational capacity.

The second factor is limited political interest or will to support or invest in MSC. Most countries of West Africa face developmental and political challenges that they perceive to be far more important than maritime security. Corruption and poor governance sap their national budgets. The weakness of their navies reflects a general weakness in national defence and law enforcement. Without a clear and present danger from the sea, they tend to pay little attention to maritime security matters beyond the most basic policing efforts of fishing, oil fields, or tourist zones. While capacity building efforts from partners like Brazil and the USA can certainly help them, whatever capacity is gained is likely to be limited and difficult for them to sustain into the future without further assistance.

The exception proves the rule. In recent years, the sub-region of the Gulf of Guinea has developed a relatively advanced degree of international coordination and cooperation on maritime security matters.²² This is partly the result of several years of consistent effort and investment by several external partners including the USA, France, the UK, and Brazil, among several international donors and organizations like the International Maritime Organization (IMO). It is also helped by the fact that a sub-regional hegemon, Nigeria, has the resources and the strategic interest—to protect its oil fields and other maritime resources from piracy and attack—to support these efforts regionally.²³ It is a relatively well-governed set of nations. They have the material and institutional capacities, and their own national interests at stake, to support active and productive participation in sub-regional MSC.

The naval exercises and security talks associated with the IBSA (a South-South political bloc including India, Brazil, and South Africa) present a contrasting case of MSC. Once touted as a bloc of rising southern powers eager to shape the rules of the international system more to their favour, over the years it has failed to develop beyond a series of high-level talks about partnership and other largely symbolic exercises of goodwill. None of these nations lacks capacity or resources. Each has a navy capable of blue-water operations. Rather, what chiefly inhibits security cooperation through IBSA is a deficiency of clear strategic interest and operational rationale.²⁴ Politicians find ideology alluring, but for strategists geography shapes destiny. The three nations are too far apart to face shared threats to their maritime security, and history does

not provide a common enemy or purpose compelling enough to drive commitment. India's national maritime security is most at issue within the Indian Ocean, South Africa is focussed on its surrounding waters and neighbours, and Brazil faces no definable regional rival or maritime threat. Indeed, each of these nations faces far more immediate and serious problems and security threats that demand the attention of their governments and security forces. Without a clear purpose for cooperation at sea, their efforts have not developed beyond dialogue and undemanding, periodic joint exercises.²⁵

Another example of a shared effort among a group of maritime nations willing and eager to cooperate, but with limited post-Cold War rationale for doing so, is the US supported annual naval exercise UNITAS, held since the 1950s in the waters of the South Atlantic (as well as along South America's Pacific coast). Over the decades, UNITAS has expanded and contracted in accordance with the capacities and resources of the South American navies and their perceived importance as partners for US global military interests. For the navies of South America, UNITAS presents unique opportunities for them to train and practice with relatively sophisticated systems and vessels. For the US Navy, UNITAS is about sustaining partnership and goodwill. With the end of the Cold War, the maritime threat to the US security from the south consists of smugglers of drugs and people, not warships. The US Fourth Fleet, which owns no warships itself and operates using whatever the US Navy and Department of Defense allocates annually to the fleet, has to be creative to find ships to participate in the exercise.

Relations with the North

There is at least one prominent exception to this general rule that the South Atlantic is a low-threat, low-interest region undeserving of significant naval attention and unlikely to support active MSC. The contention over the ownership and sovereignty of the Falklands/Malvinas Islands and other UK territories in the South Atlantic remains hot enough to complicate notions of an institutionalized regional security community. For Argentina, Brazil's vague notions of a South Atlantic security community contrast sharply with its ongoing conflict and persistent possibility of future military action to deter the deepening of ties between the islands and the UK. To the degree that a South Atlantic security community were, in fact, to develop and institutionalize, the community

would have to be prepared to state a position and operate accordingly in regard to this long-standing—and likely to be long-enduring—dispute. The respect for the political rights of self-determination is at play. Given Brazil's characteristic reluctance to take clear, decisive positions in other countries' disputes, the Falklands/Malvinas problem seems another obstacle to the realization of institutionalized MSC at the regional level in the South Atlantic.

At the present time, the lack of resources and common interests in the South is more disabling of MSC efforts across the South Atlantic than intervention from the North. Ironically, while initiatives like ZOPACAS and IBSA denounce (explicitly or implicitly) Northern security presence in the region, most member states of those initiatives participate in and benefit from programmes designed and resourced almost entirely by governments and organizations of the North.²⁶ USA and European maritime forces and organizations have resources, as well as the strategic interest, to help support and build MSC in the Gulf of Guinea and along the West African coast. Towards the eventual prospect of a region-wide security community, they are indifferent or mildly supportive and would most likely participate in one if invited. But for the time being, they are focussed on building regional capabilities to respond to actual threats in the trade routes and coastal areas.²⁷

Under the previous two administrations, a centrepiece of US national security strategies was the building of cooperation with capable regional partners who shared USA concerns with terrorism and other global threats, so that those partners could lead and support regional security cooperation.²⁸ The Trump administration's National Security Strategy, released in December 2017, shifts focus to countering China and Russia and de-emphasizes reliance on partnerships to achieve US security goals.²⁹ Regions and issues that are not viewed as being of direct relevance to these great power competitions, such as Latin America and Africa, are given short shrift. This indicates that, at least for the next few years, the USA is more likely to maintain its current, modest level of security cooperation activities in the South Atlantic, or even reduce it.

Given the current turmoil in trans-Atlantic relations, high states of tension with North Korea, Russia, and Iran, and ongoing conflict and instability in Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the South Atlantic is virtually assured of remaining off the USA and European to-do lists. Brazil and other nations contemplating a South Atlantic security community, or less ambitiously a regional MSC programme, are democracies and,

if not always friendly, at least certainly not enemies. The key objectives of ZOPACAS and other regional initiatives—to better protect regional economic interests and natural resources from the illicit activity—are in line with European and US objectives for the region. As long as the objectives and practices of such regional initiatives are in line with international law, common maritime practice, and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and as long as an outside power with questionable commitments to international law—namely China—is not actively involved, there is no reason the USA or a European nation should take issue with those initiatives. What Brazil and its Southern partners can expect from the North is the continuation of the current pattern of active, though very modest, regional presence in support of MSC.

To summarize, Brazil has clear strategic interests in building a regional coalition for MSC, one that expands its influence while improving regional safety and security. Brazil faces a challenge, however, in convincing its American and trans-Atlantic neighbours that such a coalition also serves their interest and, more pointedly, is worth significant investment on their part. Without local support and commitment rooted in those governments' and maritime forces' perceptions of their own interests, cooperative efforts are unlikely to achieve lasting improvements to their capabilities or to regional MSC. Regional partners must see that security cooperation with Brazil will help them address their own objectives, and provide for their security, and is not only an instrument for Brazil's aspirational foreign policy.

WAYS: HOW AND WHERE SHOULD SOUTH ATLANTIC MSC FOCUS?

If it is agreed that promoting MSC in the South Atlantic is Brazil's strategic interest, then Brazilian planners have to determine what are the best ways to pursue that cooperation. For example, Brazil can build on existing security cooperation frameworks and efforts, or try to create new ones. The framework or grouping can be exclusive to a set of countries, or inclusive. Brazil's MSC model can be transregional in scale, or instead, it can focus on specific sets of partners in specific sub-regions. It can consist mostly of periodic training and exercises, or it can include a full-time presence of liaisons, attaches, and advisors. It can include security

assistance in the form of donated equipment, materials, and funds to address capability deficiencies, or it can help partners with whatever limited resources and equipment they possess. These decisions can determine how much MSC is likely to cost Brazil's Navy and its taxpayers, at what risks, and what are the benefits it will likely achieve.

The South Atlantic is not without MSC already. The navies and civilian law enforcement authorities of South America already cooperate regularly and at a relatively sophisticated level. Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Argentina have participated in the Coordinator for South Atlantic Maritime Activities, or CAMAS, since 1959.³⁰ The location and leadership of the CAMAS rotate among member nations, but the organization provides a continuous venue for discussion and coordination in maritime security affairs, supports regional naval familiarity and partnership, and coordinates exercises and games to practice strategic planning. In addition, CAMAS provides a legal structure for the organization to assume leadership, in the case of war or another urgent need, over a joint regional maritime task force.

On the eastern Atlantic shore, in the Gulf of Guinea, another framework for MSC exists and supports operational communication and coordination.³¹ The region's offshore oil and gas industry, and its fishing industry suffer attacks from local pirates and insurgent forces and foreign illegal fishing fleets. In response, for several years countries of the region have cooperated with the United Nations, the IMO, and several external partners—chiefly the USA and France—to develop their individual and collective capacities to address the problems of underdevelopment and marginalization that drive such attacks, and the maritime security deficiencies in the face of these problems. The regional organizations Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Economic Community of Western Africa (ECOWAS) provided a political and legal framework that supported agreement, in 2013, on a Gulf of Guinea Code of Conduct regarding the importance of building capacity and operating in a coordinated way to address maritime security threats.³²

This process took several years of regional meetings among navies and security forces, and among political leaders. It built upon several preceding years of active maritime security assistance and training, from the forces of the USA, France, and Brazil, among others. The full implementation of the agreement still suffers from a lack of resources and capabilities among some partner nations and technical and cultural challenges to

the sharing of information. But the nations of the Gulf of Guinea, with significant outside help and direction, have made meaningful progress towards cooperating against maritime security threats they share.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC), centred on its largest member South Africa, has been talking for years about promoting regional MSC, and the heads of state of its member countries signed an SADC Maritime Security Strategy in 2011. Those efforts struggle to advance due to a lack of capacity and capabilities on the part of the member nations' navies and political indifference.³³

As a set, these three relatively well-developed regional initiatives or organizations for MSC indicate that the countries of the South Atlantic have only limited interest and resources to dedicate to maritime security, and where such interest exists cooperation is already underway. Particularly in West Africa, where national political and material resources are relatively limited, such programmes are likely to succeed only with significant outside resources and direction.

Given that several regional programmes exist already, at the sub-regional level, to develop, and promote MSC, and that the nations of the region have limited capacity to engage in such efforts, Brazilian planners should consider at what scale and in what areas it may best advance its own interests in further MSC.

Scope of Membership

Should Brazil pursue wider or more effective MSC at a level, or among a grouping, different from those which already exist and to which Brazil contributes alongside other partner navies? The Brazilian Navy in recent years has increased MSC via the Community of Lusophone Speaking Countries (CPLP in Portuguese) based on cultural ties, although that MSC spans an area broader than the South Atlantic. Under Lula, the Brazilian government promoted the 24-country ZOPACAS community as the key forum for its efforts. But such a forum is impractical due to its size. Advocating or supporting active cooperation among such a large group of diverse countries invites collective action problems. Furthermore, several members have demonstrated minimal interest in, commitment to, or capacity for maritime security operations. However, ZOPACAS does offer Brazil a largely passive, existing organization aligned ideologically with an anti-imperialist, reformist foreign policy agenda. If Brazil's strategic perspective has shifted after the

impeachment of President Rousseff and the emergence, for now, of a more centre-right government, then ZOPACAS would appear to have little to offer.³⁴

Another alternative is to continue to promote and contribute to MSC in partnership with other naval powers active in the South Atlantic from Europe, South America, or North America. The Brazilian Navy is an active participant and contributor to multinational MSC efforts in the Gulf of Guinea and elsewhere, some of which have begun to produce positive results. Another advantage, in addition to the proven effectiveness of such cooperation, is that such engagement with highly capable navies provides opportunities for exchange and learning for the Brazilian Navy while they also provide assistance to African partners. To the extent that the Brazilian Navy has an interest in expanding its international cooperation in other regions, as it has in recent years through cooperation in the Middle East with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) mission and other initiatives, such engagement with international navies helps build relationships and familiarity which will improve operational effectiveness in the future.³⁵ The drawback for Brazil, however, is that being an effective partner for MSC among several others, especially much larger naval powers like the USA, is effective in practical terms but will not allow Brazilian branding or the South-South symbolism that strategic planners would prefer.

Similar to the issue of inclusiveness or exclusiveness in regard to partners from outside the South Atlantic is the issue whether Brazil's goals for MSC require a transregional, South Atlantic initiative or whether they would be better met acting at regional or sub-regional levels in support of more specific MSC objectives. A transatlantic vision may be attractive strategically because it connotes a coherent geopolitical region and a sphere of influence for Brazil. It is less practical, however, given the significant diversity among the interests, capabilities, and relations of the countries of the South Atlantic. Until or unless the South Atlantic community faces a circumstance, problem, or common threat, one which aligns their thinking and drives them towards cooperation based on shared interests, real cooperation is likely to proceed only slowly. In practical terms of building maritime security capabilities more effectively, it is almost certain Brazil's Navy would be better off supporting existing initiatives and continuing to cooperate with others, at the sub-regional level, against specific problems.

Scope of Function

Planners and strategists must also consider what should be the best functional scope for cooperation. Would MSC efforts be most likely to succeed and achieve Brazil's objectives if they included various elements of maritime security or if they were more focused? It is simpler logistically and administratively for a navy or government to focus its offering of maritime security assistance to the delivery, training, maintenance, and support for a single platform or type of system, for example, a single type of patrol vessel or aircraft or system of sensors. Or maritime security assistance can be effective and simple if focussed on a particular capability or type of operations, such as fishing stock protection, port control, or offshore infrastructure protection. One capability essential for cooperation is the ability to collect, manage, analyze, and share information about shared threats or problems. In some cases, this capability requires technical assistance: regional navies need an integrated communications system. In many other cases, however, sharing is hindered by a lack of confidence, which can be addressed through joint training and the promotion of personal relationships. If there are shared regional demands for a particular area of operations or capability, and if the providing partner can offer expertise in that area, MSC efforts can be focussed to improve effectiveness. If the nations of the region have different needs and priorities, however, such a focussed approach can be limiting.

As in most other cases, Brazil is interested in promoting MSC in the region not only to address regional threats, but also in part to promote its domestic defence equipment producers. For this reason, nations engaged in security cooperation generally prefer to train partners on the use of their domestically produced systems and equipment to establish long-term partnerships and improve interoperability. Security cooperation often goes hand in hand with security assistance, in which nations donate or finance the sales of domestic equipment to their partners, in order to bolster partnerships and domestic industry. Brazil has long-standing defence cooperation relations with some African nations, such as Namibia, which have included the sale and donation of Brazilian equipment. Other nations in the region could likely benefit from purchasing Brazilian-made equipment and systems. Do Brazilian defence equipment suppliers produce sea or air platforms that are simple to operate, easy to sustain, and are appropriate for the missions and requirements of African partners? The Tucano and Super Tucano aircraft,

for example, have proven highly desirable worldwide. An Embraer aircraft suitable for sustained maritime patrolling, for example, or a shallow-draft and fast coastal patrol vessel could be useful assets to leverage in the promotion of South Atlantic interoperability for MSC. On the other hand, security cooperation that primarily consists of training can also be effective for building partner capacity, improving trust and affinity, and promoting regional security cooperation. By far, most US security cooperation efforts in the Americas and in Africa are of this sort, limited to training and relationship-building and do not involve significant transfers of equipment.

