



The Falklands/ Malvinas War in the South Atlantic

Edited by
Érico Esteves Duarte

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“The War of the South Atlantic (1982) continues to resonate in multiple ways as a historical watershed of recognized national and international scope, consequences and projections. The military conflict between Argentina and Great Britain—after the frustrated Argentine intention to recover the islands in British possession since 1833 in 1982—meant the withdrawal of the last military dictatorship and the beginning of an unprecedented democratization process in Argentina and throughout the Latin American Southern Cone.

The only war that Argentina fought in its contemporary history was a ‘witness case’ that brought forward the end of the Cold War and can also be taken as a precedent for the type of warlike confrontation characteristic of the times that followed, with the collapse of bipolarity until the wars of our days: asymmetric conflicts, disputes for the control of natural resources, geostrategic relevance of maritime transit routes and resizing of naval, air, land and space power.

This impeccable and rigorous academic research offers new perspectives to study and understand that conflict and its significance in the regional and global historical context.”

—Fabián Bosoer, *political scientist, editor-in-chief/journalist of Clarín, Author of Malvinas, Capítulo Final: Guerra y diplomacia en la Argentina (1940–1982)*

“The Falkland’s War was a critical factor in propelling Argentina from military dictatorship and towards a democracy and continues to influence Anglo-Argentine relations. While other Latin American nations, such as Chile and Brazil, also made the transition from dictatorship to democracy, none did so through the lens of external conflict with a European power. Drawing upon new material which has come to light primarily in South American archives this edited volume balances out the wealth of Anglo centric literature that has been produced since 1982 by assessing the Argentine experience of the war and its aftermath.

While the Falklands War infused concepts of British identity in the 1980s and beyond, this volume adds not only depth but breadth to Argentine planning and decision, including the key role played by Admiral Anaya in pushing for war, the conduct of the campaign and its significant impact upon Argentina. It’s multidimensional approach to the Argentine perspective provides a stark and highly relevant reassessment of civil-military relations in Argentina, the utility and professionalisation of Argentine military forces that conducted the campaign, the role of the war in Argentina’s domestic and foreign policy as well as the impact upon wider Latin American relations. This is a welcome, and much needed,

volume that adds rich depth to understanding critical aspects of the war itself and the legacy it has had upon Anglo-Argentine relations since 1982.”

—Dr. Martin Robson, *University of Exeter*

“This book presents a multifaceted and multidisciplinary vision of the Malvinas War from historical, sociological, international relations, and political science lenses. The past is examined from a current perspective, by a group of qualified experts, with richness and depth. An important contribution to the knowledge and understanding of this important historical event and its consequences.”

—Professor José Manuel Ugarte, *University of Buenos Aires*

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Érico Esteves Duarte

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Introduction

Érico Esteves Duarte

The Falklands/Malvinas War, although its brevity, never left to be a case recurrently addressed by the scholarship. Since 2012, the disclosure of British and Argentine archives and new stages and levels of contention over the Falklands/Malvinas Islands gave breath to a revigorated trend of studies, which has brought new perspectives and contested old ones. A brief review of the recent scholarship on the Falklands/Malvinas War reveals four primary concentration areas.

First, new studies have continued focusing on the United Kingdom and Argentina's civil-military relations, strategic assessments, and diplomacy channels before and during the war.¹ They have stressed the conflict erupted in an unfortunate moment for British relations with the European continent, Canada, and the United States.² A much smaller number of studies have dedicated to drawing a better picture of the diplomatic channels available to the Argentine military junta. They present new documentation and understanding of the international and regional alignments regarding the conflict. For instance, the clashing arena in the Organization of American States between Latin American and Caribbean blocs

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and the notable roles of Argentine exiles, Mexico, Cuba, and Peru in gathering further support and *matériel*.³ New evidence also stresses the Israel provision of military supplies to Argentina during and after the war, as that moment was the lowest point of British-Israeli relations since 1948.⁴

Second, even the Anglo-Saxon share of the scholarship started to question a simple history of the Falklands/Malvinas War centered on a sole discourse of liberation of the British Islanders hostages. Based on critical theories, new studies have contended that ‘the Falklands/Malvinas dispute, nonetheless, continues as a battle between history and memory.’⁵ The relation between identity and memory of that war unveiled new aspects of its causes and consequences. The war stressed intersubjective contradictions by severing the previous self-images of both contenders and, at the same time, promising redemption.

In Argentina, the war broke its identity as more an European than a Latin American country, which, in large, sustained its self-emulation as the regional leader.⁶ The Argentine defeat made it impossible to decouple the recent past of dirty war against left-wing groups, shadowing the war’s remembrance and veterans’ reintegration, particularly those that served in the continent in reserve and logistical roles. Though the largest in numbers, the ‘fake’ veterans could not compensate the armed forces’ involvement in domestic repression with a nobler duty against the Britons.⁷

In the United Kingdom, the war also came in a moment of decline due to economic stagnation and difficult relations with the continent as Germany raised and started to centralize the European Economic Community. Thatcher’s response manipulated the British collective memory by re-enacting Churchill’s response to Germany in the Second World War. That might have ended miserably in case of defeat, but the victory allowed to resume the war’s predominant narrative as Argentine aggression in prejudice of the legal question upon the Islands demanded by the United Nations since 1965.⁸

The third area of studies’ concentration is the contest among theories and hypotheses to divine the Falklands/Malvinas War causes. There are five groups of them:

1. The collision of misperceptions focuses more on the British than Argentine failures in coercive diplomacy that led to mutual misjudgment and Argentina’s resolve to take the Islands by force. Those

studies point out that the United Kingdom had several opportunities to make decisions to tackle the crisis and bargain with Argentina. However, it was unable to realize beyond short term, predictable, and visible costs.⁹ The inconsistent British policy would have as counterpoint its action in the 1977's previous crisis when it was able to present a credible deterrence threat and deescalate the relations with Argentina¹⁰;

2. The divide government theory advances the feature of the broken decision-making process of democracies during crises. The divide positions inside Thatcher's cabinet would have caused overall reactive decisions, loss of initiative, and lousy signaling.¹¹ The divide also existed in the Reagan administration due to the cracks in the Anglo-American special relationship and inside the US government to take a position between Argentina and the United Kingdom. Others maintain the United States divide did not make it dysfunctional and unsupportive to the British efforts to retake the islands after the Argentine *coup de main*.¹² It seems that both positions are valid and expose the complexity of the diplomatic relations because, at the same moment, the Secretary of State Alexander Haig pushed toward US neutrality, the US Navy risked civil oversight and unity of command by proactively providing anything the British Navy needed: material, shared intelligence, qualified new equipment, and prepared the USS Iwo Jima in case Argentines have neutralized HMS Invincible or Hermes. Consequently, the United States' ambiguity and indecisiveness severed the relationship with the United Kingdom and South America. However, it is possible to recognize the divide inside the Argentine military junta as well. The long tradition of political involvement of Argentine military elites favored different agendas and clients to serve, which explain that each military branch followed its own planning and level of compromise to the war¹³;
3. The honor theory proposes that the risk of shame and humiliation restricts any bargaining with a moral nationalist decisionmaker who favors defeat over concessions. In the British case, Thatcher had 'preferred fighting because it offered the prospect of avoiding concession altogether or, at least, repairing honor by demonstrating fidelity to "the basic principles we must protect".'¹⁴ Collectively, the British discourse was coined with stories of heroes and martyrs, evident in the long list of books of British first-views and war

memories.¹⁵ Furthermore, the ‘magic recovering’ of self-image and international prestige resurfaced in the Argentine public debate once in a while. It was present in the military junta’s communications since the first moments of the crisis.¹⁶

4. The diversionary theory is the most disseminated explanation for Argentina to provoke the war. The more common variation is that the war was intended to be a scapegoat for Argentina’s economic debacle. Variations of that formulation point out the military junta aimed domestic support by accessing national symbols and interest. Finally, the brinkmanship decision making recognized the need to gain legitimacy and unity from a fractured society.¹⁷
5. The most recent proposition is the use of prospect theory that posits Argentina could not have normalized its foreign policy after losing territory and political and economic statuses in Latin American. Accordingly, Argentina moved to maximize the sunken costs it invested for years in the military buildup and would have risked a war with the United Kingdom even it had a different political domestic arrangement.¹⁸ Therefore, the Argentine unity and self-esteem would be dependent on the ‘recovering of the lost things,’ which means the Argentine decision-making process was a hostage of the psychological drive for retaking territory and national projects.¹⁹

Finally, the recent scholarship has given attention to the prospect of Anglo-Argentine relations. A new conflict is considered unlikely given the current military gap between both countries is more extensive than in 1982 and that the Islands are also much better defended.²⁰ However, the rivalry, since 2012, has continued with new shapes. Although excelled by Argentina, both sides have performed, in different ways, the strategy of cooptation of support from media, regional organizations, and international forums.²¹ Beyond the diplomatic and public opinion, the expansion of commercial fishing and offshore oil discoveries in the islands led Argentina and the United Kingdom to enhance scientific researches around the islands’ region to assert their claims. The *Pampa Azul* or *Pampa Submergida* was created in 2014 by the Argentine Ministry of Science, Technology, and Productive Innovation to have science in the service of national sovereignty. By its turn, the Falklands Interim

Government created and funded in the same year the South Atlantic Environmental Research Institute to promote the ‘knowledge economy’ in the islands but also to strengthen the islanders’ self-determination claim.²²

That last point brings to the floor that the Falklands/Malvinas Islands have always been active players before, during, and after the war. They have a constitution since 2008 and revenues from fishing licenses and oil drilling that promise to bring the islands’ GDP per capita to the top among the South Atlantic countries.²³

Despite those studies and topics, the scholarship on Falklands/Malvinas War and its developments has been harmed by unbalanced historiography and points of view. Besides Lawrence Freedman’s two volumes, *The Official History of the Falklands Campaign*, one can count several other general history books and more than thirty war journals, biographies, and first-view narratives with British perspectives of the war.²⁴ Particularly relevant for the study of the war are several publications covering British political and strategic decisions.²⁵

However, in the English language, Moro’s *The History of the South Atlantic Conflict: The War for the Malvinas* and Middlebrook’s *Argentine Fight for the Falklands* are among the very few dedicated to ‘the other side’s perspective.’²⁶ Excellent edited books—such as Danchev’s *International Perspectives on the Falklands Conflict: A Matter of Life and Death*, Badsey’s *The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years On: Lessons for the Future*, and Barbéti and Castro’s *30 Years After: Issues and Representations of the Falklands War*—offer one or no chapter with an Argentine perspective, and none of them access Argentine documentation and scholarship.²⁷

Much of the research on the Falklands/Malvinas War is also insufficient because it has been making little use of the benefit of the disclosure of archives in Argentina and Chile, Brazil, Peru, and other South American countries that performed a role in that war. Although the Falklands/Malvinas War was a watershed moment in South American relations, particularly between Argentina and Brazil, there is a lot to uncover between the war’s regional consequences and the new regional landscape it has shaped.²⁸

That does not mean that Argentine scholarship on Falklands/Malvinas War, or in other languages than English, is overwhelmingly consolidated. There is a problem there, too. Ongoing research studies on the war in Argentina and South America exist, but they are unconnected.

That is the void this edited book aims to address—to balance the scholarship on Falklands/Malvinas by connecting it to current Argentine research. This book asserts more than one Argentine perspective and approach to the Falklands/Malvinas War and its developments to Argentine society and relations with the United Kingdom.

This book provides new aspects and assessments of Argentine armed forces' performance in the war. It also reflects the various short- and long-term implications upon Argentina's foreign policy and society. Therefore, it dialogues with the reinvigorated scholarship on the Falklands/Malvinas War, adding new perspectives and analyses. In this way, it aims to foster a global history of the Falklands/Malvinas War by stimulating further South American research publications.

It comprises seven chapters that assess original primary data, mainly recent disclosed official documentation, and interviews with military officers and combatants, and the current scholarship in Argentina on the subject. Finally, it provides a preliminary overview of the implications of that war in South America by focusing on Brazil's assessments and lessons and accessing recently disclosed documentation.

The first three chapters appraise new aspects and assessments of the Falklands/Malvinas War's military history, contributing to a better understanding of its developments in Argentina's domestic politics and foreign policy.

Germán Soprano's Chapter 2 queries the common notion of the lack of professionalism of the Argentine Army's units in the war.²⁹ It develops a social history of the artillery group sent to the islands, the 3rd Artillery Group, revealing its qualifications and experiences. Moreover, its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Martín Balza, stood as a critical figure in the war's aftermath. He was raised as the Army commander after the democratic transition and performed a central role in the containment of the latest armed forces' mutiny and the reconciliation with Argentine society during their restructuration. Balza was also the first top military officer to publish a *mea culpa* for the armed forces' performance on the 'dirty war.' Therefore, Soprano argues that professionalism existed in some of the Argentine military units regarding tactical effectiveness and detachment from the military regime's repression.

Érico Esteves Duarte and Luís Rodrigo Machado's Chapter 3 reassess the causes of the war and its developments by offering a critical analysis of the Argentine planning and decision-making process. It covers mainly those related to Argentine Navy, unveiling its commander's central role,

Admiral Anaya, in dividing the military junta's unity of command, escalating the crises into conflict, and jeopardizing any possibility of more positive development and conclusion of the war to Argentina. It also contests much of the literature determining a sure British victory by providing structured counterfactuals and a process-tracing analysis.

Daniel Blinder's Chapter 4 expands the understanding of the most intense dimension of that war: air warfare. It assesses the Argentine Air Force plans, reports, and pilots' testimonies, distinguishing organizational from material deficiencies. It also analyzes an underappreciated and sensitive implication of the war: the British policy restricting dual-use technology transfer to Argentina from 1983 to 2018. As its analytical background, this chapter has the interrelation between the international structure of military production and technology transferences and geopolitical notions. Therefore, it bridges the gap between the war's immediate developments and the current Anglo-Argentine relations.

Andrea Belén Rodríguez, in Chapter 5, presents the results of ethnographic research with the veterans of the naval unit Apostadero Naval Malvinas. She reconstructs and interprets its former conscripts' experiences and memories in their returns to a daily life marked by censorship and concealment. She dialogues with intersubjectivity studies of the war and advances its causes and consequences by making the Argentine society accountable for the deployment of thousands of conscripts and then the absence of reintegration programs even after the 1980s' democratic transition. That sociocultural historiography is a relevant approach of the Argentine scholarship that considers the factors for the normalization of the civil-military relations in Argentina.³⁰

The Falklands/Malvinas War reconfigured South American relations. Despite that, the comprehension and processes-tracing of the defense and foreign policies' shifts in that region are a challenging project in construction. Among them, the South Atlantic war was a turning point event to Brazil, ending a secular rivalry of Argentina and eroding much of the Brazilian military regime's convictions on itself and the relations with the United States and Western Hemisphere. Chapter 6—by Vágner Camilo Alves and Marcio Teixeira de Campos—and Chapter 7—by Eduardo Munhoz Svartman and Dilceu Roberto Pivatto Junior—examine the impacts of the Falklands/Malvinas War on the Brazilian Army and Navy, respectively.

Alves and Campos' Chapter 6 accesses the Brazilian military regime's assessments of war. It reveals the Army's recommendations on military preparation, which were deeply concerned about an emerging system

of alliances and its role outside and beyond the Cold War's bipolarity. That notion of political transition also reflects the ongoing Brazilian process of political openness. Therefore, the chapter considers which military reforms were carried on during the democratic transition when the Army enjoyed incomparable conditions to conduct its professionalization. However, the actual execution of a review of its background of involvement in domestic politics followed unsuppressed as it goes until nowadays.

Svartman and Pivatto Junior's Chapter 7 addresses the impacts of the war on Brazilian Naval thought. Beyond naval technology and operations, the Brazilian Navy reassessed the Brazilian national interest and strategic position in the international system. That was not just an intellectual endeavor. It presented recommendations to the National Security Council, and the chapter stresses those carried on by the latest Brazilian military regime's president.

Both chapters detail the Brazilian assessments over the belligerents' performances and strategies, the United States and South American countries' positioning during the conflict, and the lessons learned toward modernization and professionalization. Many further studies are necessary to figure out how Brazil paved its way to its actual position regarding the Falklands/Malvinas issue and may, or may not, perform a buffer role between Argentina and the United Kingdom.

Finally, Alejandro Simonoff's Chapter 8 unfolds Argentine foreign policy toward the Falklands/Malvinas Islands. It offers a thoughtful analysis of each Argentine administrations' strategy, successes, and failures from 1983 to 2019. It argues that, despite the variations in terms of orientation and performance, all of them shared the same goal of resetting the Anglo-Argentine relations to the pre-war state of negotiations over the islands' sovereignty. Therefore, this last chapter converges along with Daniel Blinder and Andrea Rodrigues's ones, pointing out the possibilities and constraints of improving Argentina's relations with the United Kingdom over the Falklands/Malvinas Islands.³¹

The present book has several limits. For one, the Falklands/Malvinas War deserves a better diplomatic history. This book approaches alternatives to Argentine diplomatic channels and strategy during the war and the Argentine foreign policy toward the United Kingdom afterward. However, the regional diplomatic exchanges during the crisis escalation to war are still waiting for proper research, and the extra-regional implications of the war are under-considered. On the one hand, the Soviet

Union offered material and intelligence to Argentina, but what was the extent and plausibility of those offers? How did they affect the United States and other Cold War players? On the other hand, what were the war's impacts on the rest of the former European colonies in Africa and the Middle East?

Nevertheless, it is a long road for a global history of the Falklands/Malvinas War. For a start, its scholars ought to recognize their mutual existence and start to collaborate.

NOTES

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Combat Experiences of the Argentine Army Campaign Artillery in the Falklands/Malvinas War

Germán Soprano

INTRODUCTION

The South American historiography has paid insufficient attention to the understanding of the perspectives and experiences of combatants of the wars in which the armed forces of the countries of the region participated in the twentieth century: Brazil in the Second World War, Colombia in the Korean War, Argentina in the First Gulf War, Brazil and Bolivia in the Acre War, Bolivia and Paraguay in the Chaco War, Colombia and Peru in the Colombia-Peru War (Leticia War), Ecuador and Peru in the Cenepa War, and Argentina and the UK in the Falklands/Malvinas War. In the twenty-first century, some researchers reversed this dominant trend in the academic agenda. Still, in relative terms, we know more about the interventions of the South American armed forces in national politics and the imposition of forms of social control in the twentieth century,

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and less about perspectives and experiences of the combatants in those conventional wars.

In order to contribute to the development of a social and cultural history of war, combat and its combatants or the production of historical anthropology of warfare, this chapter aims to build a historical and ethnographic study of the combat experiences of the members of the Argentine Army 3rd Artillery Group, which participated in the perimeter defense of Puerto Argentino/Stanley during the Falklands/Malvinas War. On the one hand, I analyze the importance of the adequate and intense instruction and training of the personnel and the enlistment of 3rd Artillery Group before the war, for its high combat performance. On the other hand, I seek to understand the positive impact of the leadership of its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Martín Antonio Balza—who later was head of the Argentine Army between 1991 and 1999—on the experiences of officers, non-commissioned officers, and conscripted soldiers from the moment they arrived at the Falklands/Malvinas on April 13, until the end of the war on June 14, 1982.¹ I hypothesize that there was a conventional combatant capability at the tactical level in some units of the Argentine Army. To support my arguments, I use the methodological resource interviews with war veterans of the 3rd Artillery Group and analyze the Argentine armed forces' official documentation.

The chapter relates the study of 3rd Artillery Group to the research of Argentine academics on the history of Argentine military units in the Falklands/Malvinas War, analyzes the composition of 3rd Artillery Group personnel, his instruction, training, and enlistment, his performance in the war and the leadership of his commander: Lieutenant Colonel Balza.

THE SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON COMBATANTS OF THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS WAR IN ARGENTINA

This section situates my arguments into the Argentine scholarship on the Falklands/Malvinas War and the perspectives, experiences, and memories of Argentine combatants and non-combatants. This dialogue with social scientists' research does not intend to disregard other civil and military scholars' contributions or by the testimonial literature produced by veterans of the Falklands/Malvinas War. Therefore, it is not an exhaustive review of the Argentine state of the literature on that war.

In the last thirty years, Argentine scholars have developed relevant studies that recognized and understood the singularities of officers'

perspectives and experiences, non-commissioned officers, and conscripted soldiers on the Falklands/Malvinas War. Those studies have improved the understating of hierarchy, trajectory, and roles the Argentinean militaries fulfilled in the military chain of command, the organic and functional characteristics of military organizations in which those social actors were enlisted, and their locations units were stationed during the war.

The first anthropological study in this area was *De Chicos a Veteranos. Memorias Argentinas de la Guerra de Malvinas* by Rosana Guber, whose ethnographic fieldwork was carried out in 1989 and between 1991 and 1993. It was centered mainly on the memories of conscripted soldiers who lived in different Argentine provinces and fought in various military units. Also, it incorporated testimonials from Army and Air Force officers and non-commissioned officers.² The book highlights that one of the consequences of this war was the formation of a new social identity defined by its national belonging, by age, and by direct participation in the South Atlantic Theater of Operations between April 2 and June 14, 1982: the “ex-soldiers,” “boys,” “former combatants,” or “Malvinas veterans.” Subsequently, she continued her research on the war, focusing on memories of the Navy personnel and the outstanding experiences of the pilots of the A4B fighter aircraft of the Air Force.³

The studies initiated by Federico Lorenz in 1995 are an inescapable reference, which also considers the diversity of combatants’ perspectives and experiences. When he published *Las Guerras por Malvinas*, he aimed at understanding the “distinct ways” in which the war “was experienced” and “to explore the relations between the experience of the actors, protagonists and voluntary and involuntary testimony of war and its consequences.”⁴ The book focused on the conscripted soldiers or “former combatant soldiers.” Likewise, in a more recent article, Lorenz highlighted the uniqueness of war’s perspectives and experiences, recognizable from the analysis of the places where the military units were stationed. Some cases were addressed in particular, such as those Army officers stationed in the Isla Gran Malvina/West Falklands—5th Infantry Regiment 5, companies of the Mechanized Infantry Regiment 8, and the 9th Corps of Engineers—that were isolated after the British landing in the Estrecho de San Carlos/Falklands Sound on May 21, 1982. They starved due to shortages in supply and endured the harassment of enemy forces practically without entering combat.⁵

In turn, the research of the political scientist Alejandro Corbacho and the historians Andrea Belén Rodríguez and Pablo Melara focused on the

particular experiences of the personnel of the Argentine Navy assigned to the Malvinas Theater of Operations during the war: the Marine Infantry Battalion 5, the Malvinas Naval Station, and the Tactical Divers Association, respectively.⁶ Lastly, the anthropologist María Pozzio studied the original experience of the women sent to the islands as nurses of the military health personnel.⁷

Wars are collective phenomena, and as such, we can recognize historical similarities and differences among them. In turn, the experience of combatants in a war also reveals collective and inter-individual similarities and differences. A reading of the work developed by those Argentine social scientists allows us to call attention to the diverse perspectives, experiences, and memories generated by the Falklands/Malvinas War, according to the social role occupied by its protagonists in their military organizations and concerning the place they deployed and their unit's participation in the combat.

THE 3RD ARTILLERY GROUP COMPOSITION

The barracks of 3rd Artillery Group are located southeast of the province of Corrientes in front of the Brazilian city of Uruguaiana (State of Rio Grande do Sul). The unit belonged to the 3rd Infantry Brigade. In addition to the 3rd Artillery Group, this Brigade sent the 4th Infantry Regiment (Monte Caseros), 5th Infantry Regiment (Paso de los Libres), and 12th Infantry Regiment (Mercedes) to the Malvinas Theater of Operations.

On April 9, 1982, the 3rd Artillery Group left their barracks and arrived in the islands on April 13. Its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Balza, learned about their 'recovery' on April 2, together with the rest of Argentina's citizens.⁸ On April 6, the Army Command arranged for its unit to be sent to San Antonio Oeste, on the coast of the province of Río Negro. This decision was not made on the heat of the moment, and the unit had been previously enlisted for combat. On the night of April 9, they departed on a train to Paso de los Libres—taking with them weapons, ammunition, vehicles, and provisions. After almost one day of travel, they stopped at Martín Coronado station, in the conurbation of Buenos Aires. In the evening, they boarded another train that took them to Ingeniero White, where they arrived on April 12, at six o'clock in the morning; at a stop at the Coronel Pringles station, they were informed of their new destination: Puerto Argentino/Stanley. On that day, a part of

the men traveled to the nearby Air Base, Comandante Espora, to board three C-130 Hercules Air Force transport planes and two Boeings 737 from the state-owned civil aviation company, Aerolíneas Argentinas.

The unit had the Artillery Batteries A and B, with six OTO Melara 105 mm pack howitzer each. It was reinforced by the Artillery Battery C with six other similar weapons from the National Military College. Lieutenant Colonel Balza was not only the commander of the 3rd Artillery Group but also the coordinator of the Fire Support Army Group of Puerto Argentino/Stanley, whose mission was to defend the perimeter of this region. To carry out this function, he coordinated the fire support of his unit with the 4th Airborne Artillery Group (with 17 OTO Melara 105 mm pack howitzers) and the Battery A of the 5th Marine Infantry Battalion (with 6 OTO Melara 105 mm pack howitzers). Besides, Balza added to his unit two 155 mm caliber SOFMA guns of Artillery Group 101—incorporated on May 13 and 14—and two 155 mm caliber SOFMA guns of Artillery Group 121—one arrived at Puerto Argentino/Stanley in the morning of June 13 and the other later that night, the latter not being able to be transferred to the area of operations. Balza made the integration of all those people into the Artillery Group.⁹

The personnel of the 3rd Artillery Group assigned to the Malvina's Theatre of Operations was composed of 161 men: 13 officers, 39 non-commissioned officers, and 109 conscripted soldiers—the majority from the class of 1962 and a few from the class of 1963. Before arriving at Puerto Argentino/Stanley, 17 officers and 24 non-commissioned officers from different locations joined their unit. In the Islands, the other five officers, three non-commissioned officers, and 43 conscripted soldiers from the class of 1962 were assigned. Thus, in the Malvina's Theater of Operations, the 3rd Artillery Group had, at a certain point, 35 officers (33 from the command corps and two from the professional corps), 69 non-commissioned officers (56 from the command corps and 13 from the professional corps) and 152 conscripted soldiers, making a total of 256 soldiers.

On the morning of June 14, when the ceasefire took place, only the 3rd Artillery Group had lost soldiers in the combat: Lieutenant Alberto Rolando Ramos and Corporal Ángel Fidel Quispe, and other 25 were injured. The Argentine troops in Puerto Argentino/Stanley were made prisoners. The junior officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers were sent by the British to Puerto Madryn, where they arrived with

other Argentine combatants between June 18 and 21; while commanders, senior officers, a few junior officers, and non-commissioned officers of the Army, Navy and Air Force remained prisoners of war until they were transferred to the locality mentioned above where they arrived on July 14. Balza was among the latter.

It is important to highlight two issues arising from this composition of the 3rd Artillery Group, which were decisive in subsequent combat performance. On the one hand, the ratio between cadres and their soldiers and “aggregates” was practically one to one; and, on the other hand, almost all soldiers were of the 1962 class. Therefore, they had received training throughout 1981. The main reasons invoked by the protagonists for which not all staff moved to the Falklands/Malvinas Islands were at least three. First, they noted that an insufficient number of aircraft was available to transport the whole unit. Second, as a result, much of the personnel and material moved should remain on the continent. Third, finally—as expressed crudely by some testimonies of officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers—Balza decided to take only those he considered best suited for combat. Balza endorsed this opinion: “Among the officers and non-commissioned officers I selected to go to the islands, I left on the mainland those who showed little initiative or excessive attachment and reverence toward preconceived canons, as well as the ones who were too cautious about making decisions. With a few exceptions, I don’t think I was wrong.”¹⁰

In April 1982, Martín Antonio Balza was a lieutenant colonel. He began his military career joining the National Military College as a cadet at the beginning of 1952. When he was appointed commander of the 3rd Artillery Group in December 1979, he prepared for almost twenty-eight years to lead an artillery unit in conventional warfare by attending advanced training courses and activities in various operational destinations and participating in an international mission. During this long period, he undertook the following functions:

- Cadet of artillery branch at the National Military College (1952–1955);
- Deputy Officer in operational units: Uspallata Mountain Artillery Group (1956–1958), Light Artillery Group of Motorized Campaign “Brigadier General Iriarte” of Ciudadela (1959–1960) and 3rd Artillery Group of Paso de los Libres (1966–1967);

- Instructing officer (1962–1964) and head of the Central Division (1965) of the National Military College;
- Student (1958–1959), officer instructor (1961–1968–1969), and director of the Teaching and Doctrine Division at the Artillery School (1978).
- A military observer in the Middle East (1970);
- Student at the Army War College (1971–1973);
- Staff Officer of the Command of the IX Brigade in Comodoro Rivadavia (1974–1975);
- Student at the Army War College of Peru (1976–1977);
- Head of the Teaching and Doctrine Division of the Artillery School (February–September 1978) and head of the Artillery Group 102 of Junín in the framework of “Operativo Soberanía” (October 1978–March 1979) on the occasion of the escalation of the border conflict between Argentina and Chile;
- Staff Officer of the Artillery Command (1979).¹¹

I present this account of milestones in Balza’s military career to draw the reader’s attention to the following premise: having a sound tactical military leader demands an investment of resources that a State and a society can only achieve by continuously sustaining efforts aimed at basic training, improvement, and operational professional activity. Although this premise’s obligatory fulfillment does not necessarily guarantee the success of the tactical commander’s leadership in the war, it is not possible to disregard its importance in the results of his performance. It should also be noted that Balza reached the rank of lieutenant general and was commander of the Argentine Army between November 1991 and December 1999. His leadership is remembered not only for initiatives of modernization and military reforms but also because on December 3, 1990; he repressed what would be the last “military uprising” which took place under the democratic regime in Argentina and for an institutional message addressed to the society in which he formulated a “self-criticism” for the participation of the Army in the illegal repression during the 1976–1983 dictatorship.

THE 3RD ARTILLERY GROUP'S INSTRUCTION, TRAINING, AND ENLISTMENT

The organization and operation of the 3rd Artillery Group and other artillery units of the Argentine Army were planned and executed annually to face a conventional war, that is, considering the possibility of border conflicts with Chile and Brazil. Balza was appointed commander of that unit on October 31, 1979, and took office on December 20. According to his cultivated idea for almost thirty years, this leadership position was the opportunity he was waiting to model an artillery group. He immediately focused on the instruction and training of personnel and the enlistment of the unit. Lieutenant Oscar Martínez Conti, assigned to 3rd Artillery Group in the late 1980s, remembered that:

[...] Balza was always very focused on his profession. It was usual for him to be active between seven in the morning and ten at night. Saturdays and Sundays were often part of this dynamic. [...] 3rd Artillery Group was successful or had a good performance in Malvinas [war] because we fulfilled what was expected of the organization. We did what we had been preparing [to do] for two years. We didn't do anything besides that. In 1981, we went to the field fourteen times. That's why I always say: good performance is number fourteen. War is waged on the ground. Except, of course, that neither the classroom nor field practice can really represent what happens in war. Nevertheless, field practice is irreplaceable. Usually, we would go to the training field at the barracks or to Campo Ávalos, near Monte Caseros. Those outings provided technical and tactical abilities. At the end of 1981, there was a replacement for officers and non-commissioned officers. Balza put together an outstanding team of officers. Balanced. On our part, the officers tried to maintain good interpersonal relations of solidarity and camaraderie amongst ourselves and convey that to our non-commissioned officers and soldiers. Perhaps it was a way to face the personality and demands projected by the head of the unit.¹²

Major Carlos Milanese was an operations officer. He recounted that in the year of 1981:

We had much work to do. 3rd Artillery Group was a unit selected to experiment with the quarterly recruitment of conscripted soldiers. The unit was always under training and operational. Possibly the renovation [of the conscripts] every quarter was carried out inside each battery. The unit's enlistment program foresaw, for example, the motorized march with the

equipment and supplies to the place chosen for the exercises, assuming a position, artillery shooting, all this staged as a land operation. Balza had the unit training all year round in the field. People were under continuous practice. No one in the country had thought about a war against the United Kingdom, let alone on an island territory. But still, we walked all the time and all year round, walking at night, adapting, and learning to endure fatigue. Balza put much emphasis on that.¹³

In times of peace, in addition to Command and Service Batteries, artillery units had two batteries. In the specific case of 3rd Artillery Group, each had six OTO Melara 105 mm pack howitzers pieces of artillery incorporated in 1981, to replace the Schneider 105 mm canons. There was a chief battery officer at the front of each battery (a first lieutenant) and one or two battery officers (lieutenant or second lieutenant). At the same time, for each piece of artillery, there was a chief sub-officer (first sergeant or sergeant), an auxiliary sub-officer (first corporal or corporal), and six soldiers working directly with the piece, assigned as a right gunner, left gunner, grader (the one who sets the timer of the projectile fuse) and two ammunition suppliers. Among them, one played the role of communicator.

Soldiers of a class called to serve as conscripts were drafted by a letter that ordered them to report to the military district's headquarters corresponding to their domicile, as declared on the national identity card or enrollment register. According to Oscar Martínez Conti, at the end of 1981, the Army established an experimental system in the 3rd Infantry Brigade called "quarterly." This system meant that conscripted soldiers would join the group quarterly to ensure soldiers were trained, and the unit remained operational all year round. That is why only 25% of the 1962 class soldiers were discharged at the end of that year.¹⁴ With this "experimental" system, the first incorporation of the year took place in February-March and the last one in November-December. Thus: "If three of the six people responsible for operating an OTO Melara were trained - the gunner, the loader and the shooter - it was enough; the rest moved the boxes."¹⁵ As then Corporal Guillermo Castillo recounts:

The class of 1962 soldiers was very well trained in the [use of] OTO Melara. The advanced observer knew how to estimate the target and make corrections very well. The communicator knew the specific vocabulary. As for the ones who operated the piece, the right and left gunners and the grader were alert. Once the task had been learned, it had to be done

routinely under the chief's control and the officer in charge. Therefore, when the class of 62 soldiers was reinstated in April 1982, it was only necessary to refresh their knowledge.¹⁶

The daily routine began at the barracks around 06:00 hours, with training formation at the place-of-arms, closed-order practice, artillery studies, and practices: theoretical and practical knowledge of artillery firing, topography, communications, service of artillery pieces, military regulations, internal service, and garrison. Mostly, non-commissioned officers were in charge of the instruction, but the batteries' officers also intervened in some instances, such as when they carried out shooting simulation or artillery shooting.¹⁷ "We learned the roles in operating the artillery pieces, advanced observer, and Firing Direction Center [CDT]."¹⁸ They trained on the unit's combat and athletic track. They would run around or into the city. On the polo field next to the barracks, they practiced artillery firing with sub-caliber ammunition that did not produce an explosion but was used to reach targets.¹⁹ According to Castillo:

Balza was present throughout the process of training soldiers as artillerymen. The training was strict, permanently controlled, and evaluated. For example, on Friday, we would shoot on a field behind Zapadores-Lomas Valentina. The target zone and base point were El Hachazo. We went out to shoot [with howitzers]. In the afternoon, Balza arrived to control the shooting exercise, and he could say: 'This is not right, stay until tomorrow' [...]. During the week, we went out to exercise and run with him. [...] The practice of artillery shooting was intensive, permanent, throughout the training. We also went to the Campo Ávalos to do our exercises or participate in those of the Brigade. We could fire 30 or 40 shots per piece [...] In June, we did a helicopter transport exercise in Campo Ávalos, only with the frames and with one piece of each battery. Unfortunately, we could not put the latter into practice in Malvinas [war] due to the lack of [helicopters] and, therefore, we had to move the pieces with vehicles.²⁰

The unit had systematized and well incorporated Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to perform different activities automatically, facilitate "their execution, command, and control of the head of the lowest level element" and "overcome unknown demands" in contingencies that occur during combat.²¹ For Balza, the SOPs were:

Something that one learns in every activity. It automates everything. For example, the firing procedure [...]. That avoids giving unnecessary orders to carry out routine tasks. To provide oneself with a signal is enough. We had a request for everything. But to achieve that takes time in any unit. And continuity in work with officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers. I had already started that in 1980 and by April 2, 1982, I had been doing it for more than two years.²²

Soldiers with full secondary education were offered the possibility of taking the AOR course (Auxiliary Reserve Officer). In 1981, the conscripts who joined that modality were incorporated into the Battery B. Their training as soldiers and artillerymen was more rigorous, as they ended their military service with the rank of reserve second lieutenant. That year, approximately forty-five to sixty of them opted for this modality, but only seven or five concluded the course. They underwent training as an advanced observer, a horizontal plane operator (who handles cartography and performs calculations for artillery firing), and a battery officer. This type of military service benefited from ending the conscription in November, with the first soldiers being discharged.²³

The outings of the unit to the field to exercise were frequent—some testimonies point out once a month—and could include cross-country marches with materials and equipment from Paso de los Libres to the small town of Yapeyú, distant about 75 kilometers to the north along the shores of the Uruguay River, or go to the training camp the Army had a few kilometers to the south in Campos Ávalos. In the latter, they practiced firing with OTO Melara 105 mm pack howitzers. Sergeant José María González Fernández remembers that in 1981: “We always had field training. At any time, there was enlistment. Balza was present all the time.”²⁴ Moreover, the soldier Elías Mango: “In Campo Ávalos we shot [artillery] close, above the [infantry] troop at less than 600 meters. A very delicate, risky shot. In the war, we had to fire at our troops many times, and we already had that experience.”²⁵ Still, Sergeant Luis María Rodríguez, ammunition and explosives mechanic, said:

That year the training was intense because the OTO Melara [105 mm] howitzers were received, but when we returned the Schneider [105] mm, we had to finish with all the ammunition we had [for the latter]. That’s why that year we shot with both kinds of cannons. Although each one has its particularities, the principles are the same. We optimized the instruction as much as possible. We must have shot twice as much as we do in a year.

I tell the young people that what we did in Malvinas/Falkland's [war], we did because we had already done it in training. [...] Because we had had training and the team was ready. We had reviewed it. There was an exact order for packing things in our bags and for taking them out. It was only later that we realized that it is not the same when everything is ready. We each had our helmets, rifles, and ammunition. Everything was ready. The formation was finished, and enlistment was ordered, and each one went to get weapons, helmet, ammunition, and bag. At first, it was difficult. We didn't see the relevance [of this]. Then we finally realized why. Why do we have to follow this exact order? So that each one knew quickly [what to do] and others could use one person's equipment. The ammunition of the pieces, I already had them prepared by a battery and by piece for each battery. Each one had the initial provision. In the case of the OTO Melara [caliber 105 mm], 70% of projectiles with instant fuse, 20% with timer fuse, and 10% with smoke projectiles. 190 shots per piece. I had understood how the system was.²⁶

The then first Sergeant Miguel Ángel Rubio used to say that Balza ordered every month or every month and a half, the enlistment of the unit to have it ready for its displacement and engagement in combat. "Each one knew what they had to do. Enlistment could be ordered at any time, for example, in the middle of the night and without warning. On Saturdays, too. Once, he did it at two o'clock in the morning. He gathered us in the barracks' main place-of-arms and gave us the order to march to Yapeyú. Deep down inside, we hated him for this, but that made a difference in Falklands/Malvinas [War]."²⁷

The soldiers had to learn to identify a vital issue for the survival in combat of the members of an artillery battery: to recognize the time it takes a projectile between the "bang" in the pieces of the enemy until it falls to the ground in our location or its proximities. That was also a critical practical knowledge later in the Falklands/Malvinas War, as one non-commissioned officer pointed out: "There [in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands] we had to learn that the [British] frigates shot with a certain cadence and, therefore, it was difficult to differentiate the 'bang' from the projectile being shot [from the frigate barrel] and the 'bang' of the explosion when it hit the ground [in our location]."²⁸ That is to say, instruction in times of peace was paramount, but war always imposed new situations. These unforeseen contingencies had to be understood and dealt with to be efficient in combat and, of course, to survive.

That year of 1981, 3rd Artillery Group was so well prepared physically, militarily, and morally that they sent a representation to participate in an infantry exercise competition—which included firing, grenade throwing, combat tracking, and march or cross-country race—organized by the Brigade in Curuzú Cuatiá and they won. “The commander of the Brigade wanted to kill the infantrymen; the artillerymen had beaten them in their own specialty!”.²⁹ Having the personnel trained and the unit permanently enlisted was a decisive factor when the 3rd Artillery Group was ordered to march to the south of Argentina in early April 1982 and, obviously, in the war.

Finally, let us point out that according to the education directives given by the Army, the discourse of the “fight against subversion” was present in its conceptions. However, Balza maintained that those directives had no practical consequences on the instruction and enlistment of the 3rd Artillery Group since it was a unit that had no territorial responsibility except for the control of the routes near the barracks. Consequently, in the years in which he was the commander officer—1980, 1981, and part of 1982—the priority was given to the training and enlistment activities of a field artillery unit.³⁰

ARGENTINE ARTILLERY IN THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS WAR

If the imminent confrontation with Chile at the end of 1978 had been the result of tensions accumulated between the two countries during a century of possibilities of border conflict, the recovery of the Falklands/Malvinas Islands by Argentina on April 2, 1982, and the beginning of the war with the UK were events for which the Argentine Army had not prepared itself throughout its history. Federico Lorenz points out that out of every ten Argentine combatants in the Army, seven were conscripted soldiers of the 1962 and 1963 classes—those of the latter with little or no military training, since they had been incorporated at the beginning of 1982.³¹ On the other hand, the British units were entirely integrated by professional military personnel and were technologically better equipped. These two factors were not the only ones that decided the conflict in the UK favor since, despite the high performance of many Argentine officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, they could not face a conventional war against a world power.

The analysis of the *Report of the Commission for the Analysis and Evaluation of the Responsibilities of the South Atlantic Conflict*—known as the *Rattembach Report*—highlights the remarkable role played by the unit commanders of the ground operations: Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Martín Balza (commander of 3rd Artillery Group), Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed Alí Seineldín (commander of the 25th Infantry Regiment), Major Aldo Rico (commander of Commando Company 602), Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Alberto Quevedo (head of 4th Airborne Artillery Group), Lieutenant Colonel Hector Lubin Arias (head of 601st Defense Artillery Group), and Frigate Captain Carlos Hugo Robacio (commander of 5th Marine Battalion).³²

Comparing the firepower of the field artillery of the Argentine and British forces, the asymmetry was expressed by the following: the first had 18 OTO Melara 105 mm pack howitzer of 3rd Artillery Group, 17 OTO Melara 105 mm pack howitzer of 4th Airborne Artillery Group, 3 SOFMA 155 mm guns (the fourth was not operational) from Artillery Groups 101 and 121 added to 3rd Artillery Group, and 6 OTO Melara 105 mm pack howitzer from the Artillery Battery of 5th Marine Infantry Battalion (total 44 pieces). Let us remember that the Argentine 105 mm cannons had a range of 10,200 meters, and the 155 mm cannons had a range of 20,000 meters.

Meanwhile, the British field artillery had 105 mm cannons with a range of 17,000 meters: 18 pieces the Airborne Regiment 4 of the Royal Artillery, 18 pieces of 29th Regiment of the Royal Artillery, and 18 pieces of the 66th Regiment of the Royal Artillery (total 54 pieces).

Colonel (R) Horacio Rodríguez Mottino, therefore, concludes that the power ratio between the two field artilleries was favorable to the British at a ratio of 3/1.³³ For Balza, the asymmetry was increased due to Argentine unfavorable mission of defending the extended perimeter of Puerto Argentino/Stanley with relatively insufficient number of artillery pieces. At the same time, the difficulties grew as very few 105 mm illuminating projectiles, 155 mm ammunition, and radars suitable for the target selection and means of communication were available, helicopters were absent for the transport of the material, and the lack of coordination with some infantry units to regulate artillery firing.³⁴

What factors contributed to accomplishing the 3rd Artillery Group's missions, and which ones did limit them? According to Balza's evaluation of his unit's combat performance in the immediate postwar period in the

3rd Artillery Group Operations Report of August 6, 1982, the positive factors were:

1. Adequate level of instruction of cadres and troops;
2. Use of class 1962s soldiers with a system of quarterly incorporation and selection of troop personnel, leaving on the continent those who were not strictly necessary;
3. Optimum physical conditions of personnel;
4. Artillery material and Rasit radar in good condition;
5. Efficient Rasit radar operators;
6. Good functioning of communication equipment;
7. Intensification of night training before the start of operations;
8. Efficient technical assembly in piece service, advanced observers, firing center, and communications equipment operators;
9. Means of communication were operated by army personnel (cadres);
10. Supervision at all levels of the ordered aspects relating to the maintenance of morale, favoring positively in the 'team spirit' and the 'disciplinary index'.³⁵

On the other hand, in his opinion, the limiting factors were:

- a. Lack of anti-weapon radars (counter-mortars and counter-artillery), Ratac radars for artillery firing direction (especially for 155 mm SOFMA guns), and David type computers for firing control;
- b. Limited knowledge of the possibilities and limitations of the artillery itself on the part of the maneuver elements;
- c. Lack of illuminating projectiles for OTO Melara 105 mm pack howitzer; the Navy provided those available for 155 mm SOFMA guns;
- d. Lack of mobility, mainly aerial (helicopters) for transporting parts, ammunition, and personnel;
- e. Need for more 155 mm artillery pieces;
- f. Lack of integrated instruction between the maneuver element (mainly Army infantry units) and fire support.³⁶

Balza also highlighted other factors that contributed to his mission: his men's good health at the medical officer's care, the maintenance of

morale by the personnel officer, and the quartermaster officer's high performance. Other factors that made it difficult were: the admission of new member (aggregates)—officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers from other units incorporated into 3rd Artillery Group—a few hours before leaving for the theater of operations, and the fact that, in general terms, their technical knowledge of artillery was inadequate to their higher commanders. Also, in some cases, they did not have adequate physical conditions required for combat, for which “they had to take the rhythm of the unit during the development of operations” and “some did not achieve it.”³⁷

In short, the adequate performance of 3rd Artillery Group in the perimeter defense of Puerto Argentino/St Stanley during the Falklands/Malvinas War was a consequence of:

- a qualified and experienced military leadership forged in the process of education and development of Balza's professional career as an artillery and staff officer that lasted for thirty years from the time he entered the National Military College in 1952 until he took the leadership of 3rd Artillery Group in December 1979;
- officers, non-commissioned officers, and conscript soldiers of the 1962 class were duly and intensely instructed in field artillery operations and enlisted with more than one year's work in the barracks and on field trips;
- a cohesive unit in times of peace that, despite having incorporated “aggregate” personnel shortly before crossing into the Falklands/Malvinas Islands, was reduced in the continent, leaving the unfit personnel for combat at the charge of the head of the unit. Moreover, although it experienced the natural intergroup disputes that goes through in these extraordinary circumstances, they did not lose their social integration and effectiveness in combat until the ceasefire on June 14, 1982. That outstanding performance of 3rd Artillery Group was endorsed in the post-war period by the decorations awarded to its commander and some officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers, and for one additional fact: it is a unit of the Army in which its war veterans—officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers—meet annually to commemorate their baptism of fire' in the Falklands/Malvinas War.³⁸

Now, here it is necessary to point out that the basic training of an artillery officer, the development of his professional career as a subordinate officer in weaponry operational units in the Artillery School and as an officer of the General Staff. The intent is to assess the doctrine and specific activities that Argentine field or anti-aircraft artillery officers had to develop concepts and deployment of operations of a conventional war. As Oscar Martínez Conti has pointed out during the Falklands/Malvinas War, they acquired skills such as:

[...] to reach up to three targets simultaneously with the same sub-unit, to perform night shooting against stationary or moving vessels with shooting data obtained from the information provided by a land surveillance radar – based on cartography [of the area] to gather shooting data such as location, target identification and shooting adjustment from a helicopter in an environment without aerial superiority - as well as the use of a standard target location system, to overcome the permanent difficulties of observation due to the prevailing meteorological rigor and to simplify the fire support requirements of elements engaged on the front line or of command troops during their infiltrations.³⁹

Thus, the imponderable situations experienced in the war led Argentine officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers to acquire extraordinary, infrequent, or unthinkable skills in planning training or field artillery doctrine.