It would appear that the most practical approach for Brazil in its promotion of MSC in the South Atlantic would be to continue the pattern of recent years: contributing to wider cooperative efforts, including those which involve external powers, as well as supporting bilateral initiatives where it can. In South America, Brazil and its partners can benefit from building upon decades of institutionalized MSC, which involves not just CAMAS and regular joint training but even cooperation in defence equipment production and acquisition. In Africa, the idea of building regional MSC in areas or with countries, where the USA, the UK, France, and other external actors have not, would leave Brazil with little leverage or opportunity beyond anti-imperialist rhetoric. In a world free—for the time being—from great power conflict, security cooperation occurs more in a voluntaristic market setting than in a context of exclusion or domination. The nations of West Africa, like those of South America, benefit from training, assistance, and cooperation from and with numerous partners, on bilateral and multilateral bases. Brazil should seek areas and capabilities of comparative advantage, where Brazil's forces and experts offer special value or can capitalize on exceptional relationships. Opportunities for helping build partner capacity alongside other advanced navies can also allow Brazilian forces to train and learn alongside other advanced military counterparts.

MEANS: HOW MUCH MSC PROMOTION CAN BRAZIL AFFORD?

A serious discussion about the means—the resources and equipment—which Brazil's forces could apply to promote or enhance MSC in the South Atlantic is beyond the scope of this essay. An obvious point, however, is that in the current context of an economic recession and tight budgets, resources for these efforts are likely to be scarce and a premium

will be placed on approaches that can accomplish greater confidence and cooperation at lower cost.

This complicates the delivery of security cooperation that requires the operation of Brazilian ships or aircraft. The costs of personnel, equipment use and maintenance, and fuel for security cooperation missions reduce the forces' capacity for other, more urgent operations such as disaster and threat response. However, MSC need not require an expeditionary deployment. Brazilian technical experts, operators, planners, and other types of advisors and trainers can offer support working locally in the partner forces' own facilities and using their equipment. Brazil has provided such on the ground assistance and training to the Namibian Navy since 1994 and just in 2014 opened a new naval support mission in Cape Verde.³⁶ In some ways such assistance, if welcomed, can be especially valuable. Full-time, on-site liaisons and trainers and experts can build personal relationships that instil confidence and affinity and open channels for future communication and cooperation with partner-nation leaders. They can also be an excellent source of insight into the partner's needs and deficiencies, helping to inform and improve Brazil's future security cooperation efforts.

As discussed before, one persistent challenge for forces providing security cooperation and capacity-building assistance is the assessment of the effectiveness of those efforts. Security cooperation, especially with smaller, less operationally capable partners, pursues objectives like "stronger partnership" that are relatively unfamiliar and vague for military planners and evaluators. They are also lower priority missions for militaries and rarely draw the type of interest and scrutiny from senior leadership which do combat-related missions or the operations of major assets. As a result, in many cases, cooperation efforts are poorly understood and evaluated, seldom assessed for improvement, and they often fall well short of meeting broader strategic objectives. To overcome such tendencies, Brazil and its South Atlantic partners would be well-served to consider investing in teams and offices of security cooperation managers, one responsibilities of which would be to plan, monitor, and evaluate the effects of their efforts in regard to strategic goals. Another role for this office would be to collect and manage the information that Brazilian trainers, experts, and other officers learn while engaging with their foreign counterparts, use that information to refine and focus their security cooperation efforts, and act as liaison with the intelligence branch.

The fact that the Brazilian Navy may need to approach MSC with its South Atlantic partners with smaller operational budgets costs than other major navies can work to its advantage. The US Navy, for example, often conducts security cooperation using relatively advanced US equipment and larger ships—because these are what it typically uses and has available—reducing the effectiveness of the cooperation. Building capacity and interoperability are most effectively done at the lowest common level of technology and sophistication, and building upward from there. In many cases, the most useful form of cooperation is to help a partner develop simple new practices (e.g. records-keeping on maintenance and parts supply, regular cleaning and revision of equipment, proper storage) to improve their application and maintenance of existing equipment. Such advising does not require much more than an officers' salary and per diem while working abroad. If budget limitations push Brazil in the direction of taking a more individual-level, less capital-intensive approach to building partnerships and MSC in the South Atlantic, this could help improve the effectiveness of its efforts. One especially cost-effective approach to building security cooperation is to welcome foreign military officers and personnel into your national defence schools, so that they can train and learn alongside your own. The USA does this at great scale, with military and civilian students from around the world. The Brazilian armed forces have also, increasingly, opened slots in their schools for African military students.

Ultimately, Brazil's MSC efforts in the South Atlantic will be shaped by its forces' own capacities and capabilities for maritime security. Brazil's navy and other forces, like those of any other nation, will be most successful at promoting security cooperation in capabilities and using practices and systems on which it trains and operates itself. Effective trainers and advisors present knowledge and practices they learned over years of operations themselves. One significant advantage US trainers and advisors have, in conducting training with less-practised forces, is that because US forces have been at war more or less consistently for many years they can present lessons learned from years of operational experience including under fire or in harm's way. Thankfully, given the security environment in the South Atlantic, MSC in the region need not involve training or practice for major combat operations. Still, Brazil's efforts at building MSC will be most effective and most welcomed by partners if it involves capabilities in which Brazil excels and which it practices routinely.

Brazil can improve its effectiveness for MSC in the region by improving and expanding its own maritime security capabilities in its own waters. More frequent patrols and actions against illegal fishing or smuggling in Brazil's major river systems and in the Amazon delta build a wider population of officers with experience and expertise at such operations. Those officers make the best advisors and promoters of MSC abroad. Greater monitoring, surveillance, and analysis of maritime activity and potential threats along Brazil's coastline and around its key ports, and more practice in sharing that information and analysis with interagency and foreign partners, will improve Brazil's ability to assist or advise other nations in creating their own maritime domain awareness. Put simply, Brazil can train and advise for MSC only in proportion to its own experience practising MSC. Brazil's forces and Ministry of Defence can improve their future capacity for supporting and promoting South Atlantic MSC by engaging today more effectively and innovatively in MSC with their long-standing maritime security partners in the Americas.

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The African Way of Warfare and Its Challenge to the South Atlantic Security

Igor Castellano da Silva

INTRODUCTION

The increasing levels of maritime insecurity in African coasts have like one main cause the continent's continuous state of war. Nonetheless, most analyses on South Atlantic security do not carry a clear notion of African conflicts and their possible impact in regional maritime security dynamics. This may occur due to two main factors. First, the analyses produced on South Atlantic security issues are constructed through an outside-in focus, regarding either the expertise of the analysts or the object of analysis. Many authors that currently incur studies on South Atlantic security lack extensive expertise on African history, politics, sociology, and security—what is reflected in the literature they refer to in their work. Moreover, Africa usually serves either as a forgotten coast of the Atlantic lake or as an object where interactions occur, mainly determined by extra-regional powers and factors. Local politics and organizations are not regularly considered as agents of security dynamics itself, with the exception perhaps of non-state armed groups.¹

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Secondly, analyses on South Atlantic security often ignore African conflicts also because there is a lack of effective and conclusive assessments on the characteristics, causes, and consequences of African wars. Lack of theoretical and empirical knowledge may produce myths about reality based on what we believe to be true referring superficial images and personal preconceptions. About Africa, this has been the rule since colonial enterprise and is well established even in popular literature and cinema. Although recurrent, world attention to African conflicts is selective and sporadic. The narrative on the wars in Africa generally reproduces a limited view, based on the humanitarian impacts of violence and the more grotesque characteristics of the irregularity of the belligerent groups. The need to draw public attention to the forgotten continent is often privileged, to the detriment of the lucidity of strategic and operational aspects of the war in Africa.

Even in the academic field, fatalistic interpretations give Africa a special account of exotic place, where ontologically different political and social processes develop. Consequently, African wars have been widely described as an apolitical, domestic, and locally constricted phenomenon. In this view, African armed conflicts are a matter of personal and irrational disputes, with no political objectives in evidence. Moreover, they do not represent an aspect of international politics, and when they do, this is based on extra-regional influence and not on complex regional dynamics.² There is also a scarcity of broad and systematic analyses that compare the characteristics of the armed conflicts in the continent and that explain and contrast the main hypotheses available in the literature about their causes and systemic effects. The analytical deficit is liable to undermine the assessment of the impact of responses to African wars and the development of sustainable solutions. Therefore, the limits of comprehension on African wars challenge clear assessments of how international dynamics linked to African security, including maritime security, especially on the South Atlantic coast, have developed, will develop, and can be dealt with effectively.

In this chapter, I argue that a better comprehension of the characteristics, causes and consequences of African conflicts, are a necessary condition for a useful understanding on current and future dynamics of South Atlantic security. Any possibility of South Atlantic regional maritime governance has its odds shaken by the recurrence and scale of the wars in Africa. Moreover, what is most striking, the blurred view

of African conflicts, their political, institutional, and regional basis, are a primary cause for the incomprehension of their systemic causes and for bringing about more sustainable responses, in land or sea. To contribute to overcoming this challenge, I tried to organize the secondary literature that approaches Africa wars and contrast them with the empirical research I have produced in the last eleven years. This includes assessment of documents and databases obtained in Brazil and in field research in southern Africa (South Africa, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe) in two occasions, in 2011 and 2013. Based on this theoretical and empirical research, I sustain, in opposition to many popular accounts, that the prevailing wars on the African continent and its notorious complexity and irregularity constitute a security triad. This triad involves, in a relatively integrated way, the increasingly significant presence of irregular groups and non-state actors in armed conflicts; the permanence of proxy warfare and significant interstate rivalries; and regionalized conflicts capable of articulating regional systems. Their more systemic causes and effects are related to the process of state-building in the continent, and its interaction with regional transformations and extra-regional penetration, and more effective responses need to be concerned to state self-strengthening reforms and regional involvement. Such understanding can bring essential lessons for the maritime security of the African Atlantic coast, particularly in understanding the central roles of African regional organizations (ECOWAS, SADC, GGC).

I organize the chapter in the following structure. The first section seeks to assess the unbalance of scope between generality and particularity in analysing African armed conflicts, what I call the distance-proximity paradox and proposes a cautious adoption of three concepts that may contribute to overcoming this challenge. They are complex irregular warfare, proxy war, and regional security. The second section identifies the distance-proximity paradox in practice, through observation of common misconception in the characterization of African wars, as well as reductionist views on their causes, consequences, and resolution alternatives. In the third section, based on empirical data, I present the most relevant qualitative characteristics of the wars in Africa, which comprehends the security triad of regionalized irregular proxy warfare. Based on this new interpretation of the aspects of African wars, the chapter also proposes a more comprehensive systemic view of causes,

consequences, and possible resolution alternatives for African armed conflicts. The general conclusion returns to the complexity of characteristics and causes of the phenomenon of war on the continent and presents lessons to be learned from the perspective of South Atlantic maritime security.

CONTEMPORARY WARFARE AND THE DISTANCE-PROXIMITY PARADOX

Evaluating characteristics of wars has been one of the main tasks of strategic studies. In the specialized literature, there is a multiplicity of classifications for armed conflicts, each with a main focus, which prioritizes specific variables identified in the conflagrations to establish a particular typology. For example, Antoine-Henri Jomini, Claus von Clausewitz and, much more recently, John A. Vasquez have produced general and popular classifications, widely adopted in the strategic studies literature.³ Other classifications that take multiple variables can be found in the literature of law, history, and political philosophy. In a synthetic effort, Luigi Bonanate⁴ divides types of war into five essential elements: agents of conflict, how force is used, type of weaponry, objectives in the war, and dimensions (scale) of war. Also, international powers have proposed classifications that are appropriate to their strategic priorities. For instance, military doctrine in the Indian Army classifies wars according to their degree of violence, highlighting nuclear war, and peacekeeping operations.⁵

Efforts like those may serve as an excellent instrument to clarify characteristics of wars, and inform inferences on their causes, consequences, and commitment to implement their resolution. Nonetheless, many attempts of classifications have their limits to apply to reality, as any typological enterprise.⁶ Most difficulties occur if the lenses adopted to observe reality produce concepts that are not in a balance between extension (generality) and intension (particularity).⁷ In the case of Third World and African conflicts, one of the main difficulties involved in observing the characteristics of armed conflicts is the axiom of differentiation. This presupposes that social processes and current armed conflicts in Third World, in general, and Africa, in particular, are substantially different from any other experience in other time or space. As a consequence, Africa is a stage of unique kinds of social relations,

political individual, and groups, including new forms of warfare, which carries *sui generis* characteristics, causes, and consequences.⁸

This axiom leads to a research paradox, which can be verified in several studies regarding the continent, specifically in the security field. I call this research paradox the distance-proximity paradox. Its logic is the following: the particularities of African political dynamics are such that they must be analysed through reductionist theories, which highlights micro-scale processes with few considerations to more systemic and complex dynamics. As a result, efforts to investigate more structural processes, in their particular contexts, are disregarded in advance. Then, by discarding systemic theoretical perspectives, accounts on characteristics of social interactions, including violent conflict, ignore critical empirical evidence that show that the local particularities also carry regular mechanisms, which are observed elsewhere in human interactions. Paradoxically, theoretical accounts are reduced to consider small-scale processes (proximity) and, following reductionism, empirical evidence ignore structural processes and stay distant from many aspects of regional reality (distance).

Many concepts related to war in Third World have the potential to contribute to overcoming these difficulties. Three of them are irregular warfare, proxy war, and regional security. These concepts may be used to evaluate particularities of the region and relate them with general categories regarding, respectively, the way of using force, the type of belligerents, and the geographic scale of conflicts. Nonetheless, their usage still produces some deficiencies that may reproduce the distance-proximity paradox, as shown below.

Regarding irregular warfare, since the end of the Cold War, and especially after the 11 September 2001 attacks; Anglo-Saxon literature has increasingly assessed this phenomenon and adopted the concept of complex irregular warfare (CIW), introduced by the British think tank International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).⁹ In general terms, the recurrence of irregularity in contemporary warfare demonstrates generational aspects. For some analysts, contemporary war is the fourth generation war (4GW), characterized by the end of the state monopoly on war, the proliferation of non-state armed groups in inhospitable environments, the intensification of decentralization and the increasing importance of cultural factors and differences.¹⁰ Information and the media would play increasingly strategic and organizational roles in the

war. Gaining opinions and visions of people, their hearts and minds, becomes an increasingly vital part of strategic communications in the network environment of transnational networks, owned by Network Centric Warfare.¹¹ Furthermore, with the reduction of the role of the state as a central actor in the war, the world would be experiencing new wars.¹²

Nonetheless, when applied to current and local specificities, the concept of irregular warfare may still reproduce the distance-proximity paradox. Firstly, irregular warfare may seem so different from modern warfare experience and so brutal and apparently illogical that their basis could be considered singular. Relevant voices contrast this view and argue that, despite its specificities, irregular warfare is not unprecedented, and represents an incomplete and macrohistorical movement of institutionalization and modernization of war.¹³ Nonetheless, war remains, as in any era, a clash of politically interested forces, integrating, in a more or less institutionalized way, political organization, socio-economic basis and means of using force, as advocated by Clausewitz¹⁴ and his relevant readers.¹⁵ Secondly, there is a common misconception of equating irregular war with asymmetric warfare,¹⁶ although irregularity of means does not necessarily involve asymmetry of forces.¹⁷ The conceptual problem may generate difficulties in the observation of real manifestations. If irregularity means asymmetry, it tends to direct analysis away from observing interstate disputes. It refers only to the interaction between state and non-state groups, remains a big problem to identify cases between belligerents with an equivalent level of power, including through proxy war.

The second concept that has the potential to overcome the distance-proximity paradox in the analysis of Third World warfare is a proxy war. This is an armed conflict in which there is a relationship of support, to a greater or lesser extent, from one lead actor to another proxy—and in which the former seeks to avoid direct participation and responsibility for war. The leading actor provides the proxy with material assistance in varied types and scales, which presupposes a minimum of coordination of activities, and advantages obtained by irregular groups. The primary concern of generic proxy warfare is to maintain plausible the deniability about involvement to avoid surplus costs. Proxy armed conflict works as a rational option to reduce the military, economic, and political costs of interstate warfare. Proxy war

allows foreign actors to advance their interests in foreign territories while remaining secure and relatively distant.¹⁸ Other essential logic of proxy warfare is that it involves a relationship of asymmetrical interdependence between principal and proxy, although proxy autonomy varies according to the characteristics of the conflict and the primary source of rivalries (domestic, regional, or global).¹⁹ Finally, proxy warfare is a hybrid conflict, not a mere insurgency because the support from outside allows insurgent groups to deal symmetrically with the national gendarmerie or guards.

Two problems also affect the concept of proxy war, which help the reproduction of the distance-proximity paradox. The first problem lies on the common idea that proxy wars are an instrument limited to great powers. In fact, it was a widely used instrument adopted during the Cold War, through the creation of zones of influence by the superpowers and support to countries and armed groups in conflict regions.²⁰ Nonetheless, proxy warfare remained present in the post-Cold War period and as an instrument of any country or group.²¹ A second problem, derived from the first, relates to how to measure and identify proxy war in a regional scale. Despite being a real phenomenon, proxy war as a concept remains forgotten or used in a less than rigorous way, and many accessible databases on types of warfare have responsibility on that. The current marginalization of the concept of proxy war implies the shortcoming of some relevant indexes, such as: the Correlates of War (COW) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/International Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) databases; in establishing where the interstate wars begin and where the civil wars end.²²

Regional security is the third concept that may contribute to the reduction of the distance-proximity paradox in analysing war in Africa. The idea of regional security as the main level of security dynamics of states, mostly for non-global powers, dating back to the 1980s.²³ With the end of the Cold War, and the temporary reduction of global disputes across most regions, the regional security complexes became one of the primary objects of analysis of security studies.²⁴ Particularly in the Global South, the regional security complexes (RSC) model provides a systemic analytical framework that opens the possibility of observing the interaction of domestic, regional, and global actors, processes, and structures, guided by comparative generalities and local specificities.²⁵

Nonetheless, profound knowledge of local and regional dynamics, and their possible connection to more general comparative concepts, should govern this promise of overcoming the distance-proximity paradox through regional security studies. The objective dilemma is how to analyse regional dynamics in a regional scale, which may present lower intensity than global relatives but profound regional impact. Moreover, a second challenge is how to identify processes usually unknown to the standard IR literature, which has always ignored Global South as a legitimate object of study.²⁶ This task is not still well succeeded. For instance, in analysing the African cases, Barry Buzan (the father of RSC theory) and Ole Waever do not give convincing answers of why regional security complexes do not exist or are in an early stage in some African regions, such as Western Africa and the Horn of Africa.²⁷ Some analysts have already reported this and other misconception, revealing both the challenge of adapting general concepts to local particularities but also the concrete possibilities of the studies on regional security to gradually produce new and better knowledge, which may fight the distance-proximity paradox.²⁸ Nonetheless, further efforts must evolve to address common misconceptions on characteristics, causes, consequences, and the sustainability of responses of African wars.

THE WAR IN AFRICA: BASIC MISCONCEPTIONS ON THEIR CHARACTERISTICS, CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND POSSIBILITIES OF RESOLUTION

Despite their definition and operational challenges, the three concepts of irregular, proxy, and regional warfare may contribute for a better and brighter understanding of the characteristics of African armed conflicts, as well as their causes, consequences, and options for their resolution. Nonetheless, various analyses currently reproduce the above-mentioned distance-proximity paradox and fail to provide consistent evaluation of African warfare. That occurs, at least, in three aspects: the characteristics and significance of irregularity in the use of force, the complex network of alliances and strategic rivalries, and the regional systemic nature of the armed conflicts in the continent. Many observations on African wars often highlight their apolitical, exclusively internal, and local-constricted character. The interpretation of the characteristics of African warfare influences the analysis of their causes, consequences, and resolution forms. This section presents the common, and mythical, evaluation of Africa's warfare.

Analyses of armed conflicts in Africa currently carry a perspective of apolitical wars. Namely, those conflagrations are characterized by naturally atavistic aspects, in which the brutality and irrationality prevail and are the primary explanation for the recurrence of crude violence, massacres, and genocides. This perspective is usually connected to interpretations about causes and origins of conflicts situated in essentialist variables, such as ethnic, tribal, and religious differences. This natural heterogeneity, combined with supposedly irrational behaviour (not considering actions and consequences, costs and benefits), would naturally be translated into a particular kind of violent conflicts, belonging almost exclusively to Africans and so-called uncivilized peoples. Here, the idea of armed conflicts irregularity in Africa presupposes that they have their own apolitical/irrational logic, especially in cases involving religious fundamentalism/terrorism. For instance, Robert Kaplan (1994) relates Third World conflicts, particularly in Liberia and Sierra Leone, with cultural clashes, environmental degradation, and resources competition that produce armed conflicts marked by banditry and disorder.²⁹ Love (2006) connects war in Africa to differences in religious beliefs, especially forms of beliefs inclined to violent behaviour. Donald Horowitz (1985) situates ethnic divisions, capable of mitigating the very notion of civility, at the centre of violent conflict causes, including in Africa.³⁰ Most striking is Jeffrey Gettleman's (2010) vision, which assumes that wars in Africa are not wars in the traditional sense, because they are naturally irrational, marked by unclear objectives and ideology and limited to brutality and crime.³¹ To sum up, there is a structural and robust view in the literature that African conflicts are not wars according to Clausewitzian terms because they are outside the matter of states, armies, and nations.

Here I reach the second misconception of the general view on Africa warfare. Since the 1990s, the powerful idea has been that armed conflicts on the continent are exclusively intrastate, that is, civil wars between states and domestic groups. In addition to journalistic narratives, academic texts also assume this view. Ibrahim Elbadawi e Nicholas Sambanis (2000) equalize the war in Africa to civil and ethnic disputes. Luís Ivaldo Santos³² argues that nearly every African war has been intrastate, besides pointing out that few experienced external incentives. Clarence Tshitereke³³ situates African wars primarily in the state-society relations, specifically related to civil conflicts resulting from reduced state autonomy. The widespread adoption of the concept of civil war to characterize African war several times ignores more subtle interstate rivalries

and disputes, mainly because they are distanced from the local reality and informed by the experience of the strategic interaction between the great powers. When state business is included, the central aspect considered is the global politics. Proxy warfare in Africa is a matter of great power scramble for the continent, while the African countries are commonly viewed as passive objects in a world of extra-regional subjects.

To conclude, the regional dimension of African war is regularly ignored. As for whether it was always localized and did not follow regional systemic patterns. Richard Jackson,³⁴ for example, reduces the international dimension of African war to the possibility of intervention and the eventual extrapolation of armed conflicts primarily located in a single state. Likewise, as mentioned above, Buzan and Weaver³⁵ consider the security dynamics in West Africa and the Horn of Africa to be insufficient to compose real regional security complexes, despite the fact that the region's securitarian interaction and armed conflicts are visibly regionalized.

Narrow interpretations of the characteristics of Africa's way of warfare may produce a reductionist explanation of its causes, consequences, and prospects of the solution. Recent studies have sought to assess the different reasons for the occurrence of armed conflicts in Africa, both in a quantitative perspective, by looking at significant associations,³⁶ and in a broad qualitative way.³⁷ Despite the increased interest in Africa conflictive environment, most analyses sustain a limited comprehension regarding the structural dimension of its causes. As a consequence, a focus on causes of African wars is still predominant, producing particular problems for a convoluted interpretation of the phenomenon. Three sets of causes are more regularly considered for war occurrence in Africa.

Firstly, the most current set of analyses highlights *social factors* as direct causes of the African wars. Among them, there is the complicated relationship between ethnicity and armed conflict,³⁸ the precarious sense of collective identity and national belonging³⁹; the contradictions resulting from the process of modernization/westernization; and inequalities in civil, political, and social rights as a result of policies of co-optation and marginalization of different populations.⁴⁰ The problem with that explanation is its possible reductionism, related to any mono-causal accounts, as well as the possibility of readings that African wars are apolitical, as discussed above. Although aspects of symbolic and identity conflicts are relevant to the understanding of African wars, more critical studies argue that such factors are not necessarily primordial/natural,⁴¹

nor do they denote the inexistence of rationality and interests on the part of political actors.⁴² Even in the actions of groups linked to Muslim religious fundamentalism (e.g. Al-Shabbab, Boko Haram) or Christian (e.g. Lord's Resistance Army), such values and ideas are translated into interests defined both from the existential point of view (present-aim rationality) and by the calculation of cost, benefit, and available resources (self-interested rationality).⁴³

The second set of explanations for war in Africa is on *economic and development issues*. Studies attempt to relate the profusion of wars on the continent to situations of acute poverty⁴⁴ in an environment of scarce resources and populations that are excluded from the process of economic growth, especially after failed structural economic adjustment processes⁴⁵ and despite (or due to) international financial and humanitarian aid programmes.⁴⁶ The economic and social development is precarious because of the simultaneous presence of islands of development and the localized availability of natural resources of high economic value. This reality opens the way to explanations that define "resource wars", based on the availability of natural resources (minerals and hydrocarbons) in regions controlled by warlords and of great strategic interest on the part of regional and global actors.⁴⁷ Despite the role of economic variables for war occurrence in Africa, the problem with this set of analysis is the typical narrow consideration of political interest, aspects, structures, and actors.

Nonetheless, the inclusion of political elements in the causal evaluation of African conflicts can still reproduce reductionist views. *Political factors* are the third set of causes often singled out as an explanation for the African wars. In the context of domestic politics, the characteristics of political regimes and ruling elites ground the analysis. Governments composed of closed circles of elites are marked (i) by patrimonialism as a way of sustaining power; (ii) by the use of appeal to unify ideologies (Africanism, neo-colonialism, socialism); and, (iii) the obsession with permanence in power (security of the regime) to the detriment of institutional strengthening.⁴⁸ Despite the importance of these direct causes for African armed conflict, the stress to local disputes and the so-called Big Man rule African style of government omit more structural constraints related to institutional and social formation, as well as international politics.

Different assumptions about their consequences accompany the diversity of causes for African armed conflict. Studies on economic, social, and human development impacts on the increasing internal fragmentation

of societies transfer the notion of objective causes to objective consequences.⁴⁹ For example, if poverty, social fragility, environmental impacts, unequal distribution of resources, income and entitlements, displacement of populations, and institutional instability can encourage the emergence of armed conflicts, they are also tending factors of the same conflagrations.⁵⁰ The causes of armed conflict can also become its consequence, which denotes the complexity and causal multi-directionality of the phenomenon.⁵¹ Nonetheless, a general preference for dealing with direct causes of African wars results in the over-consideration of their essential, but short-termed, humanitarian impacts and for responses directed to these constant problems. That results in an obsession with short-term solutions to deter the perceived causes of war in Africa.

As an expected consequence of the distance-proximity paradox in the comprehension of African armed conflict, inadequate responses have proliferated. It has occurred both in the level of combat and conflict resolution. The direction of war efforts based on a conventional understanding that armed conflict originated exclusively from local groups, disrupted national forces from confronting the proxy war. Moreover, the choice of belligerent leadership by the most accessible route to combat, prioritizing external support to the detriment of a policy that uses the strategic opportunity to strengthen indigenous fighting forces, has been detrimental to the emergence of national coercive capacities. The participation of mercenary troops, regional allies, extra-regional powers, and multilateral institutions in the war effort in the form of significant combatant forces has in practice generated disincentives for the construction of autonomous national armies suitable for internal and external defence.⁵² This is not to say that the local population did not suffer either intervene in the fighting. Though, in general, the most relevant forces in the definition of armed conflicts were imported and that the scale of local people's use did not produce robust organizations that would form the basis for the formation of national armies, something more complex and socially organic than merely armed groups.⁵³ Alternatively, in cases where the national indigenous fighting effort was verified, as in Nigeria, South Africa, or Angola, the state was able to establish a national army as a pillar of its coercive capabilities. But these are exceptions that confirm the rule.

Strict interpretation of African conflicts has also generated considerable challenges through unstable peace agreements. Studies have shown that Africa is a victim of purely formal peace agreements, which do not

result in structural reforms of the armed forces towards deterrence building against the resumption of new conflicts⁵⁴ and that grant insurgents groups with political positions and within state bureaucracy (including the military services) using power-sharing mechanisms.⁵⁵ Those are primary drives to the resurgence of conflicts in short and long terms.⁵⁶ International pressures for the exclusively negotiated settlement of African armed conflicts, based on power-sharing arrangements, have contributed to the fragility of states in post-conflict situations, where armed groups are components of the government and state administration. This mechanism encourages the reproduction of political authoritarianism (administration groups are almost autonomous and defend particular interests) and the lack of national unity (command and control of the armed forces)—besides instituting a system of rewards for groups that decide to take up arms, which motivates its reproduction. In these cases, the spread of States of Violence is typical, which are unstable situations in the limbo between formal peace and declared war.⁵⁷

Other examples of conflict resolution through short-term perspective are endless peace missions and external interference. Despite the importance of the UN in the African wars, there goes the leading, most prolonged, and most robust peacekeeping missions, such as MONUSCO. They aimed imposing offensive force and international responsibility to protect (a contemporary adaptation of the concepts of *droit d'ingérence* and humanitarian intervention), which test did not always succeed, as in the controversial case of Libya. The central point here is that UN missions outnumber regional missions, although they attempt to gradually take up more space in line with recurring international criticisms of UNSC decisions and priorities and polemical actions (immobility and criminal acts) of blue helmets.⁵⁸ Also, extra-regional powers have adopted their own policies, not always debated or legitimated locally, to face African security challenges. The USA established AFRICOM in 2008, with an African base in Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, and maintains military operations in the Sahel, Horn, Maghreb, and Central Africa, with a central focus on counterterrorism. France adopts a regionalized perspective in West Africa and the Maghreb, focussing on supporting allied governments against insurgents and suppressing non-allied regimes. The current Barkhane Operation, which began in 2014, established a permanent base for 3000 French troops in Chad for counter-insurgency operations in the Sahel, specifically in French-speaking Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger. The actions

of the USA and France, with eventual support from the UK, have perhaps been the major security-impact initiative on the continent, as has recently occurred in the Ivory Coast, Libya, Mali, and CAR, although they are criticized by African states of autonomist profile, for its interventionist impetus.⁵⁹

The problem with these two types of response is that they reproduce the same deleterious effect of exporting combat-locking efforts, while they are not free from political manipulation or implementation failures. Even when it has a positive impact, such as the current Force Intervention Brigade in Mali, there is little indication of how states will be able to break the cycle of dependency and take control over the primary activity of its empirical existence, the legitimate monopoly of the means of coercion.⁶⁰ Even for extra-regional powers, the costs are much higher than the capacity-building alternative.⁶¹ Alternative of conflict resolution should reflect a systemic perspective of characteristics, causes, and consequences of African wars.