BALZA'S MILITARY LEADERSHIP

The performance of the 3rd Artillery Group in the Malvinas/Falkland War depended on the suitable instruction and training of its staff and the leadership of its commander. In this sense, officers, non-commissioned officers, and veteran soldiers stressed in their testimonies the outstanding role that Lieutenant Colonel Balza played in the combat effectiveness of this unit at the tactical level.

Oscar Martínez Conti had told me that when he returned from the Falklands/Malvinas War, "the only one who understood us was Balza."⁴⁰ Why? What was the meaning of that statement? Why did he understand them? What did he know? What was the essence of Balza for his men? I will attempt to provide some answers to these questions. However, we must bear in mind that the roles of Balza as a lieutenant general in charge of the Army in the 1990s and as a public figure since he retired in

2000 to the present, had or have for each veteran of 3rd Artillery Group is something necessarily vested with unique and historically changing contents.

In testimony by Julio César Navone—an officer of Battery B—about his experience in the Falklands/Malvinas War, he compared the differences experienced by the 3rd Artillery Group and other Army units when they retreated over Puerto Argentino/Stanley due to the land advance of the British forces. In that comparison, the role played by Balza in the leadership of his men stood out:

In general, without ammunition, lacking equipment, shelter, exhausted by effort and tensions, without having received food in the last forty-eight hours, many of them without their original team leaders, either because of the disorderly retreat of some fractions or because they had fallen dead, wounded or prisoners and yet, despite the gravity of the general situation, our men [those of 3rd Artillery Group] stoically stood at the foot of the cannon. Standing by us, serene, exhausted by the long nights of combat but with great lucidity to continue commanding the unit as he did from the first day we arrived in Malvinas, was our commander. I thank God that I was commanded with firmness and rigor in combat, but always by personal example. That allowed that spirit to reach the last of the men, and the unit fought outstandingly, but above all, the discipline was kept monolithically until the last day of combat.⁴¹

Trying to understand the deeper meaning that Balza had and has for the 3rd Artillery Group veterans, at the end of the interviews with officers and non-commissioned officers, I asked if they could define who Balza was for them. Oscar Martinez Conti told me:

You ask me to talk about General Balza, and for me, Balza is that lieutenant colonel I met in Libres in December 1980 when I was 23 years old. When I graduated from the Military College, I was assigned to Zapala. There, my first mentors were a sergeant and a second lieutenant. They were my first role models as a soldier. Then came Balza. Other companions were not that lucky. In Balza, I see the guy who took me to war and brought me back. I can tell you about Balza in Malvinas, but when I talk about it, I don't think about the isolated man but about the 3rd Artillery Group, in a context. Balza was a good leader, but leadership is the merit of the one who leads and those who recognize his leadership and follow him. He convinced people. I see Balza as the lieutenant colonel who led us in combat. And there he was not alone. He knew how to transmit to

his subordinate commanders what he wanted from them. They gave an outstanding response, and the success of the group followed from that.⁴²

Miguel Ángel Rubio stated that:

Balza was a true leader in the Army. [He was] the ‘commander’ that thought and executed. He provided non-commissioned officers with the benefit of having a secondary education. As a unit commander, he always cared about his cadres and solved problems immediately. But he had us shitting [ourselves] the two years he was here... [laughs].⁴³

Likewise, Luis María Rodríguez asserted:

When Balza arrived at the unit [...], he embraced the unit’s operational performance as a whole unit and individually. This articulation that he produced in the Group was later extrapolated to the Army when he was chief. He prepared us physically and intellectually in peacetime to perform in a theatre of operations [...] The unit is a set of people who contribute to the common goal of being useful in the theatre of operations. When that does not happen, [the concept] of the unit as a whole is lost. Maybe the young people didn’t see it that way then. He demanded physical and intellectual preparation, and we would say “hey” as if it were an excessive demand, but then we valued it when we were in the war because there we applied what we learned in peacetime instruction. If we compare ourselves with other units, we did have a team spirit [...]. Balza sent the message to the unit that each one of us was necessary for our work. Today I see it. Maybe then I couldn’t see it, but it’s the whole that matters.⁴⁴

In turn, soldiers Julio Palacio and José Carlos Carbonell said:

Lieutenant Colonel Balza was a great leader in the Malvinas [War]. We respected him very much. We had great admiration for him as a commander. He did not allow mistakes in the personnel. He went through the trenches to see if we had dug them in the correct depth because he said that could save the soldiers’ lives. It was tough to make them because of the stones and wet soil. It was complicated to make them. He would review us, and the soldiers had to have everything in [adequate] conditions for their protection. If I had to serve again, I would serve in artillery. We received the shots from the enemy, we took refuge, and after protecting ourselves, we shot again. That generated adrenaline. The smell of gunpowder. The command conditions of our officers were excellent. We

rose to the occasion. There was much camaraderie among the gunners. Why? Because it was encouraged by the chief: Lieutenant Colonel Balza [...] Also Scineldín and Robacio had a special recognition. The Nation, however, has not given the same credit. I don't know if it is appropriate, but I think it's important to say so—a simple soldier's opinion, but one hundred percent Argentine. I never knew of anyone who disagreed with Balza's order, and we had great respect and, above all, admiration.⁴⁵

I am proud to have fulfilled my duty to my country. Whenever I talk about Malvinas [war], I always say: [I hope] that what we did will help the Argentine flag fly in Malvinas one day. I hope it works, and maybe my children won't see it. Maybe some grandson could say that he had a grandfather who was in the Malvinas [war]. And if 3rd Artillery Group had an outstanding performance in the Malvinas [war], it was because of Balza. He protected us, and he went to the front. He was always at the head as a great soldier. When he became chief of the Army, he continued to have a relationship with us. It did not change a thing. For me, he is Martín. He used to come here [to Paso de los Libres] [...]. And once he got us on a helicopter and took us to Yapeyú for a ceremony to [commemorate] San Martín.⁴⁶

Luciano Abel Benitez, then chief non-commissioned officer, defined Balza using Balza's word, [based on something he had said] around 1966 when he was a young corporal: "You cannot confuse discipline with submission. You must be subordinate. Do as you are told. But only whether the order [given] is a good one. And then you must decide when to do carry it out and when not to do it".⁴⁷ In turn, Guillermo Castillo said:

The basis of the unit's good performance in the Malvinas [war] was preparation and instruction during times of peace. Balza was a fierce chief, a son of a bitch [smiles] both in peace and war. But you'll never find a soldier who says Lieutenant Colonel [Balza] didn't share what they did. After each counter-battery fire, the presence of the chief [Balza] was noticeable. He took care of people. He got into the jeep with Quiroz and even went to see Battery C, which was further away. But if he came and found something wrong, he would shit on our heads. In that, he was as fucked up in peace as in war times. You knew that you didn't fuck with the chief. And if my chief is here, we thought, I just have to follow him. You don't know how that boosts morale [...]. We went as a unit and came back as a unit. And we only had two dead. You can also see here that the training was

excellent. Today the spirit of unity is intact. It is not, therefore, just any unity.⁴⁸

The remarks that Balza awoke among veterans, however, are not exhausted in these positive appraisals. Other veterans' testimonies—albeit the minority—gathered in interviews or informal conversations criticized his assessments as a military leader and public figure. They were more accentuated in some cadres, especially officers, and referred to his role as Chief of Staff of the Army between 1991 and 1999 or, later, with his public performance since he retired.

ASSESSMENT OF BALZA'S COMMAND AND THE 3RD ARTILLERY GROUP IN THE *RATTEMBACH REPORT*

The Commission for the Analysis and Evaluation of Responsibilities in the South Atlantic Conflict (CAERCAS), created on December 2, 1982, carried out a survey of information, systematic analysis, and evaluation of the functions and responsibilities of political and strategic-military leadership in the Falklands/Malvinas War, materialized in the Rattembach Report.

While the Commission's conclusions were generally overly critical, it gave positive weight to some tactical units' performance, including the 3rd Artillery Group. Balza was one of the last officers to testify before the Commission. His informative statement was made on May 17, 1983.⁴⁹ Not all the questions asked him were informative; some requested an assessment of the facts. He was asked, for example: "What impression did you have of the defense plan when you set up your unit in Malvinas, or what did you see as defenses installed at Puerto Argentino?"⁵⁰ Balza said that in addition to being the commander of the 3rd Artillery Group, he was fire support coordinator for the Puerto Argentino/Stanley Army Group and that, as a result:

The defensive maneuver that I had to support with the fire was a perimeter maneuver, and it was a perimeter defense, that is to say, in 360°, very overextended. Perhaps one of the fundamental drawbacks of fire support was that I was the oldest artillery officer. Perhaps that was also the case of the rest of the units in the position - was the lack of mobility.⁵¹

He was then asked if he could defend those three hundred and sixty degrees of perimeter and if he could do so by changing the pieces' position or initially placing them in the zone of positions. He replied that he could adapt to limitations, having three batteries—six pieces each—belonging to 3rd Artillery Group at the beginning. He pointed out that he had foreseen position changes, placing two batteries to the south of Puerto Argentino/Stanley. Consequently:

There was no major limitation to the north, the east, or the south because the distances were truly short; there were four and a half kilometers to the South coast. The problem was to the west. That worried me from the start. That is why I deployed a battery under my command, centralized, but eight kilometers from there facing west, to reach that sector's maximum reach, which worried me initially. That was mainly resolved when Marine Infantry Battalion 5 received a battery added by the mainland Marine Infantry Group; they made it available to me. I had, then, one more battery to cover that western flank, which worried me.⁵²

Balza's initial appreciation that the western flank of Puerto Argentino/Stanley's perimeter defense was the primary defense organization problem was a decisive issue. The final British attack advanced on that flank, after the landing in the Estrecho de San Carlos/Falklands Sound. He was then asked whether he was under the command of Brigadier General Oscar Jofre and whether Brigadier General Mario Benjamin Menendez "conducted the defense according to what was discussed, or rather had other concerns." He answered the first question affirmatively and the second that at all times, he received orders—as well as planned, executed, and changed positions—under the command of Jofre as Commander of the Army Group of Puerto Argentino/Stanley (Menéndez was Governor of the Islands). They asked him again about the defense plan and his evaluation of it:

When asked: You mention that the defense plan contemplated the defensive maneuver; the fire program was executed for a defensive maneuver. Was that displacement foreseen somewhere in the plan, or was it merely a static position that you had to complement with your fire?

He responded: No, when I say defensive maneuver, I don't rule out the dynamics of the defense, which is the movement; that is, I don't disregard a movement within the dynamics of the defense. In

this sense, I had a battery ready to be moved by airmobile means, as soon as it was ordered; a battery that was qualified, because of the training in times of peace, I had done heliborne exercises, but for that, I needed heliborne elements that, in that case, was the Puma helicopter.⁵³

Those heliborne means of transport were not available for the pieces' movement, and they could only rarely count on them for artillery observers. The members of the Commission were aware that the defense of Puerto Argentino/Stanley had presented problems, especially in securing the western flank of that position. They then asked him if he had participated in the defense planning: "Were you in agreement with those defense plans? Did you think they could be effective?". Balza responded cautiously, but acknowledging that there was a weakness in the defense:

What I know about the mission was to defend Puerto Argentino. The defense was geared towards that. Although very overextended. The overextension of the front caused weak spots, but there were no available assets to avoid it. Perhaps, what I was not satisfied with was mobility; I saw that it was lacking.⁵⁴

Stressing that the weak flank of Puerto Argentino/Stanley's defense was to the west, the Commission specified its interest in the following question: "And that defense was fundamentally concerned with an attack from which direction?"⁵⁵ Balza's answer was descriptive, without offering any assessment:

The defense was oriented at three hundred and sixty degrees. Artillery supported the maneuver element. The maneuver elements were made up, from north to south, by Infantry Regiment 7; on the airport peninsula, 25th Infantry Regiment; going from east to south, by 6th Infantry Regiment - facing south -; and, to the southwest, 3rd Infantry Regiment, limited to the west - I am going from the north, clockwise - with the 5th Marine Infantry Battalion, and there was a highly visible path on the cards - the road leading to Darwin - which was the boundary between the 5th Marine Battalion and the 7th Infantry Regiment, covering part of the west and the rest of the north. That is, the maneuver elements were at three hundred and sixty degrees.⁵⁶

The problematic lack of coordination between commanders and, mostly, the absence or a few examples of joint military action between the armed forces was one of the issues on which the Commission was interested. That is why he was repeatedly asked in that regard. Balza reported in some detail about the coordination with Brigadier Luis Guillermo Castellano for an operation in which three Pucará planes of the Air Force—based in Puerto Argentino/Stanley—and the 3rd Artillery Group intervened, intending to attack an enemy artillery position to the west of Mount Kent. On that occasion, Balza's artillery pieces—which could not beat the British pieces—employing two or three smoking projectiles guided the Pucará to target them. The members of the Commission asked him whether air defense coordination was right; his answer was affirmative.⁵⁷ The Commission then returned to the questions concerning the difficulties encountered in the perimeter defense of Puerto Argentino/Stanley:

When asked: Always with the vision of the Commander of the Artillery of General Support, with a defense of zone whose front limit is given by the heights, so in general terms what possibility did you have, of support to an action that was executed in Mount Kent: limited, none, scarce?

He responded: Very limited. Our artillery had no means of acquiring targets. When I say 'had no means,' I mean suitable means, target acquisition radars. The acquisition of targets was limited, on the ground, to the action of advanced observers and aerial observers. At risk, particularly on the twelfth and thirteenth days, they carried out several missions [...].⁵⁸

When asked: Always from this perspective and returning to the dynamics of zone defense, the offensive reactions, ways of [carrying out] counter-shock, counterattack prepared in certain zones and directions - most threatened ones - etcetera, how do you evaluate the battle for Puerto Argentino after the fact? Were any of those [protective measures mentioned above] executed? Was there any forecast? Did you have supplies to carry out [these actions]? Were there any reservations in magnitude and location, or was it a defense that each one executed as they could - in their areas of responsibility - without a coherence in the set of actions and conduction through firing, movements, reserves, etc.?

He responded: The reserve lacked the necessary mobility.

When asked: What was the reserve?

He said: I meant the defense. The defense lacked a fundamental element to react within that dynamic that of a defense able to execute quick actions, counterattacks. It lacked mobility. It did not have mobility.

When asked: But, did you know from the beginning that you wouldn't have it?

He responded: Initially, heliborne means of transport were planned to transport the reserve. When the final assault took place, the helicopters had already been destroyed on the ground.⁵⁹

Note that the members of the Commission insisted on focusing on the difficulties of the perimeter defense of Puerto Argentino/Stanley until they finally got a compelling assessment from Balza (who until then prudently had not made it explicit): the defense lacked mobility. Moreover, this was indeed the case. He was not wrong in his assessment. The issue of reserves—and the mobility of reserves—for the defense of Puerto Argentino/Stanley was also of interest to the Commission. The questions they then asked Balza exceeded his role as fire support coordinator; they questioned him as if he had been an officer of Brigadier General Jofre's General Staff:

When asked: There was a moment when you knew that there was no mobility that you could not give mobility to your reserve. What measures were taken to approximate these reserves, to foresee other forms of employment when, in reality, you had no reserves in the first place to employ? What reserve did the defense have at the critical moment of the twelfth and thirteenth?

He said: I think at the critical moment, the reserve was practically a fraction of the Armored Cavalry Exploration Squadron 10. And I say I believe because, in those last two or three days, I was already absorbed by the unit [he refers to his: 3rd Artillery Group]. The Armored Cavalry Exploration Squadron 10 is equivalent to a subunit.

When asked: One single reserve?

He said: And a fraction because here I want to clarify that I was already entirely [involved with] the problem of [artillery] fire in those days. I believe there was a fraction of Regiment 6, under Major Jaimet. And I say I believe, because in the night - I need to tell this, because it can clarify - in the night of the thirteenth to the fourteenth [of June] and during [...]. First, on the thirteenth, all day long, the Artillery was bent on supporting the Marine Infantry

Battalion 5. During the night of the thirteenth to the fourteenth, the Artillery acted in coordination and support of the withdrawal of the Infantry Battalion 5. And that night, two counterattacks are executed. I listened. One of them was support with fire by Captain Soloaga, Second Chief of the Exploration Squadron of 10th Armored Cavalry, the equivalent of a Company. This Captain carried out a counterattack because he asked me for fire, and fire I gave him. He told me on the radio that he reached some positions previously held by the RI7 [7th Infantry Regiment]. So that counterattack, which is being executed by Captain Soloaga, was a reaction – and in my opinion – a feeble reaction, an insignificant counterattack, because it was part of the Squadron. And I don't know if it was executed – but I think it was – a slight offensive reaction, under Major Jaimet. But there is no other that I can specify.⁶⁰

The members of the Commission understood that the defense of Puerto Argentino/Stanley had not been planned or had poorly been planned by the high command. Therefore, they asked Balza again about the means and the quality of the means available. Balza first responded with prudence, but finally ended up stating what his critical analysis was: the weak point in the planning of the perimeter defense of Stanley, the western flank, had not been well resolved by the command of the Army Group. Balza also maintained that he had warned his superiors of this problem, and they did not foresee that the final enemy attack would come from the west and not from the seaside. They wanted to deepen his understanding of why the Command had initially foreseen that the most likely enemy attack was an amphibious operation to the east or south, or even to the north, of Puerto Argentino/Stanley:

When asked: Did you just say that you thought that this enemy operation – to disembark there – would have been risky and costly?

He said: For the enemy, yes.

When asked: Did some of the other members who attended those meetings agree with you on that opinion?

He said: Yes, I was talking [...]. The thing is that they were such informal conversations [...]. But there were several.

When asked: In your Command, at all times, was it clear that the landing was going to be by force – in the peninsula – in the vicinity of the airfield, in the part where Lieutenant Colonel Seinfeldin was, either none did even think about that western [flank]?

He said: I concluded that the Command thought so because there was no modification of the devices. So, if you ask me, I owe you an answer. Perhaps - and I don't say perhaps, because I said this informally, in a conversation, as if, perhaps, it could be or not, speaking of this element, in agreement, with Lieutenant Colonel Quevedo, of having taken out a Company of the Infantry Regiment 25, a Company of the RI6 and a Company of the RI3 - already on the twenty-first [of May] - and having formed a grouping under someone's orders, towards the west, as if to strengthen the west. Because already on May 21, the center of gravity of the enemy - in my opinion - was defined.

When asked: However, did the Command still think, at that time, that this may be a diversion operation and that the main action was yet to come, where the RI25 was?

He said: I listened to the radio, and a landing - when they said they had already landed four or five thousand men - it was the main effort and not the secondary one.⁶¹

In this last intervention, Balza referred to the British landing in the Estrecho de San Carlos/Falkland Sound—which separates Isla Soledad/East Falkland from the Gran Malvina/West Falkland—that took place on the night of May 21, 1982. It is then possible to imagine Balza's professional recognition in the face of the following Commission statements:

When asked: Evidently, you were right. But then, the defense lacked a sound foundation from its conception and means of execution; what was achieved was by the individual merit of the Commanders in the field themselves, and not by the unsuccessful conduct; and, probably, had the facts been accepted as they were presented, the outcome - for example, in time - would probably have been different, or perhaps delayed. Do you agree?

He said: I agree with that view. Regiment 4, for example, is a Regiment that mostly organized its position under enemy fire because it was placed in the sector of Mount Harriet - in the area of Mount Harriet and Mount Challenger - at the last moment. Lieutenant Colonel Soria, who organized it under enemy fire [...]⁶²

When asked: If you had been the defense commander of Puerto Argentino/St Stanley and your Chief of Staff had told you: 'Sir, let us not scatter the troop on such a wide front, which is always going to

be weak; why don't we keep the mass for the counterattack where our infantry attack is within reach,' what would you have said?

He said: That I agreed. And the reason is as follows: we did not have the means, nor the forces, nor the elements to carry out a defense of the zone that – by doctrine – maintains a specific terrain. Moreover, if I cannot be strong in the front as a whole, I will occupy critical sectors. I would have had occupied Mount Kent - because there, an Englishman told me, they had installed a telescope that increased the starlight a million times, and he told me that Mount Kent is an amphitheater from which he could see the whole position. I would have occupied some key points, with more or less reliable elements, and formed one or two strong groupings to counterattack. However, I would have had to ask for greater mobility, and the limiting factor in the transport between the islands was the helicopter.⁶³

The Commission members also asked whether, between April 2 and May 1, it was possible to organize the defense as Balza proposed, bearing in mind that the first British attack took place only on the latter date. Balza answered in the affirmative, but with limitations.⁶⁴ Finally, they were once again interested in joint military action, this time in the coordination between Balza and frigate captain Robacio—commander of the 5th Marine Infantry Battalion:

When asked: In his statement [before the Commission], Captain Robacio said that they worked with artillery as if they had worked together all their lives. That phrase implies an opinion. Why is that? Was it because [the interaction] was planned, or because you had contacts and solved the problems there, there, in the field?

He said: I said the same thing on several occasions that I worked with BIM5 as if I had worked [with them] all my life. But I think it is because - I am not going to talk about the training of my unit, because it is not my place and it would be inappropriate for me to do so - it was a very well trained unit, and they were used to working on the integration of the firing element and the maneuver element; therefore, things were made more straightforward; the advanced observers had been trained up to the section level. It means that the fire requests, the radio traffic, the type of fire you ask for were all very fluid when you worked with the BIM. [Illegible] that on the seventeenth, eighteenth, and twentieth of April, we totally agreed. He even put his battery at my disposal.⁶⁵

This answer was the closing statement in his declaration, which confirmed the existence of joint military action experience at the tactical level between units of Argentine armed forces.

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of field and anti-aircraft artillery experience and, particularly, of the 3rd Artillery Group allows us to advance in a hypothesis practically unexplored by social scientists in their analysis of the Argentine Army between 1955 and 1983. In essence, the higher performance of the Argentine artillery in the Falklands/Malvinas War can be understood due to the improvement of base camp training and the military academies. The operative units' readiness planning period followed mainly to face a conventional war.

That hypothesis does not contend but rather complements researches that highlighted the importance for the Argentine Army of the "French doctrine of revolutionary war" since 1957 and, especially, of the "American doctrine of counterinsurgent war" since the early 1960s in defining an internal enemy as the main scenario of military employment. Conversely, there is a limited number of studies on specific military units or on the trajectories of officers and non-commissioned officers that allow empirically weighing the application—considering different military jurisdictions and types of units—of the hypothesis that emphasizes the role of conventional warfare in basic training and improvement in military academies and the instruction, training, and enlistment of units between the decades of 1950–1980.

The findings reached here are in line with a renewed history and social and cultural anthropology of the Argentine military in those years, suggesting one should not neglect the study of their conceptions and professional practices for a conventional war. In other words, the doctrines of "revolutionary war" and "counterinsurgent war" were indeed taught at the *Escuela Superior de Guerra*, exercises were carried out in which their conceptions were put into practice, and they even served as the basis for the legislation on defense and national security of the period between 1955 and 1983. However, at the same time, the basic training of officers in the National Military Academy, their further training in the Weapon Schools and the National War College, as well as the annual planning of instruction, training, and enlistment of infantry, cavalry, artillery,

engineering, and communications units, continued to focus on conventional warfare. In turn, the outstanding professional career of Lieutenant Colonel Martín Antonio Balza between 1952 and 1982 and the adequate performance of artillery in the Falklands/Malvinas War also confirm that hypothesis.

Moreover, the present study adamantly counters interpretations that reduce the performance in combat of all the officers and non-commissioned officers according to the hypothesis that the Argentine armed forces in the Falklands/Malvinas War were not prepared to fight a conventional war because, since 1955, they would only have been prepared to carry out functions of political intervention, governmental administration, and internal repression on the population. I defer to that statement applies to the decisions and actions of those most responsible for Argentina's political, diplomatic, and military leadership in the Falklands/Malvinas War. However, it does not adequately correspond to all officers and non-commissioned officers and their operational units. Therefore, it is necessary to produce reports about each unit and its personnel, giving accounts of their trajectories before, during, and after the Falklands/Malvinas War as more precise assessments of their respective performances.

Finally, I would like to point out a research agenda on Argentine military units in the Falklands/Malvinas War, with adequate historical adaptations or modulations of time, space, and military actors. I highlight at least three. First, it is still vacant the research on specialties units such as military intelligence and command companies that the notions of the revolutionary war and counterinsurgency could have more weight and more significant impact on instruction, training, and readiness.

Second, even so, it is waiting for better scrutiny to distinguish the Argentine military units that attained responsibilities in State terrorism during the dictatorship of 1976–1983. The case of the 3rd Artillery Group should not be generalized. The assignments of illegal and clandestine repression activities followed according to jurisdictional zones, and not functional or branch specialty. Therefore, the theoretical and practical influences of revolutionary war or counterinsurgency could have been appropriated and eventually also exercised by other artillery units.

Third, it is necessary to address the latter trajectory of the Argentine veteran officers and non-commissioned officers of the Falklands/Malvinas War, especially to investigate whether the military services and themselves

exploited those knowledge and practical experiences later, in their postwar period's professional career.

NOTES

1. To know the biography of Lieutenant General Balza and his importance in recent Argentine history, see G. Soprano, *Martín Balza. Un General Argentino entre la República y la Democracia* (Prohistoria, Rosario, 2019). Volume 1 and 2.
2. R. Guber, *De Chicos a Veteranos. Memorias Argentinas de la Guerra de Malvinas* (Buenos Aires, Antropofagia, 2004).
3. R. Guber, 'Crucero ARA General Belgrano in memoria. Linajes político-navales en las memorias de Malvinas', *Revista de Ciencias Sociales Iberoamericana* 30 (2008), 7–26; R. Guber, *Experiencia de Halcón* (Buenos Aires, Sudamericana, 2016).
4. Lorenz pointed out the differential impact that the war experience and the defeat in the war had over the professional identities of the three armed forces and the public perception about those produced by their fellow citizens. In the Army, there was a horizontal division between "Malvineros" and "non-malvineros," between "desk officers" and "active-duty officers," which would later surface in the crisis of the active-duty uprisings' of April 1987, January and December 1988, and December 1990. For the Navy, "the public perception of a force that had not faced combat was consolidated." However, there were significant human losses with the sinking of the ship ARA General Belgrano. Moreover, for the Air Force, "the social perception [about the pilots] was excellent even during the war" and—possibly for this reason—they did not experience "internal confrontations" due to the defeat. F. Lorenz, Malvinas. *Una Guerra Argentina* (Buenos Aires, Sudamericana, 2009), 175–176.
5. F. Lorenz, 'Gran Malvina. Una Mirada a la Experiencia bélica desde los testimonios de sus oficiales', *Anuario Colombiano de Historia Social y de la Cultura* 41 N°2 (julio-diciembre de 2014), 225–257.
6. A. Corbacho, 'Factores organizacionales y desempeño en combate: la experiencia de la IMARA en Malvinas', *Serie Documentos de Trabajo* N°255 (2003), 1–24. A. B. Rodríguez, *Batallas contra Silencios. La Posguerra de los Ex –Combatientes del Apostadero Naval Malvinas (1982–2013)* (La Plata, Universidad Nacional de La Plata/Universidad Nacional de Misiones/Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento, 2020).
7. M. Pozzio, 'La Experiencia de las Mujeres en Malvinas: de la Sanidad Militar al reconocimiento', *Cuadernos de Marte. Revista Latinoamericana de Sociología de la Guerra* Año 6 N°8 (2008), 129–157.

8. The following account of the history of 3rd Artillery Group is a synthesis constructed for this article, based on interviews conducted between December 2015 and May 2016, with war veterans of this unit, officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, mainly in the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires and in Paso de los Libres.
9. The Argentine forces also had anti-aircraft artillery—not organically dependent on Balza—in Puerto Argentino/Stanley, made up of the GADA 601 Air Defence Artillery Group, a battery of the Air Defence Group 101, which joined the previous unit, the Marine Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalion and the Anti-aircraft Artillery Group of the Argentine Air Force. They were part of the Air Defence Artillery Group.
10. M. Balza, *Malvinas, Gesta e Incompetencia* (Buenos Aires: Atlántida, 2003), 128.
11. These milestones in the military career have been ascertained based on interviews with Lieutenant General VGM (R) Martín Antonio Balza and through the analysis of the following official documental source: Argentine Army. *Legajo Personal del Teniente General Martín Antonio Balza*.
12. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel VGM (R) Oscar Martínez Conti. December 14, 2015. Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires.
13. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel VGM (R) Carlos Milanese. December 17, 2015. Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires.
14. O. Martínez Conti, 'El Grupo de Artillería 3 en Malvinas', *Revista Santa Bárbara* N°39 (without date), 56–60.
15. Interview with Lieutenant General VGM (R) Martín Antonio Balza. March 23, 2016. Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires.
16. Interview with First Sargent VGM (R) Guillermo Castillo. April 22, 2016. Paso de los Libres.
17. Interview with former soldier Julio Palacio. February 23, 2016. Paso de los Libres.
18. Interview with former soldier Ramón Elías Mango. February 23, 2016. Paso de los Libres.
19. Interview with former soldier Hugo Mango. February 23, 2016. Paso de los Libres.
20. Interview with First Sargent VGM (R) Guillermo Castillo. April 22, 2016. Paso de los Libres.
21. O. Martínez Conti, 'El Grupo de Artillería 3 en Malvinas', *Revista Santa Bárbara* N°39, 56–60.
22. Interview with Lieutenant General VGM (R) Martín Antonio Balza. March 23, 2016. Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires.
23. Interview with non-commissioned Major VGM (R) José María González Fernández. February 22, 2016. Paso de los Libres.

24. Interview with non-commissioned Major VGM (R) José María González Fernández. February 22, 2016. Paso de los Libres.
25. Interview with former soldier Ramón Elías Mango. February 23, 2016. Paso de los Libres.
26. Interview with non-commissioned Major VGM (R) Luis María Rodríguez. April 23, 2016. Paso de los Libres.
27. Interview with non-commissioned Major VGM (R) Miguel Ángel Rubio. February 22, 2016. Paso de los Libres.
28. Interview with First Sargent VGM (R) Guillermo Castillo. April 22, 2016. Paso de los Libres.
29. Interview with lead non-commissioned officer VGM (R) Jorge Quiroz. February 23, 2016. Paso de los Libres.
30. Interview with Lieutenant General VGM (R) Martín Antonio Balza. May 4, 2016. Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires.
31. F. Lorenz, *Una Guerra Argentina* (Buenos Aires, Sudamericana, 2009), 70.
32. Junta Military. *Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlántico Sur* (Buenos Aires, 1983)
33. H. Rodríguez Mottino, *La Artillería Argentina en Malvinas* (Buenos Aires, Clío, 1984), 19-20-27-28-56.
34. M. Balza, *Malvinas, Gesta e Incompetencia* (Buenos Aires: Atlántida, 2003), 126.
35. M. Balza, *Informe de Operaciones del Grupo de Artillería 3* (Buenos Aires, August 6, 1982), 17–18.
36. M. Balza, *Informe de Operaciones del Grupo de Artillería 3* (Buenos Aires, August 6, 1982), 20.
37. M. Balza, *Informe de Operaciones del Grupo de Artillería 3* (Buenos Aires, August 6, 1982), 21–22.
38. The contrast with other Army units that combated in the Falklands/Malvinas War is striking. In other units, veterans had such historical conflicts between officers, non-commissioned officers, and conscripted soldiers that shared reunions and commemorations were hindered.
39. O. Martínez Conti, 'El Grupo de Artillería 3 en Malvinas', *Revista Santa Bárbara* N°39 (without date), 6–60. I dealt with the formation and professional overview of Argentine Army's artillery officers between 1945 and 1982, in: G. Soprano, 'La formación profesional de los oficiales artilleros del Ejército Argentino entre la Segunda Posguerra Mundial y la Guerra de Malvinas,' en: A. Fuccille, L. R. F. Goldoni y M. C. de Oliveira Aldao (eds.), *Forças Armadas e Sociedade Civil: Atores e Agendas da Defesa Nacional no Século XXI* (São Cristovao, Associação Brasileira de Estudos de Defesa/Editorial UFS, 2018), 51–88.
40. Interview with Brigade General VGM (R) Oscar Martínez Conti. December 14, 2015. Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires.

41. Testimony of Julio César Navone, 'Disparando el gran Berta', en *Así Peleamos. Malvinas. Testimonios de Veteranos del Ejército*, coord. M. A. Balza (Buenos Aires: Fundación Soldados, 1999), 232.
42. Interview with Brigade General VGM (R) Oscar Martínez Conti. December 9, 2015. Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires.
43. Interview with non-commissioned Major VGM (R) Miguel Ángel Rubio. February 22, 2016. Paso de los Libres.
44. Interview with non-commissioned Major VGM (R) Luis María Rodríguez. April 23, 2016. Paso de los Libres.
45. Interview with Julio Palacio. February 23, 2016. Paso de los Libres.
46. Interview with José Carlos Carbonell. February 24, 2016. Paso de los Libres.
47. Interview with principal non-commissioned officer VGM (R) Luciano Abel Benítez. February 24, 2016. Paso de los Libres.
48. Interview with First Sargent VGM (R) Guillermo Castillo. April 22, 2016. Paso de los Libres.
49. The statement of Balza is in Volume V, files 1,044 to 1,053. In the end, it is signed by Balza, Lieutenant General (R) Benjamín Rattenbach, Brigadier General (R) Carlos Alberto Rey, and Admiral (R) Alberto Pedro Vago. That was not the first occasion in which Balza reported his performance in the Falklands/Malvinas war. When Balza returned to the mainland, he had to draft a report, like other unit commanders.
50. Junta Military. *Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlántico Sur. Declaraciones* (Buenos Aires, 1983), Tomo V, 1.044.
51. Junta Military. *Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlántico Sur. Declaraciones* (Buenos Aires, 1983), Tomo V, 1.044.
52. Junta Military. *Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlántico Sur. Declaraciones* (Buenos Aires, 1983), Tomo V, 1.044.
53. Junta Military. *Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlántico Sur. Declaraciones* (Buenos Aires, 1983), Tomo V, 1.045.
54. Junta Military. *Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlántico Sur. Declaraciones* (Buenos Aires, 1983), Tomo V, 1.045.
55. Junta Military. *Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlántico Sur. Declaraciones* (Buenos Aires, 1983), Tomo V, 1.045.
56. Junta Military. *Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlántico Sur. Declaraciones* (Buenos Aires, 1983), Tomo V, 1.045–1.046.

57. Junta Military. *Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlántico Sur. Declaraciones* (Buenos Aires, 1983), Tomo V, 1.047–1.048.
58. In the portion of the document, which was omitted, Balza reports how he sent First Lieutenant Caballero on board of a helicopter to fulfill a risky mission as an aerial observer.
59. Junta Military. *Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlántico Sur. Declaraciones* (Buenos Aires, 1983), Tomo V, 1.048.
60. Junta Military. *Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlántico Sur. Declaraciones* (Buenos Aires, 1983), Tomo V, 1.048–1.049.
61. Junta Military. *Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlántico Sur. Declaraciones* (Buenos Aires, 1983), Tomo V, 1.050–1.051.
62. In the portion of the document, which was omitted, corresponds to the question that the Commission asks Balza regarding his request to the command of the SOFMA guns, 155 mm caliber.
63. Junta Military. *Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlántico Sur. Declaraciones* (Buenos Aires, 1983), Tomo V, 1.051.
64. Junta Military. *Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlántico Sur. Declaraciones* (Buenos Aires, 1983), Tomo V, 1.051–1.052.
65. Junta Military. *Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlántico Sur. Declaraciones* (Buenos Aires, 1983), Tomo V, 1.052.



Between Coercive Diplomacy and Malvinas Fortress: Argentina's Maritime Operations in the Falklands/Malvinas War

Érico Esteves Duarte and Luís Rodrigo Machado

INTRODUCTION

This chapter contends that the Falklands/Malvinas War is an exemplary case for a theoretically oriented approach since it complies with the two most essential requirements of limited war as described by Julien Corbett's theory: the dispute for a territory of limited political value and it took place in a theater prone to be strategically isolated.

When other propositions of his theory are applied, it is possible to have a preliminary evaluation of the reasons for the Argentine failure and the importance of a thoughtful study. The Argentine invasion was rapid enough to prevent any British reaction that could bring it to a halt and adequately proceeded with the concentration of land forces to defend the islands. However, either Argentina was not compelling enough or did not have adequate means to conduct a maritime offensive that could

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break the British maritime lines. The British were the ones to isolate the islands, resulting in the demoralization and rendition of the Argentine land forces, rendering Argentina unable to retaliate to this setback.

Several questions must be better investigated and reviewed with the benefit of the disclosure of the official archives since 2012. Among them, two questions are central: Were there better options for the Argentine maritime campaign? To what extent was the lack of interoperability among the Argentine armed forces decisive to the war?

According to Corbett's theory, Argentina was incapable of conducting all the phases of a maritime operation in limited wars. The UK had ample advantage of naval resources in relation to the Argentine Navy, with the highest level of performance and readiness of a full naval task force with air support, submarines, surface vessels, and missiles. Argentina was incapable of withstanding the British in a decisive naval battle on the high seas. Consequently, they were also unable to conduct a naval offensive that could break the British sea lines of communication or neutralize British access to the islands. Let alone conduct a coercive offensive to conquer additional British possessions of value to exchange them for the Falklands or add reasons for London to give into the Argentine terms. Similarly, Argentina could not sustain sea lines of communication for supporting any established force in the islands.

The British naval advantages were potentially limited in coastal and shallow water environments where its submarines would have less freedom of action (mostly as they were subordinate to the naval command in Northwood and not to the task-force commander, Admiral Woodward). In the case that the British relied almost exclusively on their *Sea Harrier* fighter-bombers to face the combinations of missile capabilities of the Argentine surface vessels, with the coastal anti-aircraft defenses and their numerical superiority in the aerial arena. In the worst-case scenario, Argentina had an advantage of 80 fighter-bombers against 20 of the opposing side. Although the British had more effective air-to-air missiles, the Argentines, on the other side, were capable of undertaking casualties that would not put their operation at risk. This Argentine advantage would have been more significant if Argentina had been able to count with its aircraft carrier, *Veinticinco de Mayo*, operating close to the islands, with unrestricted use of the runway at Stanley (or Puerto Argentino, to the Argentines) for supersonic fighters, as the Mirage III or the combined availability of A-4 fighters with the destroyer, *General Belgrano*, and three modern frigates which they had at their disposal at the beginning

of the conflict. Therefore, the Argentine pilots would rely on shorter flights, allowing them to conduct combat missions for longer durations and a concentrated air campaign with the support of radar systems and ship-based and land-based communication systems.

Our main argument is that, in contrast between the conceptual propositions of Corbett and the correlation of the fighting forces of Argentina and the UK, Argentina had only two strategic options: either it would conduct a symbolic military operation with minimal land and maritime signatures, reducing the possibility of losses; or it would increase risk by concentrating enough forces in the Falklands islands that would make the British consider the costs of recovering the islands too high. In the first case of coercive diplomacy, the garrison force would suffice. In the second case, Argentina would have to build its own “Malvinas Fortress” and be capable of resisting, at least, limiting British attacks for a beachhead or a demonstration of force in order to influence the negotiations, which should never be suspended. Argentina had sufficient naval, air, and land means to convert the islands into its “Malvinas Fortress” and to impose upon the British a decision-making dilemma: accept the risk of losses with the available means in a short time, or to postpone the recovery operation in order to concentrate more means carrying the risk of losing the political conditions—both nationally and internationally—for this.

Although this chapter focuses on the analysis of Argentina’s strategic possibilities, it is not constrained to the Argentine sources nor solely by the point of view of the use of engagements for the purpose of war. It also considers the political, tactical, and logistical points of view of the maritime operations in the Falklands/Malvinas War. The next section, after this introduction, presents the theoretical content to be applied. We limit this presentation to a fraction of the theory of limited wars, focusing on the propositions that consider the aspects involving maritime forces and briefly cover land operations.

The second section places into context the objective elements of war: the correlation of forces, and the conditions related to the direction of the engagements, and a brief review of the Argentine decision-making and planning.

In the third section, from the contrasts of Corbett’s conceptual framework and the objective conditions of means, we consider the utility of the use of force in the Falklands according to the political interests of the Argentine military junta. Hence, Argentina’s two strategic possibilities are considered: Either the symbolical use of a military operation

as a source of coercive diplomacy.¹ Alternatively, a campaign of limited war centered in the first phase of the defense of the valued object and the resignation of any initiative for the sea's control. Therefore, it uses considerations regarding the contemporaneous reality of war in the missile era that would favor coastal forces over fleets on the high seas, in relative terms.²

The fourth section presents the final remarks and a critique of Argentine maritime operations.

THE THEORY OF MARITIME OPERATIONS IN LIMITED WARS

Julian Corbett states that the political utility of limited wars derives first from not always being advisable or possible to destroy the opposing fighting forces. Secondly, some political goals can be reached with limited intervention by seizing positions and limited objects. Thirdly, the political context and other more or equally critical political goals can prevent significant involvement in a specific war.

In the context of national states, he states two prerequisites for limited wars to not escalate to an unlimited war. First, the aimed objective must not only be limited by area but by political value as well. In other words, it must not be an organic element of a nation. Second, it needs to be "strategically isolated or be able to be reduced to real isolation for strategic operations."³ The disputes for territories or border possessions between neighboring or adjacent states in continental terms will occur in a gray area between limited and unlimited wars. The same reasoning applies regarding the conquest "of overseas possessions or in the fringes of vast swaths of countryside not perfectly occupied." In all these cases, political goals can be isolated by maritime and land operations, meeting limited war conditions.

These elements bring the most relevant distinction of limited wars. In unlimited wars, the weight and power of strategic offensives compel the opponent to concentrate forces in its own defense, and because of this, it is made difficult to counterattack other areas of the aggressor. Whereas in limited wars, everything will depend on the geographic disposition of the objective and the global distribution of forces. In remote regions, and where there is a low probability of enemy reaction, just one limited offensive may suffice. In less remote regions, or those prone to any response from the opponent, it could be necessary an offensive campaign

to conquer the objective, followed by a coercive second phase—ideally, a defensive campaign served by limited engagements—in a way to force the opponent into accepting the adverse situation imposed upon it.⁴

The same is true for a war between two continental powers separated by a third country. Corbett concludes that limited wars will always be a resort of insular powers or powers separated by sea, but mainly used for the power capable of commanding the sea. It allows not only isolate the objective of war but also to make its recover unfeasible due to the high costs involved, as well as any retaliation operation elsewhere. With this elegant reasoning, he exposes the maritime operations' more relevant role in limited wars than unlimited ones. Adding to these considerations, we have a map for a war plan in limited wars, coordinating combatant activities—both maritime and on the land.⁵

Firstly, a limited war develops by the dynamic of the balance between the theater of operations and the impacts and political use of the goals under dispute in other geographical regions. In other words, in most cases, there is no geographical correspondence between the political effects and the theater where the war is fought. Corbett points out that an object must have limited political value. Otherwise, there will be no room for concession and accommodation with the opponent.

Secondly, the probability of success increases with initiative and speed in the object's conquest before the opponent can defend it. At this point, the object is the aim of the war, and the destruction of the opposing forces is only a means when necessary.

Thirdly, the consolidation of the intended political goal is obtained after building the balance of forces in the theater of operations through a strategic defensive, which cannot be restricted to defensive engagements. At this stage, the opposing fighting force becomes the military goal on the land, while the maritime forces assume an essential role in preventing the opponent's buildup over the recently conquered object. Hence, it may create the need to block the opponent's naval bases, and even take control of its sea lines of communications through naval battles.⁶ Thus, although conducting a defensive land campaign, the dispute for the sea lines of communications may require an offensive maritime campaign, mainly because both opponents will lay their lines in common areas.⁷ Acknowledging the opponent can have landlines of communications, combined operations may be necessary to break them or set a more advanced position to isolate the desired object.

Fourthly, after securing its positions through land and maritime operations, a campaign with defensive intent, but vigorously offensive in the form must be conducted. At this stage, a general pressure—by threatening or taking control of another or more objects would demonstrate to the opponent that it stands to lose more than win with the continuity of the war. Once more, one must consider the political effects of these other objects. If they do not imply a sovereign symbol, on the one side, and if they have some value to the opponent, on the other side. If the political and strategic circumstances do not allow for this possibility, it is necessary to apply attrition operations against the opponent's fighting forces.⁸

It is essential to observe that the maritime activities of the last two stages necessarily demand the division of the fleet and that the command of the sea, in those cases, does not mean the concentration of the fleet or navy in a limited area. That would demand at least three sections: one section to support the defensive position of the object and the line of communication; a second section to obstruct its use by the opponent, and a third to defend the homeland. Only from these accomplishments, and mainly from the second, it would be possible to consider a fourth section's redeployment or reunited naval force to realize a coercive campaign.⁹

Finally, in light of this political and strategic overview, Corbett reinforces the centrality of joint military staff and its articulation with the political leadership for the success of a limited war.¹⁰ Mainly where the correlation of forces is symmetrical or disadvantageous, the difference in the success of operations resides on the quality of the structure and procedures of the joints military staff. The development of limited wars demands decisions from the assessments of the political value of goals and objects, conversions of offensive and defensive campaigns, and the concentration and dispersion of land and maritime forces, which factors are complex as they are fluid.

THE CONTEXT OF THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS WAR

This section presents the composition of Argentine and British aeronaval forces and outlines Argentina's political goals and decision-making process.

The Argentine Naval and Air Forces

The Argentine Navy was composed of miscellaneous warships and submarines, with some acquired brand new, mixed with veteran ships from World War II.

The aircraft carrier *Veinticinco de Mayo* was the flagship of the fleet, with a displacement of 16,000 tons commissioned in 1945, it had already undergone three modernization processes and operated with twelve Douglas A-4Q Skyhawks and five Grumman Tracker aircraft in its Air Group. The aircraft carrier and its air group were designated *Grupo de Tarea 79.1* (GT 79.1).

Their escort was composed of the ARA *Hercules* and the ARA *Santísima Trinidad*, two destroyers with missiles—Type 42, acquired as brand new from the UK, different from the British Type 42. They had four MM38 Exocet anti-ship missile launchers besides the usual class armament: a 4.5-inch naval gun, a twin-arm anti-aircraft Sea Dart missile with a 22-round capacity, and two 20 mm anti-aircraft guns. Also, as part of the escort, there was the ARA *Seguí*, an old World War II Allen M. Summer class destroyer, modernized with the installation of four MM38 Exocet launchers in addition to its six 127 mm naval guns, two triple torpedo launchers, and four anti-aircraft guns mounted on two twin arms. The three escorts and the auxiliary tanker ship ARA *Punta Médanos* made GT 79.2, operating in support of GT 79.1. However, due to propulsion problems, the ARA *Seguí* had to return to port on April 29 (Table 3.1).

The second biggest ship on deployment was the ARA *General Belgrano*, also a World War II veteran and survivor from the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor. It was a ‘light cruiser’ with 11,000 tons of displacement, also modernized, but the characteristics of its armor and massive guns displayed the anachronisms of its design. The cruiser was the only armored ship in the whole theater of operations: its armor was 10 centimeters thick, contrasting with some British ships made of the aluminum superstructure. Its guns were also the biggest of the theater: fifteen 150-millimeter guns mounted on five triple towers with a range of eighteen kilometers. *Belgrano* also had eight 127-millimeter guns mounted on a single-arm, which primary function was to provide heavy anti-aircraft fire, but it also against ships or support and fire to land. After a modernization process, it received two 40-millimeter quadruple launchers of anti-aircraft SeaCat missiles, and, complementing this role, it

Table 3.1 Argentine naval combat vessels available at the beginning of the Malvinas/Falklands War

	<i>Tons</i>	<i>Tube armament</i>	<i>Anti-ship Missiles</i>	<i>AA</i>	<i>ASW</i>	<i>Aviation</i>
ARA Veinticinco de Mayo	16 kt			10 × 1–40 mm		12 A-4 Skyhawks 5 Grumman Tracker 2 helicopters
ARA General Belgrano	11 kt	5 × 3–6 in 8 × 1–5 in	–	2 × 4 Sea Cat 2 × 4–40 mm	–	
ARA Hercules	4.1 kt	1–4 in	4 × 1 MM38 Exocet	1 × 2 Sea Dart 2–20 mm		Helicopter Lynx
ARA Santissima Trinidad						
ARA Comodoro Py	2.4 kt	2 × 2–5 in	4 × 1–MM38 Exocet		2 × 3–torpedo 2–Hedgehog	Possible helicopter
ARA Segui	2.2 kt	3 × 2–5 in	4 × 1 MM38 Exocet	2 × 2–3 in	2 × 3–torpedo 2–Hedgehog	Helicopter
ARA Hipólito Bouchard				–		
ARA Piedrabuena						
ARA Rosales	2 kt	4 × 1–5 in	–	3 × 2–76.5 mm	2 × 3–torpedo 2–Hedgehog	
ARA Almirante Storni						
ARA Drummond	1 kt	1–3.9 in	4 × 1 – MM38 Exocet	1 × 2–40 mm 2–20 mm	2 × 3–torpedo	
ARA Guerrico						
ARA Granville						
Total	51.2 kt	54 tubes	36 launchers	58 naval guns 12 missiles	54 torpedoes 12 Hedgehog	12 A4 Skyhawks 5 Grumman Trackers 5 helicopters

Source of Data English, Watts 1982; Rivas 2012 (Adrian English and Anthony Watts, *Battle for the Falklands* [London: Osprey Publishing, 2001], 11–14; Santiago Rivas, *Wings of the Malvinas: The Argentine Air War Over the Falklands* [Hitoki Publications, 2012], 338–341)

had two 40-millimeter double guns. During the conflict, it harbored two helicopters, one of them an Allouete.

Its escort comprised two destroyers. The ARA *Hipólito Bouchard* and the ARA *Piedra Buena* were also World War II veterans and modernized Allen M. Summer class with four MM38 Exocet launchers, six 127-mm guns, two triple torpedoes launchers, and a hangar and deck for helicopters. These ships, alongside the tanker ship ARA *Punta Delgada*, completed the GT 79.3.

The remaining surface warships available at the beginning of the conflict made up GT 79.4. Three frigates of 1,000 tons of displacement were the French A-69 *D'Estienne d'Orves* class with four MM38 Exocet missiles launchers, two triple-tube ASW torpedoes, besides a 100 mm gun for naval gunfire and fire support for land attacks. This group was supposed to be reinforced. Four Meko 360 destroyers with 3,440 tons of displacement were being built in Germany, and six frigates of 1,700 tons of displacement were being built in Argentine shipyards. Three were already at sea from the units built in Germany, and the first commission was expected in the second semester of 1982.

The Argentine submarine force was notably reduced at the beginning of the war. From the four submarines of the fleet, the ARA *Santiago del Estero* was inoperative, towed between bases to confuse the British. The ARA *Salta* was under maintenance at the beginning of the war, unready to fight, remaining two submarines operational. Santa Fé was a US remnant of World War II with ten 533 mm torpedo launch tubes, with 1,700 tons of displacement. *San Luis* was a German Type 209-1300 with 1,200 tons of displacement, eight 533 mm torpedo tubes, but its firing computer was inoperative, constraining its launches to manual calculations (Table 3.2).

At the beginning of the conflict, besides the aircraft onboard the ARA *Veinticinco de Mayo*, some other aircraft were deployed to close air support missions in the islands. There were 25 *Pucarás* close air support aircraft, four Turbo-Mentors trainers modified to attack mission, and seven Aermacchi AM339 for the same mission besides several helicopters, all based on the archipelago.¹¹

The Argentine Air Force (*Fuerza Aérea Argentina*—FAA) and the Naval Aviation Command (*Comando de La Aviación Naval Argentina*—CANA) had operationally available twelve Mirage IIIs, 25 IAI M5 Daggers, 38 A-4B Skyhawks, eight Canberra Bombers, 45 Air Force

Table 3.2 Argentine aircraft deployed to the Falklands/Malvinas Islands

<i>Type</i>	<i>Force</i>	<i>Quantity</i>
Pucará	FAA (Air Force)	25
Aermachi AM339	CANA (Navy)	6
Turbo-Mentor	CANA	4
Chinook	Army	2
	FAA	2
Puma	Army	5
	Coast Guard	1
Hue	Army	2
	FAA	2
A109	Army	3
Skyvan	CANA	1

Source of data Grove 2005; Rivas 2012 (Philip Grove, 'Falklands Conflict 1982—The Air War: A New Appraisal,' in *The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years On: Lessons for the Future*, ed. Stephen Badsey, Rob Havers, and Mark Grove [London: Frank Cass, 2005], 268; Rivas, *Wings of the Malvinas*, 330–344)

Pucarás, four Super Étendards, eight A-4Q *Skyhawks*, ten Aermacchi AM 339s, three S-2 Trackers and two P-2 Neptunes.¹²

Due to inadequate preparation of runways and the lack of proper aircraft maintenance facilities, most of the Argentine aircraft had to take off from the continent, flying between 700 and 1,000 kilometers until reaching the archipelago airspace. These long distances were covered at the cost of air refueling or combat time. For instance, the IAI M5 Dagger could spend only five minutes at a time 'on-station' (Table 3.3).

The Argentine Air Force could count on two Embraer P-95s leased from Brazil for maritime surveillance missions, alternating with the P-2, due to their short range. The Argentines used the C-130 Hercules and a military Boeing 707 to identify British ships on the route from Ascension Island until the theater of operations. Although they were inadequate for surveillance, the crews' navigation and flying skills allowed them to locate many targets.

One of the C-130 was improvised as a bomber with the installation of bomb pylons under its wings replacing external fuel tanks and an aiming system derived from a *Pucará*. The "Bomber" C-130s performed three patrol missions on the Atlantic Ocean, between Ascension and the Falklands.¹³

Table 3.3 Argentine aircraft employed in the Falklands/Malvinas Islands

<i>Air Force</i>	<i>Commissioned</i>	<i>Operational</i>
Mirage III	15	12 (Group 8)
Dagger	37	25 (Group 6)
A -4B/C(P)	52	38 (Group 4 & 5)
Skyhawk		
Canberra	10	7 (Group 2)
Pucará	45	45 (Group 3)
Air Navy Force	Commissioned	Operational
Super Étendard	5	4
A -4Q Skyhawk	10	8
A M339	10	10
S-2 Tracker	6	5
P – 2 Neptune	3	2

Source of data Grove, 2005; Rivas, 2012 (Grove, *Falklands Conflict 1982—The Air War: A New Appraisal*, 271; Rivas, *Wings of the Malvinas*, 330–344)

Besides the combat aircraft cited above, some transport aircraft—C-130 Hercules, Boeing 707s, and other small aircraft such as the *Short Skyvan*—were available to the operation to meet the logistical roles of transporting troops, supplies, and armament to the archipelago. Another critical role of the Hercules variant KC-130H was in-flight refueling, which executed 40 missions and more than 100 operations of this type for Skyhawk and Super Étendard.¹⁴

The most significant deficiency of the Argentine aircraft resided in their weapons systems, particularly in their air-to-air combat missiles. The missiles available for the intercept missions were Matra R530, Matra R550, Shafrir 2, and an old version of the Sidewinder AIM-9B. It demanded the attack plane to position itself behind the target to fire. Another critical point was the armament's quality to attack ships, since the Argentine armed forces had only 5 Exocet MM 39 missiles capable of being launched from airplanes, having to rely most of the times on using unguided bombs.¹⁵

The British Naval and Air Forces

Conceived as an escort aircraft carrier during World War II, the British had the HMS *Hermes* available. It had undergone the installation of a sky-jump in 1980 to operate as a base for Sea Harriers. It usually operated

with 24,000 tons of displacement with twelve fixed-wing Sea Harriers and nine Sea King helicopters. For air defense, at the time of the conflict, the HMS *Hermes* had two surface-to-air Sea Cat missile launchers. The second aircraft carrier available to the British was the HMS *Invincible* with 16,000 tons of displacement and an air component of ten Sea Harriers. The *Invincible* also boasted an anti-aircraft Sea Dart system.¹⁶

The escorts at the theater of operations consisted of eight destroyers and fifteen frigates of different classes and capabilities. The force was composed of five Type 42 destroyers with 3,500 tons of displacement, equipped with a double launcher of Sea Dart surface-to-air missile, a 4.5-inch gun and two 20 mm guns, two triple launchers of ASW torpedo, and a Lynx helicopter. Two County-class destroyers, with 5,400 tons of displacement each, equipped with four MM 38 Exocet launchers, a double launcher of Sea Slug surface-to-air missile, two quadruple Sea Cat launchers, two 4.5-inch guns mounted over a double tower, two 20 mm guns, and an ASW helicopter. Finally, there was the HMS *Bristol*, with 6,100 tons of displacement, equipped with a double launcher of Sea Dart surface-to-air missile, one ASW *Ikara*, one 4.5-inch two 20 mm guns¹⁷ (Table 3.4).

The British task force also had Type 22 frigates. The HMS *Broadsword* and the HMS *Brilliant* had 3,500 tons of displacement each and four *Exocet* MM38 launchers, two sextuple launchers of the Sea Wolf anti-aircraft missile, two 40 mm and two 20 mm anti-aircraft guns, besides carrying 2 Lynx helicopters. There are seven Type 21 frigates with 2,750 tons of displacement, with four MM38 *Exocet* launchers, a quadruple launcher of Sea Cat missiles, two triple launchers of torpedoes, and one 4.5 inch, and two 20 mm guns, besides carrying a helicopter.

Three Type 12 M frigates, the HMS *Argonaut*, the HMS *Penelope*, and the HMS *Minerva* with 3,200 tons of displacement, which had four launchers of MM38 *Exocet*, two quadruple launchers of *Sea Cat*, and two 40 mm guns. One Type 12 M frigate, the HMS *Andromeda* with the configuration of a six-round anti-aircraft Sea Wolf missile launcher. Two Type 12 frigates with 2,800 tons of displacement with one quadruple launcher of Sea Cat missiles, two 20 mm guns, and two 4.5-inch guns mounted on a double tower, with Wasp helicopter. Also present were two oceanic patrol ships with 1,500 tons of displacement, configured with one 40 mm gun.¹⁸

Two amphibious assault ships, the HMS *Fearless* and the HMS *Intrepid*, with 11,000 tons of displacement, followed the task force with

Table 3.4 British warships deployed to the Falklands/Malvinas Islands

	<i>Ton.</i>	<i>Tubes</i>	<i>Anti-ship Missiles</i>	<i>AA</i>	<i>ASW</i>	<i>Aviation</i>
HMS Hermes	24 kt	–	–	2 × 4 Sea Cat		12 Sea Harriers 9 Sea King 10 Sea Harriers
HMS Invincible	16 kt	–	–	1 × 2 Sea Dart		
HMS Fearless	11 kt	–	–	1 × 4 Sea Cat 2–40 mm		
HMS Intrepid						
Destroyers						
HMS Bristol	6.1 kt	1–4.5 in	–	1 × 2 Sea Dart 2–20 mm	Ikara ASW	Lynx Helicopter
HMS Sheffield	3.5 kt	1–4.5 in	–	1 × 2 Sea Dart 2–20 mm	–	Lynx Helicopter
HMS Coventry						
HMS Glasgow						
HMS Cardiff						
HMS Exeter						
HMS Glamorgan	5.4 kt	1 × 2–4.5 in	4 × 1 MM38 Exocet	1 × 2 Sea Slug 2 × 4 Sea Cat 2–20 mm		Wessex Helicopter
HMS Antrim						
Frigates						
HMS Brilliant	3.5 kt	–	4 × 1 —MM38 Exocet	2 × 6 Sea Wolf 2–40 mm 2–20 mm		2 Lynx Helicopters
HMS Broadsword						
HMS Active	2.7 kt	1–4.5 in	4 × 1—MM38 Exocet	1 × 4 Sea Cat 2–20 mm	2 × 3—torpedo	Wasp Helicopter
HMS Alacrity						
HMS Antelope						
HMS Ardent						
HMS Ambuscade						
HMS Avenger						
HMS Arrow						
HMS Minerva	3.2 kt	–	4 × 1—MM38 Exocet	2 × 4 Sea Cat 2–40 mm	2 × 3—torpedo	1 Lynx helicopter
HMS Penelope						
HMS Argonaut						

(continued)

Table 3.4 (continued)

	<i>Ton.</i>	<i>Tubes</i>	<i>Anti-ship Missiles</i>	<i>AA</i>	<i>ASW</i>	<i>Aviation</i>
HMS Andromeda	3.2 kt		4 × 1—MM38 Exocet	1 × 6 Sea Wolf 2–40 mm	2 × 3—torpedo	1 Lynx Helicopter
HMS Yarmouth	2.8 kt	1 × 2–4.5 in		1 × 4 Sea Cat 2–20 mm		Wasp helicopter
HMS Plymouth	140.7 kt	21 tubes	52 launchers	140 missiles 58 guns	66 torpedoes	34 helicopters 22 Sea Harrier

Source of data English, Watts, 1982; Rivas 2012 (English and Watts, *Battle for the Falklands*, 7–11; Rivas, *Wings of the Malvinas*, 345, 362–363)

700 men on board. They had air defense capabilities composed of two 40 mm guns and a four-round Sea Cat missile launcher. Although they were not considered combatant ships such as the two amphibious assault ships, the six Sir Lancelot class logistic landing ships with 5,600 tons of displacement could transport 400 men and two 40 mm anti-aircraft guns.¹⁹

The task force brought several smaller ships such as two mine-countermeasure vessels with 750 tons, three hospital ships, ten tank ships, four combat supply ships, a storage ship, and a helicopter support ship, all from the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. In addition to the Royal Fleet's insufficient logistics ships, civilian ships were required, with volunteer crews appointed to the theater. Among them, three luxury cruise ships, the RMS *Queen Elizabeth II*, the SS *Canberra*, and the SS *Uganda*, performed essential roles during the war. The British Navy requested fifteen tanker ships, eleven roll-on/roll-off ferries, a container ship, six passenger ships, four offshore support ships and three tugboats, a cable-laying ship, and three fishing ships to be used as mine-countermeasures.²⁰

Five British nuclear submarines and one conventional diesel-electric participated in the war. Among the nuclear ones, two were Churchill class commissioned at the end of the 1960s, with 4,900 tons of displacement and six torpedo tubes capable of firing 533 mm torpedoes and Harpoon missiles, two Swiftsure class submarines, commissioned during the 1970s with 4,400 tons of displacement with five torpedo tubes, also capable of launching missiles and torpedoes. Finally, the old HMS *Valiant*, the second nuclear submarine of the Royal Navy, commissioned at the beginning of the 1960s with 4,200 tons of displacement and six torpedo tubes. An old Oberon class diesel-electric submarine was available for the operations, mainly used for the commandos' infiltration into the archipelago, with 2,000 tons of displacement, six bow and two stern torpedo tubes.²¹ The task force's fragility was its surface ships' limited anti-submarine capability, relying on the anti-submarine protection to the British attack submarines.²²

Among the air defense capabilities of the surface force, the most modern was Sea Wolf, supersonic, short-range, capable of engaging aircrafts and missiles, present only in three of 27 of the task force's combatant ships. It was challenging its employment against close surface targets because of its deficiency in differentiating the target from the waves caused by its trajectory. The second most modern system was the long-range Sea Dart, present on seven ships, effective for high altitude

engagements. However, it was known for losing efficiency when engaging targets close to the surface, and to would take a long time to warm up after being reloaded. Sea Cat was the oldest and most numerous missile system, present on 17 ships. It was the first generation of air defense missiles and is still based on a manual optical guided system operated by radio.²³

Argentina's War Plan

The sources indicate that the planning for the Argentine operation in the Falklands/Malvinas began on the December 22, 1981, one day before Galtieri's inauguration as president, when Admiral Anaya instructed the chief of the Navy Staff, Vice-admiral Alberto Gabriel Vigo, to formulate a detailed plan for the deployment of special forces for reconnaissance, and information gathering about the necessary number of troops to occupy Port Stanley with supporting units and with the logistics for its defense. Although not mentioned a deadline for execution, the instruction detailed that the Super Étendard and P-3 aircraft *preparation* should occur before July 1982. He retransmitted this instruction to Vice-admiral Juan José Lombardo to proceed with the preparation measures alongside the '*Departamento de Material Naval*.' From then on, Lombardo became the main official in charge of designing the original Argentine plans.²⁴

However, Galtieri's authorization for the beginning of the planning occurred a week later, on December 29, at the first meeting of the military cabinet (or *junta*)—between Galtieri and Anaya, and Brigadier Basilio Lami Dozo. At this meeting, Galtieri and Anaya mentioned that the 150-year milestone of the British occupation of the Falklands/Malvinas would take place in one year and introduced the idea of an Argentine action that could take place by that date.

Without any unequivocal planning schedule, the junta continued to meet regularly to discuss the Falklands/Malvinas, among other issues. Meanwhile, the Navy developed its operational planning alone without consulting its peers. Remarkably, the Army Staff were not included in it, although Lombardo complained to Anaya of its importance when he anticipated that the new conscripts would be unready to deploy before April.²⁵

On January 5th, 1982, the *junta* agreed that they should proceed with negotiations round with the UK in New York, between February 27th and 28th, stressing they would only proceed with the military planning in

the case those negotiations failed. On January 12th, the junta defined the Malvinas' planning group, composed of General Osvaldo Jorge Garcia, Brigadier Sigfrido Martín Plessl, and Vice-admiral Lombardo. However, this was not a real joint planning command, since the Army and Air Force Staffs were not included, and the drafts and plans were classified as ultra-secret and restricted. Not even the composition and activation of the group, on January 26th, was documented.

The planning group elaborated on three work plans. The National Strategic Directive (DENAC 1/82) defined military deployment's strategic parameters to solve the Falklands/Malvinas issue. It assumed that the UK would not react with military operations, that the United States would remain neutral, and that the operation's logic would be to occupy the islands to set negotiations. The Military Strategic Directive (DEMIL 1/82) had to consider the most favorable circumstances in its proposal to execute the operation. It proposed July 9th as the date for the operation's execution, and the Argentine forces should be instructed, including of their logistical details, by May 20th.²⁶ Afterward, this date was changed to May 15th. Finally, the Campaign Schematic Plan expected the employment of a considerable amphibious force, without British casualties, to be finished within five days of the commencement of operations. The Malvinas' planning group had to present the final operational plans in mid-March.

Curiously, on January 12th, the same planning group pointed out to the *junta* that Operation Alfa should not be executed before the February negotiations. The operation involved infiltrating a military detachment in the South Georgia Islands. Versions of this plan had been considered since Perón's times. However, initially, Operation Alpha did not aim to create an international incident, neither its occupation.

Vice-admiral Lombardo was also responsible for updating this operational plan, before Galtieri's inauguration and the emergence of the islands issue in the *junta's* meetings, since its execution had been considered in the South Atlantic summer of 1982. Consequently, when he also received the task to plan Falklands/Malvinas' operations, Lombardo mentioned the incongruence between these two operations to Anaya, since the first would compromise the second. Anaya gave into Lombardo and canceled Operation Alpha. Chancellor Costa Mendez and the Argentine ambassador at the UN had access to this operation plan and requested its cancellation, too. However, seemingly, Anaya secretly proceeded with the planning, shared only with his right-arm, Vice-Admiral Vigo.

At the *junta's* first meeting after the failure of the negotiations with the British at the end of February, on March 2nd, there was no definition about the date for Operation Azul, the occupation of the Falklands/Malvinas, but the date and the procedures for the review of the Malvinas group's plan were defined. On March 16th, the first meeting between the Military Committee and the Malvinas' planning group occurred. Therefore, for the first time, the Argentine Joint Staff was involved aiming to broaden the DEMIL 1/82. At this meeting, they also decided that would put Operation Alpha on hold, and it would only be executed alongside Operation Azul, the occupation of the Falklands/Malvinas.²⁷ At last, on March 23rd, the military *junta* determined that the operation would be executed in the first days of April.

With the developments of the incident in South Georgia, and after the original Argentine's dispatch contingent to the Falklands/Malvinas, on March 26th, the *junta* and the Malvinas' planning group conjectured that the UK could react militarily. They considered two options: either suspension of the landing or going ahead, considering the possibility of engagement with casualties. The decision made by Anaya was to deploy the corvettes *Granville* and *Drumond* to the conflict zone. Only on the night of the same day, Galtieri decided on the deployment.

On April 7th, Galtieri decided on the expansion of the operation to start in two days. Consequently, the operation was not a resource of coercive diplomacy anymore and opened the path to war. However, in addition to the marines' detachment, they decided by deploying three mechanized infantry regiments without their armored vehicles and organic artillery groups, which was not reported to General Menendez, the senior commander of the operation's land forces.²⁸

THE ARGENTINE STRATEGIC POSSIBILITIES

Most of the British literature points out that Argentina's political reasons to take the Falklands/Malvinas were based on an attempt to give survival to the military regime, which was in disarray due to economic and social deterioration conditions. With access to unpublished documents and interviews with the key figures, recent Argentine academic scholarship draws a more complex and idiosyncratic narrative.

Archives about the government of General Leopoldo Galtieri show that a resolution of the Falklands/Malvinas issue was the Navy's price to support his ascension to the presidency in place of Roberto Viola.

However, although Galtieri manifested an inclination to deal with it, he, the Argentine Army, and the Air Force never developed previous plans or elaborated discussions.

Galtieri had as master plan in his first months as president to neutralize the Navy's influence and centralize the military and civil ministries under his authority. The chronology of the military *junta*'s meetings allows for questioning whether Galtieri really would opt for an invasion at some point, under the influence of the Argentine Navy, and not as a resource to unite and deceive the military high command. At the same time, he drove the reorganization of political forces and loyalties both inside and outside the military government.

The minutes make evident how those meetings dealt with the islands erratically, with revised schedules at each meeting and no preparatory measures relating to joint planning. On the one hand, he had much more energy and urgency in replacing provincial governments with the focus of reviewing the political loyalties of the armed forces to the presidency, and he even began to work out the conditions for his candidacy for president after a democratic transition. On the other hand, he accelerated Argentine alignment to the United States to support his regime. Even by British intelligence, something identified later was that an attempt at retaking the islands could occur within the first two years of his presidency.²⁹ However, the crisis came only three months after the transition of the new military regime and would not have occurred so early were it not for Anaya's performance and the incident of South Georgia.

Thus, where the Falklands/Malvinas issue was most pressing was in the Navy, which had updated operational plans since 1955. Admiral Jorge Isaac Anaya last accessed these on December 22nd, 1981, just two months after his promotion to Commander of the Navy. In addition to a personal obsession with the issue, Anaya justified that the action in the islands was necessary to win the necessary diplomatic prestige and so providing the foundations for civil-military reconciliation. By the end of 1981, Anaya and the Navy recognized that the military regime was unsustainable and needed a transition process. However, this would not be possible, and without vindictiveness against the military establishment, without conditions that, in some way, would celebrate or recover its credibility.³⁰ It was assumed that a military operation's in the Falklands/Malvinas was symbolic and an expected short-term effect. Therefore, it would be no more than a low-risk and low-cost demonstration of force with limited gains.

Given the correlation of forces and the military *junta*'s political goals, it can be pointed out that there were only two viable courses of action. The first was creating an international crisis from which Argentina could withdraw concessions from the UK. In this case, it should avoid any possibility of confrontation with British forces, and the development of the crisis should be maintained mainly in diplomatic terms. Accordingly, the military footprint in the islands should be minimal and symbolic. On the one hand, the positive side of this course of action was keeping military risks and potential losses to a minimum. On the other hand, the gains would also be limited and symbolic, as well as the development of this course would not necessarily be under the military *junta*'s control. While the dispute had become an international crisis, with possible involvement and arbitration of the United Nations and the United States, Argentina would have to wait and accept sub-optimal gains.

The second course of action would involve proper and detailed military preparation and a plan of action that involved taking and retaining the Falklands/Malvinas, with a substantive concentration of naval, air, and land resources to make the British intervention very costly. As discussed in the previous section, Argentina had the means to do so, whether the course of political decisions and logistical preparation had been different. Below, we propose in detail the viability and operational prerequisites of both alternatives.

Coercive Diplomacy

From a theoretical point of view, Argentina's strategic alternative of compelling the British to resume diplomatic conversations in a more reliable way to be more susceptible to their plea would be not a course of action of limited wars. However, it is considered here given that it was a viable option and a plausible counterfactual for contrasting the second strategic option.

The *junta*'s original plan of action involved three steps: (1) a new round of bilateral negotiations; (2) the conduct of the operations in the Falklands/Malvinas and perhaps also in South Georgia; (3) the return to bilateral negotiations with the UK. Moreover, the original plan for Operation Azul of January 12th forecasted a military incursion of only five days.³¹

[The] Military Strategic Directive “(DEMIL) prepared by the junta initially established an operation limited in time by the withdrawal of Argentine troops from the Malvinas.

The initial provisions provided that the “D” day would be set for the second half of May and would end five days later.³²

This symbolic force would have a composition of 600 men, who would bring bilateral negotiations through a *fait accompli*, in which the British would be indemnified and compensated. It also included the United States and consultations with the European Common Market and contacts with socialist bloc countries.

However, the Argentine diplomatic service *was isolated from the junta* and the Malvinas’ planning group’s considerations and planning. Evidence of that was the request by Admiral Anaya for the replacement of the Argentine Ambassador in the UK by a naval officer, arguing that this would give better conditions to report the events to his peers.

In this sense, if the *junta*’s main political goal was to create an international situation that would confer diplomatic prestige, this coercive diplomatic action had to conduct a military operation synchronously with actions by the diplomatic representatives in United Nations, where the talks about sovereignty and decolonization of the Falklands/Malvinas Islands were treated since 1965 and resumed in 1982. Diplomatic relations with the United States had to be considered, especially in a period of rapprochement with Argentina for its support in counterinsurgency operations in Central America and a peace operation in Sinai. Thirdly, there should have been better coordination in the consultations and discussions with potential supporters and allies in Latin America and the Non-Aligned Movement Bloc.

This operation of coercive diplomacy had two essential prerequisites. Firstly, from the beginning, it should have been designed and planned with the participation of diplomats regularly in the *junta*’s weekly meetings, from December of 1981, and principally in the Malvinas’ planning group—formed by Admiral Lombardo, General García, and Brigadier Plessl—responsible for the detailing of the military operation. Second, in addition to the logistical considerations of the landing and extraction of military detachment, the composition, and the operation’s timing had to be subordinated to a plan of diplomatic movements in Washington, New York, and London.

Nonetheless, as far as is known, the Argentine foreign service had only consultative and limited participation in the *junta* deliberations and was informal in the case of the Malvinas' planning group. In the latter case, the most striking was the erratic assessment of the military actions of Operation Alpha on South Georgia by the Argentine Foreign Minister, Costa Mendez, and the chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral Lombardo, and the recommendation for its cancellation. Furthermore, the *junta*'s understanding was that the diplomatic negotiations and military actions existed in the absence of, or as a result, of the other.

There was an evident lack of synchronization between military operations and diplomatic actions. In the first instance, the Falklands/Malvinas dispute had never been presented to the Latin American countries and the Non-Aligned Bloc, which was not even aware of the resumption of negotiations with the United Kingdom since the beginning of 1982. They were never consulted on the possibility of forming a support group in the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly. In the same vein, the Argentine representative at the United Nations, Eduardo Roca, took his position on March 31st, 1982, too late to play any role, and there are still no records to indicate that he had been charged with any such task. Furthermore, because of the gravity of the issue, Costa Mendez, should have consulted the block of supporter countries directly and outside of the United Nations and been present at the United Nations before the military operation. Costa Mendez was present in New York only on April 3rd: after the invasion order was given. Francis Toase points out that the Argentine landing in the Falklands took place too late because, after the US Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick's replacement as president of the UN Security Council. He was a prominent figure in the endorsement that US foreign policy should give more support to the Argentine military regime in exchange for its anti-communist activity in Latin America.³³ Likewise, Argentina made little use of the support it enjoyed by the Latin American block within the Organization American States.

Nevertheless, even considering the actual events, between April 6th and 27th, Argentina had an international stage at its disposal and the articulation of the two major Western powers seeking its reconciliation. The Argentine should have seen the US diplomatic intervention led by State Secretary Alexander Haig as incredibly positive and should have accepted some of his proposals, especially the second one.

Haig conceived three proposals. On April 6th, he proposed the British task force's diversion and the Argentine forces' withdrawn and replacement by a peacekeeping force composed of Canada, the United States, and two Latin American countries, which would give the conditions to resume negotiations. On April 12th, this proposal was updated by a second suggesting that would serve most of the Argentine interests since it recommended the suspension of economic sanctions, and that the United Nations, the United States, the UK, and Argentina would constitute an interim authority to celebrate an agreement. Argentina would have participated in the island's administration, controlling the police, and appointing the governor. Haig's third and last proposal was presented on April 27th and tended to favor the UK, whose task force was ready and waiting for the command to proceed: either give a demonstration of force or perform a recovery operation for the islands. According to it, both belligerent countries and the United States would name representatives to compose an interim administration, and a definitive way of government for the islands would be decided by consulting the local population and preserving the continuity of the local administration traditions, where Argentina would be able to name two representatives to compose the executive council of this administration.³⁴

Any scenario accepted by Argentina regarding the first two proposals would place the UK in an uncomfortable situation and under pressure from the international community. Regardless of the amount of time and whether the islands would continue under total Argentine sovereignty or not, these would be small drawbacks if compared with the international prestige acquired for defeating, diplomatically and publicly, a great power and with United States' endorsement.

The Malvinas Fortress

According to Corbett's limited war theory, the object's conquest and defense can immediately bring the war to a peace agreement in circumstances of positive political goals in limited wars. First, it occurs because the defensive campaign at this stage does not suffer from the disadvantages, typical of unlimited war, with the moral and material effects of relinquishing territory added to the loss of initiative. Therefore, it is an extraordinarily strong position, even allowing for small forces' strategic success over larger ones.³⁵

We point out that the gap between Argentine and British assets was not so significant. The British task force had more than twice the number of ships of the Argentine *Grupos de Tarea*, 27 against 13, respectively, and had approximately three times more displacement capacity, 140 thousand tons against 51 thousand tons. However, the relative missile launching capabilities were only 1.5 times in favor of the British ships. Although the quantity and the quality of the Argentine naval assets were insufficient for engagements at the high seas, the strategic balance could be different at narrow seas of islands' coasts.

According to Corbett's theory, Argentina did not have the means to execute the last two stages of a limited war. It did not have the naval means to attack, on the high seas, the British task force, or escape its blockade. Neither had Argentina the capacity to attack other valuable objectives to disperse the British forces sent to recover the Falklands/Malvinas and as a bargaining token. Therefore, Argentina had to bet everything on the defense of the islands. It should have been a credible undertaking with a concentration of means which—added to the geographic and climatic factors, scarcity of British military reserves, and an undefined international alignment—would profoundly constrain the UK's cost-benefit analysis.

Argentina could have prepared and planned the invasion having a strong defensive position on the islands as the primary strategic aim. In this way, to impose upon the British political assessment the dilemma over increasing risks uncertainties with the task force possible at hand, or the need to deploy a more robust task force, with the logistical burdens and time constraints that it would have involved. Even the deployment of a task force with the sole role of a demonstration of force would be subject to the Southern Atlantic “stoppable power” and would have a short time of self-sustainability.³⁶

Argentina had relative logistic advantages and numerical superiority in aerial and land assets, which, combined with the naval ones, were enough to an effective coastal defense plan. As much as the Argentine defensive position concentrated forces, which clash with the British task force would result in significant losses on both sides, whoever be the victor, more the internal and external political forces would be against the British resolution of following with the interposition. A strong position, adequately prepared and served by reserves, would allow Argentina to use all the advantages of defense, without its deficiencies. The longer the Argentine forces could keep the islands and presenting its claim to the international

community, it would lead to a high British cost for opening the hostilities compared to yielding to the return of negotiations and the subsequent symbolic gains mean to Argentina.³⁷

The first and greatest Argentine mistake was the inadequate use of naval means. First, it employed the submarine *Santa Fé* and two corvettes to support Operation Alpha in South Georgia. Second, after the sinking of the *Belgrano*, the decision for the total retreat of its naval force from the theater of operations. What happened less for lack of means and more for Anaya's decision not accepting a significant number of casualties that could put his command position at risk. Anaya was enthusiastic about the Falklands/Malvinas defense, but not with his own service paying the costs.³⁸ Therefore, the Argentine Naval Aviation Command designed an aerial campaign based on opportunity shots of the five Exocet air-surface missiles.³⁹ After this, the Argentine defense of the islands was limited to an aerial campaign of fustigation and depriving the land forces of any support of aerial and naval fires. Under such conditions, the land forces were limited to a static defense and forced to disperse its contingents to more favorable terrain to protect against British close air support attacks and avoid being surrounded by British troops.⁴⁰

The understanding that the British submarines and missile advantages could surpass any Argentine defense is biased. A more detailed assessment of both sides' relative means may suggest other scenarios.

On the one hand, the British forces' employment of attack submarines, propelled by nuclear power, was not omnipresent or even combined with the surface force. The deployment of these assets was questioned and done very carefully after the decision made because of their role in safeguarding the Barents Strait during the Cold War.⁴¹ Furthermore, their employment affected the political impressions of both socialist and Western blocs. For this reason, the submarines *Splendid*, *Spartan*, and the *Conqueror* had their operations directly and exclusively subordinated to the British Royal Navy in Northwood and not under the task force commander, Admiral Sandy Woodward.

The HMS *Spartan* and the *Splendid* left from England on April 1st, and the HMS *Conqueror* on the 2nd and arrived at the theater of operations ten days after to impose the maritime exclusion zone. The HMS *Spartan* witnessed the Argentine landing on Stanley, and the HMS *Splendid* patrolled the area between Argentina and the Falklands. On each occasion that they had contact with Argentine vessels, they reported to

Northwood. The *Conqueror* initially had the mission of patrolling South Georgia and could not detect the Argentine submarine *Santa Fé*.⁴²

The two Argentine diesel-electric submarines would have threatened the British task force only with intelligence support from a surface, air, or land platforms. The Argentine submarines had sufficient concealment capacity but limited targeting systems.⁴³ Therefore, the possibility of attacks from a safe position relied on the triangulation from information obtained by other assets. Since the first week of April, this had been available due to the deployment of the anti-submarine patrol aircrafts Tracker to Stanley and West Falkland Islands.⁴⁴

On the other hand, despite the British forces' numerical advantage, none of the sides had doctrines of missile employment in "salvo," as oriented by the modern understanding of war at sea.⁴⁵ Because the British had longer-range missiles with better guidance and communication systems, they would probably always prevail in a pinpointed attrition exchanges of fires.⁴⁶

Had Argentina concentrated its overall assets to only a few coastal battles, it would have immensely increased its odds. Because, despite even having more losses, the British would suffer much more significant logistical and political effects. In other words, Argentina should have positioned at least one fraction of its surface navy around the islands. Even the British task force commander, Admiral Woodward, admitted that if one of the Argentine destroyers with the capacity of launching Exocet missiles had been deployed between them, it would have been exceedingly difficult to neutralize it. Possibly, this would have been more useful employment of the *Belgrano* and her two escort frigates.⁴⁷

In the same fashion as the first, the second Argentine mistake was deployment and employment of its air force because it was possible to have allocated a share of Argentine aircrafts on the archipelago. By operating far from the theater, 600 kilometers, and without radar support available to naval land forces, the Argentine pilots were no match for the Sea Harriers. Consequently, they did not have enough operational engaging time nor intelligence data to be used more effectively against the amphibious landing ships.⁴⁸ Despite it, between May 21st and 25th, the Argentine air fighters forced the British aircraft carriers to keep a very safe distance, operating east of the islands. As a result, the Sea Harriers were limited to provide air superiority for the amphibious operations only six hours per night.⁴⁹

Therefore, the presence of Argentine air groups in the islands would significantly impact the British task force's assessment and positioning. Argentina did have conditions for adjusting the runways in Port Stanley to operate Mirage and Super Étendard fighters if its Malvinas planning group had planned for that. Even without those preparations, it was still possible for the A-4 *Skyhawks* to operate under the existing airstrips at the time.⁵⁰ However, that deployment would have meant to take them from the Argentine aircraft carrier and to operate probably under another chain of command. Moreover, that was the essential point: the Argentine Navy controlled the planning process and decided not to deployment any of its air assets to the islands.

The Malvinas Fortress option would have a final significant benefit for the Argentine forces: to fight with its air and naval forces in the defense. Thus, the most detrimental effect of the "fleet in being" strategy that remained as the only course of action was that those forces had to undertake the costs of attacking the British task force. Even under numerical inferiority conditions, the Argentine naval forces conducted an attack on May 2nd, when the *Belgrano* was neutralized. In much the same way, the Argentine air campaign gave the British the advantage of employing their limited air assets with the economy of force.⁵¹

Something remarkable regarding the Falklands/Malvinas War and current debates about Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) are that radar platforms operating on the land have comparative advantages over radars on ships and aircraft.⁵² On April 2nd, the Argentine installed a 240-mile range AN/TPS-43 radar in Port Stanley, capable of locating aerial threats and British ships and aircraft carriers. Besides, seventy anti-aircraft guns were integrated into its air defense systems.⁵³ This system would have had considerable effect against the British task force had it been added to the conventional missile and artillery power of surface vessels and A-4 airplanes.

There was no surveillance and early warning aircraft system from the British side, and they were dependent upon perimeter security provided by the Sea Harriers. Besides the limited sensing capabilities, the British also had limited fire coordination systems and communication between its naval force's main components. The amphibious transport docks, *Fearless* and *Intrepid*, were out of date in command installations and sensing. The *Fearless* did not have satellite communications and secure communication only via VHF.⁵⁴

Therefore, even with minimal capacity for denying access to the islands, it would have affected the British odds of success. The British commanders were aware that the task force would initially be only a dissuasive resource. The deployment meant to be a demonstration of force to influence the negotiations, in which the upper threshold would be a beachhead in a safe area and without opposition.

On April 8th, the British military staff briefed the task-force command with a plan for Operation *Appreciation* in which it was acknowledged that the available military means would possibly not be sufficient to comply with the political goals. The operation was constrained to reestablish the British presence on the Falklands/Malvinas and pressure the Argentine position. The document assumed that a landing would not be possible until an effective maritime and aerial exclusion zone had been established. Most importantly, the document was ambiguous about the operation's result and did not cover instructions beyond a beachhead's establishment. Michael Clapp and Julian Thompson—respectively, commanders of amphibious and landing groups—assumed that conducting a forced amphibious assault landing against the opposing forces would not be possible. Until April 22nd, it was maintained that the operation's objective was only a demonstration of force.

After the Argentine refusal to Haig's third proposal on the 26th, the British activated the plan for Operation *Sutton*, which demanded the recapture of the islands, starting on May 16th.⁵⁵ At this point, South Georgia had already been recovered, and a special forces detachment had found out about the Argentine contingent on the islands and concluded that they had limited training conditions.

FINAL REMARKS

In this final section, we bring final remarks to critically assess some of the overarching aspects that led to such a stark contrast between our hypothetical expectations and the actual Argentine conduct of its maritime operations in the Falklands/Malvinas War. We also return to our initial questions: Were there better options for the Argentine maritime campaign? To what extent was the lack of interoperability among the Argentine armed forces decisive to the war's outcome?

We argue that Argentine had two strategic alternatives to orientate its maritime operations. Each of them had a specific pre-condition.

On the one hand, to conduct a typical coercive diplomacy action, a temporary and symbolic seizure of the islands. The main pre-condition for this alternative course to be plausible was Operation Alpha's abandonment in South Georgia. It did not attend Argentine political goals and just served to expose any diplomatic and military actions to improvisation. On the other hand, the strategic option for a Malvinas Fortress, a concentrated coastal defensive position in the islands, had as pre-condition significant changes in the preparation and momentum of the Argentine invasion. We point out that all of those were feasible, which made the second alternative plausible.

By contrasting those counterfactuals with the Argentine course of action, we may assess its main failures that answer our first question.

First, Argentina wasted the constellation of diplomatic support and options it had in the United Nations, Organization of American States, Latin America, and within the United States' government. Conversely, Argentina should have acted in those arenas to access and pressure British representatives. There was a general prerequisite that seemed to be more challenging to Argentina's military establishment whatsoever the course of action. In limited wars, military operations must advance combined with diplomatic negotiations. However, in the Argentine military *junta*'s reasoning, there was a misinterpretation that diplomatic actions and military operations should be sequenced. The former would be suspended and only resumed after the conquest of objectives by positions and secured strategic advantage. Conversely, Argentina broke the negotiations mediated by the United States Secretary of State Alexander Haig on April 27th, two days before Prime Minister Thatcher's authorization for the amphibious deployment, and one day after the Argentine deployment of reinforcements to the islands.

Second, the Argentine military failed in reaching the Achilles heel of any expeditionary operation: its logistics. The British operation to recover islands—executed 14,000 kilometers from its territory—has an intrinsic fragility in its supply line. We criticize the Argentine Navy's surface forces and its submarine force's disastrous participation, which compromised the operation's possibility of success. In the first moment, the Navy decided for a decisive "Mahan style" battle, and then it assumed a "fleet in being" strategy confined by its air force seeking for opportunity targets around the British exclusion zone. It never conceded employing its assets in a joint coastal defense of the islands, which would benefit the Argentine Army's anti-aircraft artillery and radars, available there. Therefore,

Argentina had the possibility of executing a coordinated defense in the Falklands/Malvinas, with reasonable chances of keeping their possession, which was assumed by the British, United States, and Soviet observers of the war.⁵⁶

The Argentine Navy would have the chance to perform more useful and effective maritime operations if it had divided its fleet. The employment of its two submarines to harass the British lines of communication, and the deployment of some surface ships, including its aircraft carrier, close to the islands' ports or in the strait between them, keeping the remaining of its fleet in the continental ports, but as ready task force in reserve. On the contrary, Argentina chose a middle-ground approach between the two alternatives we proposed here. It was too intense for a coercive diplomatic action and too weak to establish a defensive position in the islands that could uncover the British calculations and possibilities for success. Consequently, the nonsense *fail accompli* in South Georgia (Operation Alpha) escalated the operation initially intended to be a rapid and symbolic capture of the islands (Operation Azul) toward an improvised invasion (Operation Rosario). In this sense, the execution of Operation Alpha colluded against the possibilities of Argentine diplomatic and even military success. These results were so negative that some Argentine authors consider Operation Alpha a conspiracy.⁵⁷

Before answering our second research question, it is necessary to highlight two important factors. First, it was necessary to prevent the rivalry and mutual distrust among the Argentine military services. Second, the Argentine air and naval forces needed a major doctrine review. While the Air Force was not adequate for naval warfare, the Navy did not appreciate the employment of its surface force as "mobile artillery" in defensive coastal operations.