THE REGIONALIZED IRREGULAR PROXY WAR IN AFRICA: CHARACTERISTICS, CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND POSSIBLE RESPONSES

In this section, I develop the argument that to achieve a deeper comprehension of the characteristics and causes of African wars arise, as well as more sustainable options for conflict resolution, a better notion of irregular, proxy, and regional warfare needs to be developed. These three components show a real Clausewitzian aspect of African warfare, in a sense that it is a matter of political interests and produce systemic political impacts.

Through an empirical review of African wars in the last 60 years (Table 7.1),⁶² I verify several qualitative factors evident in African wars. The first of them, by the general literature, is the irregular use of force. We can refer to the use of non-traditional weapons such as: collective rapes and child soldiers; tribalism as an aggravating factor in the opposition of rival groups and domestic political instabilities; the recent penetration of religious fundamentalism as a pillar of armed insurgency (terrorism); the availability of natural resources as a form of illicit financing of insurgent groups (as well as an aggravating factor of international competition in the region); and the consolidation of transnational networks of drug trafficking, piracy, and human trafficking. Wars in Africa

Table 7.1 Main wars in Africa, over one thousand casualties (1952–currently)

<i>Date</i>	<i>Duration (years)</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>War</i>	<i>Region</i>	<i>Main location of operations</i>	<i>Casualties (approx., thousand)</i>	<i>Objective (predom.)</i>	<i>Nature</i>	<i>Proxy type</i>	<i>Regionalization</i>
1952– 1960	8	CW	Mau Mau Uprising	Horn of Africa	Kenya	13	Independence	Out-of- state	No	No
1954– 1962	8	CW	Algerian War of Independence	Maghreb	Algeria	300	Independence	Intrastate	No	No
1956– 1972	6	CW	First Sudanese Civil War	Horn of Africa	Sudan	500	Territory	Intrastate	No	No
1960– 1965	5	CW	Congo Crisis	Central	DRC	200	Territory	Mixed	Yes	Yes
1960– 1994	34	CW and Post-CW	South African Freedom Struggle	Southern Africa	South Africa, Angola, Mozambique	20	Government	Intrastate	Yes	Regional and global
1961– 1975	14	CW	Angolan War of Independence	Southern Africa	Angola	80	Independence	Out-of- state	No	Yes
1961– 1991	30	CW	Eritrean War of Independence	Horn of Africa	Eritrea	220	Territory	Intrastate	No	No
1963– 1974	11	CW	Guinea- Bissau War of Independence	West Africa	Guinea-Bissau	15	Independence	Out-of- state	No	Yes
1964– 1975	11	CW	Mozambican War of Independence	Southern Africa	Mozambique	60	Independence	Out-of- state	No	Yes
1963 1964	1 1	CW CW	The Sand War Zanzibar Revolution	Maghreb Southern Africa	Algeria Zanzibar	1 20	Territory Government	Intrastate Intrastate	No No	No No

(continued)

Table 7.1 (continued)

Date	Duration (years)	Period	War	Region	Main location of operations	Casualties (approx., thousand)	Objective (predom.)	Nature	Proxy type	Regionalization	
1964–1979	15	CW	Rhodesian Bush War (Zimbabwe)	Southern Africa	Zimbabwe	30	Government	Intrastate	Yes	Regional and global	Yes
1966–1990	24	CW	Chadian Civil War	Central	Chad	60	Territory	Mixed	Yes	Regional and global	Yes
1966–1988	22	CW	Namibian War of Independence	Southern Africa	Namibia, Angola	20	Independence	Out-of-state	Yes	global Regional and global	Yes
1967–1970	3	CW	Nigerian Civil War (Biafran War)	West Africa	Nigeria	1000	Territory	Intrastate	Yes	global Regional and global	Yes
1975–1992	17	CW and Post-CW	Mozambican Civil War	Southern Africa	Mozambique	100	Government	Mixed	Yes	global Regional and global	Yes
1975–2002	27	CW and Post-CW	Angolan Civil War	Southern Africa	Angola	500	Government	Mixed	Yes	global Regional and global	Yes
1975–1991	16	CW	Western Sahara Conflict	Maghreb	Western Sahara	6	Territory	Mixed	Yes	global Regional and global	Yes
1977–1978	1	CW	Ethiopian-Somali Conflict (Ogaden War)	Horn of Africa	Ethiopia	30	Territory	Intrastate	Yes	Global	No
1978–1979	1	CW	Uganda-Tanzania War	Central	Uganda	100	Government	Mixed	Yes	Regional	Yes

(continued)

Table 7.1 (continued)

Date	Duration (years)	Period	War	Region	Main location of operations	Casualties (approx., thousand)	Objective (predom.)	Nature	Proxy type	Regionalization	
1981–1986	5	CW	Ugandan Bush War	Central	Uganda	500	Government	Intrastate	Yes	Regional	Yes
1983–2005	22	CW and Post-CW	Second Sudanese Civil War	Horn of Africa	Sudan (South)	1.9	Territory	Intrastate	Yes	Regional and global	Yes
1987–2017	30	CW and Post-CW	Lord's Resistance Army	Central	Uganda, DRC, Sudan, CAR	12	Government	Intrastate	No	–	Yes
1987–2017	30	CW and Post-CW	Insurgency Somali Civil War	West Africa	Somalia	400	Government	Mixed	Yes	Regional and global	Yes
1989–1997	8	CW and Post-CW	First Liberian Civil War	West Africa	Liberia	150	Government	Mixed	Yes	Regional and global	Yes
1989–1991	2	CW and Post-CW	Mauritania-Senegal Border War	West Africa	Mauritania-Senegal Border	–	Territory	Intrastate	No	–	Yes
1990–1994	4	Post-CW	Rwandan Civil War	Central	Rwanda	500	Government	Intrastate	Yes	Regional and global	Yes
1990–1995	5	Post-CW	Third Tuareg Rebellion	West Africa	Mali (North), Niger	–	Territory	Intrastate	No	–	Yes
1990–2017	27	Post-CW	Casamance Conflict	West Africa	Senegal (South)	3.5	Territory	Intrastate	Yes	Regional	Yes

(continued)

Table 7.1 (continued)

Date	Duration (years)	Period	War	Region	Main location of operations	Casualties (approx., thousand)	Objective (predom.)	Nature	Proxy	Proxy type	Regionalization
1991–2002	11	Post-CW	Sierra Leone Civil War	West Africa	Sierra Leone	75	Government	Mixed	Yes	Regional and global	Yes
1991–2002	11	Post-CW	Algerian Civil War	Maghreb	Algeria	50	Government	Intrastate	No	–	Yes
1993–2005	12	Post-CW	Burundian Civil War	Central	Burundi	300	Government	Intrastate	Yes	Regional and global	Yes
1996–1997	1	Post-CW	First Congo War	Central	DRC	200	Government	Mixed	Yes	Regional and global	Yes
1998–2003	5	Post-CW	Second Congo War	Central	DRC	3800	Government	Mixed	Yes	Regional and global	Yes
1997	1	Post-CW	Republic of the Congo Civil War	Central	Congo-Brazzaville	10	Government	Intrastate	Yes	Regional	Yes
1998–2000	2	Post-CW	Eritrean-Ethiopian War	Horn of Africa	Ethiopia-Eritrea	300	Territory	Intrastate	No	–	No
1999–2003	4	Post-CW	Second Liberian Civil War	West Africa	Liberia	150	Government	Mixed	Yes	Regional and global	Yes
2002–2007	5	Post-CW	First Ivorian Civil War	West Africa	Ivory Coast	3	Government	Intrastate	Yes	Regional and global	Yes

(continued)

Table 7.1 (continued)

Date	Duration (years)	Period	War	Region	Main location of operations	Casualties (approx., thousand)	Objective (predom.)	Nature	Proxy	Proxy type	Regionalization
2003–2017	14	Post-CW	War in Darfur	Horn of Africa	Sudan (Darfur)	300	Territory	Intrastate	Yes	Regional	Yes
2003–2017	14	Post-CW	Congo State of Violence	Central	DRC (East)	1600	Government	Intrastate	Yes	Regional	Yes
2003–2017	14	Post-CW	Conflict in the Niger Delta	West Africa	Nigeria (South)	2	Territory	Intrastate	No	–	No
2004–2008	4	Post-CW	Second Civil War of the CAR	Central	CAR	1	Government	Intrastate	Yes	Regional and global	Yes
2005–2010	5	Post-CW	Chadian Civil War	Central	Chad	7	Territory	Mixed	Yes	Regional and global	Yes
2007–2009	2	Post-CW	Fourth Tuareg Rebellion	West Africa	Mali (North), Niger	1	Territory	Intrastate	Yes	Regional	Yes
2007–2008	1	Post-CW	Ogaden War	Horn of Africa	Ethiopia (East)	1	Territory	Intrastate	No	–	No
2009–2017	8	Post-CW	Boko Haram Insurgency	West Africa	Nigeria (North)	15	Government	Intrastate	No	–	Yes
2010–2011	1	Post-CW	Second Ivorian Civil War	West Africa	Ivory Coast	1.5	Government	Intrastate	Yes	Global	No
2011	1	Post-CW	First Libyan Civil War	Maghreb	Libya	15	Government	Mixed	Yes	Regional and global	Yes
2012–2017	5	Post-CW	Northern Mali Conflict	West Africa	Mali (North)	1.5	Territory	Intrastate	Yes	Regional and global	Yes

(continued)

Table 7.1 (continued)

Date	Duration (years)	Period	War	Region	Main location of operations	Casualties (approx., thousand)	Objective (predom.)	Nature	Proxy type	Regionalization	
2012– 2017	5	Post-CW	Third Civil War of the CAR	Central	CAR	2.2	Government	Intrastate	Yes	Regional and global	Yes
2013– 2017	4	Post-CW	South Sudanese Civil War	Central	Southern Sudan	50	Government	Intrastate	Yes	Regional	Yes
2014– 2017	3	Post-CW	Second Libyan Civil War	Maghreb	Libya	5	Territory	Intrastate	No	–	No

Source Elaborated by author based on data from Guy Arnold, *Historical Dictionary of Civil Wars in Africa*, 2nd ed. (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2008); TCA, *Twentieth Century Atlas, Death Tolls for the Major Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century*, 2010; Igor Castellano da Silva, *Congo, a guerra mundial africana: conflitos armados, construção do estado e alternativas para a paz* (Porto Alegre: Leitura XXI/Cebralica /UFRGS, 2012); Meredith Reid Sarkees, 'The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 18(1) (2000): 123–144; M.R. Sarkees, F.W. Wayman, and J.D. Singer, 'Inter-State, Intra-State, and Extra-State Wars: A Comprehensive Look at Their Distribution over Time, 1816–1997', *International Studies Quarterly* 47(1) (March 2003): 49–70(22); Nils Petter Gleditsch et al. 'Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset', *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5) (2002); Sven Chojnacki and Gregor Reisch, *New List of Wars, 1946–2006* (Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin/Berliner Forschungsgruppe Krieg (FORK), 2008)

use of all resources and means of impact (child soldiers, collective rape, genocide) and mobilization (instrumentalization of ethnic, communal, or religious ties). The complexity of irregularity manifests in other aspects of warfare. For instance, environmental characteristics (sense forests, long rains, scarce infrastructure, linguistic heterogeneity, and the presence of lethal diseases) also complicate the locomotion inside and outside the theatre of operations and conduct of conventional military operations.⁶³ Equally important is a multiplicity of participants, observed mainly in the plurality of subnational (sometimes, transnational) irregular groups, whose internal political instability allows the recurrent splitting of their structures and the emancipation of new factions. That relates to the capacity for local, regional and global political and economic rise and mobilization of the so-called warlords.⁶⁴

Nonetheless, our analysis contrasts deeply with the assumption that irregular war means apolitical conflict. On the contrary, irregular warfare in Africa is profoundly political. It is, therefore, “[...] *about people, not about which side has the biggest guns, or most advanced technology. Success depends on understanding social dynamics, tribal politics, religious influences and cultural mores*”.⁶⁵ The main feature of irregular warfare is that it seeks to gain legitimacy and influence over relevant populations and to nullify the support of these populations to rival groups/governments.⁶⁶ Its irregularity, complexity, and eventual brutality, however, do not mean the absence of rationality or political-strategic interests. Although some analysts interpret this type of conflagration as naturally irrational,⁶⁷ irregular warfare does not have a differentiated nature from conventional war, as it bases on the contradiction of political interests.⁶⁸ In Africa, where colonial imposition produced unfinished, illegitimate, and unstable modern institutions, irregular warfare is an integral part of the dilemma of modernity.⁶⁹

The second important aspect of African war identified in our empirical analysis is the potential regularity of the use of force, provided, above all, by national states acting through proxy war. Irregular warfare in Africa is not merely a civil war; perhaps there lays its most in-depth complexity, related to the nature of the threats of the African war and the character of the main fighting forces. Within the quality of the threats, there is a quasi-consensual understanding that in Africa domestic security threats are predominant vis-a-vis interstate, inter-regional, or global levels. There is a constant presence of state and transnational sub-state and transnational actors, who, in general, claim strong relations with post-traditional structures (ethnic bonds, instrumented or not) and control regions rich

in strategic natural resources, explored with support from external networks. Variations of these cases range from warlords (Jonas Savimbi and Charles Taylor) to tribal/spiritual leaders (Joseph Kony, of the Lord's Resistance Army). However, the continued existence of internal threats and shortages of real interstate wars hides the constant presence of significant interstate rivalries. Insurgent groups in Africa have the support of other African states or extra-regional powers and often represent a minor part of the conflict.