Beyond that, although desirable, an Argentine joint task force deployed to the islands would not require a high interoperability rate. It was possible to determine operational sectors for air, naval, and land components. However, that concentrated deployment of forces would demand a joint operational command in the islands, with authority and capability to design and execute one standard operational plan. In that sense, the Argentine divided military establishment seemed to face an insurmountable obstacle.

NOTES

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Falklands/Malvinas' Air Warfare and Its Consequences: A Critical Geopolitical Approach

Daniel Blinder

INTRODUCTION

This chapter investigates the geopolitical and technological dimensions of the South Atlantic air warfare conflict over the Falklands/Malvinas in 1982. On the one hand, it analyzes the aerial dimension of the war and its results for the Argentine Republic and the UK. On the other hand, it reviews the postwar context of technological restrictions imposed upon Argentina and, consequently, the two countries' different airpower capabilities. It assesses the Argentine presidential administrations from 1983 to 2018, that is to say: Alfonsín, Menem, De la Rúa, Kirchner, Fernández de Kirchner, and Macri. With an emphasis on the last two, it stresses

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how the UK controlled the exports of military technology or dual-use technology to Argentina, developing a “web of technological limitation,” which extended from British defense and trade governmental apparatuses to international institutions.

The analysis proceeds a critical geopolitical approach, combining world-systems theory with geopolitics. This approach recognizes the international division of labor and technology, including the military ones, to attend not merely the capital accumulation but also the national notions of territoriality and power. Therefore, that approach addresses the geopolitical drivers of diffusion and the manufacture of military industry and technology.

Besides a bibliographical review, this chapter benefits from the survey of British official documentation on export licenses to Argentina between 1997 (the first year the reports were available to the public) and 2018.¹ These sources allow me to outline the British policy to hamper Argentine access to sensitive technologies, constraining its path to acquire military capabilities that could threaten the Falklands/Malvinas Islands.

I argue that the UK kept a coherent policy toward the Falklands/Malvinas issue, and consequently, of technological transference restriction that could empower Argentina’s capability to jeopardize the islands. Meanwhile, Argentina had presidencies that changed its foreign policy toward the UK, resulting in much more variation and inconsistency in its policies to face British restriction.

The chapter has five sections. The next one presents the conceptual framework of critical geopolitics. The second one analyzes the contending air forces, especially Argentina’s losses, which significantly depleted its overall air capabilities. The third one outlines the postwar British restrictions on Argentina to obtain military material amid economic crises and after the Cold War’s end. It analyzes the British documentation on export control, reasoning the patterns of export licenses to Argentina with the Falklands/Malvinas issue, and the bilateral and global geopolitical dimensions of that policy. Subsequently, the fourth section provides a preliminary assessment of Argentine last administration and a perspective of the bilateral relations. The last section resumes my final remarks.

GEOPOLITICS, SEMI-PERIPHERY, AND WAR

A review of the critical geopolitics' literature points out the relationship between war and capitalism, as the modern military institutions have followed the contemporary development of capital.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Werner Sombart related economic development, geographical expansion, capital accumulation, the manufacture of materials for war, destruction, and subsequent reconstruction and other events that favored the capitalist system's emergence. The war as an institution also created a bourgeois spirit by demanding martial order and uniformity, construction, and research in military technology, nationalism, and expansionist colonialism. Later, Schumpeter called this the destructive force that creates capitalism.² However, Sombart identified it as the two faces of war: it destroys here and builds there.³ A few decades later, Cipolla recognized that innovation in military technology, firepower, and navigation is related to the expansion of European capitalism.⁴ Ruttan went so far as to respond that war is necessary for economic growth, explaining the case of the US science and technology institutions, which funded research and development in general-purpose technologies—and in the defense sector—to then be produced and commercialized for civilian use. That was the nuclear industry cases, computing, semiconductors, the Internet, and the aerospace sector.⁵ In turn, Mazzucato, studying similar cases, analyzes this problem for an enterprising State, which invests in disruptive developments whose risk investment the capitalist would not be willing to undertake due to risk aversion. However, when the technology proves to work, the private sector invests.⁶

Furthermore, geography is never the backdrop where events unfold: no spatial arrangement is neutral, as Peter Taylor and Colin Flint assert.⁷ Geopolitics is studying the geographical distribution of power among states and the assumptions, designations, and interpretations that intervene in politics at all geographic scales. Thus, geopolitics implies the geographic distribution of power among different States, comprising the corresponding normative framework and without neglecting the legal omissions of that which is not legislated or regulated by a state bureaucracy or a world multi-state system.

Wallerstein claims that a world-system gives rise to core countries, semi-periphery countries, and the periphery countries. A core country has robust attributes for the exercise of sovereignty. The peripheral countries

lack them, such as institutional and political consistency for that exercise. However, semi-periphery countries are in transition. Despite being in periphery areas of the world-system, they display some core countries' characteristics in their internal structure and government, mostly due to greater industrialization and other economic resources.⁸ A critical component of the semi-periphery is that having some industrial capacity and scientific and technological development, they demand technology from the core countries that could ultimately lead to competition for their market. Capital-intensive technology, such as aerospace technology, is headed by core countries and, on a much smaller degree, by semi-periphery countries.

The study of value chains in interdependent competition focuses on the geopolitical organization of capital of production. This organization defines horizontal and vertical structures that rule a country's participation in the total profit produced by the global value chains' capital. The international governance of value chains sets in which such capitalist corporations and states wish to participate, which countries provide which components of the chain, and who controls the strategic assets that allow relative monopoly or monopsony.⁹ This process involves control over logistics, the division of the most qualified and least qualified labor throughout the global value chain, technological innovation, and property rights.¹⁰

However, concerning the military sector of global chains, they operate differently, since the defense technology companies, even in the era of globalization, benefits from protection, incentives, and other advantages for production in their home countries. The decision-making process for developing a military technology mediates the national security interests, bureaucratic preferences, and foreign policies toward allies and rivals. While the strategic ones can be transferred to allies to maximize the scale of production and profits, the leading defense manufacturers will not allow its transfer to semi-periphery countries, especially if they are considered potential rivals. Therefore, the global value chain of a military platform or system to be manufactured is not market-oriented but based on geopolitical reasoning. That is to say that the national security policies oversight the clients, the partners, and a given line of military equipment's production, which is observable in the five cases discussed in this chapter, even though they comprise billions of dollars companies that expanded internationally to gain scale economies.¹¹

To perform as a modern military institution, the Argentine Air Force requires systems and platforms of the high-value chain, whose suppliers turn out to be foreign countries capable of manufacturing, and willing to sell the surplus. However, as other semi-periphery countries, Argentina can never acquire the state-of-the-art, but mature or obsolete technologies replaced by more advanced ones. The most advanced aerospace technologies, especially in military aircraft, tend to be limited to countries that share the global security/capitalist core architecture, excluding semi-periphery countries. Moreover, these countries' position in the worldwide chain value creates a path dependency determined by supplier countries.

Until 1976, Argentina was a country with significant levels of industrial development and income distribution. However, since that year's military coup—in addition to the repression of trade unions and political opponents, state terrorism with kidnappings and torture—a policy of market liberalization began to undermine the country's industrial foundations and national productive activity,¹² and to transfer resources from workers to the capital linked to the financial and transnational sector.¹³ Toward the end of the dictatorship, the military government forcibly recovered the Falklands/Malvinas Islands, leading to a war with the UK. The consequences of which further deepened the crisis of the regime and the national economy in general.

After re-democratization, Alfonsín's government faced structural limitations due to the existent political and economic crisis before the Falklands/Malvinas War. Thus, they also unfolded political and institutional crises, hyperinflation, foreign debt, and coup attempts by military sectors that limited the exercise of presidential power and its legitimacy.¹⁴ In the 1990s, President Menem subsumed the military's executive branch, stifling the last subversive attempts against democracy. Conversely, he carried out trade liberalization and financial deregulation policies, forging an alliance with the United States that had prevailed in the Cold War and resuming bilateral relations with the UK. That model reached exhaustion during De la Rúa's government, which ruled over economic and institutional collapses.¹⁵ Kirchner took office in the following decade, and his wife, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, followed him. Both carried out economic-growth oriented policies, aimed at certain levels of income development and distribution.¹⁶

Summarizing my argument here, Argentina, before its last military dictatorship, was a sovereign country with significant productive capabilities, with a relative level of industrialization, a foreign policy with the

ability to gain ground in the international agenda, whose central hypothesis of conflict was the internal enemy, Chile, and Brazil. After the military government's negative economic performance and the defeat in the Falklands/Malvinas War, Argentina's development suffered significantly and its armed forces as well. Among them, the Air Force paid the highest price due to its loss of pilots and aircraft.¹⁷

FALKLANDS/MALVINAS' AIR WARFARE

What were the geopolitical consequences of the Falklands/Malvinas War? The Argentine Air Force and Navy participated in aerial warfare, and their military aviation suffered the effects of a theater of operations located around 500 kilometers from the coast. The British Task Force had to travel more than 12,000 kilometers, which involved impressive logistics of personnel, warships, submarines, helicopters, aircraft carriers, and fighter, bomber, and cargo aircraft. The British resolve to reach the islands' territory, and the adjacent maritime area was accomplished on April 30, 1982.

In the war's first air operation, codenamed Operation Black Buck, Vulcan bombers attacked Puerto Argentino/Port Stanley. Informed of that, the Argentine Air Force Command correctly anticipated there would be further air raids on radars and other defensive positions in Puerto Argentino/Stanley by the British Task Force aviation. It assumed the British aircraft carriers would be kept far enough to the east of the islands, out of the Argentine Navy's fighter-bombers' radius of action. For this reason, it was only possible to devise the use of Air Force's Mirage III and M-5 Dagger interceptors to perform missions against British targets.¹⁸

The first air engagement of the war took place at 07:45 am. Two M-5 Dagger took off from the Río Grande, armed with Shaffrir missiles. These Argentine fighters, codenamed "Toro" and piloted by Captain Carlos Moreno and lieutenant Ricardo Volponi were supported by the Malvinas Interception Station of the Center for Information and Control and continued in contact with two Sea Harriers of the HMS Invincible, piloted by LtCdr RN Robin Kent and Lt Brian Haigh. The Toro did not engage in combat and landed back in the Río Grande at 09:45 am. Compared to the Argentine Mirage, the Sea Harriers, due to their steerable engines' design and the possibility of gaining an extra lift in combat maneuvers, had more maneuverability at low levels. Their AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles were "all aspect," that is to say, they could be

fired in any relative position to the target, and not only from the tail cone as the Argentine Shaffrir but, above all, they had a long time of permanence in the zone of combat.¹⁹ The combat at low altitude increased the Mirage III and M-5 Dagger consumption, which could not return to the continent without being refueled. That battle was their baptism of fire.

The following air combats inflicted significant damages on the British forces at the cost of a large portion of the Argentine Air Force and its pilots. It deployed for the Theater of Operations a total of 84 combat aircraft,²⁰ out of the approximately 200 of its inventory, including Canberra MK-62, Mirage IIIEA, M-5 Dagger, A-4B Skyhawk, A-4C Skyhawk, IA-58 Pucará, Hercules C-130H, and Hercules KC-130, among other transport and reconnaissance aircraft.²¹ The Naval Aviation went into battle with 12 attack aircrafts: 8 Skyhawk A4Q, 4 Super Étendard, and 5 Aermacchi.

They were able to sink the British ships Sheffield, Ardent, Antelope, and Atlantic Conveyor, which meant nearly half of the enemy surface fleet, though it had its price the loss of three A4Qs.²² The Air Force, even operating at the limit of its radius of action from the continent and with adverse weather conditions, had hampered the enemy's goal of achieving local air superiority. It was able to enact a real aerial-maritime tactical intervention against a powerful naval fleet with high NATO military technology, detecting the enemy's weaknesses, especially its flawed early warning system. The Navy's Super Étendards, armed with Exocet AM39 missiles, succeeded in sinking the HMS Sheffield destroyer and the HMS Atlantic Conveyor container ship. The Air Force's Skyhawk and Dagger bombs sank the HMS Ardent and Antelope frigates, the HMS Coventry destroyer, and the HMS Galahad logistic ship.

Furthermore, below follows a list of British vessels that suffered partial damage by Argentine air attacks:

- the HMS Glamorgan missile destroyer was damaged by impacts of 30 mm cannon and explosions nearby 1000 pounds bombs. The ship continued in operations but was later knocked out by an Exocet AM/39 missile, fired from the coast by the Navy;
- the frigates HMS Arrow, HMS Alacrity, the destroyer Glasgow and the frigate HMS Brilliant which were severely compromised by bombs dropped by fighter planes from Argentina;
- the missile frigate HMS Argonaut damaged by cannons and missiles;
- the missile destroyer HMS Antrim;

- the missile frigate HMS Broadsword damaged by 30 mm cannon shots, then put out of combat by bombs MK17 which did not manage to explode;
- the landing ship RFA Sir Bedivere, the logistic landing ships RFA Sir Lancelot, RFA Sir Galahad, HMS Fearless damaged by bombs and shootings;
- the missile frigate HMS Yarmouth;
- the aircraft carrier HMS Invincible;
- the landing craft LCU Foxtrot 4;
- the landing ship RFA Sir Tristram;
- the missile frigate HMS Plymouth.²³

The Argentine Naval Aviation's pilots had to teach the Air Force's colleagues their techniques and expertise in low height air raids during the war. Since the Air Force's pilots had never received this type of training before, they attended classes on aeronaval tactics at *Comandante Espora* Naval Air Force Base in the south of the country but enjoyed short hours of flight training. That type of low-level flight "combing the waves" hindered early detection by the ships' radars and favored the attack.²⁴ However, it resulted in failures in the activation of bombs' fuses, resulting in hits without detonation over the targeted vessels. The bombs were either lodged in their hulls or went to the bottom of the sea.²⁵

The Super Étendard performed very skillfully, flying remarkably close to the water waves to not be detected by their naval targets and thus delivering destructive blows with missiles. The Daggers, Mirages, Skyhawks, and Pucará attacked naval targets in the Falklands/Malvinas, dropping bombs and shafting fire. Also, they faced modern naval defense systems and met British Harrier and Sea Harrier in aerial combats. The Argentine Air Force lost 10 Douglas A-4B Skyhawk, 9 Douglas A-4C Skyhawk, AMD 2 Mirage M-III, 11 IAI M-5 Dagger, 2 BMK-62 Canberra, and 11 FMA IA-58 Pucará.²⁶

The UK, in turn, fought with the last generation technology in aerial combat. Its air component comprised 38 Sea Harrier and Harrier fighter planes, and about a hundred support planes and helicopters. According to official records, the Sea Harrier performed much better than the Argentine expected, resulting in 21 British victories and the Argentine fighters brought none of the opponents down. However, the Argentine Air Force Captain Guillermo Donadille and other observers tell a different story about a confrontation between a squadron of Dagger and Mirage that

he commanded.²⁷ He reported the hits of a Harrier with shots from his only weapon, a 30 mm cannon, which aircraft was up in smoke and fell 30 kilometers away from the area.²⁸

The Harrier and Sea Harrier were the state-of-the-art in technology for the year of 1982. They could take off and fly vertically, giving them more maneuverability and, therefore, tactical advantage. For instance, they could perform the VIFFing, which raises and reduces flight speed by positioning the aircraft to attack or other maneuvers.²⁹ They had similar characteristics to the Argentine fixed-wing fighters in terms of weapons, but they had the American air-to-air AIM9L Sidewinder missile, with a much more precise heat-guided system.^{30,31}

What were the British losses of aircraft in combat? A total of 4 Harriers GR3 and 7 Sea Harriers were lost, all of which suffered an attack or were shot down due to ground attacks with anti-aircraft artillery, attacks on aircraft carriers, by small arms, or hit by a missile. However, due to lousy flight conditions or operational accidents, two of these planes also fell.³² What was the planning logic for gaining sovereignty over the Malvinas/Falklands Islands and how to sustain it with airpower? According to the Rattenbach Report, there was no planning, and the UK was technologically and militarily superior.

Operational Plan 2/82 "Maintenance of Sovereignty" was issued on April 7, a few days after the troops' arrival in the islands. This plan was the product of a meeting in Buenos Aires, in which the Commander of the South Atlantic Theater of Operations, the Commander of the Malvinas/Falklands Military Garrison, and the Strategic Air Commander intervened. They assigned the Air Force the tasks of maintaining an airline of communication between the Falklands/Malvinas Islands and the continent; patrolling and distant reconnaissance missions with KC-130s in coordination with Naval Aviation; strategic interdiction over the enemy fleet; and tactical air operations such as close fire support, search and rescue, and direct and indirect air defense.³³ The planning also contemplated Chile's intervention in the conflict and provided units to counter it. The purpose was to neutralize British naval task forces' possible action, carry out air and ground operations, and prevent a surprise action by the Chilean Air Force, dissuading this one from intervening in the conflict.³⁴ However, while British regulations prohibited attacking targets on the continent and limited operations to the islands and their respective maritime boundaries,³⁵ the Chilean deployment and regulations for the Falklands/Malvinas War are still unassessed and open to scrutiny.

On April 5, the Strategic Command created the Southern Air Force Command with strategic, defensive, tactical, and transportation air responsibilities in the South Atlantic Theater of Operations and the Southern Theater of Operations, correcting their jurisdictions' overlap and fostering their coordination.³⁶ The Air Defense Command planned and executed with speed and efficiency the deployment of air defense assets to Patagonia's coastal bases. For instance, Mirages were transferred to the Southern Theater of Operations, though there were no confrontations in the continent, so they remained unused.³⁷ The Air Transport Command carried out its tasks with success until the Argentine capitulation. The resources and personnel to be transported and the scarcity of military cargo aircrafts led to the mobilization of the air fleets of commercial companies such as Aerolíneas Argentinas and Austral Líneas Aéreas.³⁸ The Southern Air Force Command deployed with speed and success, and without notice, to the continental air bases in Trelew, Cómodoro Rivadavia, Santa Cruz, San Julián, Río Gallegos and Río Grande.³⁹

Concerning aeronaval warfare, the Rattenbach Report stated that:

[...] at the beginning of the conflict with the United Kingdom, the Navy was not operationally ready to face this hypothesis of unprecedented war, due to the recent initiation of the naval year training, and the incorporation of the Super Étendard-Exocet weapons system was neither completed nor ready. (...) Concerning joint training, this was practically non-existent. Therefore, after the conflict had already begun, the two practices had to be improvised with the Air Force's resources.⁴⁰

The Naval Aviation could not operate from the aircraft carrier ARA 25 de Mayo as this was taken to its Naval Station. The Skyhawk A4Qs operated from the continent, as well as the recently incorporated Super Étendard. They were not employed combined, decreasing their attacks' effectiveness, though they could inflict damages above the preliminary estimative.⁴¹

The Rattenbach Report replicates the Air Force assessment, pointing out it could not face that type of air warfare at sea, lacking doctrine, and joint training, which resulted in improvisation and less effective employment. Although they also managed to inflict considerable damage, that was insufficient to neutralize British air forces' superiority.⁴²

The training of the Argentine personnel followed other combat scenarios. Therefore, the pilots experienced unprecedented procedures of

attacks on surface ships, "but the lack of specific training for this type of fight, added to the great technological capacity and size of the enemy force, cause numerous losses of lives and aerial resources."⁴³ Besides, as mentioned above, the attacks' effectiveness was considerably diminished because 60% of the bombs that hit British naval assets did not explode. "This was because the available bombs did not have their fire train ready for naval targets, nor for the used technique of attack, the only one that allowed to launch their ordnance with some probability of survival against modern enemy anti-aircraft weapons."⁴⁴

Although it was decided that the Puerto Argentino/Port Stanley airstrip would be adequate for Argentine aircraft's needs, it could not be completed because of the British naval blockade.⁴⁵ The lack of coordination between land forces and the air attacks' employment resulted in limited close air support.

[...] this could not be carried out as expected since there was not a well delimited Main Line of Combat, nor was it possible to distinguish it from the enemy targets by the aircraft in flight. The differences of approach concerning these air operations had their origin in a lack of training in joint operations, which generated ignorance on the part of the land forces of what an aircraft could do.⁴⁶

Also, "the operations carried out in conjunction with the Naval Aviation obeyed, preferably, to direct local coordination between the assigned resources, instead of an operation [embracing] the doctrine in effect in this field." However, they were able to coordinate in-flight refueling and attacks on the British HMS *Invincible*.⁴⁷ Furthermore, Argentine planes did not operate from the islands or the 25 de Mayo aircraft carrier, due to technical issues, the blockade, and bombardment generated by the enemy forces. The Rattenbach Report recognized there was a clear superiority of the British pilots "not only because they had the last generation missile Sidewinder AIM-9L provided to Great Britain by the USA, but also because of the lack of autonomy of their airplanes that limited their permanence on the target to 2 or 3 minutes, otherwise they would run out of fuel."⁴⁸

Nevertheless, all those British advantages could not capitalize on a total or permanent command of the skies since it could not prevent the critical losses inflicted on its surface vessels, given the innovative and brave action of the Argentine pilots in combat. During the last days of the

conflict, the Air Force tried to provide close fire support by attacking British units heavily defended by “RAPIER” and “BLOW PIPE” infantry missiles, which resulted in the shooting down of several of its aircrafts. These actions were not fully effective due to the lack of coordination with the Argentine Army units and the Air Force’s pilots own inability to hit those ground targets.

Moreover, there was a jurisdictional issue that marked the competences between Argentina’s two air forces. The Air Force was in charge only of the air space over the coast. Once at sea, the Naval Aviation held operational command. The Air Force had as a secondary responsibility and no autonomy to attack targets at sea. Therefore, it did have the authorization to search naval targets, but not to attack them.⁴⁹

The Naval Aviation Command, in turn, also had an outstanding performance, although with operational flaws like those of the Air Force. At the beginning of the operations, the embarked attack planes could not operate to help accomplish the assigned mission. Still, when these aircrafts were deployed to mainland bases, they performed well enough to inflict severe damages to the enemy. The units employed were *Grupo Aeronaval Continental*, *Grupo Aeronaval Insular*, and *Grupo Aeronaval Embarcado*. They performed air patrolling and reconnaissance, attack and armed reconnaissance of British ships, positions and land forces, logistical support and transport of personnel, search and rescue, and various other purposes. The assets deployed to the Falklands/Malvinas Islands were divided between the Malvinas Air Base and the Calderón Island Base, which was evacuated after a successful attack by British commandos that destroyed several of their planes. These troops were under the Naval Component Malvinas’ operational command,⁵⁰ acting successfully in few opportunities of joint military maneuvers with the Air Force. Section F of paragraph 679 of the Rattenbach Report states that “all aerial assets were not organized under a single command from the beginning; instead, each component was allowed to independently dispose of its aircraft and support elements and conduct them under different criteria.”⁵¹ It confirms that the UK always counted on aeronautical advantage and achieved military supremacy over the air and the sea.

In summary, according to the analysis carried out by the military regime itself, the Argentine Air Force and Naval Aviation were not ready to embark on such a conflict against a superior enemy. The air forces were not adequately trained for aeronaval warfare, and the doctrine restricted the action to the sea. Nevertheless, the report mentioned that, given such

disadvantages, the Argentine high command decided not to discard these combat forms, accepting its perils.⁵²

The Argentine Air Force had another challenge in securing the airspace of coastal areas. It is faced with the need to extend the scope of airspace control and cover the radio's shadow cones surrounded by fixed echoes from the ground. To attend that, it created an Air Observer Network, made up of volunteer radio amateurs, stationed in their combat zone, to give a timely alarm to the air defense. Alongside them, there were pilots and civil aircraft for flight relay tasks, light transport, patrolling and surveillance, search and rescue, diversion tasks to confuse and keep alert the British forces with different planes, and aircraft guidance squadrons to the combat zone.⁵³

The Rattenbach Report also states Argentine technical and logistical inferiority to British ability to sustain air operations and air defense capacity.⁵⁴ It was particularly challenging to supply fuel and lubricants for its aircrafts had to be transported from a very remote area from the theater of operations—such as Buenos Aires—because there were no means of packaging them in the nearest city of *Cómodoro Rivadavia*.⁵⁵ Therefore, no unified command acted organically and efficiently during the war.

The procedures adopted by the Military Junta led the Nation to war without adequate preparation, contradicting essential planning norms and thus engendering fundamental errors and omissions that affected the military's strategic orientation and the coherence of contributing planning. All this constituted a decisive cause of the defeat.⁵⁶

THE BRITISH POLICY OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGICAL TRANSFER TO ARGENTINA

In the long term, the Falklands/Malvinas War resulted in different paths of air power development. Argentina's military expenditure has fallen systematically after it and continued the decline in the 1990s due to a new foreign policy based on international insertion in line with the new liberal world order, hegemonized by the United States after the disappearance of the Soviet Union. Chart 4.1 shows how Argentine Defense spending has systematically decreased.

Consequently, Argentina invested a small percentage of its national budget in defense—and only a share of it in the Air Force—which was not enough to keep its military aircrafts operational. It retired most of




Chart 4.1 Argentine military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 1997–2018 (Source The World Bank Data. “Military expenditure [% of GDP].” <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?end=2018&locations=AR&start=1997>. Accessed July 12, 2019)

the Mirages and Skyhawks, remaining only a few that can fly.⁵⁷ Something similar happens with Navy Aviation, which received five modernized Super Étendard fighters, almost forty years old.⁵⁸ Indeed, after a long period of decline, Argentina no longer has a capable military air force. Meanwhile, the Royal Air Force remains operational: its Harriers, once a state-of-the-art weapons system, are now regarded as museum pieces and replaced by the fifth-generation F-35.⁵⁹

One explanation is the lack of resources to invest in defense programs. Although this is a reasonable interpretation for Argentina’s period of economic crisis in the 1990s, its economic recovery took place in the mid-2000s, which affected the Defense budget, as can be seen in Chart 4.2.

Thus, alongside domestic politics, what else can explain those different paths? I argue that a significant share of the explanation lies in the UK controlled the exports of military technology or dual-use technology to Argentina, developing a “web of technological limitation,” which extended from British defense and trade governmental apparatuses to international institutions.




Chart 4.2 Argentina's Military expenditure (current USD), 1997–2018 (*Source* The World Bank Data: <https://datos.bancomundial.org/indicador/MS.MIL.XPND.CD?end=2018&locations=AR&start=1997>. Accessed July 12, 2019)

Although the UK has lost its place as a world power after the Second World War, it has retained strategic industries, global value chains, multinational corporate interests, and oversight over strategic-military technology transfers. In effect, any industrial-technological system grounds on a dual-use matrix, the result of which is the development of industrialized products for military and commercial purposes, and scientific knowledge create multinational businesses linked to the defense industry. Investment in this area has increased a lot since the terrorist attacks in New York and the Pentagon in 2001, after declining relative terms during the 1980s and 1990s. In 2014, the UK had 13 companies at SIPRI's *The Top 100 Arms-Producing and Military Services Companies*: BAE Systems, Airbus Group, Rolls-Royce, Babcock International Group, MBDA, Serco, Cobham, QinetiQ, GKN, Thales UK, Meggitt, CNH Industrial.⁶⁰ In a list in which the United States companies predominate, nine are of British property, three join a European consortium, and BAE Systems ranks as the third top defense company. After the United States, which holds 54.4% of the list's value, the UK's participation is 10.4%: the second in relative terms.⁶¹ That entails the British potential to use technology as a power resource.

Military technology is directly related to the territory in which it is produced, and its geopolitical worldview. The international system's patterns and distinct characteristics attributed to individual countries define policymakers' geopolitical worldview. Consequently, there is a geopolitical discourse about how political and economic events are read, and how power is represented in space, as it is and as it should be.⁶² Geopolitics offers perspectives of the global landscape using geographical descriptions. Metaphors such as "Iron Curtain," "Third World," or "Rogue State" are inherently geographic as they also inform policymakers about political characteristics, positions, and commitments.⁶³ A First World or Core Country represents a country with a developed, diversified, technologically advanced economy, which enjoys considerable leverage in the international system. Can one think of a technologically advanced country outside the interstate system? Not in any way: there are metaphorical notions about development because these also exist about underdevelopment. Developed countries design national and international norms and institutions—that regulate socio-economic growth and technological tenure. The most sensitive and regulated of them are those related to war and the development of military technology.

After the Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982 with Argentina, the British geopolitical strategy consisted of blocking the institutions and the economic sectors on which Argentine military technological development depends. The UK has constrained Argentina technologically so that this one became unable to develop either its military or technological capabilities. After the war, the British policymakers kept the geopolitical notion that Argentina has remained as a threat to the islands. Therefore, Argentina became an object of British foreign policies that limited economic intercourse related to military use technology. The official documentation published by the British government between 1997 and 2018 makes that evident.

After Argentina's defeat and the diplomatic relations broke down, the British exerted pressure to constrain the Argentine military capabilities and enforced an embargo over a series of items as long as possible.⁶⁴ That was carried on even after the UK's allies—for instance, France and Italy—ended the ban and sold some military equipment to Argentina.⁶⁵ At the time, however, the UK lifted part of the embargo on Argentina to facilitate compliance with contracts with its European trading partners who used British industrial components in their war machinery. For instance, four Rolls-Royce turbines and propulsion material and electronics from

the firm BAE Systems were authorized for Argentine destroyers of West German origin. The Argentine ships also embarked on British-made Westland Lynx helicopters and Exocet missiles manufactured in France but with British components. Rolls Royce 540 Viper engines powered the French Mirage planes and the Israeli Daggers of Argentine Air Force. Despite this, Thatcher's government continuously lobbied in the shadows to guarantee the embargo, and therefore the restriction of Argentine access to the international market of military technology and arms. The ban lasted until 1998, during Carlos Menem's presidency and with the normalization of the bilateral relations.⁶⁶

The UK resumed the embargo on Argentina in December 2011, when the tension between them escalated because the Mercosur countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) decided to deny their ports to British Falklands ships.⁶⁷ In 2012, a British Parliament report stated that issue, mentioning the original policy on controlling Argentine access to British goods and technology for military use and the new orientation since 1998. There was still embargo over new military technology items. However, it allowed the export of older military materiel. It also acknowledges that the last change and hardening of British policy responded to the diplomatic actions of Mercosur countries, as they damage the Falklands Islands' economy, but aimed exclusively export licenses for end-users in Argentina.⁶⁸

Moreover, Argentina is subject to British export controls along with other countries such as Afghanistan, Burundi, Macao Special Administrative Region in China, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Congo, North Korea, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Republic of Guinea, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Zimbabwe. The People's Republic of China also suffers from export controls on military technology, and the Russian Federation is under sanctions from the European Union.⁶⁹ These technological export restrictions comprise sensitive material, not only to weapons of mass destruction but also to software and hardware technologies that may end up composing a high dual-use development.⁷⁰ The European Union's list of export control materials, to which the UK adheres, comprises nuclear materials and their equipment, chemicals, micro-organisms, toxins, processing materials, electronics, computers, telecommunications and information security, sensors and lasers, navigation and avionics, navigation control, and aerospace and propulsion technology.⁷¹

The UK stands two lists of export lists. The Standard Individual Export Licenses (SIELs) are the most restrictive and list export licenses for specific controlled goods such as: as dual-use (civilian or military), coercion (including drugs used for lethal injection), radioactive sources, military products, and electronic technology.⁷² Issued by the Export Control Organization (ECO), the Open Individual Export Licenses (OIEL) is more flexible and designed for the exporter's needs, allowing multiple overseas shipments of specific goods to specific countries. It contemplates the control of dual-use technologies and materials that could be sensitive. Therefore, their commercial trade can be facilitated depending on the nature of the business and the exporter.⁷³

All the accessed documents mention criteria to grant or not licenses related to the buyer's behavior in the international community, the attitude toward terrorism, the nature of their foreign alliances, and respect for international law. Besides, there are other factors such as the impact of the export in question on the economic, commercial, industrial, and social interests of the acquiring country, and in particular, the effects on the British economy, as well as its commercial and industrial benefits, the effect on bilateral relations, the effect on collective defense with British allies, and the strategic protection of industry.

The available data presents that, between 1997 and 2018, the UK has exported to Argentina a certain amount of variable inputs, which have been affected by the abovementioned British policies' changes during the same period. However, the UK has granted SIEL and OIEL export licenses to Argentina independently its administration and policy orientation to the Falklands/Malvinas Islands: from the most friendly government in terms of foreign policy and the islands—Menem's—to De La Rúa's, through the provisional government of Duhalde, to the most sovereign government of the Kirchners, and, finally, Macri's complacent government toward the UK and the Falklands/Malvinas issue. What remained constant, and what changed?

Chart 4.3 presents that British SIEL licenses to Argentina had increased since 2004, leaping during the Néstor Kirchner's administration and reached its peak in 2008 when Cristina Kirchner Fernández had already been elected. A slight fall followed the international crisis of the same year. The increase of licenses resulted from Argentine higher demand due to industrial growth and import substitution policy and Kirchner's creation of the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Productive Innovation to foster scientific and technological activities.⁷⁴




Chart 4.3 U.K. Standard Individual Export Licenses (SIEL) to Argentina (Source UK Government. “Standard Individual Export Licences, September 12, 2012”. <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/standard-individual-export-licences>. Accessed November 11, 2019)

Conversely, the number of rejected licenses, which was relatively low until 2012, increased in reaction to Argentina’s decision to reject the docking of British-flagged vessels bound for Falklands/Malvinas Islands throughout Mercosur. Those licenses include dual-use material, cataloged as both civilian and military.

Chart 4.4 presents the grants of OIEL licenses performed similarly: they steadily increased since 2004, decreased after 2008, and the number of rejected licenses increased significantly from 2012. It is essential to highlight that the SIEL and OIEL licenses did not increase significantly during the Macri’s government that took office in December 2015. It tried a *détente* with the UK by suspending the Argentine claims over the Islands. Despite that, it had equivalent levels of acceptance and rejection of licenses of Kirchner’s last years. The same can be said about the military-type export licenses, presented in Chart 4.5. It may be due to three concomitant factors: the economic opening that brought down productive activity in the country, the systematic reduction of the military budget, and the president’s statements on talks with the UK about the sovereignty of the islands, later emphatically denied by the latter.⁷⁵




Chart 4.4 U.K. Open Individual Export Licenses (OIEL) to Argentina (*Source* UK Government. “Open Individual Export Licences, August 14, 2012”. Last updated February 13, 2015. <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/open-individual-export-licences>. Accessed November 11, 2019)




Chart 4.5 U.K. Military Equipment Licenses to Argentina (*Source* UK Government. “Standard Individual Export Licences, September 12, 2012”. <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/standard-individual-export-licences>; UK Government. “Open Individual Export Licences, August 14, 2012”. Last updated February 13, 2015. <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/open-individual-export-licences>. Accessed November 11, 2019)

AN ASSESSMENT OF BRITISH-ARGENTINE RELATIONS DURING THE MACRI'S ADMINISTRATION

The Prime Minister of the UK, David Cameron, telephoned his counterpart Mauricio Macri, who won the 2015 presidential elections by a tight margin on the second round. In this conversation, Cameron congratulated the president-elect, and they agreed there was an opportunity to strengthen bilateral relations and develop the existing investments and trade. The Prime Minister gave his support to the economic market reforms to be carried out and the free trade negotiations between the European Union and Mercosur.⁷⁶

Prime Minister Cameron later met with Mauricio Macri. Both agreed that there was an opportunity to embark on a new chapter of the relation between the two countries. They spoke about economic reforms, trade and investment, and about the Malvinas/Falklands issue. They discussed how the European country could help Argentina in its plans for reforming the economy, particularly in terms of energy, transparency, and science. According to both representatives, the economic reform in Argentina could lead to significant business opportunities for British investors in infrastructure, oil and gas, mining, agribusiness.⁷⁷

Subsequently, in the heat of foreign policy successes that gave a different color to bilateral relations, the British government issued a press release in which it celebrated that "the United Kingdom received with resounding success the visit of the Argentine Navy in July 2016 through the ARA Libertad to the city of Liverpool. The visit was part of the resumption of relations with Argentina under the Macri administration. The last time this training ship visited the UK was in 2003."⁷⁸

The British Foreign Minister, declared a significant improvement in relations with Argentines since Macri's election: "a great step was taken after a decade of difficulties given the isolationist approach of the previous government."⁷⁹ He was alluding to Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. Nonetheless, no such official visit had taken place since 2009, when Fernández de Kirchner was in her first term in office, and that the dialogue was a significant step forward in establishing air connection with the Argentine territory. Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner also stressed the right of the islanders to remain British citizens.

Both parties made a joint statement covering several of the new Macri and Cameron administrations' bilateral agenda topics. I highlight point 3 of cooperation in Science and Technology for innovation and

manufacturing improvement and collaboration in scientific and Antarctic institutions: all sensitive and strategic issues for Argentine foreign policy and development, whose position in the face of power like the UK is weaker. Jointly, in item 8 on Security and Defense, it was agreed to confront the global challenges to world peace and stability, and the cooperation of the Armed Forces of both nations. The most important of the bilateral relationship—point 10—establishes collaboration and dialogue between both parties. “In this context, it was agreed that appropriate measures should be taken to remove the obstacles that limit the economic growth and sustainable development of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands, including trade, fishing, transport, and hydrocarbon exploitation.”⁸⁰

Although that reversed Kirchner’s policy and discourse of avoiding and blocking the colonial enclave in the Argentine territory and exploiting its resources, the British remained unchanged. It was made clear that dialogue on sovereignty was out of the table, since “nothing in the discussion or declaration affects the sovereignty of the islands and the United Kingdom remains clear in its support for the rights of the islanders.”⁸¹

A preliminary review of reports from 2016 to 2018 suggests an increase of British exports to Argentina in dual-use and military technologies during President Macri’s first administration year, which they fell to zero in a couple of years. Better treatment of further British data is necessary before a more conclusive assessment. Nevertheless, I believe that drop and Macri’s foreign policy shift at the end of his administration suggest there was still—although to a lesser degree—a British geopolitical restriction of technological transfer to Argentina.

FINAL REMARKS

This chapter presented evidence that the UK conducted a policy to limit technologically Argentine military capabilities without cutting all transfers. The available data show that limitation was not total but followed segmented and conditioned by the British governmental control since, at least, 1997.

After the war, Argentina conducted different bilateral relationship approaches with the UK and its technology transfer policies. The government of Alfonsín (1983–1989), heir to the military dictatorship policies that led to the war in the South Atlantic, saw its political action reduced, limited by domestic political and economic crises. Menem’s government (1989–1999) began governing in the post-Cold War transition

and adopted the widely advocated neoliberal policies of democratization and economic openness. However, British and Argentines' context of re-establishment diplomatic channels of communication set up another institutional and geopolitical scenario. The Falklands/Malvinas War never faded away as an issue and plagued their bilateral relations with corresponding limitations. The UK documents of 1997 onwards corroborate the British control over exports, both of complete military material and dual-use technologies, to Argentina.

The assessment of that documentation indicated some upward movements in the number of export licenses granted to Argentina in the mid-2000 when its economic recovery took place. The relations with the UK were still fluid. Conversely, from 2010 and onwards, the islands' bilateral disputes were triggered again, causing rejections from the British Parliament, recognized in official and public statements, and the fall of the export licenses to Argentina. The Macri government (2015–2019), whose foreign policy toward the UK and the Falklands/Malvinas issue was complacent in its search of being acknowledged as pro-market and Western-oriented, tended to yield to British power over Argentine national interests. However, it seems it had no significant impact on those bilateral relations and the Argentine (lack of) access to British technology.

Considering the data assessed in this chapter, I proceed with the following conclusions. First, there was a policy of technological restrictions toward Argentina, described in the UK governmental documents. That policy observes the British interests in the Falklands/Malvinas Islands, securing their population, military troops, and territory with any direct transfer of war material or dual-use technologies that could be used militarily against them. Second, unsurprisingly, the Argentine foreign policy mattered on the levels of those restrictions. An appeasement policy—like that of Menem—that favored an excellent relationship with the Americans and their European allies was much more likely of acquiring British technologies than a contending one—like that of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, which promoted a joint policy with the countries of the South American region to harden the supplying of the Falklands/Malvinas Islands—that resulted in much more demanding and taxing restrictions on exports licenses.

Why have I called it technological limitation geopolitics? Because it is a policy with territorial anchorage, with the construction of a geopolitical worldview based on strategic perceptions of Argentina, related to recent military history, but also because there has been a planned action

to prevent technological capabilities that could foster Argentina's power projection in the South Atlantic. That policy was institutionalized in the British government and had been making use of international regimes. Thus, the Parliament in London limits exports to the government in Buenos Aires and emphasizes Argentina's commitment to treaties that control mass destruction weapons and non-proliferation. In other words, the British policy is a double game that compels them to participate in the liberal game of international control, as it is global and local by accessing its national and international institutions. British geopolitics is in line with the core countries' policies, and on the other hand, it directly limits interests in the bilateral relationship. The data presented in this chapter indicate that the policy has been successful.

A recent and illustrative case took place in 2014 as a development of Argentina and Brazil's foreign policy changes and rapprochement through cooperation agreements on development and defense issues. One of them fostered the Argentinean Military Aircraft Factory to cooperate with the Brazilian Embraer to manufacture the medium transport plane KC-390.⁸² In turn, Argentina announced the intention to participate with Brazil in producing the Swedish fighter planes SAAB Gripen 39 that has components of British manufacture. For this reason, the UK stated that it was not conducive to such a technology transfer to Argentina and blocked it.⁸³ Therefore, Malvinas/Falklands is an essential issue in the history and politics of the UK. Despite not being a military threat, Argentina continues to be the object of a restriction policy on sensitive and dual-use technology transfer that has not changed since the war in 1982.

NOTES

1. The UK has published several documents with data on concrete numbers and descriptions of elements accepted or rejected for export to Argentina, which can be seen in the graphs listed below to illustrate the evolution and materialization of the geopolitics of technological limitation. Despite this, some documents conspicuously possess very little data or publish export data on one particular item. The revoked licenses will be placed in the same category as those rejected, both being considered rejections.
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The Silence After Defeat: The Apostadero Naval Malvinas Veterans in the Early Postwar

Andrea Belén Rodríguez

INTRODUCTION

The Malvinas War was the sole international conflict Argentina took part in the twentieth century.¹ British and Argentine troops clashed over the Malvinas, South Georgia, and the South Sandwich Islands from April 2 to June 14, 1982. Anchored in a national historical claim—which origins date back to 1833, when Great Britain took the islands by force in an illegal act—the war was started by the bloodiest military dictatorship in Argentine history in power since March 24, 1976. In a context of an intense crisis after six years of a government filled with kidnapping, torturing, and murdering of thousands of citizens; the military junta tried to kill two birds with one stone: to recover the islands and regain popular support.

The islands remained under the Argentine domain for seventy-four days, during which the regime enjoyed phenomenal popularity: several social and political sectors enthusiastically supported and greeted the soldiers. Although it did not imply automatic support for the military

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dictatorship or leaving other economic and political demands adrift, the overall positive public opinion and support suspended the dictatorship's intense delegitimization process.²

However, when Argentina's surrender was unquestionable, the massive irregularities and improvisations that happened during the conflict went public. From mid-June onward, the military junta had to pay the price of facing a contesting society. The return of the defeat's witnesses was perceived with apprehension by the regime because their testimonies about the terrible military planning and even the abuse of the conscripts by some superiors began to circulate. They were able to fuel the social indignation and become a decisive factor of the government's destabilization and the armed force's delegitimization. That was the context of the return of about 13,000 Argentine veterans who fought in the islands.³

The present chapter focuses on the early postwar period of only a small group of those soldiers who were part of the Apostadero Naval Malvinas. This was the Navy's first unit created during the war to organize the islands' port facilities and based on Malvinas' capital at some point. It had approximately 200–250 members among civilians and military, conscripts, and career military officers. Most of whom had some technical expertise, but they were logistical personnel, not frontline troops.

Its members were assigned to various tasks, but their primary function was to stow the cargo of ships arriving on the islands and to guard the docks. Approximately thirty of them fought on the battlefield on the Camber Peninsula. On June 14, 1982, the unit ceased to exist. From that moment, its former members became prisoners of the British troops until June 20, the day they returned to the continent.⁴

Specifically, this chapter deals with the return of the conscript soldiers who integrated that unity into their daily lives in the 1980s, emphasizing the silences of the (mis)matches with civilians who had remained on the continent.⁵ It also proposes a reflection on how the absence of coherent state reintegration policies left the former combatants alone in the face of war marks. That condition continued beyond the military regime (which lasted until 1983) and persisted during democratic transition under Raúl Alfonsín (1983–1989).

Unlike the traditional military history that perceives combatants as a uniform and homogeneous collective,⁶ this chapter focuses on the diversity of the early postwar experiences of Apostadero Naval Malvinas former conscripts in their subjectivities, emotions, projects, hopes, fears, and disappointments from a micro-perspective, keeping in sight

the political and social backgrounds. It is a matter of contributing to the sociocultural history of the Malvinas War and its postwar period, which is still an evolving branch of Argentine scholarship. Although there is a reasonable amount of testimonial or written bibliography from the political-diplomatic and military perspectives of that war, the veterans' war and, especially, postwar experiences are still scarcely investigated.⁷

Therefore, this chapter is based on oral testimonies of the Apostadero Naval Malvinas veterans, gathered through semi-structured interviews and other accounts published by them. Moreover, to contrast and complement the memoirs, I use periodical publication and official reports of the war and postwar periods. It has four sections. The first examines how those veterans received public indifference by several sectors of Argentine society (at least in the big cities). That unfolded disagreements between the veterans, civil society, and the government, which constrained the veteran's reintegration in the 1980s. The second section focuses on the (im)possibility of talking about their experiences in during the democratic transition. The third section addresses their daily life returns, emphasizing social networks, and the scarcity of implemented reintegration policies. The fourth and last section presents some conclusions and topics for further research.

THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RETURNING

After the surrender, the Apostadero Naval Malvinas soldiers returned from the islands with a bitter taste of defeat, with thousands of questions about the meaning of their sacrifice and the deaths of their comrades.⁸ Many were disappointed with the end of the war but also with the Argentine armed forces' performance. The conscript soldier Eduardo Iáñez remembers his arrival at Capital Federal by plane, the striking view of the illuminated city in contrast with the islands' desolated landscape, and the feeling of uselessness of the recent experience: "I remember when we were entering Buenos Aires that I said 'this is worth fighting for'."⁹

The questionings about the meaning of the experience and the war itself were frequent among the veterans and many social sectors, which, as soon as the war ended, organized broad mobilizations demanding from the military regime "the truth" about what had happened in the islands. Beyond the public inquiring, those who had spent two and a half months in the archipelago, giving their all, expected a sure reception and recognition from the armed forces and the government that had sent them to

fight but also from the society they had fought for and for whom their comrades had given their lives. Like all others, the Malvinas War veterans expected recognition for their participation, which would serve to reaffirm the meaning of what they had experienced.

However, the armed forces' reception was plagued with silences and concealments, sometimes even the same irregularities and improvisations that characterized their war performance. The soldiers who had recently come back posed a double threat to the military regime: They witnessed the defeat and the lousy military action on the islands. If their voices were to be heard, they could both fuel social indignation and deepen military smear. The three military services established a mandate of silence to all the war protagonists, prohibiting them from speaking about their experiences and hiding them and preventing contact with society.¹⁰

Neither the actions of the armed forces, nor the social receptions were what the combatants had expected. Although it is difficult to generalize, by the time the troops returned, almost a week after the surrender, large social sectors living in the big cities, far from the theater of operations, were more attentive to the comings and goings of the military regime, the tremendous crisis hanging over the dictatorship, and to the FIFA World Cup. The media coverage of combatants' return was a clear indication of this postwar climate. The newspaper *Clarín* covered their return only on June 21 and 27 at the bottom of its pages, while the election of the president, his chosen cabinet, and the local soccer championship dominated the news.

In fact, the picture is much more complicated. The truth is that several letters were published from several citizens asking for a tribute to the combatants and for the armed forces to be held accountable for the defeat. However, in the end, those demands were not embodied in concrete actions. One must bear in mind that the dictatorship still ruled, and its censorship policy and concealment of the combatants did not contribute to their encounter with society.

It is also true that the news of their return was leaked to the press. In some Patagonian cities that had lived through the conflict intensely, such as Puerto Madryn, the citizens broke down the military barriers to embrace the soldiers who had recently come back. Nothing similar happened in the big cities far from the South Atlantic Theater of Operations or from the main military bases.¹¹ In Buenos Aires, where many Apostadero Naval veterans resided, there were no significant tributes with broad public participation in the immediate postwar period, but rather

small acts of recognition by institutions that had an affective bond with them. When they arrived, the people waiting outside the military units were, in their great majority, relatives and close friends, not the public in general.

The different routes that they took in the capital or Gran Buenos Aires until they reached their homes were signs of how they would be received by the society that had applauded them on their way to the islands. Many of them returned to their homes by taxi. The conversations with the drivers were their first contact with the civilians who had remained on the continent and lived the war in a quite different and sometimes distant way. The former conscript Alexander Egudisman remembers this:

I took a cab, wearing camouflage [...]. When I got on the taxi, the driver looked at me and said, “where are you coming from?” and I answered, “I come from the Malvinas” “Ah!” “Please, could you take me home quickly? I live in Saavedra”. He said, “wow, cool?” the guy seemed to be asking me about a soccer game. When I got home, he charged me for the fare, and I had to ask my father for money. And then I say: Shit! I was the only one who went to war because the people in other neighborhoods kept playing soccer.¹²

The sensation that Buenos Aires society had experienced the war as one more piece of news spread by the media appears recurrently in the testimonies, and it was in these first contacts with those who “had not crossed the puddle” that it became obvious.

The Apostadero Naval Malvinas veterans experienced very mixed receptions, which, besides being subject to individual situations, often depended on the region to which they were returning. While in Buenos Aires and other large urban centers, the war was experienced as a distant commitment; the receptions were more effusive and public in other localities of the countryside that were headquarters of great military units for being border regions or close to the South Atlantic Theater of Operations, such as the Patagonian coastal cities. These locations were also marked by their history of connection with the armed forces, as Lorenz explains:

Both Patagonia and the Northeast (Chaco, Misiones, Corrientes) are regions of Argentina where the military institution has a much more robust and less questioned presence than in other parts of the country: these are national territories that were the last additions to the map, where for example it was not uncommon for many young people to go to school

during their compulsory military service and look at the military career as a work option. The garrisons' routine marked the life of the towns or cities where the regiments were based. There, the officers and non-commissioned officers established concrete family ties among them and their families.¹³

The public receptiveness depended not only on the province but also on the city's size and, fundamentally, on the social networks in which the soldiers who had recently come back and his family were immersed. In those villages, where sociability was marked by closeness and kinship, the returning combatant quickly became "the" character of the locality. It was also true for those who had lived in the same neighborhood for years in cities of Gran Buenos Aires or who were more extroverted. The return of the conscript Claudio Guida to the city of Vicente López is a clear example:

I arrive home, one and a half in the morning, the block cut, my friends, neighbors, and... because my mother called everyone "Claudio was coming back" [...]. Ovation, I get off on my feet, greetings [...]. The whole block receives me; I am a guy who gets along with a lot of people [...] everybody was inside my house [...]. Well, hugs, my mother crying, I was calm, I was fine. I sit on the bed, I say "my bed, my room, I thought I'd never see it again, motherfucker, after sleeping in so many places, after so long, I'm sitting on my bed again, how incredible."¹⁴

Some entities with bounds with the veterans organized small public ceremonies in their homage. For instance: The neighborhood club recognized Eduardo Iñez; while Claudio Guida, Fernando González Llanos, and Gabriel Asenjo were honored by their secondary schools; and Alejandro Egudisman by the Popular Socialist Party where he was a member.

However, in most of the cases, the absence of broad public tributes in the big cities fed the veterans' perception that they had been alone in the war. For those on the islands for more than two and a half months, the distance between the desired return and reality could not be more significant. If not anger and indignation, a sense of disillusionment permeated their postwar years, deepening civil society's distancing, which had already begun during the conflict.

The veterans' astonishment and anguish with the unchanged civil life is a common feature in any process of post-conflict reintegration.¹⁵ In the case of the Malvinas War, additional factors contributed to their perplexity

and indignation in face of society's alienation. First, the theater of operations was an insular territory far from the major urban areas. Second, the veterans recurrently expressed their discomfort with the abysmal contrast between the radio news about the combats—partly due to the censorship—and the reality in the islands, which reinforced the contrast between the pleasant life of those who had been at home and those under the enemy bombardments. Their collective identification as combatants was forged in the war, in part, in opposition with the civilians and the military who had remained on the continent. Soon, most of them shared a sense of estrangement to society. They were the “others.”¹⁶

In many cases, that estrangement—or impossibility of recognition—turned into anger and resentment toward the social groups that had not been sufficiently engaged in the war (when they had initially massively supported it) and did not recognize their sacrifice and their companions' deaths and embrace them when they were returning. From their perspective, the Argentine society seemed schizophrenic—if not hypocritical. It had radically mutated from an initial overexcitement during the Malvinas' “recovery,” in which it had placed the hopes of national regeneration, to casual indifference about the defeat. That is evident in Roberto Herrscher's testimony:

I got off the bus at Saavedra Bridge. I walked the fifteen blocks to my house, looking at people with infinite strangeness [...]. In all wars, those who return remember the astonishment at the fact that life in the cities remained the same while they were under shrapnel, and their friends died. I had stopped understanding my country when everyone went crazy on April 2, and now I didn't understand why everything was back to normal.¹⁷

Moreover, the veterans also had changed because of the experience of war. They were unable to understand much less explain these sensations or what was happening to them in the first moments after their return, as they began to see themselves differently from “others.” The discord, then, was also within themselves and their pre-war identity. The difficulty of linking the experience of war—the “there”—and peace—the “here”—and finding some continuity between both times/spaces—were clear signs that would be hard for many of them to leave the past behind. This feeling of not being “either there or here” is the factor that marks them as “others,” and distances them from the civilians and military

who remained on the continent, sometimes alien to the conflict or with unbridled bellicosity.

The veterans were suddenly confronted with the fears, distresses, and anxieties that they had tried to deny or hide during the conflict. The marks of the war, the emotions contained, and the impossibility of assigning meaning to their experience came into full force in these first moments after returning. For this reason, some of them needed some time to try to find themselves before anything else, although this reunion was impossible:

I didn't want to; I couldn't get on the bus to the door of my house and ring the doorbell. Is that it? Is the war over? I came back, and life goes on?

I wanted to come back, but I needed to walk, to breathe. I felt in a way that I couldn't explain that I wasn't prepared to endure the hugs [...]. I got off the bus at Puente Saavedra. I walked the fifteen blocks to the house, looking at people with infinite strangeness.¹⁸

On the night of their return, the Apostadero Naval veterans were reunited with their loved ones and the wars they had lived through, full of despair, anxiety, and uncertainty. The soldier Alejandro Diego remembers that reunion:

I enter my house through the back door, through the stairs, I ring the doorbell, and my mom sees me through the peephole, opens the door, and instead of hugging me, she goes backward and stays that way, and she couldn't believe it, [I was] dressed in war, strong. [...] And I go through the kitchen, and, in a moment, there is a long corridor, and you see the living room. My father was sitting, looking at the newspaper, reading the newspaper, hunched over the paper, and carrying the sorrow that his son will not return to him. I saw him like that. I could see what they suffered. I walk towards him, I say "Daddy," and he looks at me, and [...] he goes back, hugs me, and "you came back" what do I know. And then we hugged, and I was alive¹⁹

This estrangement toward those returning from the war was experienced by many loved ones, or the returned soldiers felt that way. The veterans felt that their relatives treated them as "others," with qualms or cares that showed that they also noticed the mark of war in their lives. Some situations lived by the Apostadero Naval veterans made it so

that their loved ones could not recognize them in their eyes, in their appearance, in their war history, nor in their attitudes, marked, now, by the extreme experience. Many of them remember situations in which they were disturbed by a loud noise that referred them to war or ate desperately. Others also evoke the glances given by those who were with them in the face of these strange behaviors. For example, Antonio Gulla remembers a situation he went through with his cousin the day after returning:

The next day after I arrived, well, I didn't sleep; obviously, I didn't even know where the fuck I was, I was here, but I didn't know where I was. I'm going with my cousin to my mother's house, we're going to take the train in Retiro, we're taking a bus, and we were walking through the square [...], and a plane passes by. My cousin looked at me and didn't understand a thing. What did I do? We came together like this, I grab him and throw him, throw myself, and throw him [to the ground], I cover him. [...] My cousin says, "This one is crazy" "Of course because you didn't go through all...". Then I said, "Forgive me," "No, it's fine, cousin."²⁰

Faced with these strange behaviors and unprecedented situations, the loved ones of several veterans chose to treat them with complete care to help them elaborate such a painful experience and "forget" the war. The truth is that as soon as they returned, their relatives did not know well what to do to help them in the elaboration of their experience: Was it better to speak or not? What to ask about the war? How to do it? Fearing to deepen the traumatic experience wounds, many opted directly not to ask them about the war or hide all kinds of elements that could refer them to their wartime past.

Finally, if the veterans had returned from the war different and felt that way, the first contact with their loved ones only confirmed their feeling of being "others." The encounter with their relatives and, in general, with civil society, was, in fact, a discord not only with those "others" but also with themselves. The return proved impossible because they had no place in a society that had mutated into "other," but, fundamentally, because they were no longer the same: They lived between war and peace.

THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE WORD

The estrangement from society, the disagreement with the “other” civilians, which the veterans noticed during the first days after return, deepened throughout the postwar period. Some consider that it even continues to this day.

The conscripts who had fought on the islands felt no place for them in the post-dictatorship society. They felt that they could not find a space to talk about their experiences or resume their lives after the war experience. Why did this “social short-circuit” occur? What were those situations that fueled the veterans’ sense of being in excess? Why did many of them keep silent about their experiences for decades?

This distancing was based, in principle, on the diversity of meanings that civil society and veterans assigned to the war; meanings that ended up being antagonistic and conditioned their social bounds.

During the democratic transition, the intersections between state terrorism and the Malvinas War in the press were the day’s order. The magnitude of the armed forces’ massacre in the 1970s and the claims for the “truth” of the war have gradually overshadowed the combatants’ voices. The testimonies of the families of the disappeared and the survivors of the clandestine detention centers denounced the horror they had lived. The war was less uncomfortable and embarrassing for many sectors of society because it questioned the responsibility of each person in the face of the support granted to the conflict. Unlike the illegal repression, society could not claim ignorance about the war: It had been a public act, and popular support had been massive.

To understand how many sectors of society resolved this discomfort—or tried to do so—it is necessary to bear in mind the meaning given to state terrorism in the democratic transition since both memories were configured at the same time and were closely related. The “problem of the disappeared” had arisen together with the regime’s political debacle and the economic crisis. The immediate postwar period created a deep feeling of indignation and repudiation, which produced a true re-signification of what had happened in the 1970s, different from—and in part opposed to—the military narrative of the “anti-subversive war.” As Novaro and Palermo state:

The judgment of moral disapproval of illegal repression was based on a discourse that, although it had a pre-war history, was, to a great extent, a

novelty of the transition and operated through the replacement or twisting of the parametric definitions with which the question had been handled until then. What had been called “internal war” was now “repression” or “state terrorism,” and those who had been “subversive” were now “militants,” “idealistic youth,” “victims,” and more precisely, “innocent victims”.²¹

The images of illegal repression eventually led to a discourse known as the “theory of the two demons,” which hegemonized the public debate during the democratic transition (and much later).²² This “theory” constructed the narrative of an innocent and passive society that had been threatened by two forms of terrorism: one from the right and one from the left. It was functional for a nascent democracy that attempted to establish the legitimacy of the rule of law based on an abrupt cut with the past. It challenged the use of violence and “equated the incomparable crimes committed by irregular groups with the criminal system set up by the State, which had perverted the very principle of legality.”²³

While blaming both the armed forces and paramilitary organizations for the appeal to violence and the breakdown of democratic norms, human rights organizations and survivors of clandestine detention centers continued hiding the past of political and armed militancy to legitimize their demands. The “theory of the two demons” eliminated all possibility of talking about political affiliation without being questioned and judged. On the one hand, it built an image of the detained and disappeared citizens as innocent victims—they had only been young idealists who fought for social change—at the cost of suppressing their political identity, which was widely disseminated. On the other hand, it also absolved the social sectors for their past commitment to the Malvinas War and exempted the conscripts for any blame, which allowed this page to be turned quickly.²⁴

The Argentine civil society constructed a memory that was an “absurd war” waged by a “drunken” general to recover the military regime’s legitimacy. Thus, it condensed the responsibility for defeat in the militaries, which had organized an “adventure” based on a national cause with strong roots in Argentine society only to perpetuate itself in power. To that end, the military junta would have deceived civil society of the reality of what was happening. To make matters worse, in this useless and meaningless enterprise, the militaries and society had played with the lives of thousands of young soldiers who had suffered deplorable conditions and mistreatment from superiors.

In a context in which everything related to violence and the military was covered with a sign of reprobation, several social groups saw the soldiers as innocent victims of the dictatorship (likewise the young people who had been repressed in the 1970s). They stripped them of any agency over their experiences, to prevent that such discredit also fell on the conscripts who had gone to war without option. The complete spread image of “war boys” highlighted that soldiers were underage, perceived as passive actors without war preparation. They had only suffered inhumane conditions and abuses of authority by their superiors. The same military had tortured and killed thousands of other citizens in the 1970s.²⁵

In the democratic transition, the war was explained more in terms of domestic than international politics. It would have been an asymmetrical struggle—or, instead, a massacre—between military executioners and civilian victims (conscripts, and by extension civil society). This narrative, which quickly took over the public debate, explained the war “as yet another example of the arbitrariness of the military, nullifying collective responsibilities concerning the agreement and popular satisfaction with the recovery.”²⁶ It ultimately relegated the conflict, which became as distant as incomprehensible to its protagonists.

From the moment the emotional impact of the defeat was dissolved, the Malvinas War remained in an aura of silence, broken intermittently by commemorative acts, by the emergence of cultural resources that nourished that memory, and by the news of veterans who committed suicide. Thus, the place of the conflict and its protagonists in the media was increasingly reduced. At least in large urban centers, the Malvinas were remembered only when the events indicated it.

The military and the new democratic regimes chose to alternate between the war’s silence and its memory when public courtesy to remembrance events dictated it.²⁷ For both of them, the war took second place to the very complicated processes of repressors’ trials for the crimes committed in the 1970s. Therefore, the recognition and reintegration policies destined to veterans would take long to arrive.

How did that postwar social context influence—conditioned or made possible—veterans’ willingness to narrate war experiences? Was the image of a useless war, of conscripts as innocent victims and the military officers as perpetrators, condoned by their own representation? Beyond the situations faced in each of their homes, what other factors can explain the silence that many Apostadero Naval veterans chose to keep for years?

The truth is that the war's public memory had little to do with the meanings that conscripts and officers had assigned to it. For them, the war had been much more than Galtieri's "adventure." Although they differed in many ways, the war had been a struggle for sovereignty, and as such, a just war. Therefore, their sacrifices and comrades' deaths had not been useless: They were legitimized by the defense of sovereignty, regardless of the conflict's outcome.

However, as soon as they returned, the veterans realized that they would have no place in the Argentine society to vindicate the conflict. If they wanted to talk about their war experiences, they should do so within limits set by social images rooted in commonsense. Especially when they began to talk about their experiences, the memory of the conflict as a "military adventure" had already been constructed, and the script of what could be spoken about and the unspeakable was already partially drawn. In short, their testimonies were in excess. As this war narrative went against the meanings that the veterans themselves assigned to the conflict and their participation in it, the soldiers—and the civilians—who were part of the Apostadero Naval fell into silence.

The young veterans did not find social frameworks to integrate their memories marked by their war experiences. Simultaneously, the public debate was only enabled for those stories that denounced their superiors' abuses, which fed the image that victimized them. Therefore, in the absence of a real willingness to listen, many soldiers chose to remain silent, as Julio Casas Parera states:

I was cautious when I talked, wasn't I? I didn't talk to anyone, because I wasn't interested, and maybe a little also because I saw that other people weren't, let's say, receptive to the subject, and those who were receptive came up with the hard question "did you kill someone?", that's not important. [...] I don't know if I killed or not, but I think. [...] To ask that is disrespectful. We're not watching a war movie; you're talking to a person, a human being, I think it deserves respect and consideration [...]. That's far from [...] opening up [makes you] close yourself more, [and then you become] mute.²⁸

The members of the Apostadero Naval Malvinas were silent in the face of the questions of the "others" who were anchored in images of the war that they did not share, and with whom they did not feel identified. Rosana Guber clearly explains:

The three questions that civilians asked the “boys” and that the “boys” listened to until they had had enough were “did you kill?”, “were you hungry?” “were you cold?” they showed more the attitude of an adult towards a child than the concern for an experience that had hardened and moved those boys, but that indeed had not turned them into boys nor, much less, would it allow them to return to that condition.²⁹

The discord between former soldiers’ social image as “war boys” and the self-representation of the war experience is very evident in Claudio Guida’s story:

After a week of receiving visitors at home had passed, I couldn’t leave home. Everyone came to ask me, “how many did you kill?” bullshit. [...] “Yes, the war was hard,” “Did you starve?” “And, yes, I didn’t go on vacation,” “And cold?” “And yes, in the South, it’s cold”. In other words, I didn’t answer bullshit, “did you kill many?” “yes, I may have killed or not, I don’t know” “and did you see your comrades die?” “no, none of mine, no, I know that the people nearby took it hard.”³⁰

The communication between many sectors of society and those who had lived through the war was impossible because what the veterans wanted or could tell was not what their interlocutors wanted or could hear, and vice versa. Society’s questions from its preconceptions and images of war were considered disrespectful or, plainly, flagrant. The sensation of incomprehension of one’s own experience on the “others” deepened the silence of veterans.

They also remained silent in the face of the impossibility of fulfilling the expectations of the “others” about the war, or with their perception of them. It is usual for veterans to feel their story does not live up to what their interlocutors’ expectations because the war experiences are different from the social imaginary of the glory and honor of combat.³¹ This situation became critical among Malvinas War veterans who had completed logistical missions far from the battlefield. The distance between the questions and the answers soon became an abyss, which only brought silence. Fernando González Llanos, a volunteer that collaborated with a local Combat Information Center, recalled a case that was paradigmatic of this kind of situation:

Fernando: When I went with the boys now, and the youngest says to me, “But where were you?” I showed it to him. “And Horatio, what did he do?” you saw, my brother [captain of the schooner Penelope], “and

he wasn't, he was there" "then he was in much more danger than you" "yes - I tell you - much more, he was attacked from all sides." "And you, then, what did you do?" he says to me [laughs], "and look, I did what I could, what had to be done I did." [...] But that happens to me often when people ask you, "did you kill someone?", typical, right? I say, "no." So, people kind of wait, asking, "So what did you do?"

Interviewer: They expect you to tell them something heroic.

Fernando: Yes, of course, wait [...] "Yes, tell me something exciting." And no, not really. But I'm always happy because let's just say I did what had to be done, that's all.³²

The contrast between the experiences of Apostadero Naval veterans and the expectations of those who asked is also linked to specific elements that formed the hegemonic memory of the Malvinas War. That collective image had built on the news of the war and, above all, of the testimonies that reached public visibility in the postwar period. In this sense, the stories of veterans did not find a place in the public space due to two questions, which are nothing more than two sides of the same coin.

On the one hand, their experiences did not fit with the allegations of the soldiers in the media about the deplorable conditions in which they had fought and the terrible improvisations they had to face, nor with the accounts of their own experiences of trench war. Faced with the difficulty of making people understand what "their" war consisted of or its undervaluation by "others"; many chose to share only with those who had lived the same experiences, the only ones who could fully understand them.

On the other hand, their testimonies shed light on the tremendous logistical difficulties they had suffered, and denounced the privileges enjoyed by those who had been in islands' capital—Puerto Argentino/St Stanley—almost as an obscenity. Let us bear in mind the following accounts by Army soldiers published by *La Semana*, a widely distributed magazine, in July 1982: "The fault was down there, where everything was leftover, and it was not distributed. [...] To go back to the village and see the difference was to go crazy." In this context, already in these first months of the postwar period, it became clear which would be those voices authorized to speak about the war: those of soldiers who had been in the trenches, fighting, and facing the maximum difficulties. The rest would always have a secondary place. Early on, the war survivors built themselves a hierarchy of experiences based on pain and suffering:

those who had suffered the most had the most right to talk about the conflict. This situation is another factor that explains the dense silence in which the Apostadero Naval veterans plunged. It seemed that they had not lived the “real” war or, even worse, that they were guilty of the logistic shortage and of the suffering of their compatriots who had remained in the trenches.³³

Some of them did not return with the sensation of having been part of something historical or having lived a limited experience but rather naturalized it as a role that they had to fulfill because they were in the obligatory military service. Now, they wanted to return to the everyday life. Simply put, many soldiers did not speak because they had not understood the dimension of their own experience. They did not know what to tell; nothing seemed too extraordinary. After saying that his family always questioned him because they met many times to listen to him and contain him in the immediate postwar period and he “didn’t care at all for the whole thing,” veteran Julio Casas Parera explains this disagreement with his loved ones: “From the first day, I started to talk, but I talked about specific things, and very much like we did things naturally, what do I know, so I told you that we had gone to undermine and told you so, as you tell me this and the other, not [...] or did not add that quota [...]”³⁴

Likewise, others silenced their experiences because they felt that they were perceived as “phenomena,” making it difficult for them to return quickly to their everyday pre-war life. The conjunction between not dimensioning one’s own experience and the fascination it generated in some people because it was a strange and disruptive experience was an explosive “combo” that resulted not only in silence but also in the isolation of many veterans. The former conscript Gabriel Asenjo remembers: “A couple of morons decided to ask if I had seen dead people and all those things, so I felt [I was some] kind of phenomenon and it bothered me. So, when someone came over, I didn’t want to see them.”³⁵

The veterans’ interplay with society prompted many of them to remain silent about their experiences and to take refuge by isolating in themselves from society. However, there were cases in which, far from hiding and remaining silent, they met and formed groups in the public debate and claimed for recognition and reparation for their participation in the war. In the end, the space conquered was quite limited.³⁶ The disagreement between the conflict’s hegemonic meanings and those constructed by the veterans had symbolic but also very practical consequences that conditioned their return.

THE EVERYDAY LIFE AFTER DEFEAT

How were the returns of the soldiers of the Apostadero Naval to their everyday lives in the 1980s? What situations did feed their feeling of discomfort or displaced? What difficulties did they have to face in their returns to militancy, friendship groups, the club, the school, the university, and work?

The returns of veterans were crossed by multiple conditionings and unpublished experiences, which deepened their distance from society and fed the feeling of loneliness. Firstly, the veterans had to return to everyday situations with the scars of having undergone a traumatic experience of coexistence with death. Secondly, there were specific postwar circumstances, such as how society, different governments, and veterans could deal (or not) with defeat. On the one hand, the public images were constructed about the conflict and the combatants. On the other hand, the practical absence of the State conditioned their “social reintegration.”³⁷ The Argentine veterans were left alone in different aspects and ways in the face of the marks of war at the end of the 1980s and later.

Concerning the difficulties and unprecedented emotions that every veteran experiences when returning from the war, the sensation of being in an indefinite space and time is one of the most recurrent. Many protagonists experience war as a “discontinuity.”³⁸ In their life and identity, as being out of time/space, because of the impossibility of articulating that borderline experience with their past, now, when they return, the same thing happens: For a time, the veterans did not manage to find themselves again in times of peace.

Most of the Apostadero Naval veterans remember the feeling of not being “here” or “there”—neither on the mainland nor on the islands, neither in peace nor in war—that we saw right after their return. These feelings were experienced more profoundly during the first months of the postwar period—and sometimes, it continued, although to a lesser degree, even today. The former conscript Fernando González Llanos remembers that feeling: “All those first weeks were extraordinary, I felt very strange [...]. The same sensation as I had over there is to say: What am I doing here? What is this? I remember that I looked at everything when I was traveling by bus.”³⁹

Likewise, the changes in the perception of life and death—that every war experience brings with it—condition the combatants’ returns at the beginning and explain the difficulty of articulating times of peace with

the past of war. While they conceived that in war, “they reached the peak of their existence and experienced life at its maximum intensity, and by doing so, they had fully realized themselves.”⁴⁰ They saw as impossible and sometimes unreal the return to everyday life’s futility. They simply did not find meaning or relevance to the life of peace. For this reason, in the beginning, many veterans chose to live on the edge, going out and traveling compulsively.

Many alternated the need to leave and travel with isolation. The reclusion in their homes and the distance from the social circles they frequented before the conflict was a common situation in the postwar of many veterans. In some cases, the aftereffects of war resulting from post-traumatic stress disorder may explain it.

In the beginning, the impossibility of fighting or controlling some symptoms such as nightmares contained violence and the fear of loud noises from sirens, explosions, or airplanes, which resulted in unconscious and impulsive reactions, such as throwing oneself to the ground or taking refuge in some corner, led some former combatants to lock themselves in their homes ashamed that this would happen to them again in public. Likewise, guilt, the feeling of debt to those who had perished, that one’s own life continued because others were reaped was another factor that deepened social distancing. The case of José Bustamante, whose war was marked by great contact with the troops on the battlefield, is noticeably clear in this regard:

The postwar period was quite difficult for me to go through, that is, because [after the war] you go back to your life and you think why I could [come back to my life while] others couldn’t? Understand me? That is, for me, it was a very, very difficult subject to overcome for years. That’s why I was always half isolated from everything, and then I isolated myself, even more, I stayed more alone in life still because I didn’t want to spend the Christmas and New Year [...]. You say, “why do I have to be celebrating Christmas or this and that, and other companions ... or at least ... or establish a family?”⁴¹

This inability to understand and recognize the society to which they belonged deepened the sense of alienation of the veterans and their isolation from society, which was embodied concretely in alienating their groups of belonging. The former conscript Gabriel Asenjo highlights his friendships before and after the war:

I have friends before the war and friends after the war. All my friends from before the war, I distanced myself from everyone, [...] because when I came back from the war, I saw how they had continued their everyday life, they cared about their personal matters, the dances, what do I know. It's like they had given a shit about everything that had happened. So, although I didn't like being treated like a freak for having gone to war, the people you like, the people close to you, to see them [enjoying] this bullshit, and that they don't give a damn what you... not you, because, in reality, I was fine, but I remember S.'s face, I remember S. who did primary school with me and sat in front of me, and died there.⁴²

Claudio Guida also felt out of place when he returned to the militant group he participated in before compulsory military service. His comrades from the Communist Youth Federation of Vicente López were very hard on the subject, everything that had to do with the military was punished, and I said "stop, it wasn't all that way," [and they responded] "you've changed, they ate your head."⁴³

After the war, Claudio and his fellow militants disagreed about their perceptions of Argentine reality or the urgencies that had to be faced in the early democratic transition. In tune with what was happening publicly, the Communist Youth Federation's priority was to fight against the dictatorship and denounce the human rights violations committed by the armed forces. In this struggle, they denounced everything that was military. Claudio could not help but feel uncomfortable in that environment: In his experience, there were superiors of the Apostadero who had had a good performance or, at least, who had worried about their subordinates. Finally, although he continued to be a militant for a while, that militancy no longer had the same meaning. The different perceptions of war and dictatorship marked his definitive disassociation:

It was like I started to separate, I couldn't fit in, I hated what had happened here, on the other hand, I was susceptible because of the war, with my comrades, with Malvinas, with the kids, with those of us who returned and began to commit suicide or didn't leave Campo de Mayo [...]. Well, that's when I started to take off, that is because they didn't think like I did [...] I went on for a while, but now... I went to parties, I went to meetings, but I didn't discuss politics much. [...]. Then I went to the meetings, I shared the songs "With Fidel we say to you..." it was nice, I'd go to pick up chicks.⁴⁴

Some social images associated with the veterans circulated widely in the postwar period largely conditioned their search for work. What is certain is that for a large part of society, the veterans were “war madmen,” unbalanced and violent people, with severe psychological problems that did not respect authority, norms, or order. This stigmatization was a severe problem that the Apostadero Naval veterans also had to face, which conditioned several aspects of their lives.

The rumors of those not hired due to mental conditions spread quickly. Press reports of veterans’ discrimination and unemployment were daily.⁴⁵ Since commonsense dictated their employing was equivalent a problem, many appealed to the strategy of hiding that condition when looking for work. Many testimonies highlight it. For instance, former conscript Ricardo Pérez voiced:

As a rule, every time I changed jobs, they found out that I was a war veteran afterward, never before, because you never know how you’re going to be judged [...]. So, first they know me by the stigma of the “war freak,” of the scratched ones. Let’s agree that many of our people didn’t help to improve the image, but they were people who were in a bad situation, didn’t have any kind of support, and were hungry; what else did they have? And, careful, because they also maintained the image of “we are here, we are.” On the other hand, I didn’t reveal myself, and I even hid in away.⁴⁶

As those prejudices quickly spread, many veterans chose to hide likewise Ricardo in all spheres of socialization for a long time as a conditioned behavior to “others” gaze. Alejandro Egudisman reflects humorously on this stigmatization in relationships:

In many cases, you are branded as crazy; I repeat: you do the same as anyone else, but you are a veteran, and you have the burden of the veteran [...]. I can say to my partner, “I feel suffocated, I feel drowned,” and you say a typical phrase that happens to everyone, and since I am a veteran [they tell me]: “you are no longer in the war.” That’s not the reason why!⁴⁷

The hegemonic images of the conflict also conditioned its protagonists because the veterans were left to their own luck and without of almost any reintegration policy during much of the 1980s. As we saw, in the face of the discomfort generated by the Malvinas War and with other

tasks that they regarded to be more urgent, neither the military nor the democratic government implemented comprehensive and coherent policies aimed at veterans until 1988. They only implemented isolated and disjointed measures, which were insufficient in the tremendous demand they faced.

In principle, before approaching those policies, it is necessary to bear in mind a particular legal difficulty that young veterans raised to the public officers, which gave rise to difficult resolution situations:

I'm going back to school, the first report card. They give me the report card; I look at the report card, I give it back to the preceptor, "wait, you have to take it to your father" I say, "listen to me, go tell the principal - if you want me to go with you I will - that three months ago, two months ago, I was looking for people to blow their head off. If he finds it inconvenient that I am responsible for my signature, I'll accompany him to talk to the minister if necessary; I'll explain why I think I can sign myself now". But legally, I couldn't.⁴⁸

That was another of the great paradoxes that the Argentine veterans had to face when they returned. In contrast to the image of "war boys," the 19 and 20 year olds affirmed that having gone through war had helped them mature and approach adulthood; actually, that was not contemplated in the legal terms. In Argentine law, young people under 21 years of age were minors, incapable before the law.⁴⁹ They needed an adult custodian to answer for them for many procedures, such as, for example, medical treatment decisions, to manage compensation, or to sign official documents.

Certain situations were resolved through isolated measures aimed mainly at veterans (excluding those that remained enrolled to military), attending the entire population of veterans who were affected by a specific problem. For instance, the resolution of the military regime that all public agencies and state enterprises should favor the hiring of veterans, or the exemption of their absence in schools.⁵⁰ However, in others, it is evident that, although sometimes they followed an official orientation, the measures were taken as initiative by the different public entities or by each of the forces, which reveals the tremendous disorganization that characterized the policy followed by the military regime.

Some educational institutions granted the veterans special conditions to finish their secondary studies or reintegrate into the university as soon

as they returned. For example, Eduardo Iáñez was able to finish his secondary studies thanks to the intensive courses for veterans given by the technical schools. Carlos Olsece was able to enter the School of Medicine thanks to an exception granted by the same university, following a letter published by his father in the newspaper *Clarín*.

Other former conscripts were able to enter the labor market due to the military dictatorship's law that favored veterans' hire by public administrations or state enterprises. Thus, Claudio Guida and Eduardo Iáñez joined SEGBA (*Servicios Eléctricos del Gran Buenos Aires*), Osvaldo Corletto joined Banco Nación, and José Bustamante joined a railway company. However, the fact that the law existed did not imply that it was followed in practice, since, in some cases, its compliance depended on the arbitrariness of whoever was in charge of the company or the subsidiary, and on the national economic context.⁵¹ For José Bustamante, a former conscript of humble origins who lived in Bahía Blanca, joining a state-owned railway company was not easy. After the manager in Bahía Blanca denied him admission "because there were no vacancies" (even though José reminded him of the law that favored veterans), he traveled to Buenos Aires to meet with the chief of staff and, through him, achieved the desired position. Like everything else in his life, that was also the product of his struggle.⁵²

Since 1988, the veterans had the possibility of taking refuge in the Law 23.109 of "Social Benefits" destined to the veterans that the democratic government advocated. It established benefits of health, housing, work, and education, carried out to veterans. It allowed some of them to conclude their studies at a higher level or entered the labor market. However, the delay in its implementation—published in 1984 and regulated only four years later—only confirmed a widespread perception among veterans that the society they had fought for had turned its back on them after the defeat.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Wars are extreme experiences that scar the lives, identities, and memories of combatants. Living in a liminal condition, in which the regular borders that exist in times of peace are blurred (borders between life and death, man and animal, man and machine). The daily decisions regarding killing or dying explain war as a "discontinuity" by the combatants, as an extraordinary and limited experience.⁵³ When the conflict ends, the

veterans face difficulties returning to their old ways of living and reestablishing bridges between peace and war times. As Hynes puts it, the returns ultimately become impossible: "War annihilates the past selves of young men, changes them so utterly from youths into soldiers, that return to a past life is impossible; then, in the end, it dumps them into the strange new disorder that is peace, to construct new lives."⁵⁴

The case of the Malvinas War was not an exception. Those who had fought in the islands went through the postwar period with scars that were difficult to elaborate on, seeing themselves as "others" right after the conflict. For approximately 500 former combatants, the wartime experience and the immediate aftermath of the conflict was so extreme and impossible to overcome that they ended up taking their own lives.⁵⁵

Generalizations about the wartime experience explain too little about veterans' alienation to those who stayed in the continent. Undoubtedly, the Apostadero Naval Malvinas veterans realized that coming back from war would be extremely difficult, not only due to their war's scars but also because of their discord with those who had not taken part in the war. Each party assigned different meanings to the war. Veterans wanted acknowledgment for "their" war and the sacrifice of those who had perished. The civilians who stayed in the continent were first overexcited about the possibility of victory, but later viewed the war as meaningless, just a "military adventure," ready to be forgotten. In turn, the military tried to hide the defeat under a veil of silence. The clash between these three perspectives explains why those veterans did not find a place to return. They could not return from war because they realized that society had changed after the defeat, and so had they.

The feeling of alienation and discomfort experienced by them was framed in the last years of the military dictatorship but also in the first democratic government (and even for some, it continues, although tempered, today). The Malvinas War issue was uncomfortable and, at the same time, not a priority for both regimes. The Argentine armed forces had to face the responsibilities for the defeat, but, urgently, were trying to escape as much as possible from the review and trial for the other conflict in which they had intervened: "the anti-subversive struggle," which was a victory from their perspective. Consequently, they tried to impose a mandate of silence on the veterans to avoid increasing the military discredit. Conversely, the Malvinas War appealed for the democratic government due to its consensus over a conflict carried out by a regime

that had committed grave human rights violations, crimes whose investigation and prosecution were at the center of the government agenda and the public debate.

In the face of the government intention of quickly turning the page on the Malvinas War and the absence of reintegration policies, the veterans took different paths, ranging from extreme isolation, and even suicide, to creating associations to fight for their rights. The Apostadero Naval Malvinas veterans met again as early as 1983 and created a camaraderie meeting that continues to this day. The many battles they fought together in the islands and the continent explain the permanence of those emotional ties, forged in that experience that marked their lives for more than 35 years, at the same time fairway and so close.

Finally, it is relevant to highlight the importance of the war and postwar Malvinas' sociocultural historiography, a perspective of incipient development in Argentina.

Most of Argentine scholarship on Malvinas Was has been made from a political-diplomatic perspective that addresses on the war only as a political instrument, or from a traditional military approach, which only focuses on the operations, tactics, and chronologies of the conflict. In both cases, the experiences, identities, and memories of the combatants in the war and the postwar period have been being under considered.⁵⁶ The study of that war as a sociocultural event with its entity linked to the military, economic and political dimensions just began after twenty years of its end with the founding works of Rosana Guber and Federico Lorenz. However, although the field is in continuous and slow growth, even today, we find disjointed and fragmentary analyzes that are far from addressing it in a complex but, at the same time, synthetic way. Even nowadays, there is still a need for a comprehensive social history that addresses the Malvinas War and postwar from a multiplicity of spatial and temporal scales, which focuses not only on the combatants but also on the civilians and military who remained in the continent and gave meaning to the conflict based on its history, dynamics, and local political cultures.⁵⁷

NOTES

1. I only apply the term "Malvinas" to the islands and the war of respect for the interviewers that trusted this study their memories and feelings.
2. R. Guber, *¿Por qué Malvinas? De la causa Nacional a la Guerra absurda* (F.C.E., Buenos Aires, 2001), 25–63; F. Lorenz, *Las Guerras por Malvinas* (Edhasa, Buenos Aires, 2006), 41–67.

3. About the initial plans for the landing on the islands, the development of the war, and the improvisations of the Argentine Armed Forces, see Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlántico Sur, *Informe Rattenbach* (Buenos Aires, 1983); R. Moro, *La Guerra Inaudita. Historia del conflicto del Atlántico Sur* (Pleamar, Buenos Aires, 1985); F. Lorenz, *Malvinas. Una Guerra Argentina* (Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, 2009).
4. About the war and postwar period of the member of the Apostadero Naval Malvinas, see A. B. Rodríguez, *Entre la Guerra y la Paz: la Posguerra de los Ex-Combatientes del Apostadero Naval Malvinas. Experiencias, identidades, memorias* (Doctoral thesis, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, La Plata, 2014).
5. This chapter only discussed the return of the soldier to civilian spaces. For the return of conscripts, officers, and noncommissioned officers to the military, see Rodríguez, *Entre la Guerra y la Paz*.
6. S. Hynes, "Personal narratives and commemoration," in J. Winter and E. Sivan, *War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century* (University of Cambridge, Cambridge, 1999), 220.
7. About war and the Malvinas' postwar historiography, see F. Lorenz, y A. B. Rodríguez, "La Guerra de Malvinas: experiencias, historia y memoGuerra *Páginas*, Vol. 7, No. 13 (2015), 3–10. The historiographical approach of my investigation has referenced the cultural wars studies on the First World War, see A. B. Rodríguez, "Por una Historia Socio-cultural de la Guerra y Posguerra Malvinas: Nuevas preguntas para un objeto de Estudio clásico", *PolHis*, Año 10, Núm. 20 (December, 2017), 161–195.
8. In their great majority, the conscripts came from units near Capital Federal, where they lived with their families. They were youths from the class of 1962, who were in high school or had graduated from it; some were at university. Only one of the conscripts was from the class of 1963. Many of those in compulsory military service had managed to get permits to destinations closer to where they had come from, or taken tasks that did not require much effort, or even that they liked, thanks to the networking with family members or friends in the military force. The great majority was also drafted to the islands, but there were six cases of conscripts who volunteered.
9. Interview with Eduardo Iáñez, Olivos (Province of Buenos Aires), April 10, 2010.
10. About military receptions, see Rodríguez, *Entre la Guerra y la Paz*, 93–104.
11. The TOAS, in effect from April 7 to June 14, 1982, included the Continental Platform, and the Malvinas, South Georgia, and the South Sandwich Islands, and their respective airspace and marine and submarine

- space. Thereby, the Patagonian cities on the Atlantic coast are the ones that experienced the war effort more profoundly.
12. Interview with Alejandro Egudisman, Buenos Aires, August 11, 2010.
 13. Lorenz, *Malvinas. Una Guerra Argentina*, 63–64.
 14. Interview with Claudio Guida, Olivos (Prov. Buenos Aires), November 29, 2007.
 15. Garton, Stephen, “Longing for War: Nostalgia and Australian Returned Soldiers After the First World War,” in T.G. Ashplant, G. Dawson y M. Roper, *The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration* (Routledge, London-Nueva York, 2000).
 16. Rodríguez, *Entre la Guerra y la Paz*, 84.
 17. R. Herrscher, *Los Viajes del Penélope. La Historia del Barco más Viejo de la Guerra de Malvinas* (Tusquets, Buenos Aires, 2007), 97.
 18. Herrscher, *Los Viajes del Penélope*, 97.
 19. Interview with Alejandro Diego, Buenos Aires, November 26, 2007.
 20. Interview with Antonio Gulla, Buenos Aires, June 26, 2012.
 21. For this change in the immediate postwar, see M. Novaro and V. Palermo, *La Dictadura Militar (1976–1983). Del golpe a la restauración democrática* (PAIDÓS, Buenos Aires, 2003), 487; Marina Franco en: *El Final del Silencio. Dictadura, Sociedad y Derechos Humanos en la transición (Argentina, 1979–1983)* (F.C.E., Buenos Aires, 2018), 341–368.
 22. This interpretation of the recent past—which finds its roots in the widespread use of violence in the 1970s—and which resignified extended to the postwar period, was generalized in the prologue of the report *Nunca Más* written by Ernesto Sábato. It was also materialized in the decrees of President Alfonsín, who ordered the trials of the heads of the armed forces and the leaders of the *Montoneros* and the *Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo* (two of the leading political-military organizations in Argentina). See E. Crenzel, “La víctima Inocente: de la Lucha antidictatorial al relato del Nunca Más,” in D. Born y E. Crenzel, *Los Desaparecidos en la Argentina. Memorias, representaciones e ideas (1983–2008)* (Biblos, Buenos Aires, 2010).
 23. Novaro and Palermo, *La Dictadura Militar*, 492.
 24. On the fight for the memories of the Malvinas, see Guber, *¿Por qué Malvinas?... y De chicos a veteranos. Memorias Argentinas de la Guerra de Malvinas* (Antropofagia, Buenos Aires, 2004); Lorenz, *Las Guerras por Malvinas*.
 25. This social representation was created based on some soldiers’ testimonies who reached public visibility in the media and denounced the extreme conditions they had fought and their superiors’ abuses. Also, it was based on the success of the book *Los Chicos de la Guerra* by Daniel Kon, published in August of 1982. Later, in 1984, a movie of the same name

was released, directed by Bebe Kamín. For an analysis of both the book and the movie, see Guber, *De Chicos a Veteranos*, 63–91.

26. Lorenz, *Las Guerras por Malvinas*, 155.
27. See Lorenz, *Las Guerras por Malvinas*.
28. Interview with Julio Casas Parera, Buenos Aires, December 1, 2007.
29. Guber, *¿Por qué Malvinas?* 128.
30. Interview with Claudio Guida, Olivos (Province of Buenos Aires) August 1, 2010.
31. J. Stanley, *Involuntary Commemorations: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Its Relationship to War Commemoration*, in Ashplant, Dawson y Roper, *The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration*, 250.
32. Interview with Fernando González Llanos, Buenos Aires, August 10, 2010.
33. On the hierarchy of experiences, see Rodríguez, *Entre la Guerra y la Paz*.
34. Interview with Julio Casas Parera, Buenos Aires, November 30, 2007.
35. Interview with Gabriel Asenjo, Buenos Aires, June 23, 2010.
36. On veterans' groupings in the early postwar period, see Lorenz, *Las Guerras por Malvinas* and Guber, *De Chicos a Veteranos*.
37. I decided to place "social reintegration" in quotes because they are the words used.
38. E. Leed, *No Man's Land: Combat and Identity in World War I* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009), 2.
39. Interview with Fernando González Llanos, Buenos Aires, August 10, 2010.
40. Garton, "Longing for war...", 228.
41. Interview with José Bustamante, Bahía Blanca (Province of Buenos Aires), November 6, 2007.
42. Interview with Gabriel Asenjo, Buenos Aires, June 23, 2010.
43. Interview with Claudio Guida, Olivos (Province of Buenos Aires), November 29, 2007.
44. Interview with Claudio Guida, Olivos (Province of Buenos Aires), November 29, 2007.
45. Vg. *Clarín. Revista*, March 27, 1983.
46. Interview with Ricardo Pérez, Buenos Aires, April 17, 2010.
47. Interview with Alejandro Egudisman, Buenos Aires, August 11, 2010.
48. Interview with Ricardo Pérez, Buenos Aires, November 26, 2007.
49. The legal adult age remained 21, even when they changed the drafting age to 18 years old.
50. See *Convicción*, June 27, 1982.
51. Approximately 1800 former soldiers were able to join national public administration until 1985 when the economic crisis prompted a halt in placements. Comisión Nacional de Ex-combatientes, *Informe Situación General de los Ex Combatientes de Malvinas* (Ministerio del Interior, Buenos Aires, July of 1997), 5.

52. Interview with José Bustamante, Bahía Blanca (Province of Buenos Aires), September 6, 2007.
53. Leed, *No Man's Land...*, 2.
54. Hynes, "Personal Narratives and Commemoration," 218.
55. A. Nani, "A 35 años de Malvinas, los ex-combatientes conviven con el suicidio" (April 2, 2017), www.bigbangnews.com (accessed May 5, 2019).
56. That debate goes beyond the scope of this chapter. However, an appraisal of it is available at: Rodríguez, "Por una Historia Socio-cultural de la Guerra y Pos guerra de Malvinas...".
57. Lorenz published a synthesis of the social perspectives on *Malvinas: Una Guerra Argentina*. However, it still lacks more empirical studies to clarify critical aspects such as desertions, naval units' war experiences, and those of the soldiers positioned in Patagonia as reserves and to face any Chile's threat.



South Atlantic Lessons: Falklands/Malvinas War and the Brazilian Army

Vágner Camilo Alves and Marcio Teixeira de Campos

INTRODUCTION¹

The Falklands/Malvinas War has been the last major conventional conflict in South America.² It can also be considered the most modern conflict in its time.³ It is not surprising that it had notable effects on the different aspects of Latin American politics.

Several organizations, such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Rio Treaty (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance), were shown to be ineffectual during the war. The inoperativeness of these authorities and the United States' open support for the United Kingdom made clear that these organizations worked properly only insofar as they complied with US interests.⁴ Brazilian diplomacy paid heed to this lesson. Brazil-Argentina's rapprochement had begun with Itaipu-Corpus agreements in 1979 and continued, timidly, during the war, with Brazil's benevolent neutrality toward its neighbor. It was increased in the following years, with the prospect of integration between both countries.⁵

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Military lessons, both strategic and tactical-operational, were also drawn. Two events gave support to the preceding. In 1982, Brazil still had a military government in power. General João Batista Figueiredo was the incumbent president, and wars were matters that naturally received full attention from him. Moreover, Argentina was also under a similar regime. Until the 1970s, its army was the traditional opponent in hypotheses of engagement and war games designed by Brazilian military schools. Its equipment and doctrine were remarkably similar to those of the Brazilian Army. The same inclination for counter-insurgency warfare, at the expense of the preparation for conventional fighting, was present. It stands to reason to consider the Brazilian government and army as attentive observers of the conflict. Lessons must have been learned. Did they cause institutional transformations?

Large organizations are resistant to changes. Traditions, norms, and procedures render transformations difficult. Military organizations are even more resilient since they are institutions ruled by the principles of hierarchy and discipline. Changes always depend on the higher echelons' approval, who are usually the most conservative.⁶ Besides, military organizations, differently from the civilian ones, prepare for an activity seldom performed. This is true even for great military powers. In a country such as Brazil, a middle power located in a somewhat peaceful region, that rule is even more valid. The last time its army operated outside the country against a foreign opponent was during the Second World War, at the Italian front, in 1944–1945. All of that reinforces an inherent aversion to change.

Nevertheless, military organizations must continually change. Otherwise, they will become obsolete. The most widespread thesis on changes in military organizations stresses the need for an external driver. This driver can be a military defeat or a political player outside the organization with the power to impose changes from a hierarchically superior position, such as a minister or a president. Recent studies, however, emphasize that such a thesis cannot account for the entire phenomenon.⁷ A more robust theory on such changes is still needed.

The present chapter intends to describe and analyze the effects of the Falklands/Malvinas War on the Brazilian Army. Our purpose is to investigate whether there were lessons drawn from the conflict and, if so, which of them brought about institutional transformations. To do this, a summary of the war is presented, emphasizing land warfare. Then, it appraises the lessons discussed by the community of strategic studies,

comprising civilians and militaries. Finally, it reviews the Brazilian Army changes in the following years, assessing the lessons learned from the Falklands/Malvinas War aftermath. Finally, the chapter presents the Army's leaders and organizational culture's influence upon its transformation agenda.

We inspected extensive English language bibliography produced by specialists in strategy and military history.⁸ Besides, published primary sources, both in Britain and Argentina, were also assessed.⁹ Two works are outstanding regarding how the Brazilian Army saw the conflict and which lessons learned caused transformations in a military organization. The first one is a classified document produced by the Brazilian Army General Staff, written in 1982 and disclosed, inside the Army, in the same year. In this primary source, war lessons were assessed, and reforms were suggested. Regarding the relationship of the cause and effect of the war to transformations brought about in the Brazilian Army, the seminal work is the unpublished dissertation defended by Marcio Campos in the graduate program in political science of the Universidade Federal Fluminense.¹⁰ This thesis combines theoretical reflective thinking on the subject with the examination of many primary and secondary sources, including an interview by the author with General Leônidas Pires Gonçalves, the Brazilian Army Commander from 1985 to 1990.

THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS LAND WARFARE

The Falklands/Malvinas War, from the military point of view, can be broken down and studied in two phases. In the first phase, an aeronaval conflict was fought mainly by Argentine aircraft deployed from the continent against the British task force, including Navy vessels and aircraft. After the establishment of a British beachhead in San Carlos Water, on May 21, the second and last phase of the conflict began. In this phase, the most significant event was the clash of troops on land, though the aeronaval conflict would proceed until the surrender of Argentine troops on the islands, on June 14.

Contrary to the first phase of the conflict, where equipment and technology prevailed, command and organization would decide the war on land. The combat on the islands was typically infantry fighting. Though flat and uncovered, the Falklands/Malvinas terrain had hardly any paved surface and was inappropriate for motor vehicles. A hard look at the number of soldiers and equipment shows a certain balance of forces. Two

British brigades faced two Argentine counterparts. Troops had relatively similar artillery support. Armored vehicles were almost absent, except for a few brought by both sides.¹¹ The weapons used by both infantries were similar, and there was even a coincidence of rifles and machine guns of general use. Contrary to what many Argentines would state after the war, night-vision devices were also available to both sides.¹² The Britons had the critical advantage of fire support from its air force and warships. They also showed superiority in a specific class of equipment: helicopters. While the Argentines possessed twenty such aircraft, the British, despite the losses on the Atlantic Conveyor, had more than a hundred, specialized for the most different functions, like cargo and troop transportation, escort, observation, and attack. However, a number of these helicopters were also destined to support the task force ships.¹³

This British material advantage was more than compensated because the Argentines had stationed their troops on the island over a month earlier. Theoretically, they had time to prepare their defenses and bring and store provisions, spare parts, and ammunition before the British blockade became effective. Moreover, it is a well-known fact in military science that tactical defense has superiority over attack. Historically, it is considered an essential advantage, in men and equipment, three against one to guarantee a successful offensive action. However, the debate on the issue is still unsettled.¹⁴ The British did not have such superiority in any of the battles fought. In Goose Green/Pradera del Ganso, they were at a significant disadvantage, with less than half as many fighters as their opponents.¹⁵

Considering only the numbers, the war on land was equally balanced. It is surprising, under the circumstances, to acknowledge the British victory, so quick and straightforward. In approximately three weeks, counting from the landing on San Carlos, the British infantry defeated its Argentine counterpart in half a dozen quick and violent battles, making the commander of the Argentine garrison Major General Mario Menendez surrender his troops.¹⁶ It is worth including here a brief report of the events.

After securing the beachhead, nearly without resistance from the Argentine troops, part of the British contingent, under pressure by their government, headed for Goose Green/Pradera del Ganso, the closest target. London demanded victory on land to motivate public opinion. Housing the 12th Argentine Regiment, the village was approximately 25 km away from the beachhead. After a battle that lasted over

24 h, basically fought on May 28 and conducted by the British 2nd Battalion, Parachute Regiment (2 Para), the Argentines surrendered. There, the British took around one thousand and five hundred POWs. The fall of Goose Green/Pradera del Ganso completely isolated Argentine troops on West Falkland/Gran Malvina and, in practice, removed them from the conflict. The British now had to face the most significant and most crucial enemy front, entrenched in Port Stanley/Puerto Argentino and surroundings, on the opposite side of San Carlos and Goose Green/Pradera del Ganso beachhead, more than 60 km away.

On June 1, the second part of the British military personnel, the 5th Infantry Brigade, arrived at the beachhead. With all the troops reunited, the final attack against Stanley/Puerto Argentino was launched. The helicopters lost on the cargo ship *Atlantic Conveyor*, particularly the three Chinooks used for heavy load transportation, obliged part of the British troops to set off on a long march carrying heavy equipment on their backs. Another part was transported by landing ships to Fitzroy port, to the south of the capital. There was a successful attack by Argentine jets taking off from the continent against British landing ships, causing two hundred casualties. However, the siege had been laid.

Notwithstanding the time required for the British troops' moving toward their final objective, Stanley/Puerto Argentino and surroundings, Argentine forces remained unmoved. They kept their defensive positions in the capital and hills around it, hoping to have a bitter defensive battle such as the trench fights on the Western Front of the First World War. Only small commando units left their previous positions to face the enemy.¹⁷

From the night of June 11 onward, the final battles took place around Port Stanley/Puerto Argentino. In the dawn of June 12, Mount Harriet, Two Sisters, and Longdon were taken in violent and quick combats. After a short respite, on the night of June 13, the second stage of the attack started, directed to Wireless Ridge and Mount Tumbledown. The pattern of the previous combats repeated itself.

Due to British troops' proximity and the organized and unorganized withdrawal of the Argentine troops from the mounts taken, the Argentine command accepted the offer of surrender. So ends the combat on land and the war itself. In Port Stanley/Puerto Argentino, the British would take over ten thousand enemy soldiers as POWs.¹⁸ A large part of them had participated in no combat. One hundred forty-eight combatants of the British Army and Royal Marines died during the land campaign. Out

of these, only 56 perished in the six land battles, all of them British victories. On the Argentine side, the land campaign of the Falklands/Malvinas took the lives of 228 soldiers; most of them conscripts.¹⁹

After the war, as usually occurs, the community of strategic studies indicated and drew the lessons learned from the South Atlantic conflict.²⁰ Differently from what happened with the war at sea and in the air, highly influenced by technology, war on land did not bring fame to any weapons system, at least not in the same way as it had happened to the naval and air arsenals. In short, there was no equivalent on land to nuclear submarines, VSTOL Harrier fighters, and last generation air-to-air AIM-9L Sidewinder and anti-ship AM 39 Exocet missiles. The lessons of the war on land would point to a few technological wrinkles. Above all, however, the conflict would consolidate more traditional lessons, such as the importance of the technical quality, training, and initiative of the rank and file and the officers and the capacity for organizational logistics in a conflict situation.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM WAR ON LAND IN FALKLANDS/MALVINAS

To draw lessons from the campaign, we will base on foreign sources, experts, official documents produced in both countries, and also on a document produced by the Brazilian Army General Staff (Estado-Maior do Exército—EME), soon after the conflict.

Concerning conventional combat, no revolutionary lesson was learned from this war. However, some old ones—put into practice in more militarily advanced nations—were, somehow, new to both Argentines and other Latin American military organizations.

The first general aspect highlighted is the importance of logistics in war. Considering that the conflict occurred in a distant region, this aspect gains considerable relevance. The British naval blockade rendered the Argentine defense on the islands extremely difficult. It was in dire need of supplies just in the final stage of the war, when the siege of Port Stanley/Puerto Argentino took place.²¹ Despite that, it should be underscored the higher efficiency of the British logistics vis-à-vis the Argentines'. While the latter were approximately 700 km from the closest continental bases, in Patagonia, the first had Ascension Island, more than 6000 km away, as their closest base. It should be emphasized that the Argentines had almost a month to store on the islands all the equipment

and provisions necessary for their defense before the British blockade was imposed. The Argentine logistics preparation was very deficient and altogether accounted for many soldiers' shortage of supplies. They suffered from cold, infirmities, and even lack of food, which influenced their combat morale. Nothing like that happened to the British.

Another aspect to be emphasized concerns the absence of practice and joint operations doctrine by the Argentine military. As a result, every single force fought its own war separately—the Navy was operational chiefly until the sinking of the light cruiser *Belgrano*, on May 2, the Air Force played a significant role until the British landing on San Carlos, and the Army lead, henceforward, the most significant effort in the war. The lack of integration involved chiefly the command on the islands and the command responsible for the air raids carried out from the continent. The Rattenbach Report, in the chapter on war lessons, states that “only the integration of the Armed Forces allows the achievement of military objectives.” Differently from what it said about Argentina, it is also stated that “Great Britain showed great ability to assemble an amphibious task force perfectly balanced for its operational needs.”²² Even though the Royal Navy led the whole action, the troops were very well blended, with parts of Army and Marines units. Operations on land had the support from RAF Harrier fighters, Army and Marines helicopters, and the Navy frigates' bombardment, acting in an integrated way under a unified command.

Regarding tactical action, the victory conquered was, in the end, secured through “rifles and bayonets.” The British troops proved to be superior in professionalism, technical capacity, and combat experience.²³ They knew how to apply, with more competence, the classical principles of infantry warfare, taking the lead, concentrating fire, and maneuvering whenever necessary.²⁴ The Argentines did not show aggressiveness and mobility, something confirmed by the president, General Galtieri, himself.²⁵ The British disregard for Argentine soldiers' performance was such that the British Army did not deem it worthwhile, after the war, to draw lessons from the defeated. The institution assessed their performance later, based on the sole experience of its forces.²⁶ The Rattenbach Report, produced in Argentina, deems that the Argentine Army performance was not satisfactory, except for honorable exceptions, such as, for example, commando companies, the army air force (helicopters), and artillery groups.²⁷ The infantry units had the worst combat

performance. They were comprised of conscript soldiers and were most of the Argentine combat force.

The troop command on the islands is also criticized for its rigid conception of defense, something the report considers that goes beyond the serious logistics and mobility limitations of the Argentine force.²⁸ General Menendez and his top brass are chided for transferring the whole initiative to the enemy, even when there were propitious conditions for offensive operations.²⁹ Menendez has acknowledged the immobility but argued that it was caused by the lack of transport (helicopters) and the British's air superiority.³⁰ Curiously, the Argentine commander refers little to his army of conscripts' low military competence in his statement on the war.³¹

Indeed, poor mobility and initiative came from several factors. However, we cannot disregard the difference in terms of professionalism and combativeness of troops used by Argentines and the British. The difference in air mobility was considerable. However, at crucial moments of the war, the British also suffered from a shortage of helicopters, particularly after the loss of several aircraft aboard the cargo ship *Atlantic Conveyor*. General Julian Thompson, commander of the 3 Commando Brigade of the Royal Marines, complains, for example, that the 16 helicopters available to his brigade were not enough to move his troops and equipment away from the beachhead in the days following the landing.³² Two units—the 3rd Battalion, Parachute Regiment (3 Para), and 45 Commando Royal Marines—had to march over 60 km with the whole equipment on their back, from San Carlos to the high ground near Port Stanley/Puerto Argentino.³³

The Argentine conscript soldiers' performance was much inferior to that of the United Kingdom's professional forces.³⁴ Besides the failures in logistics, lack of air support, and an uncreative command, it is worth emphasizing that troops' difference mainly explains the difference in aggressiveness and mobility between Argentine and British forces.

In terms of the machinery, the conflict stressed the helicopter's importance as a means of reconnaissance, close air support, and chiefly as a means of transportation of cargo and personnel. Battles took place chiefly at night. It should be emphasized here the importance of the night-vision goggles. Electronic warfare was also well applied, expertise in which the British were also superior to the Argentines.³⁵

The Brazilian Army General Staff (*Estado Maior do Exército*—EME) produced, for internal consumption, an extensive document examining

the conflict less than six months after its conclusion. The analysis made is notably based on Argentine sources, which is evident in the reproductions of maps, pictures of combatants, and weapons. There was a closer affinity with the Argentine Army rather than with the British Army, due to aspects such as similarity of equipment, doctrine, combat experience, among many others. Both armies were also involved in politics for years and had intensive training in counter-insurreccional warfare.

Amid the topics addressed in the document, we are particularly interested in the third and fourth parts of the study, entitled “Apreciação de Conjunto” (Comprehensive Assessment) and “Ensinaamentos” (Lessons). In the third part, the conflict is systematically analyzed. Its importance is highlighted when the document states that the seriousness of those events for Latin America would only be outweighed by the “Communist takeover of Cuba” after the Second World War.³⁷ The authors of the study did not escape from the general pattern when they acknowledged the failure of OAS and Rio Treaty in the crisis and pointed to the consequent growth of distrust, in Latin America as a whole, of the United States. Specifically, as for regional defense issues, the failure of multilateral security instruments was seen as a precedent for the occasional use of force to solve territorial disputes in the region.³⁷ Despite such preoccupations and showing the Army’s continuous immersion in the Cold War mental framework, the document mentions Argentina’s delicate situation, where “public discontent and military dissension may favor the resurgence of the international communist movement.” Later, discussing the lessons of the conflict, the study points to the need for diplomatic actions—“within the possibilities available to us”—in the sense of avoiding Argentina closer ties with the Soviet Union and Cuba.³⁸

As for the military reasons for the British victory in the South Atlantic conflict, the EME document was not far from what studies produced by the belligerent countries and by foreign experts stated.³⁹ Its fourth part treats two kinds of lessons from the war at length, the textbook ones and those that hint at innovations. The latter will be emphasized here. The war showed the need to transform the army by adopting effective doctrine and means to change aspects of the organization similar to those of its southern peer. Thus, there are indications of desirable innovations in the Brazilian land force, based on the conflict’s lessons.

Two issues that deserve to be highlighted are connected and are outside the specified range of the Army’s actions. The first concerns suspicions about the support from friendly powers if Brazil became involved in

a similar conflict. This issue referred to the support given to the United Kingdom by all European powers and, chiefly, by the United States, which moved away from hemispheric solidarity in favor of the North Atlantic Alliance's strengthening. The preceding corollary was the need to proceed with the quest for autonomy in military equipment production. Such a lesson was already being put into practice. However, the nationalization of the weapons used by the Brazilian armed forces and, more specifically, by the army was low, particularly in more sophisticated equipment. Brazil was not significantly different from Argentina in this regard, which was far from auspicious.

Particularly regarding possible transformations in the land force, the first and maybe the most vital aspect concerned the type of combatant they were supposed to adopt. The document is clear when it states that one of the causes for the British victory was their professional soldiers' relative superiority *vis-à-vis* Argentine conscripts with one year of military instruction.⁴⁰ It suggested studies for the "adoption of professional soldiers in the Army, according to our conditions."⁴¹ More immediately, it was necessary to think about "creating at least one large rapid military deployment unit with only professional personnel." Some pieces of equipment should be produced or, in case it was unfeasible, purchased abroad. Radars, smaller communication equipment, electronic equipment for this type of war, helicopters for fire support and transport, missiles, night-vision devices were mentioned, and even battle fatigues appropriate for the regions where Brazilian troops were likely to be deployed.⁴² In doctrinal terms, in addition to the establishment of a large professional unit in the Army, the noteworthy aspects were comprehensive studies of combined operations with other forces, the creation of units and personnel specialized in electronic warfare, the creation of organic helicopter units (as yet nonexistent) and greater diffusion and appreciation of the tactical principles governing conventional warfare.⁴³ Next, we will see how such lessons caused, in fact, institutional changes.

TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE BRAZILIAN ARMY BASED ON LESSONS LEARNED IN THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS WAR

Large and complex organizations produce too much paper. Though well-made and grounded, analysis is not, per se, sufficient to overcome the conservatism inherent in these organizations. This is most noticeable when it comes to a military organization with significant autonomy within

the state, and little recent practical experience in the *métier*, conventional combat against an enemy nation. The drive to immobility is strong.

The South Atlantic conflict, however, shook the organization and worried the Brazilian Army high command a great deal. The study conducted by the General Staff, as previously mentioned, was the result of an order by the Minister of the Army himself, General Walter Pires de Carvalho e Albuquerque, issued on June 8, therefore, before the end of the conflict. This order enjoined a study on the need for the creation of “a powerful core group, essentially professional, with characteristics of an intervention force”; as well as verification of “the adequacy of the current system of military service concerning the current operational needs of the Army, taking into account short-term intervention required by contemporary conflicts, [and] the validity of the system for massive training of reserves vis-à-vis the needs of an updated and objective mobilization.”⁴⁴

Stephen Rosen, discussing transformations in military institutions in times of peace, acknowledges that, for them to be effective, in addition to external pressures, the organization command must be committed to changes.⁴⁵

The Falklands/Malvinas War occurred in the middle of General João Figueiredo’s government, the last president of the Brazilian military regime. The political *détente* had already prevailed, conducted by his predecessor, General Geisel. Such a process aimed at opening the regime slowly, gradually, and safely. In 1985, there were indirect elections, and the first civilian president took office, after more than 20 years. The Army, however, was an essential player during the transition through the next Minister of the Army, Leônidas Pires Gonçalves.⁴⁶

Leônidas played an outstanding role in Sarney’s government. In exchange, the vice-president, made president by Machiavellian fortune, gave the minister full freedom to deal with issues related to his duty as the Army’s minister. In addition to this freedom, the Sarney’s government also ensured that funds destined for the institution were not restricted, despite the severe economic crisis.⁴⁷

Leônidas was a moderate reformer. He took advantage of the conjuncture to implement institutional transformations in a project for the Army modernization, called *Força Terrestre 90*—FT-90. Most of these transformations were connected to the lessons learned or reinforced from the Falklands/Malvinas War.

Amid the technological changes, the implementation of electronic warfare and Army aviation should be highlighted. The first, present both

in British and Argentine forces, was practically nonexistent in the Brazilian Army. The first measure was training specialized personnel in electronic warfare and creating a specific unit inside the organization.

As for Army aviation, the process occurred in the reverse direction. For being too expensive, because of the cost of the aircraft (helicopters), their maintenance, the training of pilots, and the construction of bases, the 1st Army Aviation Battalion was created in 1986, even before possessing a sizeable proportion of specialized personnel. The reason for that was to take advantage of the political and institutional conjuncture favorable for incorporating helicopters in the land force, something that could change all of a sudden.⁴⁸ The adoption of organic helicopter units had been a subject discussed by the high command of the Army since, at least, 1977.⁴⁹ However, these aircraft's fundamental roles in the Falklands/Malvinas War, considered by the Argentine military command on the islands, even with a little exaggeration, as the primary reason for the troops' immobility, were a strong incentive for finally incorporating them into the Brazilian Army.

However, changes toward a more professional army and the universal conscription system were something else. Such changes faced several barriers, even and mainly inside the military institution. A thoroughly professional force is much more expensive. For its adoption in Brazil, much more resources would be needed, something unfeasible, or at the cost of the contingent reduction. Of course, that would go against the organization's *esprit de corps*, which would never accept a reduction, and against the organizational mission seen as historic: its presence throughout the national territory.

Nevertheless, a "more professional" army was built during a specific period. Before the explanation, some clarifications are needed. The Brazilian Army is constituted, concerning its enlisted personnel, of the "Efetivo Variável - E.V." (Variable Contingent) and a "Núcleo Base - N.B." (Base Core), the latter comprising career enlisted personnel and temporary professional militaries, who can remain in the organization for a limited period. It means that the E.V. comprises conscript soldiers. The base core possesses a substantial number of privates and corporals who opted, after their military service, to remain in the force. They are, initially, better trained and better paid. According to Kuhlmann's data, there was a progressive reduction in the number of recruits (E.V.) from 1987 to 1998. From 129,898 conscript soldiers, it decreased to

74,652 by the last year. Since there was no reduction in the Army contingent in this period, the difference was filled by active enlisted personnel (N.B.). This improvised professionalization was ephemeral. Since 1999, the organization's base core percentage has started to decrease, with a simultaneous increase in the variable contingent. Economic issues obliged the Army to cut expenses. Since reducing the contingent was out of the question, the solution was to reverse the process then undertaken and again to count on an increasing number of low-paid recruits.⁵⁰

The lessons of the conflict, however, led to the creation, within the FT-90, of the "Brigadas de Pronto Resposta" (Prompt Response Brigades), also known as "Forças de Ação Rápida – FAR" (Rapid Reaction Forces). Paratroops Brigade, Special Forces units, and the recently created aviation squadrons were integrated into it. The FARs gradually started to possess only engaged enlisted personnel.⁵¹ It was the "powerful, professional core with characteristics of an intervention force," as mentioned by the minister.

Thus, in this respect, the Brazilian Army reached a somewhat Solomonic decision. We could say that two armies were created. One of them made up of conscript soldiers, large, spread out across the vast national territory and in tune with the strategic mission of presence, and the other, smaller, more professional, better equipped and trained, ready for quick movement and deployment in crises, such as the one occurred in South Atlantic.⁵² If, nevertheless, they did not have the same level as that of the wealthy nations' professional forces, like those deployed by the United Kingdom during the war, they were better than the conscript troops employed by Argentina and Brazil.

As for logistics, a fundamental aspect of British superiority in the land conflict, the lessons learned did not have significant repercussions. International manuals on the subject already stressed the need to make peacetime logistics as close as possible to wartime logistics.⁵³ In practice, however, little was done. Logistics, maybe more than any military field, are put to the test in conflicts. It is hard to say whether the Brazilian Army started to be better trained, logistically, after the Falklands/Malvinas War. Based on its little combat experience since then, we would risk saying no.

As for the forces' joint operations, virtually nothing was done, which was more than expected. In the absence of an external agency capable of enforcing training and developing a specific joint doctrine, every single force kept dealing autonomously with its equipment, training, and warfare. Only with the Ministry of Defense's creation in 1999 did the

Army start, due to obligation and timidly, to discuss the matter and, in fact, work on it.

CONCLUSION

The impact of the Falklands/Malvinas War on the Brazilian Army is undisputed. If all wars are followed with attention by worldwide armies, even as a duty, the South Atlantic conflict had a special place for Brazilian militaries, for reasons already provided (basically its locus and combatants).

The developed world's literature on changes in military organizations is only partially applicable to Latin American countries such as Argentina and Brazil. First, the discussion abroad treats chiefly cutting-edge innovations; transformations never applied to other military institutions. The changes effected in the Brazilian Army were novelties to the force, but not to armies in the developed world. Therefore, there are no innovations *per se*, but only modifications.

Another aspect that should be highlighted is the role of civil-military relations. The literature, particularly that written by Anglo-Saxons discussing their military organizations, has objective control by the civil power over the militaries taken for granted. Brazilian history is quite different. The participation and interference of the Brazilian Army in politics were constant during most of the Republic, diminishing since the last decade of the twentieth century. The Falklands/Malvinas War occurred still under military government, and later organizational transformations took place under a civil government largely constrained by the Army.⁵⁴

General Leônidas played an outstanding role in the national political structure. We can consider him as the last of this type, an heir of a continuous tradition of institutional interference by the Army in politics, inaugurated in the Revolution of 1930. The Army's changes brought about by the Falklands/Malvinas War, and the maintenance of certain organizational traits that should be changed, were mostly caused by this military leader. However, he was a symbol of what it meant to be, in terms of institutional culture, an end-of-the-century Brazilian general. Although the Army ambitions to change were realized by incorporating new equipment and technology and creating a core of elite combatants, the implementation of other thornier issues—full professionalization and the development of joint operations doctrine—followed without unequivocal institutional support and failed.

NOTES

1. This chapter is a version in English language, modified and updated, of a paper published initially in *Tensões Mundiais* 8, no. 14 (2012). We would like to thank Sérgio Filho for his patient revision of the text.
2. The last war of this nature in the continent was, in fact, the brief conflict on the frontier between Peru and Ecuador in 1995. See Miguel Angel Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America* (Philadelphia, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002). However, the Falklands/Malvinas war is much more relevant due to its political consequences and military reasons.
3. Martin Van Creveld, 'Through a Glass, Darkly', *Naval War College Review* 53, no. 4 (2000): 34.
4. Important political players noticed and expressed it during the war. General Octávio Costa, subchief of the Army's Department of Education and Research, said that "the traditional hemispheric allies and indisputable partners of the country [the USA] made it clear that Europe was far more important than Latin America. We would have to deal with it on our own because Rio Treaty is rather worthless" (translated), see *apud* Rafael Macedo da Rocha Santos, 'A importância da Guerra das Malvinas no pensamento estratégico das Forças Armadas Brasileiras e o redirecionamento da cooperação militar com a Argentina pós-1982,' *Revista NEIBA Cadernos Argentina-Brasil* 7, no. 1 (2018): 9.
5. Amado Luiz Cervo and Clodoaldo Bueno, *História da Política Exterior do Brasil* (Brasília: Editora Universidade de Brasília, 2002), 450–454.
6. Mario Cesar Flores, *Reflexões Estratégicas: Pensando a defesa nacional* (São Paulo: É Realizações, 2002).
7. Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 8–18.
8. Simon Ball, 'The Unchanging Lessons of Battle: The British Army and the Falklands War, 1982', in *Big Wars and Small Wars: The British Army and the Lessons of the War in the Twentieth Century*, Hew Strachan (Org.) (London: Routledge, 2006); William Fowler, *Battle for the Falklands (I) Land Forces* (London: Osprey Publishing, 1985); Martin Middlebrook, *Argentine Fight for the Falklands* (South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Books, 2009); Martin Middlebrook, *The Falklands War, 1982* (London: Penguin Books, 2001); Harry G. Summers Jr., 'Ground Warfare Lessons', in *Military Lessons of the Falkland Island War: Views from the United States*, Bruce W. Watson & Peter M. Dunn (Org.) (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984).
9. Benjamin Rattenbach et al., *Informe Final de la Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las responsabilidades en el conflicto del Atlántico Sur (Informe Rattenbach)* (Buenos Aires: Dirección Nacional del Registro

Nacional, 1982); Julian Thompson, *3 Commando Brigade in the Falklands: No Picnic* (South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Books, 2008); Carlos Túrolo, *Malvinas, Testimonio de su Gobernador* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1983). On the British side, we have the war report written by General Julian Thompson, commander of the 3rd Brigade of Commands of Royal Marines. On the Argentine side, there are the memoirs, soon after the conflict, of the Argentine troops' commander on the islands, General Mario Menendez, written by journalist Carlos Túrolo. In addition to these two reports, the Rattenbach report was also used, a report published a little more than a year after the war. This work was produced by the Argentine armed forces to analyze and assess their performance during the war.

10. Marcio Teixeira de Campos, *A Guerra das Falklands/Malvinas e suas Repercussões no Exército Brasileiro*. Doctoral Thesis, Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2011.
11. The British had the 3rd Commando Brigade of the Royal Marines, reinforced by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, Parachute Regiment, and the 5th Infantry Brigade comprising Scots and Welsh Guards and Gurkha Rifles, with approximately 9,000 men. The Argentine had the 10th Motorized Infantry, reinforced by a battalion of marines, concentrated in Port Stanley/Puerto Argentino and surroundings, and the 3rd Brigade of Motorized Infantry, spread out in Goose Green/Pradera del Ganso and West Falkland/Gran Malvina, with a total of 10,000 men. Both sides had a relatively similar number of 105 and 155-millimeter guns as support. As for armored vehicles, the Argentines had a Reconnaissance Squadron composed of 12 French Panhard armored cars. The British brought a squadron of the Blues and Royals, with nine light armored vehicles with caterpillar treads.
12. Harry G. Summers Jr., 'Ground Warfare Lessons' in *Military Lessons of the Falkland Island War: Views from the United States*, Bruce W. Watson & Peter M. Dunn (Org.) (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 76; William Fowler, *Battle for the Falklands (I) Land Forces* (London: Osprey Publishing, 1985), 11.
13. According to SIPRI, approximately 200 helicopters were accompanying the task force. On the other hand, throughout the conflict, the Argentines used a little more than 30 rotary-winged aircraft. See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *World Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook 1983* (New York: International Publications Service, 1983), 476.
14. John Mearsheimer, 'Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics', *International Security* 13, no. 4 (1989); Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

15. The Argentines dispute such information, stating that a large part of its contingent was composed of personnel from the Air Force, poorly trained for infantry fighting. Both forces were more symmetrical in the infantry, with approximately 630 Argentines against 450 British soldiers. Nevertheless, an advantage for the defense of 1.4 to 1. See Martin Middlebrook, *Argentine Fight for the Falklands* (South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Books, 2009), 196–197.
16. Reference to amphibious operations and battles on islands in modern warfare is the US offensives in the Pacific Ocean theater of operations against the Japanese Empire. There, the two forces faced each other many times. Since the end of 1943, the strategic initiative had been entirely American. Battles were fought with total air and naval supremacy by the United States. Nevertheless, the Japanese defense resistance in nearly all operations was remarkable, especially compared to what happened in the Falklands/Malvinas. For example, to conquer the tiny Peleliu island (September–November 1944), where the Japanese had stationed a force with nearly the same size as that of the Argentines in the Falklands/Malvinas, it took ten weeks of intense combat. It was necessary to deploy a US invading force twice as large as that of the enemy, even with sea-air supremacy. See US Naval Institute (USNI), *Naval History* 24, no. 2 (2010).
17. Joseph S. Tulchin, ‘The Malvinas War of 1982: An Inevitable Conflict That Never Should Have Occurred’, *Latin American Research Review* 27, no. 2 (1985).
18. Martin Middlebrook, *The Falklands War, 1982* (London: Penguin Books, 2001), 381.
19. Martin Middlebrook, *The Falklands War, 1982* (London: Penguin Books, 2001), 384; Martin Middlebrook, *Argentine Fight for the Falklands* (South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Books, 2009), 283.
20. At the time, civilians and scholars working on the subject were exclusive to the so-called developed countries. In Latin America, this type of study was made exclusively by militaries and had little visibility outside the armed forces. That seems to be changing, little by little, in any case. As for Brazil, it is worth mentioning the creation, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, of the first *stricto sensu* graduation programs on strategic studies and the creation of a national association of researchers of subjects associated to defense (ABED), which regularly promotes meetings with the presentation of original academic works on the theme.
21. In his statement, General Menendez affirms that his troops were under much better combat conditions on May 1 than they were 30 days later (!). See Carlos Túrolo, *Malvinas, Testimonio de su Gobernador* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1983), 143.

22. Benjamin Rattenbach et al., *Informe Final de la Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las responsabilidades en el conflicto del Atlántico Sur (Informe Rattenbach)* (Buenos Aires: Dirección Nacional del Registro Nacional, 1982), items 870 and 871.
23. Benjamin Rattenbach et al., *Informe Final de la Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las responsabilidades en el conflicto del Atlántico Sur (Informe Rattenbach)* (Buenos Aires: Dirección Nacional del Registro Nacional, 1982), item 684, b.
24. Harry G. Summers Jr., 'Ground Warfare Lessons' in *Military Lessons of the Falkland Island War: Views from the United States*, Bruce W. Watson & Peter M. Dunn (Org.) (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 67.
25. Carlos Túrolo, *Malvinas: testimonio de su gobernador* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1983), 261; Juan B. Yofre, *1982: los documentos secretos de la guerra de Malvinas/Falklands y el derrumbe del proceso* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 2011), 548.
26. Simon Ball, 'The Unchanging Lessons of Battle: The British Army and the Falklands War, 1982' in *Big Wars and Small Wars: The British Army and the Lessons of the War in the Twentieth Century*, Hew Strachan (Org.) (London: Routledge, 2006), 149.
27. Benjamin Rattenbach et al., *Informe Final de la Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las responsabilidades en el conflicto del Atlántico Sur (Informe Rattenbach)* (Buenos Aires: Dirección Nacional del Registro Nacional, 1982), item 609.
28. Benjamin Rattenbach et al., *Informe Final de la Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las responsabilidades en el conflicto del Atlántico Sur (Informe Rattenbach)* (Buenos Aires: Dirección Nacional del Registro Nacional, 1982), item 677, b.
29. Benjamin Rattenbach et al., *Informe Final de la Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las responsabilidades en el conflicto del Atlántico Sur (Informe Rattenbach)* (Buenos Aires: Dirección Nacional del Registro Nacional, 1982), item 677, f. It occurred when the British started landing on San Carlos, on May 21, and especially after the successful air attack by Argentine jets to the British landing ships at Fitzroy, not very far from the Argentine contingent in Port Stanley/Puerto Argentino.
30. Carlos Túrolo, *Malvinas: Testimonio de su Gobernador* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1983), 232, 240–241, 245–247.
31. There is a single mention in a book with 337 pages! He comments that, in the final battles, many Argentine soldiers, due to lack of experience, wasted all the ammunition and left breaches in the Argentine defenses, through which British soldiers passed. See Carlos Túrolo, *Malvinas, Testimonio de su Gobernador* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1983), 266.

32. Julian Thompson, *3 Commando Brigade in the Falklands: No Picnic* (South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Books, 2008), 75.
33. Martin Middlebrook, *The Falklands War, 1982* (London: Penguin Books, 2001), 274–283. The ability to move on foot was not widespread, even for the British land force. The Scots and Welsh Guard units, for example, proved to be unable to make equivalent marches, considering their training as mechanized infantry. That led to the decision of transporting them by ship to the surroundings of Port Stanley/Puerto Argentino, which made possible the Argentine air attack at Fitzroy, which caused the loss of two whole companies of the Welsh Guards. See Harry G. Summers Jr, 'Ground Warfare Lessons' in *Military Lessons of the Falkland Island War: Views from the United States*, Bruce W. Watson and Peter M. Dunn (org.) (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 74–75.
34. It is worth mentioning that the moment of the Argentine action could not be worse. Its army had just dismissed the 1962 class of conscript soldiers and incorporated the 1963 class, with little military instruction, see Marcio Teixeira de Campos, *A Guerra das Falklands/Malvinas e suas Repercussões no Exército Brasileiro*. Doctoral Thesis, Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2011, 146. This increased the difference between the two types of combatants. We should highlight, however, that such a cycle of annual dismissals and incorporations is inherent in an army based on conscription.
35. Benjamin Rattenbach et al., *Informe Final de la Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las responsabilidades en el conflicto del Atlántico Sur (Informe Rattenbach)* (Buenos Aires: Dirección Nacional del Registro Nacional, 1982), item 875, f.
36. Brasil, Estado-Maior do Exército, *Estudo Histórico-Doutrinário sobre a Guerra do Atlântico Sul* (Brasília: EME, 1982), 86.
37. It should be underscored, in this respect, the frontier litigations between "Chile and Argentina, Chile and Peru, Chile and Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador, Venezuela and Colombia, Venezuela and Guyana and, in a lesser degree, Paraguay and Bolivia" see Brasil, Estado-Maior do Exército, *Estudo Histórico-Doutrinário sobre a Guerra do Atlântico Sul* (Brasília: EME, 1982), 87.
38. Brasil, Estado-Maior do Exército, *Estudo Histórico-Doutrinário sobre a Guerra do Atlântico Sul* (Brasília: EME, 1982), 87, 107.
39. Brasil, Estado-Maior do Exército, *Estudo Histórico-Doutrinário sobre a Guerra do Atlântico Sul* (Brasília: EME, 1982), particularly 90–92.
40. Brasil, Estado-Maior do Exército, *Estudo Histórico-Doutrinário sobre a Guerra do Atlântico Sul* (Brasília: EME, 1982), 90–91, 107.
41. Brasil, Estado-Maior do Exército, *Estudo Histórico-Doutrinário sobre a Guerra do Atlântico Sul* (Brasília: EME, 1982), 110.

42. Brasil, Estado-Maior do Exército, *Estudo Histórico-Doutrinário sobre a Guerra do Atlântico Sul* (Brasília: EME, 1982), 108–110.
43. Brasil, Estado-Maior do Exército, *Estudo Histórico-Doutrinário sobre a Guerra do Atlântico Sul* (Brasília: EME, 1982), 110–111.
44. *Apud* Marcio Teixeira de Campos, *A Guerra das Falklands/Malvinas e suas Repercussões no Exército Brasileiro*. Doctoral Thesis, Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2011, 143. The Minister of the Army, after the production of the historical-doctrinal study, ordered, in a document dated of April 12, 1983, that, because of “the importance of the lessons of the previous study and wish to give it the widest circulation (...) measures should be taken in order to produce an outline of that document dealing with the main issues of land operations.” Moreover, such “an outline as requested above (should be) disseminated so that all Brazilian Army officers could be aware of it” (translated), see *Apud* Marcio Teixeira de Campos, *A Guerra das Falklands/Malvinas e suas Repercussões no Exército Brasileiro*. Doctoral Thesis, Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2011, 190. An order issued almost a year after the war is an example of how impressed the Brazilian Army high command was. It also shows the Brazilian Army’s willingness to discuss, inside the force, the organizational transformations resulting from the lessons learned from the war.
45. Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning the Next War: innovation and the modern military* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 18–22.
46. General Leônidas even decided who should take office as president, due to Tancredo Neves’s infirmity, a president chosen in an indirect election. There were doubts about who should take on the presidency, the vice president, José Sarney, or the Chamber of Deputies’ president, Ulysses Guimarães. When Tancredo died, Sarney inherited the presidency. See Ronaldo Costa Couto, *História Indiscreta da Ditadura e da Abertura: Brasil: 1964–1985* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 1998), 415–418.
47. In fact, it was more than that. Huge extra-budget funds were allocated to the Army for use both in 1986 and 1987. See Diniz Esteves, *Documentos do Estado-Maior do Exército* (Brasília: Estado-Maior do Exército, 1996), 543. It was the price of support for the new government.
48. General Leônidas, who, later on, used to call the army aviation as “my child,” described the difficulties in its implementation as follows: “You can’t imagine the reaction against the helicopter. I even heard [from an interlocutor in the government]: an army without combat boots wants helicopters! I had to answer: if they give me money, I shove combat boots down their throat, in the whole army, three pairs each. Aviation, if they give me money, it will take me ten years to have. It took us fifteen years! (translated), see *Apud* Marcio Teixeira de Campos, *A Guerra das Falklands/Malvinas e suas Repercussões no Exército Brasileiro*. Doctoral

Thesis, Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2011, 169. Even inside the military institution, there was resistance to transformation. It was different in nature, bureaucratic. Here is Leônidas's answer to a general question about the suggestion to do more detailed planning to adopt helicopters in the army: "(...) boy, this is a conjunctural and political opportunity. In Army Aviation, the decision is to take it or leave it. Either I do it today, and later on, we see, study, organize, or we do the organizing, the study and, when the time comes to make a decision, I won't have the same conjuncture and the same environment that I have today, propitious for the establishment of the aviation" (translated). See *Apud* Marcio Teixeira de Campos, *A Guerra das Falklands/Malvinas e suas Repercussões no Exército Brasileiro*. Doctoral Thesis, Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2011, 171. The two quotes show the difficulties inherent in the transformation in military organizations. They also illustrate the importance that a prestigious and influential commanding officer has in the implementation or not of this type of institutional transformations.

49. Marcio Teixeira de Campos, *A Guerra das Falklands/Malvinas e suas Repercussões no Exército Brasileiro*. Doctoral Thesis, Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2011, 163–172.
50. *Apud* Marcio Teixeira de Campos, *A Guerra das Falklands/Malvinas e suas Repercussões no Exército Brasileiro*. Doctoral Thesis, Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2011, 185.
51. Marcio Teixeira de Campos, *A Guerra das Falklands/Malvinas e suas Repercussões no Exército Brasileiro*. Doctoral Thesis, Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2011, 188–189.
52. It should be highlighted that the EME study already predicted something like that when it indicated the war lessons as a starting point for “more complex studies in which the national conjuncture and war scenarios should be considered as a priority.” The authors exemplify using precisely “the lessons that the British professional soldier largely outdid the conscript or mobilized soldier.” For them, “It can’t be concluded that all our soldiers in Brazil should be professionals based on this historic case. We must study, in depth, a Brazilian solution, under the circumstances we imagine for the future or in war scenarios” (translated), see Brasil, Estado-Maior do Exército, *Estudo Histórico-Doutrinário sobre a Guerra do Atlântico Sul* (Brasília: EME, 1982), 98.
53. Marcio Teixeira de Campos, *A Guerra das Falklands/Malvinas e suas Repercussões no Exército Brasileiro*. Doctoral Thesis, Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2011, 158.
54. Jorge Zaverucha, *Rumor de Sabres, controle civil ou tutela militar: estudo comparativo das transições democráticas no Brasil, na Argentina e na Espanha* (São Paulo: Editora Ática, 1994).



The Falklands/Malvinas War and the Brazilian Naval Strategy: Autonomy for a Blue-Water Navy

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INTRODUCTION

The Falklands/Malvinas War, from April to June 1982, involved Argentine and British sea, air, and land forces in a limited conflict over the archipelago sovereignty. Its repercussions were decisive for the collapse of the Argentine military dictatorship and the conservative British government's consolidation. London's diplomatic victories in the United Nations (Resolution n° 502), in the European Community (economic sanctions and arms embargo on Argentina), and with the United States (a country which left its mediator role and backed up the United Kingdom with regards to the war) brought up into discussion, especially for Brazil, the regional security system based on the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, under the Organization of American States, as well

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as the already criticized dependency on Washington regarding modern weaponry acquisition. These factors drove Brazil's neutrality to favor Argentina during the war,¹ reinforced the Brazilian diplomacy to get closer to Buenos Aires, and triggered the latter cooperation initiatives to aim toward South American integration.² The war was closely followed by Brazilian diplomats and military because it shook up the regional system, as it was framed as a North-South conflict. At that time, as we will see in the next section, Brazil was engaged in a quest for strategic autonomy to become a great power. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, many semi-industrialized Third World countries harbored aspirations to change their position in the international system as Brazil did. Understanding how the conflict affected perceptions and influenced naval programs in Brazil matters both for clarifying Brazilian strategy's history and better assessing the limits and possibilities intermediate countries had to conduct their own strategy in the late Cold War years.