The so-called African civil war was marked by the support of neighbouring countries and of extra-regional powers to insurgent groups. In this case, international pressure meant that the governments of African states had to fight no longer against the first forces of the internal guerrillas—but against groups characterized by a new profile arising from foreign aid. That was the case of the Civil War of Sierra Leone. At times, the support was so robust that external troops began to fight side by side with the guerrillas, giving a more intense interstate aspect to the civil war. That engenders what I define as *mixed wars*, such as in the case of the Liberia Second Civil War, Chad Second Civil War, Angola Civil War, and First and Second Congo Wars. Still, in all those cases domestic fragility remained the underlying channel for the manifestation of political tensions in the form of armed conflicts. Proxy wars were also evident when external forces supported established governments and became decisive for the definition of conflicts. For instances, the Angola Civil War, Mozambican Civil War, Ogaden War, Somalia Civil War, First Civil War of Liberia, Sierra Leone Civil War, and Second Civil War of the Central African Republic (CAR).⁷⁰ The support of external military forces (arms, advisors, supplies, and direct intervention), either global or regional troops (mercenaries, allied forces, or peace operations), was a constant in African wars, whether they were intrastate, interstate, or mixed.

The war in Africa also has a relevant and often ignored regional dimension. The regionalization of armed conflicts in Africa accompanies its irregular proxy nature regarding overflowing threats to the region and concrete regional responses to armed conflicts on the continent. The regional dimension is an integral part of the African armed conflicts. Although politically stable, the territorial boundaries established in the imposition of colonial states, and largely maintained in the process of independence, are not able to curb the security dynamics of neighbouring countries. In this case, regions are linked more by weakness than by the power of states.⁷¹ In Africa, interstate rivalries end up being

limited regarding projection and focussing on the immediate regional environment. The ineffectiveness in internal territorial and population control produces grey areas in which the national state is unable to penetrate, which makes them susceptible to the influence of neighbouring countries, with the relatively low costs of proxy war, and irregular groups with transnational projection. That was the case, for example, of AFDL and RCD in the Congo wars, UNITA in Angola, RENAMO in Mozambique, SPLF in South Sudan, RPF in Rwanda, NPLF in Liberia, and RUF in Sierra Leone. Therefore, the continuity of irregular proxy warfare depends on the regional level of interaction and the regional level of interaction in the security complexes is realized through irregular proxy warfare. Moreover, the war in Africa is also regional event due to the sort of responses offered for its solution. Regionalism in Africa has become, after the 1990s, one of the most critical factors in security interaction.⁷² Security, firstly maritime security, is a significant part of the integration agendas, which has resulted at continental and subregional levels of advancements in the institutional consolidation of peace and security mechanisms, and peace missions.⁷³

A more precise view of the characteristics of the African way of warfare may reduce the distance-proximity paradox as well as allow more systemic perspectives on its causes and consequences to develop. Regarding the origins of African armed conflicts, a more systemic view may give consider the importance of primary causes but mainly link them into structural, permissive ones. In the first place, international anarchy functions as a permissive cause of African wars and reproduces the regional competition and there are no institutions capable of ensuring a legitimate monopoly of the means of coercion and imposing obedience to political agents.⁷⁴ In all non-hierarchical international systems, anarchy constrains the actors to seek their self-survival, adopting the necessary (security) or available (power) means. This context produces a security dilemma which, given the uncertainties and political-economic opportunities, can lead to a recurrence of war. However, this does not occur in the same way as in the great powers' balance of power.

In the case of Africa, the effects of anarchy were limited, though, by the submission of states to the precepts of the global order (given their subordinate position), the reproduction of principles of that order in the regional system, and the interests of political elites with such structure. That occurs because regional systems, mainly in Global South, are relatively opened to the penetration of extra-regional actors, processes, and

structures.⁷⁵ African so-called quasi-states would exist more by connivances of relatively friendly international and regional orders than by their own capabilities.⁷⁶ Since colonial experience on the continent, a relatively stable environment evolved by the empowerment of coastal peoples (an economic model focussed on the external sector) and the establishment of rigid and internationally accepted borders. This characteristic continued in the post-colonial period through the freezing of national boundaries and the banishment of war of aggression by the United Nations (UN) and Organization of African Unity (OAU) regimes. However, the institutional support of global and regional orders has not been able to eliminate the interstate rivalries in Africa, proper to the political world. On the contrary, the interstate rivalries occur unopposed, but they changed their form of manifestation, mainly due to the space opened by a second permissive cause of the African armed conflicts, the weakness of the states. Geographic and demographic challenges, external historical impositions, and internal opportunism have produced a widespread crisis in the coercive, extractive, and administrative capacities of African states reproduce today.⁷⁷ In Africa, internal anarchy seems to have been more compelling than that of the regional system, and such a relationship has produced the structural opportunity for the recurrence of regionalized irregular proxy armed conflicts.

The state's fragility also allowed the interstate rivalries to have both impetus and a means of substantiation, since the disincentives and costs for interstate warfare would be higher. It is possible to affirm that the formal stability of the state, concomitant with the weakness of its institutions, also allowed immediate causes to be realized, among them underdevelopment, reduced social integration, and institutional weakness in controlling elites and moderating political disputes. Thus, there was a predominance of patrimonial policies in the central government and the existence of warlords and islands of coercion, rivalling state power—which resulted in the preponderance of internal threats to state security, linked to the challenges of domestic legitimacy of the political regimes.⁷⁸ Equally, state inability has allowed political elites to encourage, ignore, or be unable to overcome difficulties from hunger, poverty, environmental degradation, abuses of fundamental rights, and reduced social and political integration that have plagued local populations and behaved as immediate causes for armed conflicts. Figure 7.1 presents the proposed connections between objective and permissive causes of war in African regional systems.




Fig. 7.1 Causal variables related to the occurrence of war in Africa (*Source* Elaborated by author)

Moreover, a more systemic view of African conflicts allows a broader interpretation of their consequences to develop. An often-omitted result of war in Africa is the pressure on structural elements of regional systems. Although limited in its use of conventional force, the war in Africa has the same capacity as elsewhere to produce transformations in the structures of international systems, including regional order institutions and the distribution of power in the system (rise and fall of powers). Conflagrations in the Horn of Africa between Ethiopia and Somalia (Ogaden War), in Southern Africa between South Africa and its neighbours (Civil Wars in Angola and Mozambique), and the Second Congo War have a systemic character, precisely because it affects such structural variables.⁷⁹

Such capacity results both from the destructive potential of warfare and from its ability to push systemic actors to provide self-reinforcing and cooperative responses that can generate positive results in the long run.⁸⁰ In this case, the ability of war to encourage the construction of systemic units (states) also matters. Here the African case seems more relevant in theoretical terms, as the belligerent situation on the continent instigates questions about the plausibility of theories, produced from European historical experience, which state that wars produce incentives for the building of state capacities.⁸¹ In Africa, the profusion of armed conflicts did not generate capable states. In fact, the impact of the war on Africa and the Third World was different from that found in Europe, although it also profoundly affected the way of social organization. Several processes may explain the inability of the war to generate stable states in this region, including factors related to the responses given by African actors to armed conflict on the continent.

Finally, a more complex and systemic account of African conflicts may also produce a better comprehension of broader and more sustainable responses to their stabilization. Given the structural causal aspect linked to the software dimension of state security,⁸² the solution of isolated objective causes of African wars will hardly produce sustainable results in the settlement of African armed conflicts. Notably, in cases where insurgent groups are predominant, as in most African armed disputes, exclusively military responses, while centrally required, are insufficient for long-term solutions.⁸³ If objective causes link to permissive causes related to the domestic anarchy of states and regional structure, which hides disputes but does not suppress violent competition, more structural solutions regarding the state and regional politics may be desirable.

Concerning efforts to reduce permissive causes of African wars may relate to the reduction of the domestic anarchy of African countries by the improvement of state capacities and the connections between state and society. One of the primordial state institutions that deal with internal anarchy, the national army, is forgotten or, worse, fragmented by international pressures and peace agreements. A structured conscript force, if an autonomous bureaucratic institution and distant of political disputes, may produce two desirable incentives for conflict resolution.⁸⁴ First, it may provide deterrence for any local or regional armed rivalry to evolve. Most of African states have weak armed forces, often disorganized by leadership, fearful of the rival power of the military and other organized groups.⁸⁵ Moreover, their counter-insurgency-focussed armed forces have the little operational capability to cope with the attrition, the broad scale, technology, and logistics of conventional fighting of the proxy war, in which local armed groups to cease to be mere insurgents by relying on military and logistical support from outside forces. The imperative of reforming Africa's armed forces connects to the importance some authors ascribe to the role of security sector reform in peace agreements, for instance, the successful experience in Angola's civil war.⁸⁶

Logically, responses to state fragility may receive the assistance from regional and international actors and institutions. Still, regional powers and institutions have few impacts on capacity building of weaker states. On the contrary, Nigeria, South Africa, and Ethiopia have usually adopted self-commitment on conflict suppression (for instance, in the cases of DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, CAR), using mainly means of coercion, in a short-term and expensive approach. Nonetheless, regional powers and institutions may incentive commitment to cooperation and the reduction of incentives for proxy war and regionalized conflicts. Furthermore, they have better conditions to cooperate and compete with extra-regional actors and institutions. On their part, extra-regional actors have seldom produced capacity building or regional cooperation. On the contrary, they have historically reproduced external dependency and regional rivalry. Despite the harsh diagnostic, new global powers and regional powers in the inter-regional environment may have space for producing long-term responses for African wars, connected with new internal empowerment and regional commitment of African regional powers. One sign of hope may emerge from the Atlantic Ocean.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: PERSPECTIVES FOR MARITIME SECURITY IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC

The renewed interest in Africa in the twenty-first century, through the establishment of a security policy of military-technical cooperation and relevant action in peace missions,⁸⁷ contrasts with the lack of in-depth analysis on the main characteristics, causes, and potential consequences of armed conflict on the continent. Most literature on African wars is short-minded in the simplistic way it characterizes African conflicts and in the reductionist perspective of its causes, consequences, and possible responses. This chapter proposed to offer four sets of theoretical and empirical contributions. First, it recovers the potential of three concepts that, if adopted with the balance between generality and particularity, may reduce the distance-proximity paradox in observing African armed conflicts. Second, it reveals characteristics of African wars rejecting common misconceptions that they are apolitical, limited to domestic issues, and locally set. Alternatively, I argue that African wars are based on a security triad, configuring the Regionalized Irregular Proxy War. Third, the chapter broadens the comprehension of causes and consequences of African wars, focussing on commonly forgotten literature that highlights systemic variables, which may open new horizons for options of conflict resolution. Finally, this last section risks some consideration on the prospects of possible issues related to South Atlantic maritime security based on the experience of the now clarified characteristics, causes, consequences, and options for the resolution of African conflicts.

It is clear that the war in Africa has been predominantly terrestrial. Events of naval warfare have been scarce and limited in the continent's post-colonial history, and memories of battles at sea are referred to global competitions during the colonial period, highlighting the two world wars of the twentieth century. One of the possible consequences (and perhaps causes) of this reality is the scarce investment in the naval modernization of most African states and the option of outsourcing more immediate defence and coastal security services. Few African regional powers have operational naval forces and ensure regular investments in their modernization.⁸⁸ An example is the inability to deal with organized crime in the coastal regions of the territorial sea or to offer a relative defence of its exclusive economic zone against piracy cases. That involves a security aspect, still distant from the situation of war. However, Africa's inability to provide the means to defend itself and

cooperate for the safety of vessels carrying valuable local resources tends to produce a vacuum of power that will potentially be filled by other security actors, which may or may not represent a potential increase in the threat to sovereignty.

African maritime security is relevant not only to the direct and indirect aspects of crime at sea, but war at sea tends to reproduce as the political interests of the contending actors intensify, and marine spaces and resources are eventually discovered and seen as an opportunity for increased strength between rival groups.⁸⁹ Given the preservation of permissive causes for the African wars, there is no reason to assume that armed conflicts in Africa do not occur in the sea. Also, in case they happen, it can be admitted that the naval war in Africa will have characteristics derived from the same structural causes analysed here. In Africa, naval clashes tend to reproduce the African way of making war. That is the components of our definition of regionalized irregular proxy war or mixed war: the adoption of irregular forces, with the participation of non-state groups; the manifestation of interstate rivalries and the indirect (or even direct) participation of states in the region and elsewhere; and, the regionalization of the conflict resolution. All these characteristics already give their signs of existence in the area of the Gulf of Guinea in the context of the threat of piracy and may be present in any case of more significant naval armed conflict.

Both in the case of maritime security and potential naval warfare, the challenges of the responses given by local actors, as well as in the other African wars, will remain. The difficulties encountered by states in eliminating and resolving these conflicts and in securing force and deterrence at sea tend to result in the outsourcing of activities to other regional and/or global actors, as in other wars on the continent. The most probable result as argued above is the increase in regionalization and globalization present in the waters of the South Atlantic. In the case of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, this result is natural, since it is a crime in international waters, which allows the presence of patrols and extra-regional state and non-state naval forces.

What does this scenario imply for the regional South Atlantic powers? In this context, the regional powers of the South Atlantic have particular responsibilities, challenges, and opportunities. Because they are countries with more significant resources, prestige, and presence, they have an interest in establishing security in the region in a relatively independent way, without relying excessively on extra-regional, often limited

and reckless protection. At the same time, other countries inside and outside the region have expectations regarding the position and willingness of regional powers to lead political and security solutions to the region's challenges, since they are the local actors with the most significant capacity to conduct land and naval war. Nevertheless, in the case of the South Atlantic, the regional powers are precisely that, regional, not global or great powers. That means that its projection power, although detached, is limited. To a lesser or greater degree, South Atlantic regional powers, such as Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Nigeria, and Angola, experience constraints linked to their actual power and state capacity, specifically political legitimacy and managerial capacity, which limit their ability to bear the costs of ordering and protecting the region. From this pessimistic scenario, however, there are opportunities for overcoming it. Regional cooperation has the potential to distribute burdens, highlight skills, and equalize capacities to sharing responsibilities. Recent examples of approximation are the CPLP and the relaunch of the Zone for Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZPCSA). However, in addition to consistent diplomatic initiatives, the region lacks concrete cooperation actions for skills management and media coordination. South Atlantic regional powers should advance the coordination of security and defence policies in the mutual support to the modernization of their capacities, particularly in the case of weaker countries, so to reduce the management costs of the security order, to assure regional autonomy and to collaborate to overcome the main causes of the regionalized irregular proxy war in Africa and, potentially, the South Atlantic.

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CHAPTER 8

Conclusion

Manuel Correia de Barros

An immense ocean separates continents, countries, people, parents, sons, friends, and companions of misfortune, but also of joys and good moments, of beliefs and traditions, and of music and dance.

What is the South Atlantic and the countries that surround it occupy the first pages of this conclusion.

This is followed by the weaknesses and threats to security and governance. A large number of them is disparate but common to many.

Possible and desirable responses to these challenges are given in the following pages.

As usual, we end with some conclusions.

THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AND THE COUNTRIES THAT SURROUND IT

It is not the largest ocean in the world, but the one with the largest drainage area. The continents on both sides of the South Atlantic have large rivers that flow into it as is the case of the Orinoco, the Amazon, the La Plata, the Congo, the Niger, and many others, although smaller, as is the case of the Kwanza in Angola.

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The continental shelves, on both sides of the ocean, with depths between 2500 and 4500 metres, reach, in some places, more than 500 kilometres in width, as is the case of Argentina and Angola. Millions of years of drainage, erosion, and sediment deposits have contributed to the creation of these platforms, among which are the largest potential reserves of oil, natural gas, and coal, as well as other minerals. The existence of large nodules of minerals at great depth, composed mainly of iron and manganese and with smaller quantities of copper, nickel, and cobalt, still little explored, is a form of future wealth.