In the military realm, the Falklands/Malvinas War operations involved anti-ship and anti-air missiles, conventional and nuclear-propelled submarines, the confrontation between shipboard and land-based aviation, expeditionary infantries and mobilization efforts, and logistics in sending and maintaining men and arms to and in a hostile and distant environment. Some characteristics such as a war in the South Atlantic, involvement of a neighboring country (with similar military capabilities), and a major central power (whose Royal Navy was a point of reference for the Brazilian Navy) also influenced Brazilian strategic perceptions. The Brazilian Army, as the Argentine, had also been involved with domestic politics and counterinsurgency, and closely followed the conflict and its implications.

According to Alves and Campos in the previous Chapter 6 of this book, the evaluation of the Falklands/Malvinas War made by the Army Staff was important in order to adopt electronic warfare innovations, the employment of helicopters, and the creation of specialized 'rapid deployment' units, formed by professional soldiers and not by conscripts. The Brazilian Navy also paid close attention to the conflict and its political, strategic, and operational implications. We argue that the war did not substantively change Brazilian Naval thought, whereas its impact was in the sense of reinforcing the already current strategic options. Even under a scenario of budget restrictions, the idea of seeking more significant levels of autonomy and domestic production of military means was consolidated. The war and its aftermath were perceived as the endorsement for

the Brazilian quest for a blue-water navy formed by modern platforms, supported with shipbuilding capability and high-level weapon systems.

Here, Brazilian Naval thought is perceived as a set of prevailing conceptions about war, strategy, and military theory in the Brazilian Navy during this period.³ It should not be treated as only naval strategy and employment doctrines adopted, available in the Navy's manuals. Military thought also involves more general conceptions regarding the international system, its risks, and threats, the country's position; the role of its armed forces in the execution and design of national defense policy, still involving views about the meaning of war and about the kind of armed force the country needs to prevent or to win. On the one hand, it can be learned from articles and books published by the specialized military press and the official documentation that guides the Navy's action regarding establishing priorities and resources, creating programs, and selecting the chosen options' legitimacy. On the other hand, these military publications have an intellectual role in its means (in the sense of spreading particular strategic concepts) and are an essential tool for feeding, backing up, and legitimizing the production of those documents since, until recently in Brazil, these type of documents that are linked to national defense were overwhelmingly produced by military personnel, most of the time being written by them exclusively.

The notions that feed strategic formulations, identifying opportunities and threats, allies, and enemies, the policy designs originated from them, as much as the profile of the armed forces are not merely corollaries of the international system. We acknowledge that the accepted formulations and the decisions taken derive from a socially built perceived structure that defines what is understood as national interest. Therefore,

the national interests are created social constructions, [...] that emerge from representations – or, to employ a more usual terminology, descriptions of situations and definitions of problems – throughout which the state agents and other stakeholders give meaning to their surrounding world.⁴

In this regard, absorbed from publications that perform an intellectual role in the military realm, and from official documents, we consider that the Brazilian Navy thought those pieces regarding the construction process of ideas for the named Brazilian national interests. In other words, who are its allies and partners, and what to expect from its real or potential adversaries. This production of ideas fed the Navy's strategic concepts

and contributed to constructing identities and meanings regarding this service's role, structure, and doctrine. In the meaning given by Hopf,⁵ they are discursive formations that define the social cognitive structure of the stakeholders.

In this chapter, the primary source to identify how the Falklands/Malvinas War impacted military thought in the Navy, we find the articles published in *Revista Marítima Brasileira* (RMB), between 1982 and 1992. The RMB is a journal specialized in naval military issues published by the Brazilian Navy since 1851. Throughout time, the journal underwent a process of change. During and after the war, the Brazilian naval officers published articles referring to strategic, tactical, and technological aspects and analyses of naval military operations from different historical periods, besides letters and readers' comments. Frequently, the RMB also used to publish articles or transcripts of speeches and conferences by the Minister of Navy, what gave (and still gives) a connotation of an official channel. Despite this, their authors signed the articles. They left some room for opinions and views that have some degree of discordance regarding the war and how the Brazilian Navy could better adapt to the war's military innovations and strategic consequences. It is then possible to perceive *Revista Marítima Brasileira* as an open space for the circulation of ideas in the naval scope, also open to society, that performs a vital role in promoting the Navy's consensus about the country's strategic options. It is essential to highlight that the articles that were published with regard to the Falklands/Malvinas War not only had a 'scientific' motivation in the sense of investigating some aspects of the conflict but also presented clear recommendations of actions to be followed or avoided in the reasoning of 'lessons learned' with the conflict. In a complementary way, documentation produced by the President's Cabinet was used (National Security Council and Messages to the National Congress) to check to what extent the authors' recommendations and priorities were aligned with the program's reformulations implemented by the Navy in that time.

Thus, this chapter is organized in the following way: this introduction; a section that describes Brazil's insertion in the international scene and the characteristics of the Brazilian Navy in the late period of the Cold War, already engaged in the process of supplier diversification, modernization and a quest for autonomy; a section dedicated to the analysis of the production of ideas published in military professional periodicals regarding the Falklands War; an evaluation of the extent to which

this production of ideas was converted into practical measures under the Brazilian Navy and, in the end, the final considerations.

BRAZIL'S INTERNATIONAL POLICY AND THE BRAZILIAN NAVY IN THE 1970S AND 1980S

The 1964 military coup promoted an inflection on Brazilian foreign policy toward an alignment with the United States and placed great weight on anti-communism as a central role for the national defense policy. The first government of the dictatorship repudiated the then named Independent Foreign Policy that was in action, broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba, and, in close cooperation with the United States, took part in the Dominican Republic's occupation in 1965. With military troops numbering over one thousand soldiers in the Inter-American Peace Force, Brazil took charge of this mission under Organization of American States' mandate (which allowed the continuity of the United States' unilateral intervention in that country).

During the 1970s, though, the following military governments adopted more pragmatic policies oriented toward greater autonomy in foreign relations.⁶ In this new realignment, the foreign relations policy was conceived to 'provide society and the State with conditions and suitable means to drive autonomous development, as far as possible.'⁷ A more diversified economy, getting through a fast industrialization and economic expansion process, demanded new markets, technologies, supplies, and partnerships. In a more complex international scenario, marked by challenges such as the oil prices spike and opportunities such as the Cold War détente and Portuguese Africa's decolonization, Brazil was redesigning its presence in multilateral forums and its bilateral relations in order to project itself internationally in a more autonomous and industrialized stance.

The word *autonomy* is used here with the meaning given by Andrew Hurrell to understand the Brazilian military regime's foreign relations policy: It entails the degree of effective independence that a State can provide. Specifically, autonomy

implies an ability to independently and coherently determine national policies, resist attempts at outside control, adapt flexibly, exploit favorable trends in the international environment, and limit and control unfavorable ones.⁸

According to Hurrell, autonomy worked as a kind of guiding ideal to provide a basic intellectual framework for foreign relations policy and Brazilian development. We understand that the quest for autonomy should not be confused with a possible 'emotional' and 'nationalist' adherence to major projects (such as the development of nuclear submarines), according to Lima da Silva.⁹ It is a rational option for expanding the country's maneuver ranges that occupy an intermediary position in the international system.

When the Falklands/Malvinas War broke out, the Brazilian dictatorship, in charge of a transitional process to a democracy controlled by the military, was bounding toward Argentina as part of a market diversification strategy, elimination of conflicts, and political conciliation in what was known as the north-south dialog. Simultaneously, the regime was facing growing internal opposition and a crisis in its economic model, marked by the second oil crisis, contraction on external funding, inflation, and GDP reduction.

The regime's central element was anti-communism, which used resources and personnel from the armed forces and police departments all over the country. However, conventional war preparation (and not only for counterinsurgency) never vanished completely for the Brazilian military, increasing demand for modern weaponry systems. The acquisitions pattern current at the time was through transference programs of US weapons, under the terms of the Cold War military cooperation and some casual opportunity purchases. This became progressively frustrating for the regime that, besides competing for military supremacy in the region, intended that its more remarkable political and economic international stance should also be backed up by military support. The United States engaged abroad and internally divided about Vietnam, limited its military aid for Latin America toward counterinsurgency, and, during the 1970s and 1980s, restricted transferees of modern systems for the region. Frustration became bitterness with the US policy, which collided with Brazilian research and development. Subsequently, the regime received criticism regarding human rights violations perpetrated by the Brazilian military dictatorship, putting an end to the special military relation between the two countries.¹⁰

The conjunction of these elements reinforced strategic partnership diversification and drove the domestic production of weapons systems. In this context, the United States refusal to supply supersonic fighter jets led Brazil to acquire them from France. In 1969, Embraer was founded, and

then had the *Xavante* jet trainer on its first orders, built under license from the Italian company Aermacchi to train future Brazilian fighter pilots. In 1970, Brazil signed a comprehensive agreement with the United Kingdom to acquire six modern frigates (*Niterói* class), two of them built in Rio de Janeiro, a modified version for ship training, locally built, and three diesel-electric submarines. The impact of this agreement was felt in the Navy's personnel's training and in the departure from the model that depended on obsolete material provided by the United States.¹¹ Besides this, it implied a critical strategic change since the Brazilian Navy stopped being merely a subsidiary from the US Navy, specialized in submarine warfare, and enable itself for surface war and anti-ship missile operations and computerized firing systems.¹² The Brazilian Navy's re-equipment program was tuned with the strategic review that set the South Atlantic as a primary designated area for Brazil, which was also expressed by the beginning of the offshore oil exploration in 1969 and the decree that expanded the Brazilian territorial sea from 12 to 200 nautical miles in 1970.

The most significant change was in the nuclear sector. In 1974, in the middle of the oil crisis and the Indian nuclear test, the United States suspended the delivery of enriched uranium that fed Brazilian research reactors, bought through the program Atoms for Peace, which incremented the negotiations with the German Federal Republic in order to establish a comprehensive agreement that encompassed the construction of nuclear power plants in Brazil and technology transference. According to Corrêa,¹³ from 1976 to 1978, the presidency's cabinet started to consider including in the Brazilian nuclear program the idea of nuclear submarines. This proposal resonated within the Navy and other state sectors, which perceived that 'a nuclear-propelled submarine would be a giant leap for Brazil that would enter the country to a new era of scientific and technological transformation and would change Brazil's status in the international system.'¹⁴ However, the program faced opposition sectors of Brazil and the United States' societies, which led the government to conduct its secrecy plans.

Therefore, the South Atlantic conflict happened in a delicate moment for Brazil when the regime wanted to advance its autonomy and industrializing project under an economically adverse environment of low political legitimacy since it was still a dictatorship. The war between a neighboring country and a great power could not have been gone unnoticed by the Brazilian Navy.

THE LESSONS LEARNED

Before going over the content of the analysis published in *Revista Marítima Brasileira*, it is essential to highlight that all the writers were Brazilian Navy officers, two of them admirals and that, although some texts had made considerations with regard to the political and diplomatic dimensions of the conflict, the approaches focused primarily on the tactical and strategic aspects; besides this, the authors avoided choosing a side between any of the belligerent countries. The sources used in the analyses were predominantly British, though, like the narratives, which followed the victorious country. Concerning this, we should ponder that it is more frequent in the instrumental studies about military campaigns that try to get 'lessons learned' from war to emphasize the 'hits' of the winner than on the 'misses' of the defeated. Since the early days, the British have made reports and documents about the war available, unlike the Argentines. The latter publicized the Rattenbach Report only in 2012.

Alliances, Dependency, and Autonomy

To the Brazilian military, the Falklands/Malvinas War consisted of an essential experiment about the convenience, or not, of the alliances' system of that time and the problems that resulted from the dependency of foreign defense material. In general, the articles show the importance of the United Kingdom of being a NATO member, which would have contributed to the diplomatic victories at the UN, EC, and the support from the United States (after the period that Washington attempted to mediate the conflict). However, according to the analysis by Admiral Armando Vidigal, the United Kingdom had been restructuring its armed forces to always operate jointly with other members of the alliance and, especially, under cover of the US Navy would justify the decommissioning of its two aircraft carriers. Because the United Kingdom had to fight a war in the South Atlantic without NATO support, this was pointed out as a negative consequence of decreasing a naval force's 'strategic flexibility' when delegating other alliance members' functions. The United States position, favorable to the United Kingdom and the European embargo on Argentina, reinforced Brazil's domestic weapons production. Several Brazilian officers pointed out that the dependency levels of weapons and

ammunition imports of Argentina limited its logistic and operational capabilities. Therefore, Brazil should guide the development of its naval power through a modernization that was less dependent on material imports from other countries. According to them, the war had revealed that the acquisition of modern weapons systems could not only be restricted to merely purchases in the international market: It should go through a nationalization process of the Brazilian military power and should be capable of challenging the threats and risks of similar conflicts.¹⁵

This perception was also shared by the military intelligence that advised the National Security Council. In an April 1982 confidential report with regard to the ongoing conflict, it was argued that countries such as Brazil 'should give greater emphasis on technological and industrial autonomy in strategic sectors such as military equipment, energy (production of liquid fuels and propellants in general), the nuclear sector and in the fields of communication and computing.' In the officers' reasoning that drafted this document, investments in defense would be a 'contributing factor for triggering the Brazilian industrial complex.' They would help promote the technological development of the country.¹⁶

At the Sea

Once the Brazilian Navy took her first steps in developing nuclear-propelled submarines, this kind of weapon's employment was considered fundamental in favor of the British. According to one of the analysis investigated, the British naval power restricted the Argentine Navy to coastal areas and ports, from the moment the cruiser *General Belgrano* was torpedoed and sunk by the nuclear attack submarine *Conqueror*. After this fact, the Argentine aircraft carrier *25 de Mayo* returned to its base, transferring its planes to the south of Argentina. This decision was taken due to the Argentine Navy's incapacity to challenge the British nuclear-powered submarines.¹⁷

According to Admiral Mário César Flores,¹⁸ the conflict showed up that the navies 'will be divided into two groups: The ones that have submarines [nuclear-powered] and ultimately secondary ones, the have-nots.' The British strategic and operative conduct was fast and intensive, not only because of its surface fleet readiness and mobilization capability but also for its nuclear-powered submarines' autonomy and speed, capable of pushing the Argentine naval retreat, denying her use of the sea. Sea denial resulted in the isolation of the Argentine garrisons in the islands,

making any action toward landing new troops, weapons, ammunition, and medicines difficult.¹⁹ Therefore, the nuclear-powered submarines had been paramount to the final conflict result, acting as an ‘imbalance’ of power during any confrontation in the sea, even offsetting the aircraft carrier force’s projection capability when they became targets. The author highlighted that the modernization of the Brazilian Navy could not relinquish its autonomous production of submarines, like those of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France.

The employment of various missiles, electronic warfare instruments, and its consequences to the war’s conduction was a novelty followed by Brazilian Navy officers. The Exocet’s performance, French-built anti-ship missile, responsible for the sinking of a destroyer and an (improvised) aircraft carrier, was perceived as a combat proof for these new technologies. According to Armando Vidigal,²⁰ the following electronic warfare elements would change the war in the naval way of thinking:

[The] introduction of precision-guided weapons, what changed the emphasis from fire volume to precision; [...] the electronic development in the areas of detection, location, defense, and command and control; [and] a gradual but continuous decreasing in the importance of protective armor, of compartmentalization and systems redundancy in ship projects.

The performance of Argentine attack aircraft, using anti-ship missiles, sometimes using bombs, showed the limits of the British air defense capabilities and its ships’ resilience: Two frigates, a destroyer, and two amphibious landing ships were sunk or severely damaged by the Argentine raids. According to Vidigal’s evaluation,²¹ the surface naval forces should have an air defense system (including combat aircraft, surface-air missiles of several ranges, and guns) perfectly integrated and capable of facing modern enemy weapons such as air-surface missiles and smart bombs. Naval shipbuilding also should be reviewed, according to the new survival needs of ships after being attacked, that should not use: low-melting point materials and materials which, when burnt, expel toxic fumes, such as those recently used by the British. These remarks are particularly relevant because, at that time, the Brazilian Navy’s most modern ships were precisely the British-built frigates, which had been recently commissioned.

The development of electronic warfare techniques was regarded as a priority that should be adopted by the Brazilian Navy,²² with the need for research and development of more sophisticated radars. Another aspect

highlighted in the Falklands War analysis was the importance of the software used in weapons computing systems. As a recommendation, the Brazilian officers proposed the national development of more efficient software since the most advanced versions of these products would not be for sale in the weapons market due to the strategic imposition to limit some states' military capability to reach cutting-edge technologies.

If nuclear-powered submarines were necessary for establishing control of the sea (and consequently for isolating landing troops), the aircraft carriers remained important since they provided air supremacy and power projection over land and sea. Fernando Silveira and Vidigal²³ underpinned the importance of fleets centered around aircraft carriers once their aircraft could be used in airborne early warning, logistics, lines protection, interception, amphibious operations, and close support with more extended range and flexibility than land-based aviation. Its protection, though, would depend on the availability of nuclear-powered submarines, which added to the Argentine aircraft carrier limitations and made this defeated country's platform particularly vulnerable. It was noticed that the British carrier-based fighters equipped with air-air missiles were capable of imposing heavy losses to Argentine land-based aviation. Therefore, the Falklands/Malvinas conflict would revive the importance of aircraft carriers, which led the British to interrupt the sale of the *Invincible* and the decommissioning of the *Hermes*, in order to keep three aircraft carriers, being two in operational condition and one that was being repaired.²⁴ These ships' capabilities to accommodate heavy helicopters and Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) fighters, even on improvised platforms, as the cargo ship *Atlantic Conveyor*, were seen by the authors as being fundamental for the British to be able to land the necessary infantry troops for retaking the islands.

Inland

The landing operations were prominent elements of the conflict, both during the islands' capture by the Argentineans and during their retaking by the British. However, the object that interested Brazilian analysts the most was the operations of the Royal Navy. The British amphibious force had a group of marines corps, a minimal number of landing ships (for troops and vehicles) and, mainly, support ships, helicopters, naval aviation, and the merchant navy in terms of conditions of boosting the

formation of a major force.²⁵ Great importance was placed upon helicopters' employment for reconnaissance and landing operations and the British forces' night operations capability since Argentine attack aviation could not conduct night operations. According to Umberto Martins,²⁶ the Falklands/Malvinas conflict led to a proposition to the Brazilian Navy about the need for a permanent, fixed center as the base for its entire amphibious force: It should be formed by ships that could perform command and control tasks, have docking capability to transport heavy landing ships, the means to operate an adequate number of transport helicopters and, most importantly, an organized landing force, equipped and trained to conduct amphibious assaults. Besides that, he suggests the development of a doctrine for the Brazilian amphibious forces.

The inland combats showed the conceptions of two different armed forces. Argentina occupied the archipelago with many soldiers formed mostly by conscripts, with only basic compulsory military service training. The British, for their side, were composed of volunteers that had chosen the profession of arms. This difference was particularly significant because Argentineans, now in defense positions, outnumbered the British offensive troops. This fact went against the tactical manuals that recommended that offensive forces must outnumber defensive forces threefold. Although the emphasis was placed on topics such as weaponry, equipment, and on their technologies, this organizational gap was not ignored, thus providing the Brazilian officers some lessons to learn such as the need to develop highly trained personnel and their readiness to perform special operations.²⁷ Still, no proposal to substitute compulsory military service in favor of Brazil's professional forces model was discussed.

Mobilization and Logistics

Specialized literature usually highlights the United Kingdom's capability to rapidly dispatch a task force to retake the islands and keep a supply line provided by air and sea that would stretch for thousands of kilometers between the North and South Atlantic. This capability was formed by both the availability and a degree of readiness and the potential of mobilizing merchant navy resources, shipyards, ports, and other civilian logistic systems. This mobilization was one of the points that most attracted the attention of the Brazilian military personnel.

In this context, the analysis highlighted that the British merchant navy's use, as an instrument of support, was possible due to the merchant

ships' high mobilization capability and the fast adaptation of them by the British industry. The use of modified merchant ships enhanced the action capabilities of the Royal Navy, such as the modifications performed in the cruise ships *Canberra* and *Uganda*, which received flight decks, the container ship *Atlantic Conveyor*, modified into a carrier, and several smaller ones requested and adapted to the war effort as auxiliary ships.²⁸

It was unanimous among Brazilian military personnel that the United Kingdom's rapid mobilization had a critical infrastructure supported by national industries and technologies, which caused the availability of material not to be dependent on foreign suppliers. Argentina faced this limitation. These evaluations emphasized that the Brazilian merchant navy (with their ships of different types and a relatively young fleet) would potentially be adapted for employment against possible threats and conflicts. Because of this, it was recommended that planning and mobilization instruments should be designed, similar to those employed by the British in the Falklands/Malvinas War.

FROM IDEAS TO PRACTICE: EVALUATING THE IMPACT ON THE PROGRAMS OF THE BRAZILIAN NAVY

The quest for higher levels of autonomy of arms and systems production remains until today, a critical component of the Brazilian Navy's strategic thought. As commented before, the Navy had already been building its arsenal up to six from two frigates purchased from the United Kingdom through the 1970s and 1980s. The perception regarding the Argentine difficulties with the embargo imposed by its arms suppliers (the United States and Western Europe) is in tune with the creation, in 1982, of the company *Empresa Gerencial de Projetos Navais*, EMGEPRON. According to a message sent to the National Congress in 1983, it was a state-owned company linked to the Ministry of the Navy (now the Ministry of Defense) that intended to manage programs that would lead to the nationalization of material used. In 1984, the Navy initiated a national development and production program of corvettes (*Inhaúma* class). It sealed an agreement with the German Federal Republic to acquire a diesel-electric submarine and for licensed production of 3 more ships of the same class (*Tupi*). These programs' length suffered from the budgetary restrictions that resulted from the external debt crisis of the 1980s and the public investment downturn in the 1990s. However,

despite delays and redesigns, the programs were concluded, and the Brazilian Navy still uses these ships.

The nuclear-powered submarine's story, whose development was supported by the referred authors, differs from conventional ships. The challenge of developing a nuclear-powered submarine involves a strong political dimension since no powerful country that masters this technology is inclined to cooperate. Quite the opposite, the nuclear energy and non-proliferation regulatory regimes that were being designed since the early 1960s were very restrictive in this sense. That is why the secrecy of Navy's program due to the cooperation agreements between Brazil and the United States and between Brazil and Germany vetoed any military initiative. Beyond the political dimension, the technological and engineering challenge is not simple. The secret program focused on two technologies before the submarine itself: The uranium enrichment process, necessary for the nuclear fuel, and the reactor development to be placed in the submarine. The program suffered from funding problems, both during the military regime and after democratization. Besides that, it faced opposition even from inside the Navy, where some sectors were against the relevant draining of organic resources from the fleet operation, which would feed internal conflicts.²⁹

After a long latency period, in 2007, the project grew in importance when it became to be considered as a priority. The next year, Brazil signed an agreement with France to construct new diesel-electric submarines and future nuclear-powered submarine hull. The publication of the National Defense Strategy in 2008 seems to reveal that after almost four decades, the Navy had consolidated its thought about the convenience of being equipped with nuclear-powered submarines. The emphasis on the role of the British strike submarines during the Falklands/Malvinas War seems to the Navy's prevailing thought only after an extended period. However, the resilience of the sectors that kept the complex project on course during underfunding periods and the successes obtained in uranium enrichment showed how consolidated this idea was among its supporters.

Since World War II, the Brazilian Navy has been seeking to incorporate an aircraft carrier as its fleet's backbone. Due to the lack of United States support, Brazil acquired the old HMS *Vengeance* in 1956, which underwent a modernization process in Holland and was only delivered in 1960, rebaptized as the *Minas Gerais*. Its dimensions and capabilities did not support jet operations, and its employment was in tune with the Navy's mainstream doctrine, which prioritized anti-submarine action.

At the time of the Falklands/Malvinas War, this was still the scenery in Brazil, only in 1988, the Navy incorporated attack and interceptor jets but based on land. Finally, in 2000, the Brazilian Navy started to operate a new aircraft carrier acquired from France (ex-*Foch*) and became capable of carrying its jets. The country had to wait until the turn of the century to allow its fleet's flagship to overcome the anti-submarine war paradigm that its 1970s frigate acquisition program had begun, and could be able to project power, a condition supported by officers in academic positions during the 1980s.

Concerning the merchant navy mobilization and employment in the logistics topic, it seems that the 'lessons learned' from the war were converted into concrete measures. Decree n° 89331 instituted in Brazilian law the National Maritime Policy, which was published in 1984 and had the purpose of guiding the development of the country's maritime activities, in a harmonic and integrated manner, besides being in tune with the development and security policies. Therefore, it articulated different ministries. Among the multiple actions listed, it was oriented to

Plan maritime mobilization in peacetime, including establishing rules to be followed in the construction of selected merchant ships, suiting them to rapid conversion for military employment.

The implementation and effectiveness of this policy are still to be scrutinized. However, the contraction of the Brazilian naval industry in the 1990s suggests that, at least with regard to the above action, little has been achieved.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Falklands/Malvinas War did not produce a substantial change in the Brazilian Naval thought. Its impact, according to our findings, rested on the reinforcement of its previous strategic options in order to constitute a blue-water navy supported by the national capability of shipbuilding and modern weapon systems production. The souring military ties with the United States in the 1970s, the support to the United Kingdom by Washington and the other Northern countries, and the arms embargo imposed on Argentina had significative political relevance to the Brazilian Navy. The most crucial strategic lesson from the war for the Brazilian Navy was to be wary about alliances with the Northern powers. Despite

the convergences around the Cold War agenda, it became clear that a great power would not hesitate to use force against a Southern country. So, the best way to protect its interest would be to develop autonomous military capabilities.

Thus, even under an economical crisis and a budget cuts scenery, the idea of seeking higher levels of autonomy and domestic production of weaponry was deeply rooted. The development of ships and technological mastery, such as nuclear and missiles, was perceived as an alternative to international restrictions and the risks associated with 'excessive' dependency on foreign suppliers. It is essential to observe that the quest for autonomy was not implied in autarchy since occasional purchases and cooperation agreements have been frequent since then.

The military operations assessments reinforced the shared understanding that the Brazilian Navy should be backboned by aircraft carriers (and nuclear-powered submarines), which would provide it with the speed, flexibility, and force projection they perceived in the Royal Navy. They also understood that the high-tech and precision-guided systems were successfully tested in the air-naval operations during the war, which reinforced the demands for missiles, helicopters, airplanes, and highly trained personal for the Navy. These lessons learned had different levels of impact. The logistics and mobilization legislation reforms might have been the organizational changes that were most immediately impacted by the war. The Navy kept its course seeking to produce new combatant platforms domestically and acquire engineering expertise to become a more autonomous blue-water navy. It is worth note that this course was traced in a time of economic and budgetary restraint and had many rival projects competing for scarce funding, which harmed its schedule and effectiveness.

Notwithstanding that and the almost three decades of underbudgeting, as mentioned before, the downsized programs were mostly completed. In 2008, Brazil released its National Strategy of Defense, the first all-encompassing defense posture document ever published. The chapter devoted to the Navy reaffirmed, once again, the long-term strategy of developing the capacity to design and manufacture surface and submarine warships and their weapon systems as well. The priority given to sea denial and force projection in the document can be understood as a longstanding echo of the learned lessons from the 1982's war.

The subject we approached here demands an unfolding research agenda. There are essential documents from the Brazilian Navy Chief

of Staff, intelligence, and other departments not yet declassified or consulted. Broadly, the Falklands/Malvinas War's impact within other Third World intermediate state navies and its comparative assessment remains to be done. Such a research agenda would improve our knowledge about military thought and an essential set of countries' strategic options.

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Argentine Strategies Towards the Falklands/Malvinas Since the Democratic Transition, 1983–2018

Alejandro Simonoff

INTRODUCTION

The dispute over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands' sovereignty between Argentina and the United Kingdom is an overly sensitive subject in the Argentine public debate, particularly after 1982. Although the conflict implied a tabula rasa in the negotiations, as pointed out by Juan Carlos Puig, two predominant forms of strategies preceded it and dated from the sanction of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution n° 2065 on December 16, 1965. On the one hand, to seek a “collective legitimization of the answering positions adopted by the claiming country.” On the other hand, to carry on economic cooperation with the United Kingdom, “that had nothing to do with the controversy.”¹ The contemporary Argentine scholars have been failing to escape the gravitational weight of those strategic poles. Autonomist and Sociohistorical Schools

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were more sensitive to the former, while those of the Neoconservative and Neoliberal Schools pointed to the latter.²

However, any prospect for improving Argentine-British relations and the Falklands/Malvinas issue requires understanding Argentine contemporary foreign policy better than a simple duality. According to this, the present chapter reconstructs Argentine foreign policy since the Falklands/Malvinas War. It critically assesses Argentine public and academic debates, suggesting more variations of the Argentine foreign policy-making from Raúl Alfonsín to Mauricio Macri administration. It offers a preliminary appraisal of Alberto Fernández's new government.

The chapter follows as this. The second section resumes the state of Argentine-British relations until the rupture of 1982. The third one assesses the Argentine foreign policy from 1983 to 2018, arguing that Argentina's permanent goal has been to normalize the relations with the United Kingdom, or, at least, to return to a pre-war pattern of relationship. But the Argentine foreign policy strategies fluctuated depending on domestic and external factors and the actual state of negotiations with the British delegations. The last section summarizes this chapter and provides some scenarios and recommendations.

THE DISPUTE OVER FALKLANDS/MALVINAS UNTIL THE WAR

From the dispossession carried out by the United Kingdom in 1833, Argentina made claims during the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, trying to avoid prescribing the problem. It should be noted that, during this period, the Falklands/Malvinas Islands' sovereignty was at the bottom of Argentine foreign policy's priorities, given the decision to preserve the relations with the United Kingdom. Not coincidentally, when the international system's changes ceased the British global primacy, Argentine claim over Falklands/Malvinas' sovereignty was raised as a political objective. For instance, the first Argentine reservations upon the issue were made within the 1940 Pan-American Conference framework in Havana and at the United Nations' foundation in the immediate post-war period.

Since Juan Domingo Perón's first term (1946–1952), and in the successive administrations, the related measures taken were almost exclusively internally rather than external. Only in Arturo Umberto Illia administration (1963–1966), Argentina promoted the problem within

the United Nations Decolonization Committee framework before the Islanders could proclaim their independence. The territorial dispute was reduced to an abstract question.³ His administration set three objectives: (1) to restore the territorial unity of Argentina while affirming its sovereign rights over the islands; (2) to reject any attempt of self-determination of the Islanders and as an indigenous population; (3) to achieve a Decolonization Committee resolution instrumental at achieving the first objective.⁴

The approval of Resolution n° 2065 of the United Nations General Assembly, in December 1965, was based on recognizing the colonial situation and invited the parties to end it through peaceful negotiation. It was an act of political acumen, having a sense of opportunity that showed a remarkably high degree of pragmatism. Since this resolution, Argentina has maintained that the Islands' sovereignty was a bilateral issue, based on territorial integrity and not on self-determination.⁵ Opposing the British position, Argentina had qualified Islanders' "interests" only about preserving their way of life and never acknowledged them as a third party.

Authors such as Carlos Escudé challenged this position, believing that there were two opposing nation models in the negotiation process: the Anglo-Saxon model and the *Volksgeist*.⁶ The United Kingdom represented the first model in which citizens' rights are in harmony with those of the nation-state. In second, as is the case in Argentina, the citizens would be below the state's interests.⁷

Dictator Juan Carlos Onganía (1966–1970) initially went ahead with the process of negotiation. In August of 1968, it reached an agreement for a memorandum of understanding, which, as noted by Archibaldo Lanús, "contains the most explicit commitment by the United Kingdom on the eventual transfer to the Argentine State of the sovereignty exercised over the islands."⁸ Instead, the military government delayed responding, which led the British to dismiss the proposal and waste the opportunity.⁹ Following this failure, during the dictatorship, the Alejandro Augustín Lanusse (1971–1973) administration sought a seduction-type strategy, consisting of regular trips to the islands, educational exchanges, health exchanges, among other aspects claimed by the British from the beginning. From the Shackleton incident in 1976 to the 1982's war, the subsequent events marked the escalation of the Falklands/Malvinas issue.

On February 4, 1976, a British economic survey expedition carried out by Lord Shackleton to the archipelago ended up granting them a

new strategic relevance due to the acknowledgment of existing natural resources. The controversy generated the interruption of bilateral relations. Since 1978, diplomatic ties have resumed based on agreeing to an annual meeting to discuss the dispute. However, differences persisted in incorporating the Falklands/Malvinas Islanders (*Kelpers*) into the negotiations and consideration given to their wishes. Argentina rejected them and the lease proposal, initially driven by both the Labor Party and the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher.¹⁰

The lack of definition in the negotiations was aggravated by dictator Leopoldo F. Galtieri (1981–1982) and the Foreign Minister Nicolás Costa Méndez, who sought new ways to hinder them proposing an impossible deadline for the British.¹¹ It had to do with the decision to boost the armed conflict due to the economic problems that resulted from the military regime's monetarist policy. The intervention solution to the islands had no objective other than guaranteeing the military's permanence in power instead of claiming the islands' sovereignty. Furthermore, as Figari says:

The Malvinas War has been a clear example of the irrational adventure of attempting to do justice for oneself [...]. It was not negotiated as indicated and ended in certain speculations that culminated in an irrational war, which only had Latin American countries' moral support first and the Non-Alienated Movement later.¹²

As noted by Carlos Escudé, the war caused Argentina's international isolation and was the culmination of a series of mistakes: the character of the military government, the systematic violation of human rights, the financial scandals, and the decision to declare void the international arbitration of the territorial disputes with Chile.¹³ In the British understanding, the Argentine defeat closed the possibility of continuing negotiations over the islands.

In general terms, the Falklands/Malvinas War was the terminal point of the military regime securing a stable political system. It highlighted the fragility of Argentina's foreign policy and the bad image it had of itself.

TABULA RASA NEGOTIATIONS

The Argentine political objective for the Falklands/Malvinas, defined by all administrations since democratic transition, has been to return to

the state of pre-war bilateral negotiations. However, Argentine administrations performed several strategies to achieve it. The present section assesses all of them from 1983 to 2018.

*The Negotiations During the Alfonsín Administration (1983–1989):
The Multilateral Option as the Only Way*

In its 1983's Radical Civic Union (UCR) platform, Raúl Alfonsín's political party stated that it would defend territorial integrity "through the recovery of the Falklands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, subject to colonial domination" and that it would promote "their recovery and definitive integration into the national territory through compliance with the Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly on this issue, in particular 2065 and 37/9."¹⁴ It also denounced as a threat to the country "the installation of military and nuclear base established by the United Kingdom in the Falkland Islands and the exclusion zone declared by that country."¹⁵

Raúl Alfonsín's administration firstly sought a bilateral negotiation route that failed in the Bern meeting of 1984 as the British representatives demanded "the previous and expressed abandonment, on the part of Argentina, of the claim of sovereignty."¹⁶ They also demanded the cessation of any antagonisms regarding the islands.¹⁷ Both issues made further dialogue impossible,¹⁸ which is the reason the issue had an unprivileged profile but yet kept alive by Argentina in international forums such as the Decolonization Committee and the United Nations General Assembly.¹⁹ With the improvement of relations with the United States, the Alfonsín government sought a mediation that allowed it to advance in the design of the sovereignty umbrella theory, which was later reflected in the Madrid Accords of 1989.

Conversely, the signing of fishing agreements with the Soviet Union in 1986 meant the implicit recognition of "the Argentine sovereignty over the waters around the Falkland Islands, becoming a fantastic precedent."²⁰ This fact produced an interpretative controversy between several authors. For example, according to Carlos Escudé, this situation complicated relations with the United Kingdom and the United States, as they were challenged by introducing the Soviets into the area.²¹ For others, as Robert Russell points out, although:

Washington was not happy with these agreements (with the USSR) [...]. It maintained a consistent support position towards Argentina as part of its new policy of defense and promotion of democracy in Latin America [...]. It acted as a transmission belt of the so-called non-papers between Argentina, and the United Kingdom tend to maintain an informal contact between the parties after the frustrated Bern bilateral meeting of 1984 and helped avoid friction between Buenos Aires and London over the Malvinas issue.²²

From another standpoint, Mario Rapoport stated that the problem of the Falklands/Malvinas showed, on the one hand, the difficulties of a strategy that contemplated “a substantial part of its economic, commercial and political relations in the two superpowers”; and on the other, the government’s “increasingly reduced” margins for maneuver.²³

*The Negotiations in the Menem Administrations (1989–1999):
Bilateralism and Seduction Strategy*

Despite the electoral campaign’s bellicose tone, the Menem administration decided to implement the bilateral negotiation outlined by the United States mediation and abandon Argentina’s previous multilateral strategy.

According to Soukassian, Menem administration privileged the strategy of restarting bilateral relations. It became feasible by his negotiation team composed by: Foreign Minister Domingo Cavallo, his personal advisor, Aldo Dadone, and the Director for the Falklands/Malvinas, José María Otegui, as well as the ambassadors Lucio García del Solar and Mario Cámpora.²⁴

They applied the sovereignty umbrella formula in the negotiations, highlighted in Madrid I and II agreements.²⁵ It consisted of protecting each party’s rights concerning the archipelagos and surrounding maritime areas. It was actually a stumbling block for normalizing diplomatic, consular, and economic relations. For some authors, such as Federico Bernal, this strategy was a lukewarm approach that “meant a postponement of the sovereignty claim.”²⁶

Even so, those negotiations ran into the presidential announcement of February 1992 to take the issue to international arbitration, an aspect that “had not been duly studied by the Foreign Minister.”²⁷ As a rejection of

this, Carlos Escudé resigned as a government advisor. His position can be summarized in four points:

1. The Argentine rights over the islands are real, but much more relative than the Argentine public believes;
2. The legal issue is too complicated and ambiguous that the case will never be resolved around these considerations;
3. The solution to the problem of the sovereignty issue will eventually come through practical considerations;
4. The only possibility for Argentina to be included in this solution is demonstrating to the world, the United Kingdom, and the Islanders that it meets minimum stability and reliability conditions.²⁸

The restoration of negotiations with the concession to British priority on the economic agenda engendered domestic criticism over Menem, especially related to fishing and hydrocarbon extraction. In the former, the Squid Fishing Agreement claimed that “Argentina was limited to fishing this species, the islanders’ main resource.”²⁹ In turn, in the latter, the signing of a Joint Declaration on Cooperation in oil activities in the Southwestern Atlantic presented some difficulties. It has a declaration signed by both countries but not really “joint,” as it was opened to explanatory notes of each of them.³⁰

Although it was just a statement and not a treaty (which denotes the evasion of a parliamentary procedure due to the ambiguity of its contents), it was the first bilateral commitment toward cooperation. It evolved to a Joint Hydrocarbon Commission, promoting companies’ participation from both countries, and preventing any action that could frustrate these undertakings. The unilateral Argentine declaration indicated that its collaboration did not imply the British claim’s recognition, nor imply accepting a British right to summon a drilling offering.³¹ It only marked Argentine refrainment from taking discriminatory measures regarding the companies’ rights that operate in the area. The expansion of the exploitation zone to areas not in the litigation granted Argentina the levy payment. The benefits and scope of the arrangement generated a severe controversy.

The government has claimed—or rather, sources close to him—that this agreement “represents a huge and unexpected diplomatic achievement.”³² Nevertheless, the former Foreign Minister Caputo said that,

with the signing of this agreement, the sovereignty umbrella became insufficient to protect Argentine interests. According to him, “we grant our sovereignty over a resource,” reducing it to an “abstract, ungraspable, and indefinable issue while granting another concrete, tangible and precise, as is the exploitation of the Malvinas oil basin.”³³ Besides, the existence of oil led to:

The issue will no longer be a discussion on natural resources that serve to finance the Falkland Islanders, becoming a strategic interest for the British, which will require, in the 21st century, sources of hydrocarbons to replace those of the North Sea.³⁴

Those negotiations highlighted the weakness of the Argentine government’s position against the defense of its sovereign rights. The Menem administration did not know how to take advantage of the British interest in restoring trade and the flow of investments in Argentina, betting on a presidential trip that obtained no real advances. The undeniable, though symbolic, exception was the British permission for the Argentine families to retrieve the soldiers’ bodies from the islands.

Furthermore, the Menem administration shifted to a “seduction” strategy toward the *kelpers*, stating “that it would consider both the interests and the wishes of the Falklands Islanders,” which was a historical mistake.³⁵ For its execution, it was necessary first to silence any voice that could place “objections” to this action in the Argentine department responsible for the Falklands/Malvinas. Consequently, Guido Di Tella stepped up as Argentine foreign minister during a moment in which “the decision circle became extremely confusing.”³⁶

The seduction strategy consisted of a means of approaching the Islanders, but ambiguously. The Argentine government signaled to the *kelpers* at the same time it declared they were not a part of the negotiations. In this context, it worried about the Islanders’ level of progress in handling several aspects, as their claim of independence became reliable in the face of new resources to exploit.

The approach was strongly contested by Menem’s opposition in the parliament, which maintained that the government delegated the Islands’ sovereignty.³⁷ For instance, the previous Foreign Minister Oscar Camilión stated that, despite “it has the clear merit of making the dialogue fluid [...], London had not shown any sign of flexibility in the core issue.”³⁸ Consequently, the seduction strategy entered a period of stagnation in

1996. The government decided to return to international forums and began to consider other strategies such as compensation to the Falklands Islanders or shared sovereignty to push the issue again.

Two new factors have generated an opportunity to resume the conversations in the following year. The arrival of a Labor administration in the British government coincided with the imprisonment of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet in London.³⁹ The British concession to the extradition request of the Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón led Chile to suspend regular flights to the Islands, leaving them isolated. Though reduced to a protocol trip, Menem's visit to the United Kingdom aimed to profit from the incident, launch new conversations, and regularize the Argentine-British relations.

The development of the situation galvanized a non-partisanship position toward the Islands in the Argentine parliament, where the resumption of the dialogue with the United Kingdom received overall support.⁴⁰ That allowed the progress of negotiations on flights between Argentina and the islands. However, they were interrupted once again due to British missteps that eroded the Argentine government's political base. On the one hand, the British delegation was composed of Foreign Office members and officials of the Falklands/Malvinas government council. On the other hand, the British visa requirement for Argentines to visit the Falklands/Malvinas caused further controversy because it implied the islands were a different territory. Naturally, Argentina refused any agreement or sign that converted the Falklands/Malvinas into a trilateral issue.

Negotiations in the de La Rúa Administration (1999–2001): Return to Multilateralism, Abandonment of the Seduction Strategy, and the Hong Kong Formula

The Fernando de La Rúa's electoral campaign designed a strategy toward the Falklands/Malvinas to continue with the bilateral negotiations initiated after the Madrid Accords. However, it defended the replacement of the seduction strategy to return to the multilateral path called by the United Nations Resolution n° 2065 of 1965.⁴¹

In his inaugural speech, Fernando de la Rúa highlighted stated, as one of his six objectives for his foreign policy, the continuation of the constitutional mandate to recover sovereignty over the Falklands/Malvinas Islands.⁴² Rodríguez Giavarini reaffirmed these guidelines in his speech

of appointment as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in December 1999, when he remarked that he would seek the islands' sovereignty by peaceful means. The negotiations would be maintained at two levels: bilateral with the Kingdom United and multilateral with the UN and the OAS.⁴³

The abandonment of the seduction strategy led to criticism from former Foreign Minister Guido Di Tella, who said that "there was no progress in recent years regarding the sovereignty over the Falklands/Malvinas."⁴⁴ He also described the management of implementing a "policy of hostility (that) leads to nothing but more hostility."⁴⁵ Even the prominent ideological supporter of the 1990s politics, Carlos Escudé, condemned multilateral diplomacy as "merely a secondary instrument for the proposed strategic objective."⁴⁶ These perspectives granted the:

Responsibilities to Minister Rodríguez Giavarini for having broken the communication established between the Foreign Ministry and the Malvinas government during the Di Tella years, which, as it was said, broke the task of approaching the population on the island.⁴⁷

At the bilateral level, there were several meetings between the Argentine President and the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, which can be highlighted. The first was held in November 1999, before the inauguration of De la Rúa, at the Conference of Social Democratic Parties held in Paris, in which the Falklands/Malvinas was only mentioned. The other took place in Iguazú in July 2001, when the Labor Party officials maintained that it was one among many other points toward the definitive normalization of bilateral relations after the 1982's war. These talks favored trade issues as the British were accompanied by representatives of Jaguar, British Petroleum, Shell, and Rolls-Royce, among others, to discuss investments in Argentina. For the British government, that agenda prevailed because the Argentine domestic crisis and the economic depression served to keep at bay the controversial issue regarding the Falklands/Malvinas Islands.⁴⁸ For the Argentine government, it was necessary to create an environment of trust with the British, which would allow progress on the Falklands/Malvinas issue.

Thus, the bilateral relations developed by addressing converging issues such as investments, positions in the World Trade Organization, United Nations peacekeeping operations, and the Socialist International meetings in which De la Rúa and Blair's political parties participated. Both leaders

enabled a rapprochement, which would open the dialogue on sovereignty in the long run.⁴⁹

One achievement of this approach was the end of the British veto against the Antarctic Treaty Organization setting headquarters in Buenos Aires. That step forward was also achieved by lowering the topic's profile and some readjustment in Antarctic bases' positioning. For Foreign Minister Adalberto Rodríguez Giavarini, it was the product of "a firm and realistic dialogue (that) had allowed cooperation and understanding on other fronts."⁵⁰

Meanwhile, the Islanders unilaterally called for an oil tender in February and April of 2000, which led to Argentina publicly rejected Falklands/Malvinas sovereignty and a call for the United Kingdom to negotiate. That year was marked by several incidents regarding Argentine fishing vessels in the islands' economic exclusion zone.

At the multilateral level, in the years 2000 and 2001, presentations were given to the United Nations Decolonization Committee, in which sovereignty and the will to settle the controversy was demanded through peaceful negotiation. According to Rodríguez Giavarini:

The progress of the relationship is also measured in the understanding achieved in the year 2001 for aircraft flight and the transit of private civil vessels between the mainland and the Malvinas Islands, the decision of a feasibility study for the demining of the Malvinas Islands, the meeting of the Fisheries Commission, which seeks to avoid illegal fishing in Argentine waters, and the implementation of binational scientific research cruises.⁵¹

In addition to the Foreign Ministry's steps, the Secretariat of South Atlantic Affairs was created. Under the responsibility of Ambassador Susana Ruiz Cerruti, it has as attributions to explore new alternatives, including taking the dispute to the International Court of Justice.