As far as currents are concerned, we refer to the sea current of Brazil, which runs eastwards and becomes the South Atlantic Current, and when it reaches the coast of Africa, and when it turns north, on the way to the Equator, it forms the Benguela Current. This current is characterized by lower temperatures near the coast, which makes the weather more pleasant. Also, the Circumpolar Antarctic Current has a branch—the Falklands Current, which runs along the coast of Argentina and another on the way to the Indian Ocean and which eventually helps to form the Benguela Current.

These cold currents help create the conditions for a greater concentration of plankton which is the basis of the feeding of the immense fish life of this part of the Atlantic, and which remains constant throughout the year, unlike the areas of the North Atlantic where the lack of sunshine in winter results in relatively short blooms.

Thus, the Atlantic continues to provide millions of tonnes of fish annually for human and industrial consumption, despite the huge illegal fishing that continues to be felt in the region. Oceanic aquaculture is a highly important resource, although it has so far been poorly explored.¹

Furthermore, another millenary form of exploitation of the oceanic waters is the exploitation of the salt, obtained mainly by solar evaporation, without costs of energy and of atmospheric pollution.

But another form of exploitation of the ocean is that of maritime transportation:

An enormous and free way of communication between lands, continents, islands, countries, and people scattered around the world. In most of its immensity belonging to no one and allowing all states – “*coastal or land-locked*” – the “*freedom of navigation*” and the “*freedom of over-flight*”, and even in territorial waters of any country the “*right of innocent passage*”.

A route with no infrastructures needed, no maintenance to be guaranteed, except at the end points. The easiest and probably the less expensive way of moving big quantities of goods, from one place of the world to another, even very far away. Don't forget that 92 per cent of the total trade from and to Africa is made through the sea.²

We then talk about the potentialities associated with energy production using natural phenomena, such as currents, waves, and different surface and depth temperatures, which can be used to produce clean, renewable, and inexhaustible energy.

We will conclude with *“the enormous potentialities of coastal tourism – enjoying the Sun, bathing, sport fishing, surfing, sailing – spending money away from home, away from cold and rainy weather, away from stress and work”*.³

THE COUNTRIES THAT SURROUND IT

If the geography says that the Atlantic is separated by the Equator in North and South, this reality removed a series of African countries whose proximity to the South Atlantic is much more logical than with the North Atlantic. I refer to the six countries that extend from Nigeria to Liberia, and as a matter of “justice”, I also added three Latin American countries—Suriname, Guyana, and Venezuela.

There are a total of 21 countries, with an area of over 21 million km², a coastline of about 25,300 km, an estimated population of 719 million inhabitants, which gives an average density of 33.8 inhab./km², a Gross Domestic Product, GDP, of six billion six hundred and sixty thousand million US\$, and an average per capita GDP of 9662 US\$.⁴

Two continents for centuries were colonized by European powers, and although South America liberated itself from this tutelage more than a century before Africa, this did not prevent the external interference from being felt. Do not forget the negative role of the USA in countries like Chile, Colombia, and others. The Cold War brought permanent interference in the internal affairs of countries on both sides of the Atlantic, with very negative effects on their people. Angola is an example of this.

These countries have large differences, with areas ranging from eight and a half million km² (Brazil), another four with more than one million,

four more with over half a million, nine with more than one hundred thousand, and three with less, and the 960 kms² of S. Tomé and Príncipe. Also, in population numbers, there are two with more than one hundred million (Brazil and Nigeria), nine with more than 10 million, five with more than one million, and four with less than one million. As for the density of the population, this goes from four countries with more than 100 inhabitants/km², two with more than 50 inhab./km², ten with more than 10 inhab./km², and four with less than 10 inhab./km² (Table 8.1).⁵

As for the extension of the sea coast, there are also big differences, since five countries have more than a thousand kms, seven have more than 500 kms, another seven have more than 100 kms, and only two have less than 100 kms.

Some countries in the region under study are also included in the various top-ten lists, not only positive ones, but also negative ones. Let's start with the latter:

Lowest GDP per capita (Liberia and Democratic Republic of Congo); lowest human development index (Democratic Republic of Congo); lowest life expectancy (DRC, Côte d'Ivoire, Angola); child mortality (Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Equatorial Guinea); killed by malaria (Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Angola); people infected with HIV/AIDS (South Africa, Namibia) and those killed by the same disease (South Africa, Namibia, and Equatorial Guinea); and the origin of refugees (Democratic Republic of Congo).

Regarding the positive top-ten, we highlight the following:

Largest geographical area (Brazil and Argentina); population (Nigeria and Brazil); largest forests (Democratic Republic of Congo and Brazil); largest rivers (Amazonas and Congo); largest economies (Brazil); greater agricultural output (Brazil and Nigeria); shipbuilding (Brazil); increased economic growth (Angola and Liberia); largest number of births × 1000 inhabitants (Angola and Democratic Republic of Congo); number of births (Nigeria, Brazil, and the Democratic Republic of Congo); highest number of children per woman (Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola); lower average age (Angola); and in the percentage of population under 14 (Angola).⁶

It would not be correct to speak of the ocean that binds us if we did not address aspects related to it: the ports and the (merchant and war) navies. As regards the main seaports of the countries under review, we note the following:

Table 8.1 Countries' data

<i>Country</i>	<i>Area in sq. km</i>	<i>Coastline in km (1)</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Density</i>	<i>GNI, PPP (\$ billions)</i>	<i>GNI per capita, PPP (\$ (2))</i>
Angola	1,247,000	1600	24,200,000	19.41	139.10	6340
Argentina	2,780,000	4989	43,000,000	15.47	579.20	13,480
Benin	115,000	121	10,600,000	92.17	21.40	2020
Brazil	8,516,000	7491	206,100,000	24.20	3209.40	15,570
Cameroon	475,000	402	22,800,000	48.00	67.10	2950
Congo, Dem. Rep.	2,345,000	37	74,900,000	31.94	48.80	650
Congo, Rep.	342,000	169	4,500,000	13.16	23.40	5200
Côte d'Ivoire	322,000	515	22,200,000	68.94	69.40	3130
Equatorial Guinea	28,000	296	821,000	29.32	14.50	17,660
Gabon	268,000	885	1,700,000	6.34	29.00	17,200
Ghana	239,000	539	26,800,000	112.13	104.50	3900
Guyana	215,000	459	764,000	3.55	5.30	6940
Liberia	111,000	579	4,400,000	39.64	3.10	700
Namibia	824,000	1572	2,400,000	2.91	23.60	9810
Nigeria	924,000	853	177,500,000	192.10	1013.70	5710
S. Tomé and Príncipe	960	209	186,000	193.75	0.59	3140
South Africa	1,219,000	700	54,000,000	44.30	685.70	12,700
Suriname	164,000	386	538,000	3.28	9.20	17,040
Togo	57,000	56	7,100,000	124.56	9.20	1290
Uruguay	176,000	660	3,400,000	19.32	69.10	20,220
Venezuela	912,000	2800	30,700,000	33.66	535.70	17,700
	21,279,960	25,318	718,609,000	33.77	6660.99	

Source Elaborated by the author from World Bank Group, *The Little Data Book—2016*

In South America, there are three major ports, three medium, and one small: three connected to large rail networks, one connected to an average network and two to small networks, and one without a railway link. These ports have two large dry docks, three average docks, and a small one, and three ports do not have this important auxiliary for ship

repair. Also, the capacity of repairs is great in three ports, moderate in two, and limited in three (Table 8.2).

With regard to merchant shipping, some countries in the region have navies with more than 100 ships, such as Brazil, Liberia, and Nigeria, and with more than fifty, such as Togo, Argentina, and Venezuela. In all other countries, the number of vessels is lower. The case of Liberia is paradigmatic since in this country 2771 ships are registered, but 2559 belong to other countries—which is called the flag of convenience. Obviously, many of the vessels in several countries under analysis are also registered abroad, as is the case in South Africa, Angola, Nigeria, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela (Table 8.3).

The political, economic, and social situation of the countries on both sides of the South Atlantic is not brilliant. Many factors are responsible for this situation, not exclusive to the area we are looking at, due to past mistakes and aggravated by the economic and financial crisis that has dragged on since 2008. And if it was thought that this year would bring some progress in solving the problem, the first few weeks have created even more doubts about this prognosis. I do not think it's worth listing them, since they're all known.

With regard to the countries of Latin America, especially the major commodity exporters, there may be a slight recovery *“but slow demand growth from China, low oil prices and an oversupply of agricultural commodities such as soybeans will otherwise keep exports largely depressed”*.⁷

As for the political situation in these countries, they also do not see great progress in resolving their crises. Venezuela will continue to go through a very difficult period, and there is nothing to suggest that any positive solution is possible in the near future. What is happening in Brazil is also not satisfactory. Research on corruption at all levels may not only create a chaotic situation but may even predict military intervention, which will certainly lead to a decrease in foreign investment, which is very necessary at this time. Argentina is also very dependent on what is happening in Brazil, but also on the other MERCOSUR member countries. It's not easy.

Let us then return to Africa.

Low commodities prices make another challenging year for most sub-Saharan African countries. Social unrest is not uncommon in these countries, nor is it uncommon for a strong central government to withstand them. But cracks are emerging in countries like Nigeria and South Africa, where political problems are likely to worsen in 2017.⁸

Table 8.2 South Atlantic sea ports

Country		Angola		Argentina		Brazil	
Port	Lobito	Luanda	La Plata	Buenos Aires	Santos		
	Harbor type	Coastal natural	Coastal natural	River basin	River natural	Coastal natural	
	Harbor size	Small	Small	Medium	Large	Large	
	Railway size	Large	Medium	N/A	Large	Large	
	Dry dock	N/A	Small	Medium	Large	Medium	
	Repairs	Limited	Limited	Moderate	Major	Major	
	Shelter	Good	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent	Good	
	Anchorage depth	14 m–15.2 m	23.2 m–Over	7.1 m–9.1 m	6.4 m–7.6 m	9.4 m–10 m	
	Cargo Pier depth	9.4 m–10 m	9.4 m–10 m	7.1 m–9.1 m	9.4 m–10 m	4.9 m–6.1 m	
Country	Brazil	Cameroon	Equat. Guinea	Gabon	Port Gentil		
	Rio de Janeiro	Douala	Malabo	Libreville			
	Harbor type	Coastal natural	Coastal natural	Open roadsted	Coastal natural		
	Harbor size	Large	Medium	Medium	Medium		
	Railway size	Small	Large	N/A	N/A		
	Dry dock	Large	Medium	N/A	N/A		
	Repairs	Major	Major	Limited	None		
	Shelter	Excellent	Good	Good	Excellent		
	Anchorage depth	4.9 m–6.1 m	4.9 m–6.1 m	7.1 m–9.1 m	12.5 m–13.7 m		
Cargo Pier depth	12.5 m–13.7 m	7.1 m–9.1 m	9.4 m–10 m	9.4 m–10 m			

(continued)

Table 8.3 Number of ships

	<i>No. ships</i>	<i>Outside registered</i>	<i>Foreign owned</i>
Angola	7	17	1
Argentina	36	15	14
Benin			
Brazil	109	36	27
Cameroon			
Congo, Dem. Rep.	1		1
Congo, Rep.		1	
Côte d'Ivoire			
Equatorial Guinea	5		1
Gabon		2	
Ghana	4		2
Guyana	10	3	
Liberia	2771		2559
Namibia	1		
Nigeria	89	33	3
S. Tomé and Príncipe	3		2
South África	3	19	
Suriname			
Togo	61		21
Uruguay	16	1	8
Venezuela	53	14	9

Source Data from "The World Factbook", CIA

One of the major problems that have the worst consequences in crisis situations is the result of the scarce diversification of the economy, sometimes aimed at exporting a single product, such as Nigeria and Angola, in relation to oil. And linked to the scarce diversification of the economy is the fact that Africa's trade is mainly done outside the continent and is small among African countries.

Another problem in Africa, due to colonization, is the lack of democratic awareness, the non-adaptation of laws to the realities of the country, the excessive politicization of public life, attachment to the power of political cadres, great interference in counselling by international organizations, countries, and NGOs, often unaware of the realities that exist in Africa.

Another reality lived in those African countries where their independence or the end of the domination of minorities forced years of armed struggle, naturally led by liberation movements that, after reaching their goal, decided to maintain their status, transforming into political parties. Obviously, the direction of an armed struggle has nothing to do with the direction of a country and the form used for the first is often incompatible with the second, and the consequences of this action are not always the best. Examples of this situation are seen in Angola, and South Africa.

But let's get back to the region. The distance between the two sides of the South Atlantic is large, but for the worst reasons (slavery), some of the countries, despite the distance, have for centuries had much in common, as in the case of Brazil and Angola. I speak of religious beliefs, linked to the sea (Yemanjá in Brazil and Kianda in Angola), music, dance, carnival, and joy, always present, even in the worst moments. But thinking in a broader sense, this connection is also considered by scholars, even strangers to the region, as is the case of Dr. Richard Haass when he says:

Africa, with its more than fifty countries, shares characteristics of both Latin America and the Middle East. [...] As in Latin America, most at issue in Africa have been questions of political governance and economic and social development. Corruption is widespread. But largely absent are classic geopolitics. [...] There are few examples of stronger states threatening the independence of weaker neighbors; many of the most pressing challenges have been and are intra rather than interstate. [...] what threats to order there are have come mostly from minorities with separatist agendas, from majorities repressing minorities, from tribal and religious clashes, from refugee flows, and from terrorist organizations.⁹

This is a simplified view of the region's reality. Let us see below the weaknesses and the threats that arise.

WEAKNESSES AND REGIONAL THREATS

In analysing the weaknesses and threats to security and governance of countries, we will begin by considering those that are global and that affect all countries, even though some have more responsibilities in their

emergence and continuation, and also that attempts by others to solve them individually are doomed to failure. Since our study is restricted to the South Atlantic, it is normal to place particular emphasis on the maritime character in this immense ocean and the countries that are bathed by it.

Let us look at these weaknesses and threats:

The Inequalities—A weakness with centuries of existence and causing enormous suffering, conflicts, and even large wars. The world naively convinced itself a few years ago that globalization, the market economy, democracy, and new technologies would end inequalities and that everyone would benefit from this new situation. The reality is totally contrary to this:

Since 2015, the richest 1% has owned more wealth than the rest of the planet. Eight men now own the same amount of wealth as the poorest half of the world [...] The incomes of the poorest 10% of people increased by less than \$3 a year between 1988 and 2011, while the incomes of the richest 1% increased 182 times as much.¹⁰

This situation is particularly serious in the countries of the South and thus in countries that are part of our study.

Natural Plagues—Excesses or failures of nature define these plagues. Some are already known, and as far as we can see, they have no solution, as is the case of the water scarcity that afflicts many countries in South America and Africa. Approximately 70% of water needs are thought to be related to agriculture, which further complicates the problem. But for the future the need for water in urban areas will also be a problem that can generate conflicts. “*As climate change causes «global drying» - making some wet parts of the world water, and dry parts drier - demand for fresh water will intensify in the coming years; half the world’s population is expected to live in water-stressed areas by 2050*”.¹¹

Desertification is partly a result of this scarcity and is expanding rapidly. At other times it is the opposite, such as the floods resulting from rainy periods that create dramatic conditions for the poorest populations. Loss of lives, housing, cultures, support services (schools, health centres, shops, etc.). The responses of governments and their agencies must be adequate, lest new conflicts arise within affected populations. Conflicts related to lack of water have almost always been internal to a given country. Conflicts between countries have so far been very rare, although

sometimes neighbouring states feel their effects (migrations and diseases). But this situation may change in the future.

Other plagues are linked to health: old diseases, which in the poor countries have yet to be exterminated—malaria, yellow fever, cholera and others—but also new diseases, mysteriously arising in years, more or less recent, as is the case of HIV-AIDS, Ebola, Zika, and others.

Terrorism—More specifically the use of a tactic with this denomination, by the most diverse actors, in conflict with much stronger opponents that prevents them from using other tactics. Subversion and guerrilla warfare are other tactics of the weak in conflict with the strongest. However, they are tactics less damaging to the life of innocent people and therefore can never be confused with terrorism, although this confusion has often been used by the strong. The example of Angola is symptomatic—the guerrillas of the liberation movements were called “turras”. The Angolans’ sense of humour created in response to the name “tugas” for the Portuguese.¹² To consider terrorism as a strategy and aiming to adopt a global response to this tactic shows an inability or lack of vision to control a form of combat from the weakest against a stronger one, but with battlefield specifics, to the enemy, to potential supporters, to existing forms of communication, to the psychological impact of victories but also to defeats and, last but not least, to the objectives to be achieved.

Illegal Trafficking—A major threat in the area we are analysing. Let’s start with the most scattered—*Drug Trafficking*. From a number of producing countries, especially in South America, sub-Saharan Africa has been a gateway to the introduction of these products in Europe, as well as South America itself in exporting to the rich countries of the north, especially the USA. Most of the countries that we include in this study act as producers or consumers, but mainly as intermediaries in this illegal business. No numbers are known, but in the World Factbook¹³ phrases such as these appear:

Illicit producer of cannabis, mostly for local consumption; utility as a narcotic transshipment point to Europe reduced by ongoing political instability—small-scale illicit producer of opium and coca for the processing of opiates and coca derivatives—however, large quantities of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana transit the country.

But linked to this illicit trafficking, money laundering has also developed, of a greater or smaller size, as it is revealed by the following findings:

Illicit narcotics proceeds are often laundered through the financial system; significant illicit financial activity [...] rampant corruption and inadequate supervision leave the banking system vulnerable to money laundering.¹⁴

Human Trafficking is a modern way of referring to the centuries-old slave trade and continues in some of the countries under analysis. In the study mentioned above and in relation to countries on both sides of the Atlantic, phrases such as these appear:

A source, destination, and possibly a transit country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labour and sex trafficking; the majority of this trafficking is internal, and much of it is perpetrated by armed groups and rogue government forces outside official control [...] children are subjected to forced labour in fishing, domestic service, street hawking, begging, portering, mining, quarrying, herding, and agriculture, with girls, and to a lesser extent boys, forced into prostitution.¹⁵

And, finally, *Arms Trafficking*—A difficult subject to analyse, since “legal” trafficking is seen as very doubtful, as defined by Nobel Peace Prize winner Oscar Arias Sánchez: “*Our regulations do not hold countries accountable for what is done with the weapons they sell, even when the probable use of such weapons is obvious*”.¹⁶ In fact, the combination is very large and so:

Illegal trade in small arms occurs in many countries and regions affected by political instability. The Small Arms Survey estimates that 875 million small arms circulate worldwide, produced by more than 1000 companies from nearly 100 countries.¹⁷

In some of the countries under analysis, this trafficking is also verified according to the following observation: “*transshipment point for arms-for-drugs dealing*”.¹⁸

Migrations—The most diverse reasons lead a person to want to leave their country. If there are countries with native populations of hundreds and even thousands of years, for example China and Portugal, there are others that practically exist because of the migrations, the most striking example being the USA. People seek better living conditions for themselves and their families, and the easiest solution is often to leave their home country. Staying can mean not finding a job that is compatible with your training,¹⁹ but also not having to perform your compulsory military service in case of war,²⁰ and even their physical survival and their close relatives, because they are part of persecuted minorities²¹ or because an open war broke out in his/her area of residence.²²

For countries of origin, this migration can be a blessing, as is the case of countries with a surplus population, and reducing their numbers can help solve the problem of those who remain. But simultaneously, there are other countries with the population ageing and declining, and immigration helps to solve the problem. And lastly, there are countries that are a source and, at the same time, a destination for migrations.²³ What's wrong? The case of the European Union is blatant. The immigrant came to solve the problem of a declining demography, but with an economic and financial crisis that continues in time, the immigrant happened to be a defector of the rights of the native population. In some African countries, and not only, immigrants come to compete, in many cases disloyal, with native workers. They are considered with greater productive capacity, even if there is a substantial difference in what they earn.

Another aspect to consider is the brain drain. Poor countries form the frameworks they need for their own development. But often these cadres prefer to emigrate to other places where they benefit from better living and working conditions. Their country of origin and payer of their training are naturally the most impaired.

Illegal Fishing—A practice that extends all over the world, but mainly in the waters of weaker countries or with less power to control their maritime areas, in its entirety or in its economic exclusivity. This practice is used by many rich countries, with large fishing fleets, allowing them a large income, which they cannot get in their waters, either because they were not careful in their management or because they are saving their reserves. Obviously, the risk they run is small. This wrongdoer not only removes a part of the wealth from the injured country but is also responsible for the impoverishment of the coastal populations that live off the fishing industry. This is considered to have led to the growth of another threat—piracy, taking advantage of the knowledge, and nautical practice of fishermen without work.

Maritime Piracy—A very old way of illegally making profits, damaging maritime commerce. A form of violence with ups and downs and that, from the middle of the nineteenth century until the decade of the eighties of the twentieth century, was totally asleep. It has since returned in force to various parts of the world, with special focus on the “*Somali Basin, the Gulf of Aden, Nigeria, all situated in Africa, and Indonesia, Malaysia and the Strait of Malacca [...] in the Southeast Asian [and still] in the waters of Bangladesh, India, the South Seas of China, Vietnam, Brazil, Peru and Ecuador*”.²⁴ Many of these places are also associated

with countries with weak governments, the poverty of the coastal populations, and of course, the proximity to major sea routes.

Waste Dumping—Pollution is now considered by the populations of rich countries as a crime against humanity. But these countries are still the major polluters and thus need to lower their brand in this “criminal activity”. Waste should be dumped away from their homes. If it cannot be in the house of the next door neighbour, do it as far as possible. The others will suffer the consequences. A ship loaded with thousands of tons of toxic or even nuclear waste discretely dumps them into the sea, off the coast of an unprotected country. The same applies to the washing of holds of ships carrying toxic products, such as crude oil. Such washing has to be done far and with a lower detection risk. The most unprotected are naturally the main victims.

WEAKNESSES AND DOMESTIC THREATS

When we attempt to analyse the causes that give rise to internal threats in a given country, the available studies place a great deal of emphasis on the problems of democracy and other related factors—governance, rights, development, elections, freedom, political participation, access to the media, and association.

Although we have no doubt that these are important aspects to analyse, it seems to us that we must go further, because these elements alone do not suffice. If not, how do we explain the recent phenomena of population malaise and which creates real threats in countries that are considered as examples of true democracies.

Let us speak of these weaknesses and threats.

Partitioning of Power—The greater importance given by politicians to their political parties than to their own country. The party that wins, legitimately or illegitimately, the power, has only one objective—to impose all its ideas. But also the one who loses it has an identical goal—to denigrate the winning opponent, even if it has done so in a totally correct way. The citizen is forgotten or even despised. The occupation of positions, even if they have nothing to do with political ideas, must be done by partisans of the winner and not by the one with the most knowledge and skills to occupy it. The distribution of benefits—in the form of access to property, participation in public tenders, discounts on taxes and others, and greater access to state information agencies—is also done in accordance with this principle.

The radicalism of the argumentation of those who favor the solution of the Government is equivalent to that of those who stand firm and stiff by the side of the trenches, and in this balance is seen much more than the natural and healthy divergences in democracy. We see rancid, hermetic, bitter conversations, bordering on intolerance, which so often end up pointing the finger at the putative servants of the rich or indigent nostalgists of the base soviets.²⁵

On the other hand, they are also closely linked to corruption, as David Van Reybrouck says:

Political parties everywhere are regarded as the most corrupt organizations on earth. In practically all Western democracies they come in at number one while in the European Union the figures are nothing less than tragic.²⁶

Conflicts—Real or latent, they are a long-standing reality. Created or increased, reflecting many threats, conflicts pose a huge threat to the security of the countries and even the regions under analysis. They are of very different origin, supported by actors outside the territories where they occur, bringing together unconfessable interests—such as the arms business—cheaper access to products important to their own economies, or the maintenance or rise to power of politicians who facilitate the life or business of these actors. But also generated by domestic power conflicts, as well as by other forms of differences such as religious, racial, tribal, and even gender.

Abuse of Corporatism—If it is normal and healthy for the professional classes to struggle to perform their functions in the best way, demanding and suggesting laws, regulations, facilities, salaries, accesses, and means, however, it should not be permissible that they take into their own hands the right to dictate or use laws; to take repressive measures; to act in a discriminatory or illegal manner, taking advantage of their status; to dominate the other citizens who do not belong to their class. The main abuses have arisen from the military and police classes, but also from the judicial, civil service, major trade unions, religious leaders, and, of course, the proletariat. Some more, some less, are serious, deep, and lasting; with more or less support, internal or external; but have given rise to many conflicts, deaths, injuries, imprisonments, endless dictatorships, discrimination, but always diminishing the quality of peoples' lives.

Corruption—An evil scattered throughout the South Atlantic, although, as usual, with a greater incidence in weak states. This widespread incidence is often exploited to accuse the other who is subject to small corruption (*"gasosa"*, as we call it in Angola), the result mainly

of miserable wages, and who tries to hide the great corruption, which involves millions; and an evil that requires fierce combat for its settlement, but which must encompass all its strands—from the highest to the lowest. It is also a factor causing malaise and conflicts.

The Bureaucracy—Also an ancient phenomenon and spread throughout the South Atlantic, with particular emphasis on younger countries and/or heirs of bureaucratic traditions (the case of countries colonized by the Portuguese). The result of several factors, starting with inadequate legislation, incompetence of public servants, and also a way to facilitate corruption. An immense threat to a competitive economy, delaying the launch of new companies, the competitiveness of businesses or enterprises, and forcing the waste of time and expenses totally useless and harmful to those who want to invest in that country.

Crime—An exacerbation of violence, most of which is the result of criminal networks, for well-defined purposes, in order to increase their areas of activity, in order to make a greater profit from their activities. There is also individual crime, as the only way to solve serious problems of one's own or his family—hunger, housing, medical care, etc. If the latter can be solved or diminished with the improvement in the living conditions of the population in general, the former is much more complicated. How often do they not have the support or leadership, even if very disguised, of individuals highly placed in the hierarchy of the state?

Nor should we forget the highly negative role that many media provide to this problem. Based on the formula that nothing should be hidden, they use the information about these crimes as a theme for opening news and trying to show the sordid aspects of crime to win audiences. Is not this an incentive for less mentally minded individuals to think that they can also earn “front page” honours if they commit a crime?

Lack of Quality of Life—A very important factor in creating discontent and, of course, launching or fuelling conflict. If it is a problem spread across the South Atlantic, it is obvious that its effects are felt more in countries with greater difficulty in solving the problem. If the problem concerns only minorities, man's selfishness removes it from the headlines and is quickly forgotten.

This factor can be divided into four main parts: housing, food, health, and education. But before moving forward, and because they are very different, we must consider urban and rural populations separately. Let's start with the first one:

Urban Population—As far as housing is concerned, we have to think mainly of those living in the suburban areas of the cities—“musseques”

in Angola, “favelas” in Brazil, “slums” in English-speaking countries, and “bidonvilles” in French language.

The quality of the construction of the dwelling itself—the ground where it is implanted, the walls, cover, doors and windows, the existence of kitchen, and WC. The difficulty of basic services—water, energy, sanitation. The insecurity of the area; existing access routes and transportation system; the existence of close basic trade; and finally, access to communication—mobile phones and TV.

Regarding *food*, it is necessary to think about its quality, availability, and price.

Health encompasses aspects such as the existence of communicable diseases, by proximity or contact with other humans or through insects or food; the proximity of health centres and hospitals to respond to diseases and accidents; and access to medicines and vaccines.

And finally, with regard to *education*, one should consider the existence of schools nearby; the quality of their teaching; ease of enrolment of school-age children; the cost of tuition fees, or in many cases, the costs that opportunists, often school employees themselves, charge for enrolment; the existence and price of school supplies—books, notebooks, etc.; and last, but not least, the quality of teachers and their ability to teach, their attendance and also their honesty.

The Rural Population—It can be said that the problems are similar to those of the urban population, but the weight of these in their life is very different. For example, heavy rains have a much more negative impact since they can also harm their home and can also lead to the loss of their only source of income—their crops and/or livestock. The basic services, in most cases, are non-existent and the population has to be the one to solve how to replace them. Water often means kilometres on foot, with laundry to be washed in the nearest river, and water for home consumption is also transported on the heads of women.

Health care and education problems are harder to solve. Schools and health centres are always at a great distance and transportation is difficult or non-existent.

Economic Factors—Given the enormous weight of the economy in the lives of countries and their populations, it is normal that failures or deficiencies in the economic management of the country create difficult situations for their life and well-being. And logically they can have a negative impact and result in more or less violent conflicts. Economic factors that have a major impact on the lives of the most deprived populations

are mainly related to unemployment, inflation, and their impact on commodity prices—food, health, and transportation. But also it is the repression against the informal market without the simultaneous creation of easy and cheap conditions for its conversion to the formal market. In addition to the injustice that this repression always involves, it is also a hard blow for small entrepreneurs who have often shown their entrepreneurial capacity and have no chance of turning it into a microenterprise, because the formalities and the price to pay are incompatible with their financial capacity. In Angola, it is particularly shocking to see the persecution of the “quitadeiras” and “zungueiras”,²⁷ who move around the city with the products they sell on the head, whether they are fruits, fish, or ingredients for a light meal, that they prepare there and then serve those who need them:

Participation in Political Life—A recent finding is that of the diminishing participation of citizens in the political life of their countries. And this finding is not limited to countries with recent democracies, but also with a strong incidence in countries with democratic regimes that have long been extended, some even hundreds of years ago. Something is happening and for which there are many theories.

The truth is that some democratic experiences of government began more than two thousand years ago and in a more or less known way have developed in societies scattered around the world, having some of these experiences worked reasonably well. And this is true for societies at the level of large nations, up to the level of small villages. In Africa, until a few years ago, there were real examples of this.