A new strategy, known as "Hong Kong Formula," was proposed. It referred to the British commitment in 1984 to deliver the territory to Beijing in 1997, acknowledging that city's particularities and its inhabitants for fifty years after its restitution to China. The Argentine case attracted criticism from several analysts, such as Carlos Soukassian, who, similarly to Escudé, stated that "it is impossible to reach a definitive and categorical answer regarding who has the right of sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands." When Argentina occupied the islands in 1820,

“it obtained rudimentary ownership over the Islands, based on expectations” and that the United Kingdom “can make a strong case of having perfected its ownership by the continuous and effective occupation and subsequent formal incorporation of the island into the British Colonial Empire.” Another variable—not at all minor—indicated by the author was “the composition of the Court and its judges’ nationalities.”⁵² Finally, the similarities between the Falklands/Malvinas and Gibraltar were remarkable and interconnected as the former’s resolution would have complicated the latter’s case, which has greater strategic relevance.⁵³ For such reasons, Giavarini’s Hong Kong formula was abandoned in June 2001.

The Provisional Presidency of Duhalde (2001–2003): Political Crisis and Negotiations at a Minimum Degree

Here, it was possible to observe the continuity of the foreign policy carried out by the previous administration. It claimed sovereignty over the islands, with a bilateral negotiation policy, which achieved the approval for constructing the monument for the fallen Argentines in the war and kept the multilateral negotiations (e.g., the UN Committee on Decolonization).

It should be noted that this government had to face delicate situations both internally (political, economic, and social) and externally (the Iraq War, negotiations with international credit agencies, and the MERCOSUR). Therefore, its lower degree of action regarding the islands can be understood.

The Kirchner Administrations (2003–2015): Multilateral Impulse and Bilateral Changes

In Néstor Kirchner’s electoral proposal, the issue of Falklands/Malvinas was highlighted. It raised the need “to ensure a multilateral approach and the policies of alliances, as well as an increase in the permanence and entry into international forums to obtain support.” It also qualified the matter as “indispensable” for Argentina.⁵⁴

On the day of his inauguration, May 25, 2003, President Néstor Kirchner stated that he would claim sovereignty both bilaterally, as he did at the 23rd Meeting of the South Atlantic Fisheries Commission, and at international forums, whether in the case of the United Nations

Decolonization Committee and other international organizations, such as the OAS or Mercosur.⁵⁵ However, his administration had to face several issues, such as the Islanders' reluctance to grant Argentine flights to the islands, the indiscriminate exploitation as result of islands' wide concession of fishing licenses that led to the scarcity of these resources, and other issues hampered the bilateral relationships. For instance, incorporating the islands as an Overseas Territory within the Constitution of the European Union.

As a result, in 2007, the Argentine government communicated the United Kingdom its decision to terminate the 1990s agreement of hydrocarbons exploration in the Falklands/Malvinas area. Foreign Minister Taiana pointed out:

The United Kingdom can no longer claim to justify, from the letter and spirit of the agreement, its illegitimate unilateral action on our continental shelf, leading to the discontinuation, seven years ago, of the bilateral commission established by the understanding.⁵⁶

The decision was based on severe divergences of interpretation on applying the agreement the parties faced from the moment of its conclusion.⁵⁷ Actually, Argentina signaled the desire to replace the terms in which the bilateral relationship had been maintained since the 1990s, with effects on legal security to British unilateral concessions. As Bruno Bologna stated:

The strategy designed by the Kirchner Administration seems appropriate and far from the policy of seducing the Falkland Islanders, which did not yield satisfactory results despite the repeated opportunities in which it was employed. For the first time, the islands' inhabitants are dissatisfied with Argentina, not for legal, political, or military reasons, but rather because they have been affected in terms of income.⁵⁸

The British response was immediate. It requested the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf its maritime sovereignty over the area under dispute islands and Antarctica. For this reason, President Kirchner expressed "his strong rejection" of the United Kingdom's claim.⁵⁹

The Cristina Fernández de Kirchner administration sustained the same tune to mark the abandonment of the seduction strategy of the 1990s and an attempt to promote bilateral and multilateral negotiations. In her inauguration, she noted the fact of the "irreversible and irrevocable claim,"

and the denunciation of the existence of “a situation of a colonial enclave denounced before the United Nations, and that it is time to fulfill the mandate of those same United Nations of which we are all part.”⁶⁰

On March 11, 2008, Foreign Minister Taiana met with members of the Commission of Relatives of the Fallen in the Falklands/Malvinas and South Atlantic Islands, promising to promote new efforts to finalize the inauguration of the monument in the Falklands/Malvinas. It was inaugurated in 2009, and the President noted in the United Nations:

We have been able to agree. [...] They have their dead buried on the islands, in the South. They have been able to travel by plane to inaugurate the cenotaph, in which a tribute is paid to the memory of those who fought fighting for the homeland.⁶¹

The Argentine government came to the new crossroads of domestic criticisms when it submitted its technical report to UNCLOS to the definitive delimitation of the Argentine continental shelf extension to 350 miles. Although rejecting them publicly, a new version of the report included the Falklands/Malvinas, South Georgia, and South Sandwich Islands territory as integral parts of the Argentine national territory.⁶²

In a further step toward the Islanders' autonomy, the Gordon Brown administration promoted their new constitution's sanction. Its entry into force led to a protest by the Argentine government, which announced that it would denounce the international community's “flagrant violation of Argentine sovereignty and international law.”⁶³

The beginning of 2010 was marked by the initiative of British oil exploration of the islands and the Argentine measures to prevent them. By the publication of the presidential decree n° 256, the Kitchener administration hindered the shipment from the continent and indicated sanctions to Argentine companies operating there. She also expressed her displeasure with the situation by a stark declaration at the Latin American and Caribbean Unity Summit in Cancun on February 22, 2010.

Since then, bilateral relations have achieved a new level of tension. Initially, as indicated by the US Embassy transcribed by Wikileaks, the decree n° 256/10 “does not affect the islands' oil production and economy, as long as supply routes remain open from Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil.”⁶⁴ However, the escalation would change that in the following two years.

The United Kingdom's first response was increasingly aggressive rhetoric. The British Prime Minister accused Argentina of "colonialism," which was rejected by Argentina.⁶⁵ But, when the British conducted military exercises with missiles in the islands, the tension generated Argentine protests in October 2010 and international attention.

During his visit to Argentina in the same month, the chairman of the UN Decolonization Committee, Donatus Keith St. Aimee, met with President Kitchener and her foreign minister, acknowledging that it will take time to solve the conflict and asked the country for "patience." In an interview conducted by the newspaper *Tiempo Argentino*, he acknowledged that "the parties have agreed that the interests of the inhabitants of the islands should be taken into consideration."⁶⁶ As a response, in December 2010, the British began to pressure the UN to change its position of support for the negotiations on the Falklands/Malvinas through notes to the Decolonization Committee. Later, the United Kingdom invited Mr. St. Aimee to visit the islands and learn British position concerning the archipelago.

One interesting aspect was the United States' public response through its Secretary of State. Hillary Clinton argued that the dispute was "a bilateral issue that needs to be addressed by the governments" and acknowledged that "management is de facto of the United Kingdom, but we will not take a position concerning sovereignty."⁶⁷

The oil debate, the rejection of the military exercises, and the claim made by the Kitchener in the United Nations marked an almost regular rhythm for the Falklands/Malvinas issue until the end of her administration. Her multilateral commitment had many critics, as shown in the oil issue, with arguments on establishing cooperative policies toward the *kelpers* and resume the seduction strategy. The situation led to a public debate on the policy that Argentina should follow to recover the islands. Many voices appeared in their criticisms of the decree sustained and the lack of cooperation toward the Islanders and supporting the seduction strategy of the 1990s.

Nonetheless, the overall situation achieved its peak from the moment Argentina received South American support. On December 20, 2011, Mercosur's member countries started to deny the berthing of ships with the Falklands/Malvinas flag.⁶⁸ When Argentina received Chilean support, British authorities tried to reverse it but without success.⁶⁹ Moreover, the United Kingdom used the excuse of Prince William's visit to the islands

and the proximity of the thirtieth anniversary of the war to increase the military presence in the area, which was also denounced by Argentina.⁷⁰

In rhetoric escalation, the Kitchener instructed Foreign Minister Timerman, on February 7, 2012, to denounce the United Kingdom for the “militarization” carried out by the British on the islands before the United Nations, while establishing a commission to disseminate the Rattenbach Report.⁷¹

On February 25, the Argentine Foreign Relations Committees of the Chamber of Deputies and the National Senate, meeting in Tierra del Fuego’s province, vindicated the Argentine position regarding the islands. It ratified “the legitimate and imprescriptible sovereignty of the Argentine Republic over the Falkland, South Georgia, South Sandwich Islands, and the surrounding maritime spaces” and condemned the militarization carried out by the British, in the so-called Ushuaia Declaration.⁷²

An accommodation started to be set up in early 2013, when the Kitchener government sent a letter to Prime Minister David Cameron, inviting him to “abide by United Nations resolutions” on the conflict.⁷³ Besides, the Argentine government continued with its strategy of adding international accessions in favor of negotiation, an aspect in which fundamental advances must be acknowledged.⁷⁴

The British reaction was mixed. On the one hand, it attempted to formalize a meeting with Timerman’s official visit to London. On the other hand, the British Foreign Office attempted to add representatives of the Islanders once more. Argentina rejected it, noting that “the international community does not accept the third party.”⁷⁵ Moreover, the call for a referendum on the part of the Falkland Islanders to decide if they wish to continue under British sovereignty was another blow against bilateral talks’ return. On March 11, 2013, a referendum was held on the Falklands/Malvinas Islands, in which 99.8% of the voters adhered to the idea of remaining under British administration as a British Overseas Territory.⁷⁶ The Argentine government rejected the referendum under the same argument that the *kelpers* were an implanted and non-native population.⁷⁷

Besides the strategy of “Latin Americanization of the agenda,” Cristina Kitchener tried to connect the Falklands/Malvinas issue to the other economic and other strategic interests at stake:

I believe that later than sooner, or sooner than later, we will discuss sovereignty, as ordered by the United Nations. Once again, we request

that the British government negotiate, considering the United Nations' multilateral organization, which orders that we discuss sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands.⁷⁸

Nonetheless, despite some positive results, Kitchener's strategies were insufficient to take the Falklands/Malvinas issue from a marginal and stagnation spot in Argentine domestic politics, with two exceptions. On the one hand, in the context of Kitchener administration disputes with the Judiciary, it criticized the highest court for refusing to consider veterans' torture and harassment by Argentine officers during the Falklands/Malvinas War. On the other hand, it encouraged the veterans to seek justice in the instance of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Perhaps, the best evidence of that lack of attraction is that, although the Falklands/Malvinas issue marked the whole of Kitchener's presidential terms, it received no mention in her final speech.⁷⁹

The Macri Administration (2015–2019): Business Desires on the Rise and Displacement of the Falklands/Malvinas Issue

Concerning the Falklands/Malvinas, the Macri administration aimed to privilege economic cooperation over sovereignty discussion, as evidenced in the bilateral meeting of May 2016. It claimed that both governments highlighted "the positions of their respective countries and agreed that the disagreement on this topic (Falklands/Malvinas) should not hinder the development of a broader positive agenda."⁸⁰ Although the Falklands/Malvinas did not occupy any more a central place in Argentine foreign policy, it continued generating discomfort, as expressed by its Foreign Minister, Marcos Novaro⁸¹ which he publicly stated:

Here is the most challenging issue to be dismantled. We have a truly clear vision regarding our claim over the Malvinas, which is indisputable. As said before, this is part of our responsibility as civil servants before the Constitution's provisions. That is to say, there is no discussion regarding the Falklands/Malvinas issue.⁸²

Unlike Cristian Fernández's, the priority of this administration on the agenda with the United Kingdom was not the islands' sovereignty, but rather:

In the United Kingdom case, we feel that there is an opportunity to take advantage of many opportunities to do business, trade, and investment. Nevertheless, we also wish to keep open the dialogue with the United Kingdom to work on a possible solution to this long-standing problem.⁸³

That approach coincided with those carried out during the Argentine Revolution, the National Reorganization Process, and the Menem Presidency. They were characterized by an attempt to focus on economic cooperation between Argentina and the United Kingdom and favoring the latter's main objective of relegating the issue of Falklands/Malvinas' sovereignty to the background.⁸⁴

I strongly believe in the principle of sitting at the table. It applies to hold-outs. It applies to the U.S. It applies to the United Kingdom and, in the bigger picture, to the Falklands/Malvinas. I am not suggesting that the subject is going to be resolved in one night. I believe that it has deep roots in both sides [...]. I only know that we will be closer to a solution when we sit down at the table – and that is what I think we should do [...]. There are no expectations of a quick result, but we have expectations regarding a conversation that can bring to the table some measures that will give both parties the confidence to find a way to solve the problem.⁸⁵

That marked the return of the so-called Hong Kong Formula from De la Rúa's time, which consisted of establishing negotiation parameters like China's former British colony. In the Falklands/Malvinas' case, a negotiation mechanism was established for approaching the issue from various aspects to build confidence.

Unlike the Fernando de la Rúa's, the Macri administration conceded to the British long position of embracing the Islanders. It developed a strategy referred to as "Humanitarian Base Plan," which consisted of "restoring relations with the Falkland Islanders" based on healthcare aid, trading fresh food, and even "re-enabling the Mercosur countries to reopen trade" with them.⁸⁶ Therefore, Macri also returned to an approach similar to the Menem administration's seduction strategy, abandoned since 1999.

Another important change in the Argentine government was the downgrading of Malvinas' Secretariat to an under-secretariat, "as it has traditionally been," as mistakenly noted by the Foreign Minister Susana Malcorra.⁸⁷ In compliance to the Argentine Senate request for inquire, she explained that the sovereignty dispute "is our most important latent

conflict” and that the bureaucratic reorganization did not imply “devaluing” the issue, but rather “revaluing it, as I personally take care of it.”⁸⁸

In August 2016, the new British Prime Minister, Theresa May, sent a letter to President Macri advocating the negotiation of two relegated points of British interest in the Falklands/Malvinas Islands: the expansion of flight frequencies and the “lifting of the restrictions on prospecting for oil in the disputed island territory.”⁸⁹ The Argentine government considered the requests in the following month, and a Joint Argentine-British Declaration, known as Foradori-Duncan, was announced. It addressed the points claimed by the Prime Minister but advanced the other two. The authorization to identify the Argentine soldiers’ bodies in the Darwin Cemetery and the return to talks about sovereignty’s umbrella.⁹⁰ As the former Foreign Minister Jorge Taiana correctly evaluated:

The British interest in achieving the best conditions to guarantee the exploitation of islands’ resources is evident. At the same time, the Argentine government seeks more cooperation on some issues in which it is not noticeably clear what the contribution would be from Great Britain or the supposed benefit for our country.⁹¹

Like 20 years before, the extraction and exploitation of natural resources, which were also the subject of the dispute, would be enabled, under the promise of doing them jointly. Likewise, it also possibly condemned the issue of Falklands/Malvinas’ sovereignty to remain *sine die*.

The Argentine commitment to clear the agenda of oil and fishing issues mitigated the logistical and cost problems of exploitation of the resources for the British.⁹² It seems to have been developed without considering two relevant events: expanding Argentine maritime limits and the Brexit. Although the disputed territory was exempted, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf granted to Argentina 1633 square kilometers, which meant an addition of 35% to its economic exclusive zone. It has been an excellent achievement for Buenos Aires’ claim in the islands’ territorial dispute.⁹³ Meanwhile, the referendum’s result for the British exit from the European Union was another favorable news from the Argentine perspective. As indicated by Roberto García Moritá, it hindered the islands’ fish production access to the European Union, the destination of 73% of it, and representing 60% of their economic revenue.⁹⁴

Those events would create economic as well as diplomatic opportunities for Argentina. Notably, the European Union may already have changed its position on territorial disputes. For instance, Brussels considered the dispute between Spain and the United Kingdom over Gibraltar as a “colonial issue.”⁹⁵ As Martín García Moritán, current Argentine Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations highlighted: “Perhaps the greatest success of Spanish diplomacy is having made the Gibraltar issue a relevant issue in the process of the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union.”⁹⁶

A few months later, the same ambassador specified the difficulties that Brexit generates for British overseas possessions:

The question is whether London will contribute effectively to the universe of needs of most of the colonies and the eight military bases it has abroad. This scenario will test the financial capacity and, among others, British logistics, both military and civil, to continue to maintain an extended global presence. Former Chancellor Willem Hague had already warned that Brexit could accelerate the disintegration of the last remnants of colonialism.⁹⁷

Conversely, Macri’s latest Foreign Minister, Jorge Faurie, pointed out that any change in the case of the Falklands/Malvinas will need a different pace of developments:

It will be the pace and needs of Brexit. Although the Islanders do not have the slightest confidence in the Argentines, they could begin to change their attitude “if Argentina ends the Kirchner government’s economic sanctions.” The second point would be “to consider that the Islanders exist, that we are people and we matter,” as the former island councilor Mike Summers puts it.⁹⁸

In several Argentine media outlets, he declared the Islanders “feel that they can come to Argentina (sic) to educate themselves, to attend to health issues, and to do business.” Accordingly, he developed that a new Argentine strategy should be aimed at:

[...] create confidence for economic and commercial integration and British investments in Argentina’s opportunities in energy, infrastructure, mining, tourism, and the agricultural sector.⁹⁹

Faurie defended that course of action before the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, even ambiguously qualifying the *kelpers* as “a people”—something that Argentina historically rejects because it considers them an implanted population.¹⁰⁰ Another drawback occurred in December 2016, when both governments announced the beginning of the soldiers’ identification tasks buried in the Darwin Cemetery on Soledad Island. However, as Carlos Biangardi points out, both in the joint declaration of August and in the protocol with the Red Cross:

The Argentine government [...] saves the responsibility of the British for the violation of operational practices about the treatment of human remains and information on the deceased, assumes joint responsibility for identifying their dead, continues to admit that a private entity finds it obliged to maintain a War Cemetery in territory occupied by the adversary’s armed forces, which are obliged to take care of it in compliance with the Geneva Conventions, and presents it as a success of its diplomacy.¹⁰¹

At the end of 2017, progress was made in identifying 88 graves of the 123 without identification in the Darwin Cemetery. However, it is worrying how the underlying problem, the discussion about the islands’ sovereignty, continued to be encapsulated in the remake of the failed seduction strategy of the 1990s, which seemed to have failed again in 2010s. The British authorities manifested throughout 2018, on several occasions, their complaint about the Foradori-Duncan Agreements. It lacked progress to “remove obstacles” to flights to the archipelago allowed the development of trade, navigation, fishing, and hydrocarbons.

Negotiations for the realization of a second weekly flight had been paralyzed since July 2019. The only impediment for the British islands’ authorities was that it could not make a stopover in Argentina. The Foreign Minister Faurie himself declared in an interview with the newspaper Clarín: “We are analyzing having a longer air connection, which facilitates the link between the continent and the islands.”¹⁰² In November, the British government confirmed a monthly flight, which would depart from Sao Paulo with a stopover in Córdoba by the Latam company. For its part, the Argentine government declared that this flight was part of the 1999 Joint Declaration and that its objective was to contribute to a “gradual process of confidence-building.”¹⁰³

As a result of the Foradori-Duncan Agreement, in November 2019, the Scientific Subcommittee of the South Atlantic Fisheries Commission (CPAS) met in London. Argentine and British delegations discussed scientific cooperation for the conservation of fishery resources in the

Southwest Atlantic. However, as happened continuously during the Macri administration, Jorge Arguello stressed:

The fact is that in this “bilateral dialogue table,” only the initiatives of one of the parties, the British, are progressing, in need of economic responses for the islands that London can no longer sustain, as in the past, due to its own traumatic situation.¹⁰⁴

The Argentine domestic opposition against Macri’s conciliatory approach continued. In February of 2019, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) sentenced the United Kingdom to abandon Chagos’ archipelago in favor of the Republic of Mauritius. This decision was reinforced by the United Nations General Assembly, which echoed it and voted by 116 in favor, six against (the United Kingdom and the United States among others) and 56 abstentions, with a resolution demanding that London withdraw from the Indian Ocean archipelago.¹⁰⁵

The British government indicated opposition to an equivalent legal action in Falklands/Malvinas and Gibraltar’s cases by highlighting its excellent relationship with the potential applicant countries.¹⁰⁶ Even so, given the similarity with the Falklands/Malvinas case, the Argentine Foreign Ministry was asked if it would use the resource of requesting an advisory opinion from the ICJ. However, the owner of the Palacio San Martín ruled it out.¹⁰⁷

Moreover, the Argentine government gave another step in favor of its orientation of economic cooperation with the United Kingdom. The Secretary of Energy awarded oil exploitation areas in the islands area to thirteen companies (ExxonMobil, Qatar Petroleum, Tullow Oil, Pluspetrol, Wintershall, Equinor, YPF, ENI, Mitsui, Tecpetrol, Total Austral, and British Petroleum), including those linked to the *kelpers*. With this, the director of the think tank the Observatory of Energy, Technology, and Infrastructure for Development (OETEC), Federico Bernal, publicly complained that “Macri consolidates the British occupation of the South Atlantic.”¹⁰⁸ Days later, the OETEC also extended its complaint by indicating that of the seven areas awarded to Equinor, “two of them are located in the West Malvinas Basin.” Consequently, those concessions granted by the Argentine federal government received objections from local political authorities. The “Rio Grande municipality presented

a collective complain to stop the benefit of companies linked to the illegitimate British government in Malvinas,” and “the Fuegian government and Ushuaia municipality” did the same.¹⁰⁹

Therefore, the Macri administration’s excessive interest in “doing business, trade, and investment” with the United Kingdom subordinated the islands’ dispute and neglected its political implications. Consequently, the issue remained to cause significant domestic discomfort and damaging its foreign policy.

Fernández Administration: First Impressions

At the time of the revision of this chapter, a change of government took place in Argentina. The Mauricio’s conservative coalition was defeated by the left-wing Alberto Fernández, supported by a formation called “Frente de Todos.” Although it is too early for assessments, I want to rescue some measures implemented, and others projected that mark changes in comparison with the previous administration.

The first was the restoration of the rank as Secretariat to the department in charge of Malvinas in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It also should be stressed the appointment of Daniel Filmus to head it, who had held the same position during the administration of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who now is the Argentine Vice-President.

Moreover, during his first speech at the opening of Congress’s ordinary sessions in March 2020, Alberto Fernández announced the sending of three bills to Congress. The first is to create the National Council for Matters Relating to the Malvinas Islands, Georgia del Sur, South Sandwich, and Corresponding Maritime Spaces, which will be made up of political representatives, academics, and veterans. The second document relates to the demarcation of the Argentine continental shelf’s outer limit and aims to preserve national jurisdiction’s natural resources as established by the United Nations. Finally, the third bill, a Federal Fishing Regime, aimed for sanction illegal fishing in the area.

Therefore, it is reasonable to assume the departure from the paradigm of prioritizing business by sovereignty that had characterized the Macri administration. Another two important distinctions are that this new approach seeks to foster a social consensus for Argentine policies toward the islands while delimiting the Argentine sovereignty and securing control over managing the available natural resources.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The following aspects marked the answers that were sought toward the issue of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.

The Alfonsín administration's foreign policy shaped a multilateral and institutionalist response while seeking to reverse the post-war situation in international arenas. The Menem administrations addressed the issue in tune with the wishes of more powerful countries and the British on a bilateral basis. Thus, Menem cherished too much the British economic and political interests when making decisions, what the subsequent administrations sought to avoid. First, De la Rúa dropped the seduction strategy; then, the Kirchners administrations reviewed the bilateral relationship.

Despite the Argentine variations in foreign policy and strategies toward the Falklands/Malvinas, one cannot ignore the degree of instrumental continuity in Argentina's attempts to retrieve the relations with the United Kingdom to the pre-war's period. The combination of bilateral and multilateral marked it, broadly referred to as "State Policies," and implemented since adopting the United Nations General Assembly's Resolution n° 2065. It achieved one positive result with the Madrid Accords of 1989 and 1990.

Following its several domestic crises of 2001, Argentina developed a strategy that privileged two factors: the increasing collaboration among Southern American countries and the relevance of an international multilateral agenda. At that time, the Southern American block impacted the peripheral nations, and the international relations were more susceptible to upholding the international norms and law. However, although Argentina pragmatically used and benefited from those favorable conditions to bring Falklands/Malvinas to many international forums, they were insufficient.

We know that it is difficult to suggest recommendations since the only significant achievement would be the United Kingdom and Argentina to sit down and resolve the dispute. However, until now, the last British governments have not shown the slightest interest. Argentina's effort must be to achieve a change in British decision-makers' attitude, but with care. That happened in the past, for instance, when the Labor Party's members of British parliament supported negotiations, though based on the interests of the Islanders, in the 1986's Paris Declaration of the

XXI Congress of the Socialist International. Nonetheless, Blair's New Laborism adopted Thatcher's theses.

Conversely, the change in the British position could come from the need to reduce military spending on the islands. That would give them two options: negotiate with Argentina or find a form of making the Falklands/Malvinas Islands pay for that spending (which they seek to avoid). Moreover, Argentina needs to involve other relevant players on the international scene, as it did with Russia or China in the past. The European Union and the United States are also decisive in this. By its turn, the United Nations can still play a role by providing a negotiation framework that reduces asymmetries between Argentina and the United Kingdom. With such a varied and essential range of support, a solution, according to Argentine interests, would be possible.

One element that should be considered is the globalization's effect on the dispute. In general terms, the unification of the global economy made viable political entities that are far from being the nation-states of the past. For this reason, we find elements that could reinforce the possibility of independence of the islands. However, this situation is a marginal complication in the debate, and not a new one, as has been recently claimed. The issue remains the violation of Argentina's sovereignty by the United Kingdom in 1833.

In turn, Argentina must not neglect in taking measures that avoid the depredation of its claimed maritime resources and allow the sustainable development of this colonial enclave. Globalization can be either a calamity or an advantage, depending on what aspects Argentina highlights to get the most out of it. Therefore, in some economic issues of globalization, such as the discussions on agricultural subsidies in the World Trading Organization, Argentina and the United Kingdom have similar positions. Furthermore, both nations have developed joint practices in United Nations peacekeeping operations, which is hugely positive. Both topics can indirectly approach positions and generate a climate of trust necessary to address the main issue.

Another way to realize the matter is that it is not instrumental but rather temporal. The Britons have always speculated and proposed solutions in the medium and long term, which were rejected by the Argentine rulers because they have been pressured by quick answers *in the short term*. And that should be the essential change in Argentine mentality to deal with the Falklands/Malvinas issue in the future. The management of it as an emergency led it to almost half a century of dialogue since

the sanction of United National Resolution n° 2065 of 1965, a war, and more other thirty years of talks with no solution in sight. If we start to think it through and act in the medium and long terms, we will achieve not only a satisfactory solution but probably in a shorter time than it already took.

NOTES

1. Juan Carlos Puig, *Malvinas y el régimen internacional* (Buenos Aires: Depalma, 1983), 200–201.
2. Juan Carlos Puig and his disciple Bruno Bologna, as exponents of autonomism, or Mario Rapoport or Federico Bernal of the sociohistorical school, have written many texts in favor of the multilateralization of the negotiation process. In turn, Carlos Escudé, Andrés Cisneros, or Agustín Romero, representatives of the other two, pointed in the second option's direction.
3. As noted in the central thesis of Carina Miller, a country such as Argentina, in this issue, "can use international institutions to overcome this disadvantage (of negotiating with a more powerful country) and seek to achieve foreign policy objectives that cannot be achieved without the assistance of an international forum." Cf. Carina J. Miller, *Influencia sin Poder: el desafío argentino ante los foros internacionales* (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 2000), 29.
4. Juan Archibaldo Lanús, *De Chapultepec al Beagle: política exterior argentina, 1945–1980* (Buenos Aires: Hyspamérica, 1984), 181.
5. . It should be clarified that both the principle of territorial integrity and the principle of self-determination are in Resolution n° 1514 on the Decolonization of Colonial Territories of the United Nations General Assembly of 1960. The note placed on the first of them was that Argentina understands that the Falkland Islanders are not an original population, but rather one derived from the colonial situation that produced a territorial session. Granting them self-determination would mean consecrating it.
6. Carlos Escudé, *El realismo periférico: fundamento para la nueva política exterior argentina* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), 177.
7. At this point, Escudé overlooked that, until after the 1982 War, for 129 years, the Falkland/Malvinas Islanders were administered by a governor elected by London. Only after this event did the Islanders gain individual citizenship status—a process completed only in 2002.
8. Juan Archibaldo Lanús, *De Chapultepec al Beagle: política exterior argentina, 1945–1980* (Buenos Aires: Hyspamérica, 1984), 197.

9. This delay allowed the recently created island lobby to operate in the British parliament.
10. Rodolfo Terragno, *Historia y futuro de las Malvinas* (Buenos Aires: Librería Histórica, 2006), 164.
11. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, *Confidencias diplomáticas* (Buenos Aires: Aguilar, 2011), 259–265.
12. Guillermo Figari, *Pasado, presente y futuro de la política exterior argentina* (Buenos Aires: Byblos, 1993), 205–206.
13. Carlos Escudé, *La Argentina: ¿paria internacional?* (Buenos Aires: Belgrano, 1984), 9–11.
14. The latter refers to the resolution approved in November 1982, where both parties are called “to resume negotiations to find a peaceful solution to the dispute over sovereignty as soon as possible.” Cf. United Nations General Assembly, *Resolution 37/9, Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)*. <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/432/49/IMG/NR043249.pdf>.
15. The problem that the British had to face consisted of the expenses for the defense of the Islands. These were reflected in the construction of a military fortress (whose cost amounted to several billions of dollars), its implementation since 1985, and the maintenance of armed forces to repel any aggression (in which, until very recent times, the military allocation widely exceeded the civilian population they defended). According to the work *Malvinas: descolonización, paz y soberanía*, the expenses of the base amount to roughly 150 million dollars annually. Cf. Rina Bertaccini (Coord.), *Malvinas: descolonización, paz y soberanía* (Buenos Aires: Confederación de Trabajadores de la Educación de la República Argentina, 2012), 44. See also Osvaldo Álvarez Guerrero, *Las razones de la libertad* (Buenos Aires: Lugar, 1990), 183.
16. Raúl Alfonsín, ‘Defender la posición tradicional argentina’, *Claexpresedril* 5, 2007, 31.
17. While there was no direct dialogue with Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government, the so-called Paris Declaration of 1986 was approved by the Labour Party. They agreed to deal with the issue when they were in government. It was aimed at “guaranteeing the way of life of the Islanders,” the term “interests” was used, and on the subject of sovereignty, a note was made “to discuss all aspects of the future of the islands...” Cf. Guillermo Makin, ‘Los Partidos Políticos Británicos y sus Posturas sobre las Islas Malvinas’, *América Latina Internacional* 3, no. 8 (1986): 26.
18. Here, it was evident that the lack of agreement with the United Kingdom regarding the Falklands/Malvinas complicated other areas of its foreign policy, such as the famous “European charter,” which sought

the rapprochement with the social democratic governments of the time with which it had an affinity.

19. Dante Caputo, 'Disertación del Canciller', en *Jornada Académica*: 30 meses de Política Exterior Argentina, Buenos Aires, 1986.
20. Dante Caputo, 'Entrevista efectuada por América Latina/Internacional al ex Canciller...', *América Latina Internacional* 6, no. 21 (1989): 264.
21. Carlos Escudé, *El realismo periférico: fundamento para la nueva política exterior argentina* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992), 36–39.
22. Roberto Russell, 'La Argentina del segundo centenario: ficciones y realidades de la política exterior', in *Argentina 1910–2010: balance del siglo* (Buenos Aires: Taurus, 2010), 272.
23. Mario Rapoport, 'El viaje a la Unión Soviética y el conflicto de Malvinas', *América Latina Internacional* 4, no. 11 (1987): 91.
24. Carlos Soukassian, 'El proceso de toma de decisiones y política exterior de Argentina', *Relaciones Internacionales* 4, no. 6 (1994): 115.
25. In the first of them, of October 1989, the formula of the umbrella was established, in addition to indicating the will to normalize diplomatic ties; the cessation of hostilities was announced, as well as the formation of the fishing preservation area, and the continuity of the negotiations. In February of the following year, the second one was signed, in which diplomatic and consular relations were restored, and the exclusion zone was replaced by an information and consultation system for the movement of naval and air units. Cf. Domingo Cavallo, 'La inserción de la Argentina en el Primer Mundo', in *La política exterior de Argentina y sus protagonistas: 1880–1995*, Silvia Ruth Jalabe (Comp.) (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1996), 362.
26. Federico Bernal, *Malvinas y Petróleo: una historia de piratas* (Buenos Aires: Capital Intelectual, 2011), 82–83.
27. Carlos Raimundi, 'Malvinas: un conflicto sin estrategias', *Relaciones Internacionales* 3, no. 5 (1993): 43.
28. Carlos Escudé, 'La relatividad de los derechos argentinos en Malvinas', *Relaciones Internacionales* 5, no. 9 (1995): 40–41.
29. Federico Bernal, *Malvinas y Petróleo: una historia de piratas* (Buenos Aires: Capital Intelectual, 2011), 67.
30. It should be noted that it was a statement, not a treaty, which denotes the evasion of a parliamentary procedure due to the ambiguity of its contents.
31. Clarín, September 29, 1995, 19.
32. Carlos Escudé, 'Enorme logro diplomático', *Clarín*, September 22, 1995, 17.
33. Dante Caputo, 'Malvinas: el realismo resignado', *Relaciones Internacionales* 5, no. 9 (1995): 26.

34. Daniel Santoro, 'La posición de Di Tella en la disputa por el petróleo en Malvinas', *Relaciones Internacionales* 4, no. 7 (1994): 44.
35. The influence of some aspects of the Escudé's theory in the seduction strategy was evident. Cf. Alejandro Simonoff, *Teorías en movimiento: los orígenes disciplinares de la política exterior y sus interpretaciones históricas* (Rosario: Prohistoria Ediciones, 2012). See also: Daniel Santoro, 'La posición de Di Tella en la disputa por el petróleo en Malvinas', *Relaciones Internacionales* 4, no. 7 (1994): 41.
36. Carlos Soukassian, 'El proceso de toma de decisiones y política exterior de Argentina', *Relaciones Internacionales* 4, no. 6 (1994): 115.
37. Carlos Becerra, 'El gobierno delega la soberanía en Malvinas', *Clarín*, January 6, 1996, 16.
38. Oscar Camilión, 'Malvinas: soberanía sin paraguas', *La Nación*, January 16, 1997, 17.
39. Despite the declarations given in the 1980s, in July 1997, Foreign Minister Di Tella met with the new British correspondent, Robin Cook, from the Labour Party. In that meeting, he concluded that, regarding the Falklands/Malvinas issue, "there will be no substantial change without the approval of the Islanders." Cf. Graciela Iglesias, 'Di Tella se reunió por primera vez con el Canciller Laborista,' *La Nación*, July 29, 1997, 7.
40. This was despite the expectations put by Foreign Minister Di Tella, in which, following the trip to London in 1999 to sign the agreement, state policy was being inaugurated. Cf. Alejandro Simonoff, 'Las estrategias argentinas hacia Malvinas (1945–2012): negociaciones y guerra', en *Universidad y soberanía: estudios sobre la guerra y la posguerra de Malvinas y Atlántico Sur*, Carlos Giordano (Org.) (La Plata: EDULP, 2015), 325.
41. Alliance, Electoral Platform of the Alliance Coalition (Buenos Aires, 1999), 19–23.
42. The Constitutional Reform of 1994 incorporated a transitional provision that considers Argentina's sovereignty over the Falkland, South Georgia, and the South Sandwich Islands and the maritime and island areas as "legitimate and imprescriptible." However, it also states that this territory's recovery is a permanent and irrevocable goal of the Argentine people. See Fernando de la Rúa, 'Discurso de Inaugural del Señor Presidente ante del Congreso de la Nación', *Clarín*, December 11, 1999, 6.
43. Adalberto Rodríguez Giavarini, 'La política exterior argentina', *Archivos del Presente* 5, no. 20 (2000): 17.
44. The abandonment of the seduction strategy generated concern among the Islanders. In his Christmas message of 1999, Prime Minister Blair

- praised the continuity of the Menem administration's agreements early that year.
45. These statements generated a response from Foreign Minister Rodríguez Giavarini: "The stage of the jokes in English, gifts, and puns with the Islanders came to an end. It is over [...]. Claiming sovereignty does not mean any hostility" (*Clarín*, July 15, 2000, 7).
 46. Carlos Escudé, 'Argentina no es China', *Clarín*, July 12, 2000, 6.
 47. Roberto Miranda, *Política exterior argentina: idas y venidas entre 1999 y 2003* (Rosario: Ediciones PIA, 2003), 66.
 48. *Daily Telegraph*, July 29, 2001.
 49. The government sought to establish negotiation parameters similar to those of China in Hong Kong. In that formula, the British committed themselves in 1984 to the delivery of the territory to the People's Republic of China, based on an agreement that acknowledges the particularities of that city and its inhabitants for fifty years after the transfer, produced in 1997, when the territory was restored.
 50. Adalberto Rodríguez Giavarini, 'En el tema Malvinas, el consenso fortalece la posición argentina', *Clarín*, June 26, 2003, 31.
 51. Ibid.
 52. Carlos Soukassian, 'El caso Malvinas y la Corte Internacional de Justicia', *Relaciones Internacionales* 9, no. 18 (2000): 98.
 53. In the case of Gibraltar, in which, in 1967, Spain managed got the United Nations General Assembly to reach the understanding that this population is not susceptible to the concept of self-determination, the Spanish government, since 1982, has decided to ensure the economic promotion of the discussion on the sovereignty and the integration of the inhabitants of the Rock to the discussions. The culminating point was sanctioning a Gibraltar constitution that stressed the inhabitants' self-determination and dismissed Spain's pretensions.
 54. Néstor Kirchner and Torcuato Di Tella, *Después del Derrumbe: teoría y práctica política en la Argentina que viene* (Buenos Aires: Galerna, 2003), 210.
 55. Néstor Kirchner, 'Discurso de Asunción de Kirchner en el Congreso (5/25/2003)'. Available at www.presidencia.gov.ar. Retrieved: January 15, 2019.
 56. Jorge Taiana, 'El diálogo como único camino posible', *Clarín*, April 1, 2007, 35.
 57. The government approved a series of measures to limit the effects of this divergence in interpretation by enacting regulations that prohibit fishing vessels and companies engaged in exploitation in the Argentine Sea from those who hold Falkland Islands licenses.

58. Alfredo Bruno Bologna, 'La cuestión Malvinas: una lectura desde lo económico', in *La política exterior del gobierno de Kirchner* (Rosario: CERIR-Editorial UNR, 2006), 263.
59. Néstor Kirchner, 'Discurso del Presidente Néstor Kirchner ante la 62^o Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas (9/25/2007)'. Available at www.presidencia.gov.ar. Retrieved: January 1, 2019.
60. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, 'Discurso de la Presidenta de la Nación, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, en el Acto de Asunción del mando en el Congreso de la Nación ante la Asamblea Legislativa (12/10/2007)'. Available at www.presidencia.gov.ar. Retrieved: January 15, 2019.
61. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, 'Palabras de la Presidenta de la Nación Cristina Fernández, en la 64^a Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, en Nueva York, Estados Unidos'. Available at http://www.caserosada.gov.ar/index.php?option=com_content&task=salaPrensa&categorias=7&Itemid=66. Retrieved: January 11, 2019.
62. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto, *Información para la prensa* N° 109/08, April 15, 2008.
63. Clarín, November 7, 2008, 12.
64. Santiago O'Donnell, 'El misterio del petróleo en Malvinas,' *Página/12*, April 10, 2011, 18.
65. Clarín, January 19, 2011.
66. Tiempo Argentino, October 18, 2012.
67. Tiempo Argentino, January 21, 2011, 2.
68. Tiempo Argentino, December 21, 2011.7.
69. In the newspaper Tiempo Argentino, 'Uruguay, Brazil, and Chile's Support Were Noted in Light of British Pressures Regarding Argentina' (January 11, 2012, 2).
70. Clarín, January 20, 2011.
71. Clarín, February 8, 2012, 3.
72. Tiempo Argentino, February 26, 2012, 12.
73. Tiempo Argentino, January 19, 2013, 8.
74. A good example was the CELAC declaration. Argentina's claim over the islands was ratified. The dialogue between the parties was urged, and a warning was issued on the increasing militarization and access to Antarctica—aspects claimed by Argentina. Tiempo Argentino, January 29, 2013, 6.
75. Tiempo Argentino, February 1, 2013, 2–3.
76. This referendum gave rise to a new impulse of intellectuals and bureaucrats who raise the need to recognize a third stakeholder in the dispute, as suggested in the seduction policy addressing the Islanders in the nineties. In this regard, Cf. Jorge Castro, 'Malvinas: hay un tercer actor ineludible en el conflicto', *Clarín*, October 12, 2013, 27; Andrés Cisneros, 'Los ingleses trabajan y acá hacemos discursos', *Clarín*, March

- 10, 2013, 9; Federico Lorenz, 'Malvinas nos sigue dando lecciones: cuesta entender (nos)', *Clarín*, February 20, 2013, 29; Vicente Palermo, 'Los Kelpers y el ombliguismo argentino', *Clarín*, March 29, 2013, 21; Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, 'Malvinas: el referéndum nos obliga a repensar políticas', *Clarín*, March 27, 2013, 29.
77. *Clarín*, February 4, 2013, 13.
78. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, 'Apertura el 132º período de sesiones ordinarias del Congreso Nacional: palabras de la Presidenta de la Nación'. Available at <http://www.presidencia.gov.ar/discursos/27266-apertura-el-132o-periodo-de-sesiones-ordinarias-del-congreso-nacional-palabras-de-la-presidenta-de-la-nacion>. Retrieved: January 13, 2019.
79. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, 'Discurso de la presidenta Cristina Fernández en la inauguración del 133º período de Sesiones Ordinarias del Congreso Nacional'. Available at <http://www.presidencia.gov.ar/discursos/28507-discurso-de-la-presidenta-cristina-fernandez-en-la-inauguracion-del-133d-periodo-de-sesiones-ordinarias-del-congreso-nacional-or>. Retrieved: January 5, 2019.
80. *Clarín*, May 13, 2016, 22.
81. Marcos Novaro noted that the claim complicates the government's international strategy. Cf. Marcos Novaro, 'Malvinas complica el regreso al mundo.' Available at http://tn.com.ar/opinion/malvinascomplicaelregresoalmundo_740418. Retrieved: January 15, 2019.
82. Honorable Cámara de Senadores de la Nación, *Reunión de la Comisión de Relaciones exteriores y Culto* (Buenos Aires: Dirección General de Taquígrafos, May 4, 2016), 14.
83. Susana Mabel Malcorra, 'Argentinian Foreign Policy under Mauricio Macri', Council on Foreign Relations, February 9, 2016. <http://www.cfr.org/argentina/argentinian-foreign-policy-under-mauricio-macri/p37519>.
84. Puig, Juan Carlos. 'Malvinas y el...', 200.
85. *Ibid.*
86. Martín Dinatale, 'Malvinas: el plan de acercamiento que fijó Macri', *La Nación*, May 18, 2016. <https://www.lanacion.com.ar/opinion/malvinas-el-plan-de-acercamiento-que-se-fijo-macri-nid1899839>.
87. In both the Alliance administration and the second term of Cristina Fernández, the Falklands/Malvinas was headed by a secretariat.
88. Honorable Cámara de Senadores de la Nación, *Reunión de la Comisión de Relaciones exteriores y Culto* (Buenos Aires: Dirección General de Taquígrafos, May 4, 2016).
89. Tarruela y Rivas Molina. "May propone un acercamiento al Gobierno argentino por Malvinas."
90. *Clarín*. 14 septiembre 2016. "El comunicado conjunto entre Argentina y Reino Unido completo."

91. Taiana, 'Muchos beneficios para el Reino Unido', 12.
92. Para ello la canciller Malcorra utilizó la expresión "remoción de obstáculos" para graficar el accionar del gobierno, cuestión que mereció una fuerte crítica, como se observó en su comparecencia ante la Cámara de Senadores en octubre de 2016. (HSN, 2016)
93. Clarín, 'La ONU aprobó la ampliación de la plataforma continental argentina', 16.
94. García Moritán, 'Una Nueva oportunidad para Malvinas.'
95. García Moritán, 'El Brexit, Gibraltar y una solución que dejó fuera a las Malvinas', 12.
96. García Moritán, 'El Brexit, Gibraltar y un giro diplomático con final incierto', 20.
97. García Moritán, 'El Brexit, las 14 colonias británicas y Malvinas', 23.
98. Clarín, 'Temor en Malvinas por el cambio de Premier y el divorcio de la Unión Europea', 5.
99. Faurie, 'Los isleños pueden venir a atenderse y hacer negocios', 12.
100. Jorquera, 'Canciller en problemas', 2.
101. Biangardi Delgado, 'Se debe actuar con suma prudencia con las medidas que se tomen en el futuro con respecto al Cementerio Argentino de Darwin.'
102. Faurie, 'Los isleños pueden venir a atenderse y hacer negocios', 12.
103. Niebiskikwait, 'Confirmado por los kelpers: se podrá viajar a Malvinas desde Córdoba', 17.
104. Arguello, 'Malvinas una gran oportunidad', 40.
105. Página/12, 'Derrota británica en un caso similar a Malvinas', 16. <https://www.pagina12.com.ar/195635-derrota-britanica-en-un-caso-similar-al-de-malvinas>.
106. Niebiesklkwiat, 'Antecedente por Malvinas: la ONU ordenó al Reino Unido que se retire de un archipiélago', 19.
107. Niebiesklkwiat, 'Argentina desiste de ir a la Corte de La Haya a enjuiciar al Reino Unido', 11.
108. Página/12, 'Con permiso para perforar la soberanía', 16-17. <https://www.pagina12.com.ar/194615-con-permiso-para-perforar-la-soberania>.
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