The end of colonialism, a period in which colonizers, concerned with democracy in their land, deliberately forgot to practice it and teach it in the colonies. As soon as forced to end with this form of exploitation, they remembered to call onto themselves the lead of the struggle for this form of government, and that this entailed holding elections.

When Western donor countries hope that countries ravaged by conflict [...] will become democracies, what they really mean is this: they must hold elections, preferably on the Western model, with voting booths, ballot papers and ballot boxes, with parties, campaigns and coalitions, with lists of candidates, polling stations and sealing wax, just like we do, only over there, and then they receive money from us. Local democratic and proto-democratic institutions (village meetings, traditional conflict mediation or ancient jurisprudence) stand no chance. These things may have

their value in encouraging a peaceful and collective discussion, but the money will be shut off unless our own tried and tested recipe is adhered to – rather in the way that traditional medicine must back off as soon as Western medicine turns up.²⁸

At the same time, they feel that something is happening with governments that fail to have the efficiency needed to solve their main problems; they cannot have the least legitimacy to stay in power.

Instead of recognizing that the balance of power has changed and going in search of new and more worthwhile forms of government, they keep on playing the electoral-media game, often against their own best interests and those of the citizens who are starting to find it all a bit tiresome and whose trust is not likely to be won back by so much overwrought and transparent hysteria; the efficiency crisis exacerbates the crisis of legitimacy.²⁹

This instability, on the other hand, is closely linked to the negative role of the media which “*true to market logic, have come to regard the exaggeration of futile conflicts as more important than any attempt to offer insight into real problems, especially in times of falling media revenues*”.³⁰

No wonder then that people do not realize their important role in shaping policies to solve their problem. “This is a problem of the State” is often heard as if it were the owner of all ideas, means, willingness to solve the problem of each of its citizens, just waiting to be thanked if his problem is solved, or criticize or be indignant if this is not the result achieved.

ANSWERS

If we have talked about the region as a whole, the following point will have a more Angolan perspective. I think this is important because it covers a specific reality for my country, which is naturally different from the others, although they may have much in common, offering readers a broader basis for drawing their conclusions. I then speak of the ideas that I consider important in order to respond to the threats and weaknesses described above. Many of the responses encompass and even require a role for other actors in the region, but this does not change the Angolan vision that I intend to give to this point.

How to solve the many problems that affect the country? What role can the countries of the region play to that end? In what ways can

Angola help to solve the problems of other countries? How to do it? How to coordinate it? These are some of the questions that we will see next.

Let us start with problems related to governance. The main ones are those linked to too much politicization of power, abuse of corporatism, lack of participation in political life, social inequalities, bureaucracy, corruption, and economic difficulties.

Let us then look at them separately. The *partitioning of power and the abuse of corporatism* derive, in part, from a mentality acquired during the period of war against colonialism, by the liberation movements that later gave rise to political parties, and reinforced by the conviction of certain professionals of their “enormous” importance. This mentality has not evolved or changed, and today, it still weighs heavily on the way the State conducts itself. A difficult problem to solve since, as the World Development Report, 2017, considers:

All countries, regardless of their level of economic and institutional development, are subject to elite bargains. Change is unlikely to occur unless powerful actors—elites—in the country agree to that change. When influential actors tend to resist change, suboptimal policies and governance institutions that are detrimental to development tend to persist. Under certain circumstances, however, elites may voluntarily agree to limit their influence to their own self-interest. Citizens can also organize to bring about change, playing an important role in applying pressure to influence the outcome of favourable bargains in the policy bargaining process.³¹

But at the same time it is a problem that must be solved internally with the persuasion of these elites that their role may be more beneficial if they give up part of their power. It has to be a peaceful transition, since any violent solution necessarily creates new elites and the problem will remain. An important role will be that of citizens not belonging to this elite, and who “diplomatically” should press to change the situation, but without creating new domains of some. The dispersion of power is important so that most problems can be solved, albeit in a differentiated way, at the lowest level. The overly centralized solutions that we have experienced a lot in Angola do not lead to real or visible solutions. Engaging citizens in political life is a more correct and effective way of reducing their problems and improving their living conditions.

Bureaucracy is another of the major problems that complicate the lives of Angolans. Its resolution, or at least its reduction, must be constantly

tackled, gradually reducing the obstacles that are placed on citizens, in solving essential problems such as obtaining and updating documents, paying taxes or other debts to the State, the creation of new businesses, access to justice, and others. However,

Angola made paying taxes easier and less costly by reducing the frequency of advance payments of corporate income tax and increasing the allowable deductions for bad provisions. At the same time, Angola made interest income tax a final tax that is not deductible for the calculation of corporate income tax.³²

The privatization of some services and the creation of competition between them may be a formula that minimizes the problem. But there will be others.

Corruption must also be combated permanently by creating formulas and processes that make its practice more difficult. One of the ways is to increase the salaries of those who have supervisory functions, avoiding that, in order to satisfy basic needs, they need to be corrupted. But the main effort must be in the fight against the great corruption in the high public entities, which some leaders and decision makers use, directly or indirectly, for own benefit diverting enormous percentages of the great investments of the State and sometimes also of the private sector.

This fight is always a pre-election slogan, but soon after, it falls into complete oblivion. In addition to the independence of the bodies entrusted with directing such combat, it is necessary to provide them with the necessary legal instruments, to create functional mechanisms, without which these objectives will never be achieved. To punish the perpetrators is mandatory, whoever they are, so that potential defaulters feel that “crime does not pay”.

Clearly, as long as one considers that happiness is only achieved by having a lot of money and there are still in the world a few who have more money than millions of others, the problem will never be completely solved.

As for *social inequalities*, they will be greatly reduced if we minimize the problems we have just stated, as well as promote real economic development.

Development matters. If maintaining popular support is critical to neutralizing the emerging internal threats, then greater investments in development initiatives that generate jobs and businesses are a priority. Development generates opportunity. And opportunity dissolves many grievances. Investments in health and education, too, are essential for

building social capacity over the medium term while reducing grievances within the general population that may degenerate into instability.³³

In Angola, the effort to diversify the economy resulting from the reduction in the price of oil in the international market has not been enough and the results are still far from reaching the desired end. More effort is needed, in particular by accepting some of the many important recommendations of the Angolan Social Political Observatory on the General State Budget—OGE of 2016, which we summarized as follows:

Prioritizing people's well-being, combating regional asymmetries and extreme poverty ... increasing spending on education, health, justice, agriculture, and poverty reduction alongside measures to increase resources at their disposal, as a means of reversing the asymmetries. [...] the progressive introduction of the bottom-up planning practice so that the end result matches the needs, priorities and proposals of local populations and institutions ... the integration of many programs already in place, namely at the level of economic diversification and of the social sector, reducing their number so as to ensure greater coordination and reduction of administration costs in implementation ... investment in agriculture and technical assistance for the sector, as well as the rehabilitation of secondary and tertiary roads, without which agricultural production can not perform satisfactorily, leaving populations even more vulnerable. [...] greater investment in justice, central to overcoming the gaps in the sector and fulfilling the aim of diversifying the economy through less bureaucracy, greater assurance of legality and greater speed in business creation and dispute resolution.³⁴

But of course this can be improved if there is a greater exchange between countries—support in the fields of health, education, technology, trade, culture, and tourism. A harmonious and joint development between the countries of the region allows them to be less dependent on the interests of the great, and thus, more easily, can defend their own interests. Dependence on a single partner is always detrimental to the weakest.

Let us see, then, the responses to the threats that are posed to all countries, even though with different incidence and degree. We consider them global because they are not dependent on the internal situation of each country, but that they are all placed even in totally different ways. And here the answer of all is fundamental, and the more participated and coordinated, the more satisfactory a solution can be reached.

By analysing the possible responses to each of the threats listed, we find equal solutions to different threats. And some of these solutions are possibly the most important or most impactful. And going a little further, these solutions are the same ones that we advocated for the solution of the problems related to the improvement in the governance.

I speak, for example, of the economic development of the countries and the improvement in the standard of living of the most deprived populations. I consider this to be the most important response to reducing inequalities, to avoid or lessen conflicts, to reduce the effects of natural pests and migrations, but also of great importance for combating terrorism, illegal trafficking, illegal fishing, and maritime piracy. In all cases, it allows the populations to be more interested in solving each specific problem, since they are more aware that the negative effects of this threat will harm them, and thus, they will be more predisposed to collaborate in their fight, not collaborating with criminal organizations and reporting potential offenders or criminals. But diminishing politicization of power, the abuse of corporatism, bureaucracy, and corruption are equally beneficial in the fight against the threats posed.

In addition to these responses, we need to consider others that can cover many of the threats, including conflicts, terrorism, illegal trafficking, illegal fishing, piracy, and dumping of waste. Let's look at some:

Central to the success of these efforts is information gathering and exchange. States are ideally suited to be central repositories of information on illicit networks that traverse the interests of multiple ministries. To be effective, this requires a concerted inter-agency process that draws on states' comparative advantage – its size and breadth of expertise – to trace funding flows, goods, and personnel used by the illicit networks. Creating a central coordinating entity is key so that all of the disparate elements of the illicit activity can be identified and connected. [...] Given the transnational nature of the threat, unprecedented levels of intra-regional and international information sharing are also needed if efforts to counter these illicit networks are to be successful. Inter-state coordination is always a challenge. However, regional interstate institutions have grown in strength and effectiveness over the years and thus provide a useful starting platform.³⁵

But for this to be effective, sharing of information by all the entities involved and the creation of a high-level structure, which collects, supervises, analyses, and distributes, in a timely manner, the results and the new measures to be taken by all stakeholders, are essential.

A positive example of this is the recent creation, in Angola, of the National Maritime Surveillance System, with its Operational Center for Coordination of this activity, in the implementation phase.³⁶

The next answer is very important and should always be present when discussing international cooperation and aid. Coordination of this important component of the response to threats is essential for non-dispersion, and sometimes even contradiction in aid, even if disinterested and/or effective, and end up harming the effects of others with the same characteristics. The states receiving such aid or cooperation aren't always able to coordinate, and thus, we lose efficiency and cost savings, and the expected results, of course, will not be the same.

The good examples of cooperation, such as the Central and West African Maritime Organization (OMAO), signed between 25 countries in the region ... the new Maritime Information Clearing House - MTISC, to be established in Ghana, must be reinforced.³⁷

A final aspect to consider is the creation of strategic plans at various levels—national, regional, continental, and global, but with the following characteristics:

Each one of these plans must be based in exhaustive studies that take into account all the possible circumstances, capacities, variables and weights of each one of the steps that constitute the whole plan. [...] Each strategic plan must contemplate the following aspects: **Objectives** [...] **Interests** – Defined/enunciated so they can better be safeguarded; [...] **Threats** [...] **Risk Measurement** [...] **Resources Available** – human; material; economic and financial; political – improvement of governance through a better awareness of the problem, increasing the education of policy makers and their political will; [...] **Strategic Space** [...] Partners and stakeholders [...] **Legal** – modification needed to existing laws or new legislation needed [...] **Monitoring** – How the plan will be monitorized, by whom, and at what intervals.³⁸

FINAL WORDS

In a world in deep crisis and with many possible and great changes, it becomes difficult to draw conclusions about the future of a region where there are no actors in the forefront—a world that thought itself surrendered to globalization and multilateralism, about which Henry Kissinger said a few years ago:

The nature of globalization and the reach of modern technology oblige the United States and China to interact around the world. A Cold War between them would bring about an international choosing of sides, spreading disputes into internal politics of every region at a time when issues such as nuclear proliferation, the environment, energy and climate require a comprehensive global solution.³⁹

To the same extent, Hu Jintao, then Chinese Prime Minister, said:

China and the United States have major influence in international affairs and shoulder important responsibilities in upholding world peace and promoting common development. Under the new circumstances, the common interests of our two countries have been growing and areas of cooperation expanding.⁴⁰

And the Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf wrote:

Hitherto, the adjustment to China's rise has been remarkably successful, particularly if one considers the gulf in culture, history and political systems between China and the incumbent powers. The Chinese economy has been dynamic and increasingly market-driven. The west, in turn, has accommodated China. That was the wise thing to do. [...] Both China and the west have much to be proud about. Yet this does not mean that everything has gone smoothly. On the contrary, both sides have made mistakes in managing their economic interaction.⁴¹

More recently Zbigniew Brzezinski and Paul Wasserman noted the following:

The world order is in disarray. The world is sliding into significant disorder with no international structure capable of handling the kinds of problems that are likely to erupt almost simultaneously. To compound it all, chaos among the major powers could generate truly disastrous consequences.⁴²

A few days before, Chinese President Xi Jinping defended globalization in Davos saying:

Pursuing protectionism is like locking oneself in a dark room, while wind and rain may be kept outside, that dark room will also block light and air. No one will emerge as a winner in a trade war.⁴³ [...] Blaming economic globalisation for the world's problems is inconsistent with reality". Instead globalisation has powered global growth and facilitated movement

of goods and capital, advances in science, technology and civilisation, and interactions among people.⁴⁴

But in the same article, Martin Wolf warned that:

The political and economic consequences of a breakdown in relations between China and the west could be catastrophic. At best, it would be impossible to sustain prosperity and manage the shared challenges created by the pressure of humanity on the world's resources. At worst, it could mean war. [...] Technology and economics have made the world smaller than it has ever been before. Now China's development is putting to an end the period of unquestioned western supremacy. East and west must co-operate, or perish.⁴⁵

A Europe that says it is united is totally divided, starting with the unexpected and disastrous “Brexit”; democratic but with an immense increase in nationalist and xenophobic parties taking control of the power and threatening to do it in countries of first greatness, like France; an open Europe now building walls and barriers at sea and on land, indifferent to thousands of innocents killed at the hands of human traffickers; the Europe of the euro, the currency that considered itself the only competitor of the dollar, is now in deep crisis and in danger of disappearing.

Russia is in a transitional phase, recovering from the negative effects of a long period, which had begun hopefully and ended dramatically for the quality of life of the citizens and, lately, intends to return to the status it had as the leading country of the defunct Soviet Union.

And not forgetting the critical domestic problems that are experienced in the countries of the region. Argentina, Brazil, and especially Venezuela, and on the other side to Nigeria, Angola, and South Africa face complicated situations requiring urgent and effective responses.

Solutions? Let us forget the great ones of the world and find formulas so that in the region we can, hand in hand, find the best answers to our problems—increase exchanges, deepen the study of our shortcomings and capabilities, jointly plan for the future, respect each other, and achieve a better future for all. Our people have long suffered and deserve the best. We hope that the publication of this book will help solve this problem.

Acknowledgements Retired Brigadier General of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), founder and deputy chairman of the Strategic Studies Centre of Angola's (CEEa) Executive Council. His last military assignment, till 2004, was as Chief of the Information and Analysis Department—Military Intelligence Services.

Since 2001, and as a CEEA member, produced many studies, conferences, articles, and interviews, in different places and forums, about politics, strategy, security, DDR, conflicts, and conflict resolution.

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